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Abstract: 
Ghana has managed to become one of the fastest growing economies in the world with a 
vibrant agricultural market. The country could be a prime example of successful, pro-poor 
development following economic liberalisation. Though first change is visible even in 
traditionally impoverished areas of the north, namely the Upper East Region, hunger and 
chronic poverty are still prevalent. Yet, after decades of restricted public expenditure, ‘pro-
poor’ agricultural policies could now be put in place, to actively improve smallholder lives in 
the area by various forms of government support. Similarly, foreign development agencies 
have recently become more engaged in supporting the local agricultural sector. All actors of 
current relevance have thereby pursued a value chain approach to developing the markets and 
livelihoods of northern Ghanaian agriculturalists. The contribution to pro-poor, ‘sustainable’ 
development, however, remains unclear as at now. This study is therefore concerned with how 
market dynamics and interventions have influenced ‘sustainable development’ of the 
vulnerable and poor in an emerging economy like Ghana. To do so, the study takes a look at 
smallholder livelihood systems in the Upper East Region of the country. Here, local peasant 
society is confronted with environmental changes, economic globalisation processes and 
interventions in agricultural value chains by the local Ministry of Food and Agriculture and 
foreign donors like USAID.  
To grasp the impact of market dynamics and interventions within this multidimensional 
context, this study argues for a combination of a holistic livelihood and a more specific value 
chain and production network approach as a useful conceptual background. Given this 
theoretic backdrop, data was collected for over 10 months in two villages of the Upper East, 
namely in Biu and Mirigu, with a focus on tomato, chili and rice, products of major 
significance to locals. The main methods applied in the field included qualitative as much as 
quantitative approaches. Farmer focus group discussions (n=37), in-depth farmer interviews 
and farm budgets (n=47) were the primary source of data gathered. Expert/key-informant 
interviews (n=70) and expert group discussions (n=2) were held. A household head survey 
(n=177) and an expert survey (n=25) were used to check hypotheses previously generated by 
qualitative methods. Primary and secondary data for tomato, chili, rice and partly also shea 
value chains was collected. Secondary data, such as confidential government and NGO 
documents, allow an insider view into farmers’ access to subsidies and support. An archive 
survey of church diaries dating back to 1905, enable a view on local developments in a long-
term, historic perspective. 
This study thereby yields a number of insights with concern for conceptual approaches 
to the issue of understanding the pro-poor impact of markets, their dynamics and interventions 
within these. Livelihood analysis proved to be an indispensable approach to understanding 
  
important aspects of people-centred, human development potentials and constraints in a local 
environmental and institutional context. Value chain and production network analysis provided 
further fruitful insights on market dynamics, their structural outlines, their basic rationales and 
market terms for the successful participation of locals. It can therefore be concluded that both 
of these basic notions, either people- or market-centred approaches, should be conceptually 
merged to advance future research on the pro-poor effect of markets and interventions within 
them, to specifically address questions of what is here understood as ‘livelihood upgrading’. 
This study further contributes to an understanding of central aspects of local 
development and possible future avenues to achieving greater livelihood sustainability through 
government or donor development interventions. Most significantly, it became clear that 
‘positive’, pro-poor market dynamics are also encountered at a local level, but cannot be made 
use of by spatially and socially marginalised, vulnerable and poor smallholders. That is mainly 
due to elite capture and corrupt practices, ultimately a question of mal-governance, a lack of 
grass-roots participation and a disregard for societal dimensions within which interventions are 
interwoven. Furthermore, neither environmental degradation nor present or future 
environmental changes, especially climatic ones and those with regard to soils, are accounted 
for. Interventions thereby remain far below their possible impact and even contribute to a loss 
of the natural resource base, aside the fact that they further increase an already high level 
socio-economic inequality. In the face of recent economic awakening, despite globalisation 
tendencies, future efforts in enabling sustainable development at local level must thus 
increasingly embrace environmental and, mostly, societal concerns in their concepts and daily 
practice.  
  
Kurzzusammenfassung: 
Ghana hat es geschafft eine der weltweit schnellst wachsenden Volkswirtschaften mit 
einem besonders dynamischen landwirtschaftlichen Sektor zu werden. Das Land könnte ein 
Paradebeispiel für erfolgreiche, armutsorientierte Entwicklung im Zuge ökonomischer 
Liberalisierung sein. Obwohl ein Wandel auch in den traditionell verarmten Gebieten des 
Nordens, namentlich in der Upper East Region, sichtbar ist, ist hier Hunger und chronische 
Armut immer noch verbreitet. Allerdings konnten nun nach mehreren Dekaden beschränkter 
finanzieller Möglichkeiten auf Seiten des Staates neue, armutsorientierte, landwirtschaftliche 
Politiken eingeführt werden, die aktiv kleinbäuerliche Leben verbessern könnten, durch 
verschiedenste Formen staatlicher Unterstützung. Ebenso verstärkt sich in letzter Zeit das 
Engagement ausländischer Entwicklungshilfeinitiativen im lokalen, landwirtschaftlichen 
Sektor. Mit dem Ziel der Entwicklung landwirtschaftlicher Märkte und, hierdurch, einer 
Verbesserung kleinbäuerlicher Leben, haben alle Akteure von momentaner Relevanz dabei 
einen Wertschöpfungskettenansatz verfolgt. Der Beitrag dieser Initiativen zu einer 
nachhaltigen Armutsbekämpfung ist jedoch bis dato unbekannt. Diese Studie beschäftigt sich 
daher mit der Frage, wie Marktdynamiken und Eingriffe in diese „Nachhaltige Entwicklung“ 
der Vulnerablen und Armen beeinflussen in einem Schwellenland wie Ghana. Um dies zu tun, 
schaut diese Studie auf kleinbäuerliche Lebenshaltungssysteme in der Upper East Region des 
Landes. In der Region treffen Umweltwandel, ökonomische Globalisierungsprozesse und 
Eingriffe in landwirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungsketten, letztere durch das Ghanaischen 
Ministeriums für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft und ausländische 
Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen wie USAID, auf eine kleinbäuerliche Gesellschaft. 
Um die Auswirkungen von Marktdynamiken und -eingriffen innerhalb dieses 
multidimensionalen Kontextes verstehen zu können, fordert und nutzt diese Studie einen 
holistischen Livelihood-/Lebenshaltungsansatz in Kombination mit einem konkreteren 
Wertschöpfungsketten- und Produktionsnetzwerkansatz als konzeptionellen Hintergrund. Auf 
Basis dieses theoretischen Herangehens, wurden über 10 Monate hinweg diverse Daten in zwei 
Dörfern der Upper East Region gesammelt, in Biu und Mirigu, mit Fokus auf Tomaten, Chili 
und Reis, ihrerseits Produkte von besonderer Bedeutung für örtliche Produzenten. Bei der 
Feldforschung wurden im Wesentlichen qualitative wie auch quantitative Methoden genutzt. 
Bäuerliche Fokusgruppendiskussionen (n=37) und vertiefte Einzelinterviews mitsamt 
Farmbudgets (n=47) waren die primäre Datenquelle. Experteninterviews (n=70) und 
Gruppendiskussionen mit Experten (n=2) wurden abgehalten. Umfragen unter 
Haushaltsvorständen (n=177) und unter örtlichen Experten (n=25) wurden genutzt, um zuvor 
durch qualitative Methoden generierte Hypothesen zu überprüfen. Primär- und Sekundärdaten 
über die Wertschöpfungsketten von Tomaten, Chili, Reis und teils auch Kariténüsse/-butter 
  
wurden gesammelt. Sekundärdaten wie vertrauliche, interne Dokumente diverser 
Organisationen, erlauben andernfalls verborgene Einsichten in den kleinbäuerlichen Zugang zu 
Subventionen und Unterstützung. Untersuchungen von Aufzeichnungen der örtlichen Kirche, 
die bis in das Jahr 1905 zurückgehen, ermöglichen einen Blick auf lokale Entwicklung in einer 
längerfristigen, historischen Perspektive.  
Diese Studie erbrachte hierdurch eine Anzahl von Einsichten mit Relevanz für 
konzeptionelle Ansätze im Bereich der Armutswirkung von Märkten, deren Dynamiken und 
Eingriffe in diese. Die Lebenshaltungssystemanalyse zeigte sich hierbei als unverzichtbar um 
wichtige Aspekte menschenorientierter, humaner Entwicklungspotentiale und -hemmnisse 
innerhalb des örtlichen Umwelt- und Institutionenkontextes zu verstehen. 
Wertschöpfungsketten- und Produktionsnetzwerkanalysen erlaubten weitergehende Einsichten 
in Marktdynamiken, deren strukturelle Gegebenheiten, deren Grundprinzipien und 
Konditionen für eine erfolgreiche Teilnahme der örtlichen Bevölkerung. Man kann daher 
folgern, dass beide dieser grundlegenden Ansätze konzeptionell miteinander verbunden 
werden sollten, um zukünftige Forschung zur Armutsminderung durch Märkte und 
Interventionen in diesen voranzubringen, um das zu adressieren was im Folgenden als 
Aufwertung („upgrading“) von Lebenshaltungssystemen verstanden wird. 
Diese Studie leistet weiterhin einen Beitrag zu dem Verständnis zentraler Aspekte 
lokaler Entwicklung und zukünftigen Möglichkeiten um eine höhere Nachhaltigkeit von 
Lebenshaltungssystemen zu erreichen, durch Eingriffe seitens des Staates oder durch 
Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen. Vornehmlich wurde klar, dass „positive“, armutsmindernde 
Marktdynamiken auch auf lokaler Ebene wahrgenommen werden, jedoch durch räumlich und 
sozial marginalisierte, arme und verletzliche Kleinbauern nicht genutzt werden können. Dies 
liegt primär an der Abschöpfung von Unterstützungsmaßnahmen durch lokale Eliten und an 
der allgemein vorherrschenden Korruption, letztlich eine Frage von schlechter 
Regierungsführung und Basisbeteiligung innerhalb der verschiedenen Entwicklungsprojekte, 
die jedoch soziale Dimensionen innerhalb derer sie sich bewegen vernachlässigen. Weiterhin 
adressieren diese Projekte weder Umweltdegradation noch heutigen oder zukünftigen 
Umweltwandel, insbesondere Klimawandel und Bodendegradation. Somit bleiben die 
genannten Interventionen weit unterhalb ihres möglichen Potentials, fördern sogar einen 
Verlust natürlicher Ressourcen und steigern weiterhin eine bereits stark ausgeprägte, 
sozioökonomische Ungleichheit. Im Angesicht des jüngsten, wirtschaftlichen Aufbruchs in 
(Nord) Ghana, trotz aller Globalisierungstendenzen, müssen zukünftige Anstrengungen die 
nachhaltige Entwicklung fördern wollen, ökologische und insbesondere soziale Dimensionen 
in Konzepten und Praxis berücksichtigen. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
This study is concerned with the sustainable development of smallholders’ livelihoods in 
northern Ghana under climatic change and market influences, whereby the latter are altered by 
government and foreign aid interventions in agricultural value chains. Research was conducted in 
Ghana’s north, in the Upper East Region, traditionally characterised as having the highest levels 
of poverty in the country (AL-HASSAN 2013: 226). In this regard interventions in the 
agricultural sector are of special importance, since farming directly employs almost the entire 
population (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 285). Public agricultural development 
policies and programmes have attempted, with minor successes, to address the issue of poverty in 
Ghana’s north since the country’s independence. However, some of these policies have intensified 
nationwide disparities, to the disadvantage of the north (SONGSORE 2011; YARO 2013). In 
addition, smallholders in the region are nowadays confronted with severe climatic and 
environmental change as well as the effects of globalisation processes, a form of ‘double 
exposure’, and as such are said to be having severe difficulties in coping with these circumstances 
(LAUBE et al. 2011: 753). Yet, in recent years, public as well as externally funded approaches 
have placed a focus on the north through interventions aiming at smallholder market integration 
by the targeted support of crucial leverage points in selected agricultural value chains 
(GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010; OUMA et al. 2012: 227-228; PWC GHANA 2013: 5, 27; 
YARO 2013: 12). Among the value chains of special significance to northern Ghana are those of 
chili, tomato, and rice, parts of which are supported by public and donor endeavours. Since the 
effects of these public and donor value chain involvements on poverty are still mostly unknown, 
they need to be tested according to their local, pro-poor impact. Focussing on agricultural markets 
of chili, tomato and rice – products that are mostly grown in northern Ghana – and interventions 
within their value chain, this thesis thereby explores the potential for economically, 
environmentally and socially suitable, thus ‘sustainable’ development of male and female 
smallholders’ livelihoods. 
The theoretical framework of this study brings together human, market and environmentally 
orientated development approaches to conceptualise and test this policy-market-poverty nexus 
accordingly, to thereby enable a closer look into the implications, constraints and opportunities for 
sustainable smallholder development. It accomplishes this goal by applying the sustainable 
livelihoods approach, which covers aspects of agency in a given social and physical context. The 
approach is enriched with value chain analysis and elements of global production network 
analysis to emphasise the outcomes of market integration and intervention. Chapter 2 provides an 
introduction to the wider vulnerability context of the region by giving an overview of historical 
and contemporary policy and foreign aid interventions. Chapter 3 distils and presents the 
theoretical background and resultant research questions, the responses to which were obtained 
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using a methodology, which included diverse methods, outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 narrows 
down the analytical view of the study to the livelihood system level. Using the data gathered over 
a 10-month stay (2012/13) in two villages – Biu and Mirigu – of the Upper East, the chapter 
centres upon the use people make of their changing natural and social environment. A major 
component of the peoples’ livelihood outcomes relates to value chain integration of tomato, chili, 
and rice production, which are altered by government and development aid interventions. These, 
the resulting chains’ structures, their avenues for access, their possibilities for upgrading and their 
contributions to livelihood sustainability are then examined in Chapter 6. Final conclusions are 
then drawn in Chapter 7. 
Background: Development Policies and Northern Ghanaian Poverty 
 
3 
2. Background: Development Policies and Northern Ghanaian Poverty 
Ghana’s economic and political history is generally subdivided into four phases: the pre- 
and post-independence period, the period of economic and structural adjustment and, the present-
era, post-adjustment. This chapter summarises insights derived from this history, to derive crucial 
leverage points that can be observed in future attempts to bring pro-poor development to the 
Upper East Region, where poverty in Ghana has always been most severe. 
2.1. Pre-Independence 
In pre-colonial days the utilization of land and the seasonal cultivation of crops in northern 
Ghana and its Upper East Region were mostly governed by religious beliefs, embodied by so 
called ‘Earth Priests’ (the ‘Tengnyam’, a.k.a. landlords). These administered land decentrally and 
were political leaders of local settlements at the same time (TONAH 2008: 116). Peasant 
communities in northern Ghana were mostly characterised by a subsistence economy, the 
exploitation of the immediate natural environment. Yet, that is not to say that peasants had not 
become parts of larger, commercial trade systems. Since the fourth century, dense trade networks 
had been woven between Saharan, northern Ghanaian and more southern market towns. Trade 
across the desert and into today’s Ghana was organised through multiple ‘Saharan ports’. Until 
the middle of the 18th century it was mostly gold, ivory, cotton, ostrich feathers and slaves which 
were exported by camel, caravan trade. Furthermore multiple internal trade channels connected 
regions within Ghana, carrying mainly local products such as foodstuffs and local crafts, but also 
few European goods (GRÉGOIRE 1997: 91). Major trade routes – connecting what is nowadays 
southern Ghana to Burkina Faso – went through today’s Upper East Region. As a result, the 
northern regions of Ghana had progressed prior to colonialisation, due to the middleman role they 
played. Their strategically favourable location had initiated the formation of a small (upper) class 
of merchants, aside the aforementioned Earth Priests (SONGSORE 2011: 153). 
Colonial rule under the British – following the annexation of northern Ghana by 1901 – 
then consciously induced socio-economic north-south disparities in Ghana, to the disadvantage of 
northern parts of the country, to attract labourers to the south of the country (AHWOI 2010: 4; 
LAUBE 2007: 60; SONGSORE 2011: 81-85, 153; YARO 2013: 6). Most economically useful 
infrastructure, commercial crop production, mining activities and general economic value of the 
land, became heavily concentrated within the southern parts of Ghana (SCHULTZE 1955: 
Beilagen 3-7). The ‘golden triangle’ between Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi prospered 
(GRÉGOIRE 1997: 92), while the north of Ghana was increasingly characterised by a mass of 
semi-proletarianized peasantry (SONGSORE 2011: 88-90), now partly under indirect rule of 
chiefs which had been enthroned by the British (AMANOR 2008: 63). On top of the severe 
conflicts that caused with the former leaders – the landlords – little to no positive socio-economic 
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development took place in northern Ghana under colonial government (YARO 2013: 7). But, with 
independence in 1957 under Kwame Nkrumah, the first indigenous president of Ghana, 
underdevelopment of the north gained more political attention. 
2.2. Post-Independence (1957 to 1983) 
 Opposed to previous colonial policies and as a sign of independence, Ghana embarked on 
economic protectionism. Massive state participation in the economy and especially in agriculture, 
far beyond the Marshallian-type of intervention as found in Europe following World War Two, 
was seen as a historical necessity. In order to industrialise the country, to diversify the primary 
production portfolio of the economy and to create economic opportunities, import substitution 
policies were implemented in the early 1960s. Tariff and non-tariff measures were further used as 
trade barriers to limit imports. The importation of final goods was heavily restricted to protect 
domestic, especially government industries. Exchange control, tariffs and quantitative controls 
were introduced to encourage domestic manufacturing. Domestic infant industries were to grow, 
at the cost of restricting movement of goods, people, information and by keeping multinational 
enterprises out of the country (LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 10-12; SONGSORE 2011: 102). 
Thus, the era from independence to the mid-1960s saw the emergence of the state as the engine of 
general economic growth (AHWOI 2010: 5-6), partly also in northern Ghana.  
Economic programmes prior to independence had largely neglected/underdeveloped the 
north of the country. Nkrumah, however, wanted to turn Ghana’s north into the bread basket of 
the country, essentially, by establishing agro-industries to be fed by large-scale irrigation projects 
(LAUBE 2007: 64). He envisioned an industrialisation of the northern countryside that was to 
initiate rural development with the help of out-grower, contract farming schemes. Improvements 
in food security and well-being were then to come from increased farmer incomes through better 
market access (AMANOR & PABI 2007: 56). State-owned industries were to be created 
throughout Ghana and especially in its north to source raw materials from large state farms and 
peasants (AHWOI 2010: 5-6). Another elementary aspect of the newly formulated policies was 
the promotion by the government of cash crops in northern Ghana. Seen as a way to diversify the 
economy, agricultural inputs, among them ploughs and tractors, seeds and fertilisers, were heavily 
subsidised (AMANOR & PABI 2007: 56; see also FAO 2005; LAUBE 2007: 64). The 
government constructed 104 small dams in the Upper East (LAUBE et al. 2008: 9) and dry-season 
cash crop gardening, such as tomato and chili, were actively encouraged (ADU 1969: 17-18). 
Furthermore, crops like rice and tomato from the newly envisioned ‘Vea’ irrigation scheme were 
to feed future agro-processing facilities in the Upper East Region (FAO 1970: iii, 1; LAUBE 
2007: 92). As a result of government intervention, tomatoes became the main type of cash-crops. 
Further government initiatives included the construction of a rice mill in the regional capital 
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Bolgatanga. At the time, a rapid shift in consumer preferences to rice had taken place, owing to 
increased incomes in the urban centres of the south, government pricing policies, as well as the 
grain’s good storability and ease of cooking. From 1957, rice production was greatly expanded in 
the north of Ghana. At least until the end of the 1990s, and if not until today, the rice processing 
factory and mill remained the region’s largest agro-industrial establishments (ADU 1969: 17-18; 
CATHOLIC CHURCH NAVRONGO 1905-1920; GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2005: 8-
12; OTENG 1997: 38; VOSCON ASSOCIATES & MAGNA CONSULTING 1997: 5; YARO 
2013: 6, 11). 
Nkrumah’s rule contributed to an economic upturn in the Upper East Region. The region 
was increasingly integrated into the domestic economy and was able to attract some investments 
in infrastructure and public services, which resulted in some poverty alleviation (ADU 1969: 17-
18). However, Nkrumah’s success in fighting poverty in the north was greatly limited since most 
of the support was captured by private, bureaucratic or political elites. Furthermore, distributional 
patterns of support corresponded with the geographical patterns of political interests, most of 
which were based in the south of the country. A wealthy, urban society, mostly southern-based, 
came to live off the rural poor, even by exploiting services that were specifically designated to 
serve the needs of the (northern) poor (SONGSORE 2011: 107, 154-155; YARO 2013: 8). Aside 
from this, government overrule of the economy, hoarding, speculation, illegal exchanges and 
contraband also diminished state resources, which led to shortages, created black markets and 
contributed heavily to the failure of Nkrumah’s economic programmes (LAUBE 2007: 66). 
Economic activity took place underground, in a parallel economy known as the ‘kalabule’ system 
(SONGSORE 2011: 163). Therefore, the government’s balance of payments came under pressure 
by financial constraints (LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 10). Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 as a 
result of growing public dissatisfaction and unrest (AHWOI 2010: 6).  
The National Liberation Council (NLC) came into power and started privatising state-
owned enterprises and farms in order to consolidate the economy (AHWOI 2010: 6). They 
pursued a neo-liberal approach to development at the nation-wide level, although this did not stop 
them from initiating a public tomato processing factory in the Upper East, the Northern Star 
Tomato Company (NSTC). Prior to this, little agro-processing had taken place in Ghana 
(ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 1). This public industry was ‘established with an over-
optimistic expectation’ which did ‘not so materialise’, due to a lack of quality personnel and final 
products (FAO 1970: 2). The processing industry depended entirely on domestic demand, but 
local consumers showed no interest in its products. Despite high duties, importation still offered a 
greater margin to vendors, and, moreover, consumers continued to prefer foreign products due to 
their perceived or real superior quality (SCHÜRMANN 1967: 4-11). Also, the tomato processing 
factory in northern Ghana operated for only three months of the year and entirely on diesel 
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generators, making it highly unattractive to producers (VOSCON ASSOCIATES & MAGNA 
CONSULTING 1997: 6). 
Initiating such agro-processing to contribute to poverty reduction in the Upper East was of 
little success and the industry continued to suffer over the decades to come. The initiated factory 
was characterised by poor operational efficiency, underutilisation of capacities, thus high 
operation costs and could only survive behind high tariffs walls as they constantly made losses 
over the 1960s and 1970s. This not only further diminished government resources, but led to 
declining real incomes in agricultural, non-industrial areas, because these government industries, 
as much as other non-government industries, were greatly dependent on imported raw materials. 
The high production costs reflected in higher consumer prices, which disadvantaged the poorest in 
northern Ghana. As a result of the continued failure to improve lives in the north, disparities in 
Ghana kept on growing.  
Ghana’s southern ‘golden triangle’ continued to prosper, but not the north of Ghana as had 
once been planned. By 1969, 86 percent of all registered industrial enterprises, over 80 percent of 
the labour force and over 90 percent of the value added to industry, were found in the Accra-
Sekondi-Takoradi-Kumasi area. The north of the country continued to suffer from severe poverty, 
leading to further migration to the cities of the south. Spatial concentration of the economy in the 
south was thus further cemented during immediate post-colonial times, because aside from the 
aforementioned tomato paste factory, the vast majority of government interventions had actually 
continued to foster the southern-based cocoa production and trade. Sharpening contradictions in 
nationwide socio-economic well-being and social marginalisation were the result. State-led 
growth in agriculture had utterly neglected the food crops sector, especially in northern Ghana, 
despite the fact that most of the North’s peasants were engaged in food crop production. From the 
1960s, domestic food demand began to outstrip the country’s agricultural production. Food prices 
and imports rose steadily as a result, but imports were restricted by foreign exchange constraints 
and thus exacerbated demands made on the government’s financial resources (SONGSORE 2011: 
109-112, 126, 130, 171).  
In 1969 the Progress Party (PP) tried to return the economy to a more market-oriented, 
capitalist system. It withdrew government support to agriculture and agro-processing as a result of 
its growing financial problems. Only minor macroeconomic management was able to take place 
before a military coup, in 1972, ended all economic consolidation efforts (LARYEA & AKUONI 
2012: 12). The military National Redemption Council started to pursue a policy of food and raw 
material self-sufficiency that involved enormous government spending. Duty exoneration and 
subsidies on agricultural inputs were designed to attract private investors and ease peasants’ 
production constraints (AHWOI 2010: 6-7; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 56; FAO 2005: 13). 
Reacting to rising food prices and imports, further investment in food crop production was made 
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under the names ‘Operation Feed Yourself’ and ‘Operation Feed Your Industry’ (SONGSORE 
2011: 130). At no time in Ghanaian history were subsidies as high as they were at this time, i.e. 
the mid to late 1970s. Northern Ghana received considerable support to produce rice and tomato, 
among other products, to feed consumers in the south. Fertilisers, seeds, bullock ploughs, tractors, 
and combine harvesters were made available in local service centres at subsidised rates (YARO 
2013: 8). Additionally, research was initiated to find further suitable places for large-scale 
irrigation in the north (SOIL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1977: 1). The ‘Tono Irrigation Project’ – 
put in place by 1975 until the middle of the 1980s – became one of the largest agricultural dams in 
West Africa. It allowed production of rice and tomato on larger scales and irrigates an area of 
about 2000 ha, used by several thousand farmers coming from eight nearby villages. It also 
includes silos with a capacity of 700 tonnes as well as grinding mills for rice, aside 42 km of 
canals and 120 km of road networks. The project is managed by the “Irrigation Company of the 
Upper Region” (ICOUR), which further takes care of a smaller irrigation scheme nearby, the Vea 
irrigation project. Both, but especially the Tono irrigation project, sought to further integrate local 
producers into the national economy (i.e. the demand structures of the south), to provide 
economic opportunities to larger sections of the population, to ease perennial food shortages by 
the production of staples, and to counter the high rate of migration from the north (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2005: 8-10; ICOUR 2009: 2; LAUBE 2009: 2, 89; MDEMU 2008: 14-
15; TONAH 2008: 113). 
Despite a multitude of further projects put in place aside the above mentioned and an all-
time high in public spending, often to support rice production, outcomes in terms of poverty 
alleviation in northern Ghana remained low during the 1970s. Public projects caused interregional 
disparities to increase, because from the beneficiaries of government subsidies were, once again, 
richer people, namely civil servants, businessmen, contractors and military officers, most hailing 
from the traditional industrial core regions of the south. Intraregional disparities grew similarly: 
though receiving considerably less in absolute amounts, the subsidies that reached the north of 
Ghana went almost entirely to local elites who earned high incomes through rice farming, 
comparable to cocoa farmers in the south. The vast majority of northern peasants were forced to 
remain at subsistence level (SONGSORE 2011: 130, 134, 178). The rent-seeking behaviour of 
local elites was partly the result of government intervention that excluded paying attention to most 
traditional crops in northern Ghana, which are also those produced by the poor. Thus effective 
purchasing power and also food security of the most vulnerable decreased, which overall led to a 
lowering of living standards in the north.  
By the mid-1970s, the situation led to famines in northern Ghana ‘in the midst of plenty’ 
(YARO 2013: 9). Elite capture and government misconduct was also reflected in the management 
of the large-scale irrigation projects that had been erected in the north. Completion of the Tono 
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Irrigation Project ‘was the result of a long, opaque and wasteful process, which made it one of the 
most expensive irrigation projects ever constructed worldwide’ (LAUBE 2007: 89). Moreover, 
most lands in the project’s command area were overtaken by ‘richer farmers, allowing the poor 
ones, very little or no access’ (YARO 2013: 9). Many externally funded projects were of similar, 
minor success. Ambitious objectives, inadequate funding and poor coordination made these fail 
(Ibid.: 10). Potential investors and government officials ‘found it more profitable to engage in 
rent-seeking and other corrupt behaviours, rather than growth-enhancing activities’ (ACKAH & 
BAAH-BOATEN 2012: 33). At best one could say that governments from the 1970s until 1983 
took decisions on political but not economic grounds, showing little understanding for the 
consequences of their actions. Furthermore, the country endured additional coups in 1979 and 
1981, which came about mostly due to the persisting, poor economic conditions (LARYEA & 
AKUONI 2012: 12). It was a period of instability with ‘successive and frequent changes in 
political leadership through the barrel of the gun affecting both economic and agricultural 
policies’ (AHWOI 2010: 5), resulting in economic decay, mostly in the north (LAUBE 2007: 66). 
From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s most (public) industries and economic activities 
collapsed. Government finances were ruined: by the early 1980s, 65 percent of total government 
expenditure had to go into deficit reduction. The economy shrunk drastically and was later forced 
to embark on recovery programmes prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). This structural crisis came earlier than most other African countries because of the 
severe mismanagement and excessive rent-seeking by the ruling military oligarchy. Only later 
were these trends exacerbated by the collapse of commodity prices and oil price shocks 
(SONGSORE 2011: 124, 163, 169, 207). In 1981, Jerry Rawlings initiated reforms characterizing 
the next era of the region’s agro-economic development: the Economic Reform Programmes 
(ERPs) and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These were side-lined by several 
international trade agreements, namely the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as the Bretton Woods institutions (LARYEA & 
AKUONI 2012: 10). Reforms were much needed, as ‘the country was on the brink of economic 
collapse’ (LAUBE 2007: 74). Given the state of the government’s financial resources and the 
economy as a whole, room for political decision-making was severely limited. ‘Neither the USSR, 
nor East European countries, Cuba or Libya would, or could, provide concessional finance on 
anything like the scale needed to restore the economic infrastructure and productive capacity of 
Ghana’ (RIMMER 1992: 181). Ghana was forced to rely on the IMF and the World Bank, who 
made strict neo-liberal reforms a precondition for support. 
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2.3. Structural Adjustment and Economic Reform (1983 to the mid-2000s) 
In its period of economic reform, distortions in Ghana’s economy were removed, trade and 
exchange rates were liberalised, and emphasis was placed on non-traditional exports and, 
moreover, export led industrialisation (AHWOI 2010: 7; LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 10). The 
Economic Reform Programmes (ERPs) and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) put 
emphasis on a free market system whereby market prices were given a central role in the 
allocation of resources (AHWOI 2010: 7). The main function of the state was now to provide for 
not much more than ‘an enabling environment for market driven and private enterprise-led 
economic growth’ (SONGSORE 2011: 166).  
ERPs started in 1983 and came in three phases. ERP I lasted from 1983 to 1986 and was 
primarily concerned with stabilising the economy, by reducing inflation and external deficits and 
by export rehabilitation through social and economic infrastructure restoration to promote 
economic growth (SONGSORE 2011: 167). SAPs followed in the same year. As a result, a 
foreign exchange retention scheme for non-traditional exports was liberalised and the proportion 
that could be retained was increased in 1987. Several initiatives were made in order to attract 
investments into agriculture. They included tax exemptions and rebates, investment guarantees, 
free trade zones with additional income and dividend tax cuts and the possibility of foreign 
ownership (AHWOI 2010: 9-10). ERP II, from 1987 to 1990, also focused on macroeconomic 
stability through GDP growth, a lower inflation rate and an improved balance of payments. Import 
licensing schemes were abolished by 1988, because they were considered redundant since 
exchange rates were now market-determined. Taxes on imported fruits and vegetables were 
lowered severely (SONGSORE 2011: 167). To reduce government spending and because donors 
were no longer willing to support inefficient government industries, processing ventures, such as 
the tomato factory in the Upper East Region, were forced to close by 1989/1999 (CLOTTEY et al. 
2009: 1437; LAUBE 2007: 197).  
ERP III set a new emphasis from the early 1990s onwards. Instead of only focusing on 
economic recovery, it aimed at accelerated growth. The Accelerated Growth Strategy (AGS) was 
formulated, whereby sustainable development and poverty reduction, with the private sector as the 
engine of growth, were at the focus. Intersectoral linkages were promoted, especially in the agro-
industry. Poverty was to be reduced by labour-intensive, high productivity activities and through 
better access of the poor to social services through decentralisation. Education and health gained 
more importance in policies besides capacity building, public sector management and private 
sector development (SONGSORE 2011: 167-168). In 1992, import quotas were completely 
abolished and tariffs for food commodities were reduced to 20 percent (ROBINSON & 
KOLAVALLI 2010: 2).  
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Adjustment efforts were continued over the decade. In early 2000, Ghana’s simple average 
tariff was further lowered, but after only three months in effect special importation taxes were 
reintroduced at 20 percent. At the time, these were lower for members of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but it took until 2002 for these tariffs to be 
entirely abolished, in order to bring regulations in line with ECOWAS and WTO provisions 
(ACKAH, ARYEETEY and MORRISSEY 2012: 104; LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 14-16). 
ECOWAS, commissioned to promote economic integration across the region by gradually 
removing barriers and the eventual creation of a customs union, was established in 1975. 
However, trade liberalization was introduced after 1990 and showed little progress until 1993, 
when the treaty started to be revised which then led to a removal of all trade barriers by the year 
2000. Additionally, until 2004, a common external tariff was to be established, but negotiations 
were delayed. Only members of the CFA zone, a bloc within ECOWAS, created a common 
external tariff. Negotiations on further alignments are still on-going and may include Ghana at 
some point (ACKAH, ARYEETEY and OPOKU 2012: 51; LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 25). 
These events were side-lined by a further relief measure to government finances that came 
in 1996, when the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) Initiative was introduced by the World 
Bank, IMF and G8. It allowed the freeing of financial resources, which would have otherwise 
gone into the paying of debts. The HIPC Initiative came with the conditionality of designing 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The first outcome was the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS I), covering the timeframe 2003 to 2005, and being the first to address poverty 
reduction directly. In its initial phase it aimed at macro-economic stability through economic 
growth, modernisation of agriculture, human resource development, good governance, and a focus 
on the vulnerable and excluded (SONGSORE 2011: 254-256). GPRS I was deemed to be ‘a sound 
macroeconomic framework’ (IFAD 2006: 5) and promised to target not only priority sectors, but 
especially those areas in which poverty was known to be chronic, i.e. northern Ghana 
(SONGSORE 2011: 261). Further support came from one of the largest externally-funded projects 
put in place since 2006, the Millennium Challenge Account grant. This US government 
supervised intervention aimed at commercializing agriculture, specifically to create a competitive 
horticultural industry (WHITFIELD 2011b: 31 & 32).  
2.4. The Cost of Adjustment 
The reforms of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s were somewhat successful at a macro-economic 
level, since they resulted in an increased growth rate, a reduced budget deficit and a lower 
inflation rate (AHWOI 2010: 7). Yet, the overall effects of these reforms on poverty in the north 
were rather bad. Both Economic Reform Programmes (ERPs) and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) – the major guidelines to government policies – forced the government to cut 
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spending and withdraw most support for agricultural, especially for inputs and agro-processing, 
and to cut tariffs. Moreover, the various government agencies that had previously undertaken the 
production, import and distribution of farm inputs were forced to close. Input prices rose sharply, 
especially that of fertiliser. Nationwide fertiliser consumption fell drastically and did not increase 
again until the second half of the 1990s. Generally, due to devaluation and price-deregulation for 
consumer goods and farming inputs, prices escalated (AHWOI 2010: 8; AMANOR & PABI 
2007: 56; FAO 2005: 13; KHOR & HORMEKU 2006: 4-5; LAUBE et al. 2008: 3; SONGSORE 
2011: 179).  
Moreover, the Ghanaian farmer increasingly faced stiffer competition from overseas 
markets. Overall, decreases in tariffs had led to rising imports of agricultural commodities, 
especially tomato paste, rice and chicken from Europe, the USA and China among other 
countries. Further imports of fresh tomato came from Ghana’s ECOWAS neighbours, especially 
from Burkina Faso (FAOSTAT 2011). In combination with the forced withdrawal of government 
support for production, these factors were later blamed for severely undermining economic 
activities, and thereby human development, in Ghana’s north. Newspapers reported tomato-farmer 
suicides in the Upper East Region on an annual basis, international NGOs talked of threats to 
farmers’ human rights and food security (PAASCH 2008: 12-17) and scientific publications 
talked of economic practices that would devastate the livelihoods of northern Ghana’s farmers 
(LAUBE et al. 2011: 753; PAASCH 2008; SEND FOUNDATION 2008; SONGSORE 2011: 
263). Due to imports of rice, production in Ghana’s Upper East Region decreased and its major 
mills closed down. Furthermore, tomato paste imports were blamed for making local production 
unprofitable (YARO 2013: 10-11) and for the shutdown of tomato processing in the Upper East 
(ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 2), the showpiece of previous development approaches. 
During the period of economic and structural adjustment, in terms of investment the 
government almost completely neglected the agricultural economy of the north. Government 
promotion of smallholder participation in the economy via irrigation schemes was of little 
success. Attempts to intensify agriculture failed, because people were unable to acquire the farm 
inputs needed, credit schemes collapsed and extension services were insufficient (LAUBE 2007: 
75). Instead the government maintained its focus on the southern industrial core and cocoa 
producers (ACKAH & BAAH-BOATEN 2012: 45-47; SONGSORE 2011: 173-178; 
WHITFIELD 2011b: 31, 32). Within the 2005 District Industrialisation Programme, for example, 
Ghana’s north received no attention and only little effort was indicated to modernize agriculture 
and support agribusiness in the region (AHWOI 2010: 9-10; KYEREMATEN 2007: 77). Of the 
GPRS I funds that came through the HIPC Initiative, the little that was spent in the north had a 
minor, positive contribution to poverty reduction. Although the programme specifically aimed to 
target vulnerable and excluded parts of society in regions characterised by chronic poverty, 
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regional prioritization of the allocation of funds clearly favoured Ghana’s south, e.g. the money 
spent in all northern regions (with one of them being the Upper East) combined was about as 
much as some southern regions received for themselves (SONGSORE 2011: 260). Other 
government projects in the north remained only ad hoc interventions undertaken in pilot 
communities (YARO 2013: 11-12).  
Externally funded interventions also neglected the north. The Millennium Challenge 
Account achieved little (WHITFIELD 2011b: 31-32) and did not even mention the poorest 
regions in Ghana – among them the Upper East Region – as a priority for investment 
(SONGSORE 2011: 264). Again, the core regions, the ‘golden triangle’, with its cocoa, timber 
and mineral export economy continued to get most of the support. Southern farmers received 
publicly funded, technical support and export promotion packages, while further benefiting from 
guaranteed prices and publicly financed spraying of fields. No comparable activities were pursued 
for food crop farmers in the north. Thus, these farmers were forced to continue their work under 
low productivity and income (ACKAH & BAAH-BOATEN 2012: 45-47).  
Subsistence agriculture on degraded lands with declining yields and without government 
support, further intensified seasonal hunger in Ghana’s north. Agriculture in the north was unable 
to keep up with developments in the south. As a result of the unequal allocation of economic 
stimuli and resulting lopsided growth, the terms of inter-regional trade shifted to the disadvantage 
of northern Ghanaian staple-crop growing farmers. Due to the SAPs, the terms of trade turned 
against food producers to the benefit of non-food consumer items, which came from the south. 
The major food crops grown in the north were not covered by a minimum guarantee price, 
resulting in the de-intensification of agriculture and low farm gate prices (LAUBE 2007: 75; 
SONGSORE 2011: 173-180, 264, 281-284). An increase in northern farmers’ incomes would 
have been required to help the farmers deal with the SAPs-induced government withdrawal of 
support (SONGSORE 2011: 173-178). Policies pursued throughout the ERP and SAP period 
caused increased poverty among certain sections of the population, especially unskilled 
households content with agriculture (ACKAH, MORRISSEY, et al. 2012: 98) and food producers 
in the north.  
Northern Ghana, since the 1980s, constantly accounted for the highest levels of poverty in 
the country (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 184). In 1991/92 about 33 percent of all 
Ghana’s poor came from the savannah of the north. By 1998/99 this number had risen to 37 
percent and it kept rising to 50 percent in 2005/06. That meant that in 1991/92, 73 percent of the 
savannah population suffered from poverty, 70 percent in 1998/99 and 60 percent in 2005/06. 
During the 1990s, reduction of poverty mainly took place in Accra and the southern forest 
regions. 60 percent of the North’s people constantly suffered from extreme poverty, whilst on a 
nationwide scale, levels dropped from 36 to 27 percent (SONGSORE 2011: 180-190, 261). 
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Spatial patterns of poverty in Ghana continued to follow a north-south stratification, boiling down 
to a north-south divide in economic prosperity. Those living in the dry northern plains had an 
especially harder time finding economic opportunities than those who lived in the south (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 184, 2007: 8).  
Due to the southern bias in the allocation of government funds, growth of the Ghanaian 
economy, especially from the early 1990s to 2006, was hardly pro-poor. The most poor, residing 
in northern Ghana, experienced little positive change in their lives, although there was a 
substantial decline in the incidence of poverty among southern export orientated farmers. Indeed, 
southern households practicing commercial farming for export were the primary beneficiaries 
(ACKAH & BAAH-BOATEN 2012: 45-47). In Ghana’s north, women in particular suffered, 
since they dominated the food crop production sector (SONGSORE 2011: 173-178). Another 
impact related to government policies’ main aim at shifting from staple food to cash crop 
production. Since it was mostly men that were responsible for the production of cash crops, 
agricultural development programmes were gender biased and enforced an already high level of 
discrimination against females in terms of access to productive resources and general livelihood 
assets (ACKAH & ARYEETEY 2012a: 204-205). Thus, ‘by all indications’ the north lagged 
behind the south, and the development gap seemed to widen (AL-HASSAN 2013: 226). The titles 
given to the development initiatives, therefore, were ‘more grandiose than the actual actions 
involved, which were rather small in scope’ (WHITFIELD 2011b: 31).  
Throughout this period, Ghana’s political parties pursued and implemented policies with 
short time horizons and without shifting the necessary resources towards building productive 
sectors that could allow for better poverty alleviation. While economic growth on a nationwide 
level took place, there was no real economic transformation, especially in the northern parts of 
Ghana (Ibid.: 6, 7). Regional elites rather than poverty levels influenced the allocations of 
government finances. While food crops production accounted for the majority of agricultural GDP 
and engaged most of the population, this sector was for the most part neglected by government 
policies (SONGSORE 2011: 199). The majority of subsidy recipients, the southern cocoa 
producers, constituted only a very small minority within the country, in fact only 1.1 percent of 
the agriculturally active population (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 301).  
Inequality in income, overall poverty and food insecurity therefore deepened, especially 
among food-crop smallholder farmers in the north, because the overall, nation-wide positive 
effects of export- and growth-oriented policies were not forthcoming in the region. The initiated 
pro-growth policies were by themselves not enough for broad-based poverty reduction. The 
‘institutional void left by liberalization policies dating as far back as 1990’ were not filled by the 
private sector (IFAD 2006: 5-6). In fact, economic reform came with further social exclusion for 
northern Ghana, reproducing the colonial economy by a widening of the socio-economic gap 
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across the country and also within Ghana’s Upper East Region. Critics have been rather sceptical 
about further government agreements, such as those found in the EPAs, that aim at trade 
liberalisation yet lack sufficient support mechanisms for the poorest (PAASCH 2008: 19). 
Clearly, any future policy that is ‘to deal with poverty in Ghana will need to start to ‘target 
[northern/] rural areas where the majority of the agricultural population resides’ (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 302).  
2.5. Post-Adjustment (the mid-2000s onwards) – New Opportunities for Northern Ghana? 
With oil reserves discovered in 2007, and oil production having begun in 2010, the 
possibility for Ghana to accelerate the pace of progress increased vastly, at least on the side of its 
public financial abilities (ISSER 2015). Ghana experienced exceptional GDP growth rates over 
recent years (WORLD BANK 2014). Moreover, recent policies have changed towards subsidising 
and protecting farmers again.  
The first indications of policy changes were evident as early as 2003, when the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) government tried to impose higher tariffs on imported rice, poultry and 
tomato. These were, however, never implemented, because development partners like the IMF 
refused. Furthermore, as critics have pointed out, the NPP preferred to subsidize urban 
consumption by cheap imports, due to the urban background of its voters, than to come up with 
profound strategies to improve domestic agriculture and agro-industries in rural, northern Ghana 
(LARYEA & AKUONI 2012: 17; WHITFIELD 2011b: 33). In 2004 the Ghana Trade and 
Livelihood Coalition was formed to lobby for policies to support rice, poultry and chicken. With 
their help, the Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers took the government to court and 
won the case in 2005, ‘but a week later the NPP government had the law repealed through its 
majority in Parliament’(WHITFIELD 2011b: 33). Tariffs on rice were later completely abolished, 
shortly before elections (Ibid.). However, in an attempt to revive processing in the Upper East 
Region under the Revitalisation of Distressed Industries Programme (RDIP) the restoration of the 
afore-mentioned tomato paste factory began (AHWOI 2010: 9-10; KYEREMATEN 2007: 77). 
Rehabilitation of old, state-owned processing factories, and the building of new ones using 
external expertise, was a central element of the then ruling NPP government’s strategy 
(WHITFIELD 2011b: 31 & 32) and, in the case of the Upper East Region’s factory, was pursued 
just in time for elections. 
The NPP’s strategy did not work out, for their rivals, the National Democratic Conference 
(NDC), won the election. Aside from their continued support for the tomato processing facility, 
the most decisive move to post-adjustment policies was made in July 2008 when the NDC became 
the first government to actively improve the production base of the agricultural sector through the 
introduction of a country-wide fertiliser subsidy (BANFUL 2009: 1). Furthermore ‘the new NDC 
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government reinstated the rice tariff in 2010 and raised it to 35 % in 2011’ (WHITFIELD 2011b: 
34). These policies were one result of the 2008 food crisis. It had become clear, even in Ghana, 
that there was a need to ‘seriously address the issue of future food insecurity in developing 
countries […] to meet various challenges, including reaching the MGD [Millennium Development 
Goal] targets on hunger and poverty’ (UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 2009: 103). Another major effort of the NDC government was its ‘Ghana 
Shared Growth and Development Agenda’ (GSGDA), which comprised of four main pillars: 
- Human development through access to quality healthcare and education, creation of jobs, 
increased productivity and a focus on the vulnerable in society; 
- Greater resilience of the economy by economic stability, private sector competitiveness, trade 
and industry, agricultural modernisation and natural resource management; 
- Infrastructure expansion with a focus on oil and gas, roads, ports and development zones;  
- Good governance through transparent, decentralised and accountable governance, anti-
corruption projects, decentralisation and citizen services (PWC GHANA 2013: 1). 
The NDC attempted to address the issues of securing the raw material base for industry. It 
thereby tried to simultaneously improve food security and increase export revenues. ‘Low 
productivity in staples and horticultural crops, inadequate research into the utilisation of selected 
crops as well as the inadequate investment in processing and value-addition’ were to be tackled 
(GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010: 38). Selected staples (cereals, tubers, beans and pulses) as 
well as horticultural crops including fruits (mangoes, pineapples and bananas) and vegetables 
(okra and chili) were to be developed and promoted according to the country’s agro-ecological 
zones, especially in the north. Modernisation of agriculture was to come from irrigation, 
subsidized inputs, mechanization services, better marketing, improved extension services and 
improved institutional coordination for agricultural development. Furthermore, from 2011 to 2015 
the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP), in the context of GSGDA, 
was to implement the second phase of the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy 
(FASDEP II) (Ibid.: 38-39).  
Trade and inequality issues were now being addressed by the allocation of specific funds 
meant to target the three northern regions. A large-scale mango project was started in 2009 by the 
Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF), which later became the Export Development 
and Agricultural Investment Fund (EDAIF). 20,000 hectares of mango were to be cultivated in 
Ghana’s north by 2015. Over 26 million Ghanaian Cedi were spent up until the end of 2012, yet 
by 2013 only 1600 hectares (8 percent of the target) had been established. Thus the project had a 
smaller impact than expected, though the north of Ghana got an exceptionally high share of the 
funds: a quarter of the lands established were in the Upper East. Nevertheless, only 25 people, of 
which just one was female, directly benefitted (EDAIF 2013: 5; EDIF 2011: 25).  
Background: Development Policies and Northern Ghanaian Poverty 
 
16 
The Northern Development Fund, which was expanded into the Savannah Accelerated 
Development Authority (SADA) by the NDC administration in 2010, provided further support 
(SONGSORE 2011: 264-265). Its projects specifically aimed to bridge the north-south 
development gap indicated by imbalances in social and economic prosperity (GOVERNMENT 
OF GHANA 2010: 95). SADA was set up precisely to coordinate a development agenda for 
Ghana’s northern savannah. It attempted to provide opportunities for poor peasants, especially 
women, through the promotion of fruit trees such as Shea (MOFA 2013b). Though SADA’s main 
aim was to improve livelihoods of the most vulnerable in Ghana’s north, it also sought to deal 
with the effects of climate change, like floods and drought (Ibid.). Aside from the afore-
mentioned decline in soil quality and resulting yields, one of the most important factors for 
sustainable development in contemporary, northern Ghana is the ability of local peasants to cope 
with climate change and variability, and related natural disasters. So, ‘the development of 
adaptation strategies to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change and to enhance the resilience 
of social-ecological systems is, therefore, of highest priority’ (WASCAL 2010: 11). The outcomes 
of SADA’s projects have yet to be evaluated. ‘Every effort must therefore be made to ensure that 
the […] project succeeds and the lessons learnt applied to other deprived regions’ (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 231). Furthermore, more ‘natural disasters will entail increasing 
the capacity of NADMO’, the National Disaster Management Organization (GOVERNMENT OF 
GHANA 2010: 49). 
The above-mentioned contemporary approaches to development of the North’s agricultural 
sector have certain commonalities, namely that most of them ascribe a special role to agricultural 
value chains and out-grower schemes to support a new ‘green revolution’ to improve 
smallholders’ livelihoods. Since around 2006, such value chain approaches became the main tool 
for enhancing agricultural development (GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010; OUMA et al. 2012: 
227; YARO 2013: 12). To combat poverty, government interventions mostly aim at the market 
integration of smallholder farmers through specific support of crucial leverage points within value 
chains. This is to be achieved, under the ‘Youth in Agriculture Programme’, through the 
implementation of rice and maize ‘block’ farming, livestock, poultry and agri-business initiatives 
(PWC GHANA 2013: 5, 27). Key elements of the government’s agenda to improve value chains 
include:  
- Reducing the cost of doing business, which hinders both domestic and global private sector 
competiveness. Thus, subsidies for producers and loans for traders are to be put in place. 
- Improving productivity and efficiency in production, which requires an improvement in quality 
and efficiency of infrastructure. The availability of credit to farmers, by various private 
financial institutions, should be enhanced to increase productivity.  
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- Improvement of marketing through commodity brokerage services by the government, such as 
that provided by the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO). 
- Better agricultural practices and farmer’s knowledge, to be achieved through training and 
demonstrations.  
- Small-scale production and the organisation of farmers, whereby the latter are to be organised 
as nucleus-outgrowers, in Block Farming schemes, to enable contractual farming that allows 
farmers to enlarge production (GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010: 23-24, 26, 36, 39).  
These public undertakings are supported by a growing number of external interventions. 
The ‘German Technical Cooperation’ (GTZ, now GIZ), has started projects on the value chains 
for pineapples, mangoes, citrus, chili peppers, aquaculture, guinea fowls and maize. Equally, the 
United Nations has become active in this field. Other prominent interventions include continued 
support by the US-funded Millennium Challenge Account and its ‘Agricultural Development and 
Value Chain Enhancement Programme’ (USAID ADVANCE), which supports crops like maize 
and rice. In 2010 the German Development Bank ‘KfW’ established an ‘Outgrower and Value 
Chain Fund’. Moreover, a ‘Value Chain Practitioners Forum’ is now trying to harmonize these 
various endeavours (OUMA et al. 2012: 227-228). However, none of these interventions target 
Ghana’s Upper East Region, and the question ‘to what extent government and NGO activities and 
value chains themselves are socially and environmentally sustainable’ remains. How do or could 
value chain enhancements affect the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable?  
2.6. Conclusion 
Agriculture was, is and will probably remain the most common livelihood and way to make 
a living in Ghana, and especially in Ghana’s north (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 
285). Therefore, progress to alleviate poverty can be achieved only by political interventions in 
this sector. Attempts to do so over time, this chapter has shown, can be grouped into several 
phases. Ghana’s agricultural sector, and especially that of the Upper East Region, was shaped by 
by trends in public policies. First mainly through exploitative colonial influences and 
accompanying innovations, then by heavy government interference, mainly aimed at agro-
processing and subsidies on agricultural inputs, and then by liberalisation efforts, which greatly 
increased globalisation tendencies. The only commonality in the polices throughout the decades, 
aside from capture of public support by national and local elites, is probably the somewhat 
continuous neglect of northern Ghana’s regions, .  
Each era’s policies altered the support provided to farmers, produce markets and thereby the 
outcomes of agricultural production. Most prominently since the beginning of the the 20th century, 
dynamics in the northern agricultural sector were shaped through attempts to introduce cash crops 
and especially dry season agriculture through irrigation. Namely tomatoes became the foremost 
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way of generating income in northern Ghana. A policy of import subsidising industrialisation was 
pursued to process and thereby market such non-traditional, dry season products. Western-style 
industrialisation of agriculture, through government provision of inputs and processing industries, 
was seen as the best way to economically empower northern farming households. Government-
initiated advancement of farming households through value chain integration via contractual 
farming with industries, was deemed to be the way forward as early as the 1960s. However, 
deregulation and liberalisation, as major elements of the ERPs and SAPs, exposed local farmers to 
stiff, global competition. Ghanian agricultural policies then experienced a strong shift to export-
orientated development approaches, which in combination with inequalities in the allocation of 
economic stimuli and social services, gave rise to further disparity within the country. Tragically, 
the regions most affected by poverty were those that received the least support over time by 
government, but yet were the most affected by government withdrawl.  
Thus, the outcomes achieved in terms of poverty alleviation have been far below the 
possibilities. In fact, due to past policies (and respectively, their neglect of Ghana’s north), 
smallholders’ livelihoods are nowadays challenged by multi-sided vulnerability contexts, namely 
globalisation processes as well as environmental changes (see also LAUBE et al. 2011). 
Vulnerability also arises from a profound lack of governmental support since the institutional 
context, from local to regional and nation-wide level, is crucial to development and hence poverty 
alleviation. Despite an overall growth in market chances, most of northern Ghana’s mal-
developments were made possible by clientelism pursued by political actors (see WHITFIELD 
2011a), which led to little economic change and hardly any poverty reduction (Ibid.). Nationwide 
and northern inequality continues to increase as a result of this threefold vulnerability context (see 
before and SONGSORE 2011). 
There is still room for hope, due to the fact that protective duties for rice and fertiliser 
subsidies may lead to improved yields, market access and thereby livelihood outcomes in Ghana’s 
north. The same goes for the revitalisation of the tomato processing plant, which could serve as a 
market alternative for locals. Furthermore, government and donor (USAID) support are nowadays 
aimed towards region, product and producer specific value chain enhancements in chili, rice, 
maize and shea. Yet it remains questionable as to whether or not the governement interventions 
will resemble those of the past. At the least, such tailor-made approaches enable Ghana’s north to 
start to receive its fair share of assistance, increasing the potential for poverty alleviation. 
Secondly, interventions now aim at the micro-, production-level, while in former times 
government tried to advance macro-structures at the domestic level. Thirdly, the majority of past 
interventions did not have to account for international competition since high tariff walls 
protected them. Fourthly, recent initiatives take into consideration environmental change.  
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The similarities of today’s interventions with those of the past, however, are striking: as 
already indicated, nucleus-out-grower farming schemes and contract farming were an integral part 
of import substitutions policies back in the 1960s and 1970s. The same goes for subsidies on 
agricultural inputs, which seek to induce a new green revolution. SADA’s concept of initiating 
development by ‘generating a market impetus as the main catalyst for stimulating farmers to 
produce, using a marketing-based outgrower system with improved technology and timely inputs’ 
(AL-HASSAN 2013: 231), has been attempted before. It is old wine in a new bottle, in the sense 
that recent initiatives promote poverty reduction by agricultural industrialisation at the producer 
level through high-yielding fertiliser responsive crop varieties, agrochemicals and mechanization. 
Most traditional crops remain totally neglected. This neglect, in the past, had an eroding effect on 
quality of life. Moreover, government initiated agro-industries largely failed and it is questionable 
as to whether high-input agriculture can nowadays be considered as environmentally sustainable.  
Compared to the former approach of ‘roll back’ in the SAPs era, recent approaches are 
really a ‘roll out’ strategy ‘to actively prepare the field of the social for the market principle’ 
(OUMA et al. 2012: 228). Contemporary approaches widely neglect to account for ‘the global 
structural environment and power relations – even the usually omnipresent question of 
governance in value chains is rarely accounted for in practice – as well as what one could call the 
horizontal entanglements of vertical chains, their dependence on broader networks of social 
relations’ (Ibid.). This may negatively affect the impact of interventions, since positive change in 
Ghana’s north has most often been undermined by elitists’ divergence of funds. As in the past, 
‘the dangers of an externally mal-articulated economy can be catastrophic to the northern rural 
dweller’. Government initiated, agricultural value chains could ‘serve as conduits of exploitation 
and control without the right regulatory mechanisms which are non-existent in a regime of 
neoliberal globalization’ (YARO 2013: 12).  
The succeeding chapter sketches a theoretical framework designed to evaluate the 
contribution of recent rice, tomato and chili value chains dynamics and interventions to the 
improvement of local farmers’ livelihoods. The analytical scope is then narrowed down to focus 
upon the livelihood systems in the study areas. The aim is to first grasp the basic foundation upon 
which livelihoods are built, to then be able to understand the effect of contemporary agricultural 
policies – which are development policies that affect agricultural value chains. 
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3. Theory: Poverty Alleviation by Market Integration  
This chapter presents the conceptual background of this study, which should facilitate a 
thorough, theoretical understanding of the possible pro-poor effects of market integration, as 
related to the contemporary policy prescriptions described in Chapter 2. The framework includes 
aspects of the livelihood approach and value chain analysis enriched with elements of global 
production network approaches. Whilst the livelihood framework allows for a good understanding 
of the realities of the poor, value chain and production network analysis are used to generate an 
up-to-date understanding of markets and possible opportunities for smallholders within these. 
3.1. Poverty and the Livelihood Approach 
The origins of the livelihood approach, according to some authors, date back as far as 1910 
(DE HAAN 2012: 348), however, it was in the 1980s and 1990s that the concepts within the 
approach as practised today were developed (KAAG et al. 2004: 2-3, 50-51). The approach 
embraces the works of SEN, post-development critique and a growing societal awareness for 
environmental concerns. It became highly popular, as detailed below, in the form of the 
Sustainable Livelihood Framework.  
The initial source of theoretical inspiration for livelihood approaches evolved against the 
background of devastating famines in the Sahel during the 1970s and 1980s. A debate emerged on 
the reasons for these human catastrophes. The discussion was essentially characterised by two 
contrary views: the food availability decline (FAD) and the food entitlement decline (FED) theses 
(BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 101). FAD, the traditional approach to famines, proposes that hunger 
and famine are caused primarily by ‘a sudden, sharp reduction in the food supply’ of a particular 
geographic locality (BROWN & ECKHOLM 1974: 25). FAD’s basic assumptions date back to 
the writings of Malthus in the 18th Century. Malthus believed to have found universally applicable 
principles by which population growth rates exceed the gains earned in agricultural productivity. 
This, in turn, produces an insurmountable barrier to the formation of an ideal and fair society. He 
concluded that population growth rates must be limited ultimately by a lack of food, once 
population has outweighed agricultural potential. Such limitation is necessary to acquire a 
desirable ratio of the two aforementioned variables. Malthus did not question social distribution 
mechanisms as such but referred to a lack of resources as incontrovertible proof that the hungry 
(the poor) are redundant in society, even an unnecessary burden to be overcome (ENGELKE et al. 
2008: 116-117; KUHLMANN 2007: 27-28). FED, on the other hand, views famines only partly 
as a result of limited food availability. Based on the works of AMARTYA SEN (1985, 1981a, 
1981b, 1981c), FED’s interpretations of famine instead emphasise entitlements to food, as 
generated by trade, people’s own production and labour, inheritance and transfers (Ibid.: 1981c: 1-
2), and aspects of practical agency entitlement. With a context- and locality-specific view, SEN 
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confirmed that Bengal’s famines occurred even when sufficient amounts of food had been 
produced, and showed that the erosion of people’s entitlements in access to food was the cause of 
hunger (BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 101; DE HAAN 2005: 5).  
The results of numerous livelihood studies, conducted at the household level in developing 
countries during the 1980s, somewhat compromised between these explanations. They attributed a 
certain degree of autonomy to local agency and thus survival strategies, which were sometimes 
already called ‘livelihood strategies’, yet at the same time, they also pointed to structural variables 
that constrain household decision-making and thereby livelihood outcomes (DE HAAN & 
ZOOMERS 2005: 28-29). WATTS (1983) and DE WAAL (1987) also contributed to the 
understanding of the causes of food crises and famines, suggesting that crises should generally be 
understood as resulting from processes that occur long before a potential famine takes place. 
WATTS and BOHLE (1993) further conceptualised the processual character of famines by 
distinguishing between a ‘baseline vulnerability’ and a ‘current vulnerability’. Their work laid the 
foundation for social science-based vulnerability research in general, and for livelihood analysis 
in particular (BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 101, 103-104; DE HAAN 2005: 5). 
Livelihood analysis became increasingly popular throughout the 1990s (DE HAAN & 
ZOOMERS 2005: 29), partly also as a result of the prevailing Zeitgeist. The end of the Cold War 
(the end of East-West bloc thinking and of communism in Eastern Europe), an already accelerated 
economic globalisation process, and economic developments in parts of the global South led to 
the realisation that established theoretical paradigms of development no longer fitted empirically 
grounded evidence (MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 4). The ‘big’ or ‘global’ theories, such 
as modernisation and dependency theories, were declared dead (OUMA & LINDNER 2010: 12). 
Instead, a more pluralistic spectrum of perspectives gained ground (RAUCH 2008: 210-211). One 
of these was the critique articulated by so-called ‘post-development’ approaches, which form 
another foundational component of the livelihood perspective.  
Post-development strives to unmask theoretical concepts by revealing their ideological 
conceptions, and hence, the structurally defined and reproduced ideas of development 
incorporated in them. It thereby actively tries to deconstruct the ideological concept of (non-) 
modernity that dominated previous discourses (HAUCK 2004: 14). Its distinct characteristic is to 
articulate a fundamental critique. Whilst previous evaluations of development theories and 
policies pointed to partial shortcomings, post-development rejected the development paradigm 
altogether, not only invalidating the paradigm’s capitalist premise with its focus on market 
integration and intervention, but also denouncing development as a myth and an ideology. This 
critique prompted post-development proponents to stimulate a theoretical renewal comprising new 
ideology-free concepts whilst primarily remaining engaged in the analysis of discourses on 
development and how ways of speaking and thinking about development are linked to power 
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relations (ZIAI 2011: 3-4). Furthermore, post-development engendered the idea of ‘alternative 
development’, in which the poor are to be empowered in and through research, whilst equally 
assuming that the knowledge of the poor should be the primary source of ideas on how to improve 
their living conditions (MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 5, 7).  
Post-development critique contributed to livelihood analysis by demanding the 
incorporation of bottom-up approaches (KAAG et al. 2004: 52), in which the desired outcomes of 
development are to be partly defined by the poor themselves. Bottom-up, participatory data 
collection and analysis at the local level, and an increase in the efficiency of external aid were 
seen as desirable (CHAMBERS 1995; DE HAAN 2012: 346; DFID 2001: Section 1.1). Partly 
because of their local, bottom-up perspectives, livelihood approaches were considered 
representative of so-called ‘middle-range theories’. These gained momentum as a result of the 
perceived failure of previous approaches with proclaimed global explanatory power, and were 
adopted in an attempt to theorise development in manageable, local socio-economic contexts, 
through an explicitly actor orientated lens (MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 9). Livelihood 
analysis thereby managed to focus on the practical aspects of vulnerability, thus the structural 
constraints, with relevance to agency-centred, local development (RAUCH 2008: 210-211). It 
represented a new, holistic and critical manner of understanding poverty and a broader 
conceptualisation of vulnerability and resilience. Livelihood analysis questioned the prevailing 
values and norms of development, which were shaped by structural adjustment initiatives and thus 
market-orientated and neo-liberal ideologies arguing for government withdrawal (ARCE 2003: 
199, 201-203). The approach achieved a compromise between previously initiated attempts, as it 
partly took up a history of ideas and critiques that had shaped the discourse on development over 
the previous three decades. Rather than being an entirely new set of concepts, livelihood 
approaches were holistic and synthetic (TANG et al. 2013: 17-18), and thus practical and less 
ideologically biased.  
A further theoretical impetus was added by the works of ROBERT CHAMBERS and 
GORDON CONWAY (1991), for the additional spotlight they threw on environmental 
sustainability aside the social dimensions of development. Growing environmental concerns had 
arisen in public and academic debates at the time (e.g. the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio, in 1992), and most likely contributed to the consequent 
success of the approach. After the contributions of CHAMBERS and CONWAY, large-scale 
organisations such as the UNDP, Oxfam and CARE started to take up ideas for this enriched 
livelihood approach, incorporating them into their own approaches. Another important step for the 
global spread of the livelihood concept was made when the British New Labour government 
integrated the approach into its development policy in 1997. In line with its party philosophy at 
the time, New Labour perceived the livelihood concept to be an alternative route to development, 
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advocating a compromise between socialist and more conservative neo-liberal agendas, alongside 
addressing environmental concerns. The approach was operationalised by the British Department 
of International Development (DFID), which designed the Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
(SLF). The popularity of the approach subsequently increased drastically (BATTERBURY et al. 
2011: 1; DE HAAN 2012: 346; DE HAAN & ZOOMERS 2005: 30-31).  
3.1.1. Overview of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
The SLF, as designed by DFID, presents an instrument useful to understand and improve, 
specifically, rural livelihoods in developing countries. The SLF can be used to evaluate and plan 
development strategies but also to check existing activities in terms of their sustainability. It offers 
a checklist of the most important aspects of development, focuses attention on core elements and 
processes, and underlines the multiple interactions of different factors that influence livelihoods 
(DFID 2001: Section 2.1). At a basic level, the SLF is concerned with the ‘means of gaining a 
living’ that are pursued by the poor or by those that the approach defines as ‘vulnerable’ 
(CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 1991: 5). The concept of livelihoods thereby espouses more than 
merely making a living, but rather an aspect of agency. Livelihoods are understood as a ‘function 
of assets and structures, and a source of subsistence, income, identity and meaning’ (TANG et al. 
2013: 17). The approach further assumes that individuals (i.e. people or actors) are embedded in a 
changing structural context, which presents constraints and incentives. Within this context, 
individuals act purposefully to avoid risks, deal with crises, and improve their living conditions. 
Individuals therefore endeavour to secure their livelihood by a multitude of spontaneous actions, 
short-term coping and long-term mitigation strategies (or ‘pathways’) and, when possible, 
enhancements to their ways of living by using a collection of assets (their resources), which may 
provide the agency-based constraints and incentives necessary to achieve livelihood outcomes 
(DIDERO 2012: 28-29). Assets depend on the whole livelihood system, inter-linkages or rather 
influences and accesses to and between them, strategies and outcomes, mediated by structures and 
processes that make up a vulnerability context (GEISER, MÜLLER-BÖKER, et al. 2011: 259).  
The central conceptual resource of livelihood analysis is its five capitals – human, natural, 
financial, physical and social – which individuals or households draw upon to make a living and 
to achieve livelihood outcomes. The vulnerability context and other external structures and 
processes define access to each resource, its values and inter-changeabilities. However, as 
previously discussed, livelihood vulnerability also depends on the individual combination of 
assets and what people do with these resources (DIDERO 2012: 28-29). Through these 
parameters, livelihood analysis distinguishes the ‘vulnerable’ from the ‘poor’ by emphasising that 
the approach revolves not only around a ‘lack or want’, but also around ‘defencelessness, 
insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks and stress’. The concept of vulnerability thus carries with 
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it both external and internal perspectives because it refers to external and structural ‘risk, shocks, 
and stress to which an individual or household is subject’ whilst equally looking at individual 
actions. Defencelessness pertains to ‘a lack of means to cope without damaging loss’ 
(CHAMBERS 1989: 33). Vulnerability can thus be understood as the level of defencelessness of a 
person or group of people in the face of danger, risk, crisis and shocks or after the occurrence of 
such damaging events. The resultant harms then limit or prohibit the functioning of certain 
components of people’s survival systems. So, a prerequisite to being categorised as ‘vulnerable’ 
are insufficient coping mechanisms (BOHLE 2005: 72). 
A general improvement in livelihood security is characterised by reduced vulnerability to 
enable the successful addressing of changes or shocks (ELLIS 2000: 42). Livelihood resilience is 
attained when those suffering from damaging events can compensate for the effects of the events, 
when they can restore the lost functions of their survival system or the capacity to deal with 
danger, and when they can repel damage (drawing from BÜRKNER 2010: 24). Moreover, a 
livelihood is popularly deemed socially and ecologically sustainable when it ‘can cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and 
in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base’ (CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 
1991: 6). According to their individual socio-theoretical context (BÜRKNER 2010: 24), 
sustainable livelihoods should be resilient when confronted with external shocks and stresses; 
should be self-sufficient even without external support (even with the availability of such support, 
it should be economically and institutionally sustainable); should preserve the long-term potential 
of natural resources; and should therefore reinforce, instead of undermine, the livelihoods of 
others or their options. On this basis, livelihoods should achieve environmental sustainability by 
conserving natural resources, ensure economic sustainability by achieving and sustaining a 
baseline level of economic welfare, guarantee social sustainability by minimising exclusion and 
maximising social equity, and accomplish institutional sustainability when structures and 
processes have the ability to perform over the long-term (DFID 2001: see Section 1.4). Progress 
made, the status of livelihood coping, and adaptation capacity should be benchmarked by 
outcomes such as income, well-being, vulnerability to shocks, food security and sustainability of 
the natural resource base (Ibid.: Section 2.6). In this way, locally distinct and thereby adequate 
and long-lasting solutions to development may be found (BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 104). 
Successful developments are thereby understood as a function of two basic elements: an external 
and an internal side to overall vulnerability.  
3.1.2. Externalities: Structural Constraints and Incentives  
The external dimension of vulnerability, structural constraints and incentives, are defined in 
the livelihoods approach as the ‘vulnerability context’ on the one hand and ‘transforming 
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structures and processes’ on the other. Both influence access to ‘assets and livelihood 
opportunities and the way in which these can be converted into outcomes’ (DE HAAN 2012: 
349). Of primary interest is an understanding of the vulnerability context, which can be altered by 
the institutional and political structures and processes that accompany it. 
3.1.2.1. Vulnerability Context 
The vulnerability context includes the broader external environment, exogenous factors or 
‘stressors’ (BOHLE 2011: 48) that lie outside the immediate influence of individual actors 
(WIESMANN et al. 2011: 234, 236). It affects the options that people have to engage in 
meaningful activities. Gaining an understanding of the vulnerability context is therefore an 
elementary step in livelihood analysis (DFID 2001: Section 2.2). 
Livelihood analysis involves an examination of the perceived and actual external ‘trends’, 
‘shocks’ and ‘seasonality’ (TANG et al. 2013: 18) of social, demographic, political, economic, 
technological and environmental relevance, in accordance with local characteristics (ELLIS 2000: 
39-40). These elements can be both positive and negative in terms of their effects on livelihoods, 
but they always change in accordance with their time horizons. In this regard, livelihood analysis 
provides three major distinctions: seasonality, trends and shocks.  
Seasonality generally refers to the constant and continuous, and thus often repeating, shifts 
in prices, employment opportunities and food availability over a year; such shifts are often 
deemed ‘one of the greatest and most enduring sources of hardship for poor people in developing 
countries’ (DFID 2001: Section 2.2). Trends point to changes in populations, resources, national 
and international economic systems, tendencies in governance and politics, and technological 
developments, which are often unilateral and taking place over medium to long time frames, 
possibly years or decades. In contrast to these more or less foreseeable events, shocks occur 
rapidly and are mostly unpredictable. Such events may result from war and conflict, flooding or 
drought, and crop and human diseases. These suddenly occurring events can directly influence all 
five types of asset, thereby having a devastating effect on the survival of individuals and 
households (ELLIS 2000: 39-44). Significant long-term processes (i.e. vulnerability factors) that 
require an adaptation of farmer livelihoods in northern Ghana are of an ecological and economic 
nature, as reflected in climatic changes and economic globalisation processes (LAUBE et al. 
2008; LAUBE et al. 2011; SCHRAVEN 2010: 18-21). 
Because of their time-bound definition, the separation of these livelihood threats is difficult 
to accomplish. A shift in prices, for example, can be a shock when it occurs suddenly but is 
classified as a trend when its occurrence proceeds over an extended period. Flooding or drought 
may no longer be categorised as a shock when it happens on an annual basis. These 
categorisations merge and change over time, and therefore require flexible handling in analysis. 
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Irrespective of their time scales, however, these events always affect people’s assets, which in 
turn are also influenced or ‘transformed’ by structures and processes. 
3.1.2.2. Transforming Structures and Processes 
Understanding transforming structures and processes involves a look at the prevailing 
social, cultural, institutional and organisational environments, including the private and public 
sectors and their respective policies and legislations (WIESMANN et al. 2011: 234-235). These 
areas are often viewed as the starting point for development interventions because they determine 
access to assets, terms of exchange among different assets, and the returns on or outcomes of 
livelihood strategies (DIDERO 2012: 17; OBRIST et al. 2011: 279; WIESMANN et al. 2011: 
234-235). In combination with people’s assets at hand, therefore, they define the ‘sensitivity’ of 
livelihoods whilst also serving as a response to vulnerability context stressors (BOHLE 2011: 48). 
Structures can be depicted as the ‘hardware’ of development, i.e. the concrete embodiment of 
public or private organisations and institutions, whereas processes serve as the ‘software’, which 
determine how these structures operate and interact through policies, legislation, culture or power 
relations (DFID 2001: Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). Nevertheless, public or private structures are not 
always external to livelihood systems but can partly incorporate and develop from these. A formal 
or informal coalition of households acting together can, for example, constitute an institution of its 
own (MENSAH 2012: 14). Democratic votes can determine government structures and processes. 
Social and cultural aspects, norms and values are driven by societal and human interactions and 
change, which necessarily also include the livelihoods of those being researched.  
Apart from their immediate influence upon assets, structures and processes also determine 
the ability to respond to external vulnerability factors. Livelihood strategies are adopted, and in 
turn respond to the performance of structures and processes (BOHLE 2011: 48). For instance, 
general trends can be shaped by public structures through political processes (e.g. influences on 
economic trends) by fostering certain developments through fiscal policies. In the case of farmers, 
the production of a certain crop can be stimulated by alterations to structures and processes, 
thereby altering both livelihood strategies and outcomes. Structures (the government and private 
sector) can thereby considerably influence pro-poor development. The public sector, for example, 
can also alleviate external shocks by supporting people with food in times of nutritional crisis 
(DFID 2001: Section 2.4).  
With regard to the private sector, trade among regions may help reduce the effects of 
seasonal food shortages by enabling people to generate income and secure the availability of food 
through markets. An important issue to keep in mind, however, is that the ‘normal’ functioning of 
markets can also cause food crises, famines and disasters. Hunger and famine are ‘not the result of 
market failures, but, on the contrary, one of the basic principles of markets that respond to 
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demand backed by cash and not by the needs of the vulnerable’ (BOHLE 2011: 49). Food 
entitlement can decline despite food availability. Famine can result from the erosion of people’s 
purchasing power, among other factors, but not necessarily because of a lack of production and 
physical availability of food (see also BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 101). Market structures are thus 
central to defining livelihood outcomes. These structures can provide access to certain assets, 
determine the terms of exchange among different types of capital, and define incomes as well as 
food security, and thereby the major outcomes of a given livelihood strategy. As with other 
structures, they also affect people’s sense of inclusion and well-being (DFID 2001: Section 2.4). 
If agricultural livelihood strategies are adjusted to market demand, then market structures 
effectively govern people’s use of their main natural resource – their land; such governance can 
then alter the sustainability of land use. Thus the influence of markets on livelihoods is crucial and 
cannot be overemphasised. Nonetheless, socio-economic and environmental circumstances are not 
the only factors that determine livelihood outcomes. Outcomes are also heavily dependent on 
what people do with their livelihoods, which brings us to the internal dimension of vulnerability. 
3.1.3. Internalities: Agency Constraints and Incentives 
The internal dimension of vulnerability concerns itself with agency constraints and 
incentives. It examines the assets that people use to pursue strategies or pathways towards desired 
outcomes. These elements fall under contextual influence but can exert feedback onto structures 
and processes through the assets that are or are not generated by livelihood outcomes. The 
primary determinants of livelihoods in this regard are assets and people’s access to them. 
3.1.3.1. Livelihood Assets 
Assets are the most important part of the internal side of vulnerability (ETZOLD 2012: 74) 
because these resources define the level of exposure to external vulnerability stressors (BOHLE 
2011: 48). A general lack of assets is a key issue for poverty alleviation because asset availability 
and access determine the direction of development and because a lack of such resources prevents 
people from escaping poverty; moreover, this deficiency causes social tensions (GEISER, 
BOTTAZZI, et al. 2011: 314). As much as any geographical vulnerability assessment, livelihood 
analysis is therefore primarily interested in the spatial dimension of the risk exposition of people’s 
assets (BOHLE 2005: 73). Although some researchers have argued for other types of assets, such 
as ‘political’ or ‘cultural capital’ (BAUMANN & SUBIR 2001: 1; MENSAH 2012: 35; VAN 
DIJK 2011: 105, 110), these resources popularly comprise natural, physical, human, financial and 
social capital. 
Natural capital pertains to the natural resource base; an examination of such capital 
explores issues concerning water, soil, air, land, pastures and forestry but also touches upon 
intangible goods, such as biodiversity, the hydrological cycle or the climate (DE HAAN 2000: 
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344; KANJI et al. 2005: 6; SCOONES 1998: 7-8). Natural capital is a dynamic asset that forms 
the production basis of agricultural livelihood activities. It is only partly renewable and therefore 
warrants use in a sustainable manner (ELLIS 2000: 32). Nonetheless, this resource can be partly 
substituted by physical capital.  
Physical capital generally encompasses man-made objects that are often created by 
economic production processes. Examples are infrastructure, transport, shelter, water, energy and 
communications, as well as houses, streets, irrigation systems, factories, electricity, and tools and 
machinery, such as farm equipment. Physical capital serves as an economic and livelihood 
diversification measure, as well as an extension of operating range. Transport infrastructure, for 
example, enables trade with distant markets and generally increases the mobility of a population. 
Use of farming equipment can increase yields. Irrigation infrastructure enables year-round 
production in arid areas. Physical capital can thus increase the use and efficiency of other forms of 
capital (e.g. natural capital) or even substitute it (DE HAAN 2000: 344; ELLIS 2000: 32; KANJI 
et al. 2005: 6) if human capital is at hand to utilise it.  
Human capital points first and foremost to labour, but it also pertains to skills, talents, 
experience, capabilities, knowledge and creativity, as well as health and individual issues, i.e. 
physical attributes that enable people to successfully pursue their desired livelihood strategies (DE 
HAAN 2000: 344; SCOONES 1998: 7-8). Under the assumption of a lack of physical capital (e.g. 
machinery), human capital is another central asset in livelihood upkeep because it positions 
human labour as a major input in agricultural production, especially in rural Africa. Furthermore, 
in relation to the complexity of an individual setting, sufficient education and knowledge (which 
may in turn require financial capital), both at individual and societal levels (ELLIS 2000: 33-34), 
are central to improving general livelihood outcomes. Human capital is constantly shaped and 
therefore dynamic because education and health issues are often determined by macro political 
developments and time.  
Financial capital refers to money in a savings account or in an ‘old sock’, i.e. a loan or 
credit (DE HAAN 2000: 344). This asset represents the purely monetary and economic basis of 
livelihoods – its stocks and flows (KANJI et al. 2005: 6) – but it may occasionally be difficult to 
distinguish from other forms of capital. In rural settings, for example, financial capital is often 
invested in animals; these are often referred to as people’s bank accounts. Rearing animals may 
afford farmers higher returns than offered by financial institutions. This situation stems from the 
fact that developing countries are frequently characterised by high and constant inflation, and 
therefore, the devaluation of currency. Furthermore, access to financial institutions is severely 
limited in the rural settings of many developing countries. Credit is even more difficult to access, 
and if offered at all, comes with exorbitant interest rates (ELLIS 2000: 34). Animals serve as 
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substitutes for bank accounts and credit, if credit cannot be acquired from family and friends via 
the possession of social capital.  
Social capital points to the quality of relationships among people, e.g. relationships with 
family, friends or neighbours (DE HAAN 2000: 344). It is another elementary asset for earning a 
living because people are, by nature, social beings and thus embedded in a social environment 
where they are compelled to interact (SCOONES 1998: 7-8). Interaction in social networks or 
general structures allows (or excludes) the securing of benefits and immediate access to social 
support, as regulated by norms and sanctions (AßHEUER et al. 2013: 23). Social capital therefore 
refers to the degree to which one can act in a social context through networks, social relationships 
and affiliations with certain groups, as well as through individual positions (e.g. profession, class) 
within society. The latter partly derive from historical backgrounds and are upheld by norms and 
traditions. Social interconnectedness is thereby upheld as the basis for creating mutual trust, and 
thereby, mutual benefit or reciprocity within a group. At a basic level, social capital can be further 
subdivided into voluntary or horizontal, as well as forced or vertical, relationships (BOHLE 2005: 
71; ELLIS 2000: 36-37). Thus, political capital is partly already incorporated in the analysis of 
social capital, since power relations can be described in horizontal and vertical terms. Elements of 
cultural capital are also captured in the social capital concept, due to the incorporation of 
(traditional) norms and values upon which social capital is built to attain a certain hierarchical 
level with proportionate benefits. When actors occupy a similar level and are possibly emotionally 
attached to one another, their social connections are often subsumed as ‘bonding ties’, pointing at 
friends and family. ‘Bridging ties’ exist between less attached actors, those of different groups or 
communities, but with similar socio-economic backgrounds. ‘Liking ties’ are understood as 
purely vertical, somewhat forced relationships, ‘such as employer and employee or landlord and 
tenant’. The setup of hierarchies defines the ability to ‘self-organise’, to ‘learn and act 
collectively’ for mutual benefits. The level of trust between actors is the most relevant indicator 
for the assessment of social capital among them (AßHEUER et al. 2013: 23-24). 
Most often, if not always, in livelihood analysis, the above-mentioned assets are graphically 
arranged in the form of a pentagon; such an arrangement became the brand of livelihood 
frameworks (DE HAAN 2012: 346). The pentagon is supposed to visually emphasise the 
substitutability and the inter-relationships among the assets (DFID 2001: see Section 1.4 and 2.3), 
as a descriptive method for evaluating them (MENSAH 2012: 30). As previously indicated, all 
five assets can be combined, substituted and switched, thereby leading to the creation of highly 
varying portfolios (SCOONES 2009: 177). Yet, some assets are more important than others. 
Natural capital is generally considered the most important in rural areas because residents 
depend heavily on farming, which in turn necessitates suitable lands for production. Most 
livelihood strategies are based on access to natural capital. In urban areas, this asset becomes less 
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relevant than physical capital (e.g. shelter) and financial capital (e.g. income earned from wage 
labour) (DE HAAN 2000: 344). Irrespective of the level of urbanisation, however, financial 
capital significantly influences the type of livelihood strategy that people pursue (SCOONES 
1998: 7-8). Moreover, non-material assets now receive a greater prominence in studies on rural 
livelihoods (JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 577), especially social and human capital.  
In the case of social capital, vertical relationships are limited by the manner in which they 
can be changed and influenced; e.g. the relationship between a worker and his employer. Given 
this backdrop, horizontal relationships (e.g. family or friendship) are often the last resort in times 
of crisis. Investments in social capital, especially horizontal relations that offer support, are 
therefore often seen as a way of securing the basics of livelihoods, and are of great concern for the 
poor (BOHLE 2005: 71; ELLIS 2000: 36-37). Poor people often live in an environment that 
compels them to rely primarily on their neighbours, family, extended kin and networks 
(WOOLCOCK & SWEETSER 2002: 26). Slum dwellers in Dhaka, for example, deal remarkably 
well with their high vulnerability to natural hazards, mostly through their high social capital 
(AßHEUER et al. 2013: 21). Yet, social capital is difficult to measure and analyse because the 
reciprocity that results from investments frequently occurs only in times of severe crisis (ELLIS 
2000: 36-37). The growing importance of human capital arises from the fact that knowledge is 
often deemed key to poverty alleviation given that it enables people to independently advance 
their living conditions through the effective use of all their assets. Sufficient health and adequate 
nutrition are other basic needs for any productive livelihood and effective education (ELLIS 2000: 
33-34). 
Assets ‘give people the capability to be and to act’ (BEBBINGTON 1999: 2022; KANJI et 
al. 2005: 6); these resources therefore ‘govern’ livelihood options (MENSAH 2012: 30) by 
quantity, quality, tenure, control, need of and access to them. The generated strategies or 
pathways can thereby be transformed into different livelihood outcomes, which can then create or 
diminish other assets (KANJI et al. 2005: 6; SCOONES 2009: 177; SCOONES 1998: 7-8). Assets 
include both tangible resources and intangible claims and access (CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 
1991: 9-12) – a definition that again underlines the importance of non-material assets, such as 
human and social capital. Beyond the immediate influence of social capital on an individual 
(household), therefore, assets also reside in a larger ‘social fabric’. This position further intersects 
‘with technology, ecology and socioeconomic differentiation’ (SCOONES & WOLMER 2002: 
27), which can entitle or limit access to assets. The prevailing social environment as well as the 
broader institutional and regulatory setting determines access to assets their valorisation, and the 
possible combinations of assets (BOHLE 2011: 47). General access to assets is often defined by 
social categories, among them class, caste, gender, ethnicity and age (GEISER, BOTTAZZI, et al. 
2011: 319-320). To identify these categories and their effects, inequality in the distribution of 
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access to and control over assets is accorded priority in livelihood studies (DE HAAN 2005: 2; 
JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 576-577). Furthermore, assets are activated when livelihood 
systems need to cope or adapt to change (KAISER & ROTHFUß 2013: 4). They thus define the 
level of exposure to stressors from the vulnerability context (BOHLE 2011: 48). 
3.1.3.2. Livelihood ‘Strategies’ or ‘Pathways’ 
Livelihood ‘strategies’ (as defined by DFID 2001) is the original term used for the actions 
people take to generate outcomes – their livelihood ‘responses’ (BOHLE 2011: 48). As explained 
in the course of this section, however, these strategies are better understood as ‘pathways’. This 
section examines how livelihood strategies are generally understood and challenges the rational 
choice theoretical underpinning of mainstream thinking. It then addresses this criticism by laying 
emphasis on those elements that crucially influence people’s actions. 
Livelihood strategies generally emphasise ‘the active or even proactive role’ of the poor in 
advancing their own situation (DE HAAN & ZOOMERS 2005: 2) – a common and important 
characteristic of most livelihood approaches (KAAG et al. 2004: 49). Analysis focuses on the 
spatial articulation of strategies in general, and the strategies of vulnerable groups in particular 
(BOHLE 2005: 73). Strategies can be understood as what people do with what they have, because 
they are the choices that people employ when pursuing productive purposes (TANG et al. 2013: 
18). All strategies are aimed at acquiring livelihood outcomes that ‘yield optimal returns’ 
(MENSAH 2012: 12). An important issue, however, is that strategies rarely refer to a single 
activity but also include complicated, multi-faceted schemes, in which contextual factors are 
incorporated (GAILLARD et al. 2009: 121). They are dynamic and therefore adjust in accordance 
with the different contextual and endowment situations in which people find themselves (START 
& JOHNSON 2004: 30).  
Classification of livelihood strategies is problematic because the categories may interrelate 
and a mixing of strategies is possible (HUSSEIN & NELSON 1998: 4-5), indeed common. 
Strategies can be differentiated by their direct or indirect reliance on the use or exploitation of 
natural resources. Activities such as agriculture, gathering of food, and animal husbandry are 
natural resource based, but these also include off-farm activities, such as moulding of bricks for 
house construction, weaving or roof construction. Occupations such as trading or the provision of 
services are classified under the second form of resources (physical capital), for they are not 
natural resource based (ELLIS 2000: 40). In the case of farmers one can distinguish the most 
basic strategies as either on-farm or off-farm activities (JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 574). 
Referring to agriculture, SCOONES (1998: 9-10) differentiated three basic agricultural strategies: 
(1) the intensification or extensification of croplands; (2) the diversification of livelihood sources, 
thus venturing into the production of other crops or engagement in off-farm activities; and (3) 
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migration – whether seasonal or permanent – which is intended to provide a new or additional 
basis for securing livelihoods. Intensification can increase productivity and therefore result in 
higher outcomes in terms of money and food. However, it necessitates high inputs, and therefore, 
assets at hand. Extensification reduces input use relative to the area cultivated, thereby allowing 
for improved conservation of the natural resource base by stimulating savings on or the 
abandonment of inorganic fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides. It can also mean a diversification 
in crops to ease the negative effects of monocultures (LOHBERG 2001: 150; SCOONES 1998: 9-
10). Extensification can be achieved by either using more land but each plot less intensively, or by 
integrated management that minimises the negative effects of chemical inputs or restores soil 
fertility with the help of ‘close-to-nature’ approaches. Such management is used to ‘maintain and 
restore soil fertility and to maintain sustainable production through practices such as low input 
resource-conserving technologies based on integrated management’ (IAASTD 2008: 1-2). A 
combination of strategies is always of special political significance because certain activities may 
have to be substituted should policies hinder people from engaging in them; the potential for 
changing strategies is subject to available options (ELLIS 2000: 40).  
Other categorisations of strategies are based on time frames. Accordingly, strategies can be 
differentiated into spontaneous acts, short-term coping, long-term mitigation or enhancement 
(DIDERO 2012: 29). All of these require a mobilisation of assets (KRÜGER 2003: 11), but they 
entail either a high or low potential for flexible response. Depending on the vulnerability context 
that surrounds people, shocks will require short-term reactions (i.e. coping responses), and 
therefore, an immediate mobilisation of (the remaining) assets, especially social capital; possibly, 
such events will compel the sale of movable assets and access to new income sources or migration 
(ELLIS 2000: 39-44). Long-term changes (i.e. trends) will require adaptation, and thus, a long-
term alteration of livelihood strategies, a reconfiguration of the use of assets, which will ‘either 
enhance existing security and wealth or try to reduce vulnerability’ (DAVIES & HOSSAIN 1997: 
5). From a similar perspective but with greater emphasis on living conditions and life phases, 
ZOOMERS (1999) distinguished compensatory, security, accumulation and consolidation 
strategies. Compensatory strategies prevail among those dealing with sudden shocks and those 
having to deal with structural shortages of land or labour power. These individuals are often 
characterised by downward social mobility. Their survival strategies include migration, sale of 
capital and borrowing, and increased reliance on family social security. Security strategies are 
often implemented in areas where livelihoods are at risk for ecological reasons. These strategies 
include diversification by multi-cropping and multi-tasking, the exploration of non-agricultural 
opportunities, sharecropping and stockpiling. Accumulation strategies are used to create a 
minimum resource base for future expansion, and improvements for upward social mobility with a 
long-term horizon. Such courses of action can include migration, land acquisition and labour 
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recruitment. Consolidation strategies follow a period of social upward mobility, whereby now-
wealthier households invest to stabilise their well-being and improve their short-term situation 
given that surplus assets are available (Ibid.: 48-51). 
Together with the capabilities of individuals, assets are the single most important factor 
defining the scope of strategic action and forms of adaptation, coping and enhancement (DE 
HAAN 2012: 346; MENSAH 2012: 10). Assets and individual capability are accorded such 
importance because one cannot accomplish meaningful goals out of what one does not have 
access to. As previously indicated, however, strategies also depend on higher-ranking institutional 
and political-economic frame conditions, as well as on the actual and perceived vulnerability 
context (GERTEL 2007: 60; TANG et al. 2013: 18). With regard to these external factors, 
institutional processes are of particular interest because they guide strategies and mediate the 
ability to accomplish goals and achieve outcomes (SCOONES 1998: 3). Government decisions on 
agricultural policies, for example, set farmers’ frame conditions and scopes of action. Similarly, 
the actions that farmers take may affect future policies (RAUCH 2003: 37). Primarily, effective 
agrarian policies require ‘a solid understanding of the land-based livelihood strategies and 
aspirations of the rural poor’ (JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 574). An assumption that remains 
questionable, however, is the ability of livelihood analysis in its current state to thoroughly 
elucidate aspirations and resultant actions. This question arises because of the underlying 
assumptions of the approach that surface when observing the concept of ‘strategies’. The notion 
of actions being rational ‘strategies’ needs to be challenged.  
Livelihood approaches, especially their concept of strategic behaviour, are orientated in 
accordance with the principles of rational choice theory (GERTEL 2007: 61). This orientation 
attests to a meaningful, utility maximising motive behind each and every pursued economic and 
social activity; this motivation is a homo oeconomicus ideal (SAKDAPOLRAK 2014: 20). In the 
case of farmers, however, such an assumption may not hold (SCHNEIDER et al. 2010: 333). 
JAKIMOV (2013: 499) emphasises that intentionality in livelihood strategies can be partly absent 
because alternative ways of living that contrast with parental lifestyles are ‘seldom considered real 
possibilities’. Thus, the scope of action can be based on both rational and strategic thought but is 
most often also grounded on unintentional behaviour (DE HAAN & ZOOMERS 2005: 27). Part 
of this scope of action is influenced by social expectations and cultural and societal sensitivities 
(MENSAH 2012: 12). Therefore, the idea that people act entirely freely and rationally on the 
basis of their endowments is (science) ‘fiction’ (DÖRFLER et al. 2003: 13). A concept based on 
the assumption of the existence of a homo oeconomicus can lead to the neglect of aspects of 
people’s lives that go beyond immediate political, economic and material dimensions (BOHLE 
2009: 528). Among these aspects are people’s perceptions, ideas, hopes and fears, norms and 
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values (KAAG et al. 2004: 54). Critics thus argue that in livelihood analysis, an ‘explicit reference 
to a theory that explains people’s actions is lacking’ (SAKDAPOLRAK 2014: 20). 
In acknowledgement of this profound critique, it is appropriate to assume that important 
components of decision-making and learning processes that lead to action and adaptation are not 
necessarily entirely rational but embedded in a ‘social [or livelihood] context that is beyond the 
control of the individual decision-maker’ (CARR 2008: 690). This context offers only a limited 
space for decision-making and action and is permanently shaped by institutions and social 
arrangements (SCOONES & WOLMER 2002: 183). ‘Livelihood pathways’, but not ‘strategies’, 
arise through co-ordination among actors. This co-ordination is a product of individual strategic 
behaviour within a historical repertoire, and is a result of social differentiation, which thereby also 
includes power relations and institutional processes that pre-structure decision-making (DE 
HAAN 2005: 145). Thus, although the factual presence or absence of assets plays a role, the 
preferences of ‘other actors and the limitations imposed by these actors and higher-level 
institutions’ (DE BRUIJN & VAN DIJK 2005: 10-12) are equally important because they may 
grant or deny access to certain assets and pathways. For example, DE HAAN and KAMANZI 
(DE HAAN & KAMANZI 2011) demonstrate that objectives, policies and instruments can be 
challenged and altered by several actors in arenas at different scales to a degree wherein ‘their 
actual outcome and impact may have very little to do with any original goals’ (Ibid.: 119). Apart 
from acknowledging people’s perception, norms and values (KAAG et al. 2004: 54), therefore, 
livelihood analysis necessitates understanding aspects of power to thereby ‘effectively contribute 
to livelihood enhancement’ (DE HAAN 2012: 346). Scholars have attempted to acquire such an 
understanding by incorporating the aforementioned ‘political capital’ into the portfolio of assets. 
Others have looked into chain-like discursive arenas (see DE HAAN & KAMANZI 2011) and/or 
have included Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and social fields into their concepts (AßHEUER et al. 
2013; DIDERO 2012; DÖRFLER et al. 2003; ETZOLD 2012; JAKIMOV 2013; 
SAKDAPOLRAK 2014; VAN DIJK 2011). 
This interpretation of livelihood analysis as a whole and of livelihood strategies in 
particular, as well as the resultant critique, is not entirely applicable. As previously indicated, 
agency constraints and structural obstacles are elementary components of livelihood analysis. 
Social capital covers aspects of power. Furthermore, the understanding of livelihood activities has 
never been neutral to processes of inclusion, exclusion, and thus power because the examination 
of marginalisation processes is intrinsic to livelihood analysis. It is in itself a rights-based 
approach given that contextual or structural variables exercise influence and define access and 
entitlements to assets. An exploration of power is incorporated into livelihood analysis by (for 
example) the analysis of transforming structures and processes, and policies and their mediating 
effects on livelihood scopes of action. Thus, ‘power, politics and social difference – and the 
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governance implications of these – have been central’; though, many studies have factually 
remained at the margins of discussions possibly because economic approaches dominated their 
concerns (SCOONES 2009: 180).  
In conclusion the livelihood approach does not require additional theoretical additives or 
enhancements to understand the role power exerts on livelihood pathways. However, special 
emphasis should be placed on the perception of norms and values, the pro-poor functioning of 
power and institutions in general, and how decisions are shaped in this context. Furthermore, 
people’s logic and reasoning – their decision-making – should be understood in local terms; which 
has consequences for the methodological approach taken by this research (see Chapter 4). The 
spectrum of individual activities that arise (from people’s reasoning) can be aggregated into 
higher-ranking, yet more complex understandings at the household, village or even district level 
(SCOONES 2009: 172). A systematic comparison of livelihood decisions in different 
geographical, socio-economic, cultural or temporal circumstances (including a consideration of 
power aspects, which are also based on social norms and aspirations) should therefore enable 
sufficient recognition of pathway patterns that go beyond a specific case (DE HAAN 2005: 146). 
Through such recognition, it is possible to derive insights into how these general pathways 
influence broad-based livelihood outcomes.  
3.1.3.3. Livelihood Outcomes  
Livelihood outcomes are generated by livelihood pathways, which in turn, depend on the 
assets at hand for a decision-making process in a vulnerability context and under the influence of 
transforming structures and processes (see before and WIESMANN et al. 2011: 235). Thus, 
livelihood outcomes are temporal results of the dynamics between socio-economic and ecological 
conditions, the external drivers of ‘adaptive capacities of exposed and sensitive agents’ (ETZOLD 
2012: 72) who struggle ‘within unequal fields of social relations’ (SAKDAPOLRAK 2014: 24). 
‘Outcomes’ are termed as such (and not as ‘objectives’) because the neutrality of the term enables 
the inclusion of local perceptions in defining sustainability, yet still underlines the strong 
achievement orientation of the approach (DFID 2001: Section 2.6). Outcomes are measured by 
combining a traditional view of poverty lines with a wider framing of well-being and 
sustainability (SCOONES 2009: 177), but are based on the perceptions of the poor (DE HAAN 
2005: 10) instead of externally defined poverty lines. Through these indicators, livelihood analysis 
aims at efficient ‘achievements […] and progress in poverty elimination’ because it focuses 
attention on exactly these accomplishments (DFID 2001: Section 2.6). Naturally they vary 
(SCOONES 2009: 172), not only in accordance with time, but also in accordance with the group 
of people being investigated. Five indicators of general welfare are central to any assessment of 
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outcomes: income, well-being, vulnerability (specifically to economic shocks and natural 
disasters), food security and sustainable use of natural resources (MENSAH 2012: 12). 
- Food security is a primary indicator because it is the basis required to engage in meaningful 
activities and to stay healthy. It is thus elementary to achieving other outcomes, e.g. quality of 
life cannot be attained when an individual suffers from hunger or starvation. It is assigned a 
separate category owing to its fundamental importance. Hunger and dietary inadequacy are 
distinct dimensions of deprivation (DFID 2001: Section 2.6; ETZOLD 2012: 72).  
- Very closely connected to food security is income because it is a main entitlement factor for 
food, but possibly also education and general quality of life. Income as an indicator 
acknowledges that people seek to increase their net returns on activities and is thereby an 
elementary part of economic and social sustainability (DFID 2001: Section 2.6). 
- Although material or productive resources are the primary determinants of quality of life 
(JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 576), well-being explicitly prompts a focus on non-material 
aspects, such as personal sense of security, social status and identity (ETZOLD 2012: 76). 
Security in this context can be understood as guaranteed ownership of or access to resources 
and livelihood activities that are necessary to offset risk and ease shocks (BOHLE 2009: 521). 
Thus, individual material well-being often depends on non-material societal factors and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, what motivates people to undergo certain livelihood activities is ‘not 
simply the acquisition of more stuff or security’; but rather is a matter of ‘dignity, enjoyment 
and meaning’ (VAN DIJK 2011: 102). Livelihoods may advance through non-material 
improvements despite a continuous lack of material aspects (DE HAAN & LAKWO 2010: 
542). ‘People [simply] value nonmaterial goods. Their sense of well-being is affected by 
numerous factors including: their self-esteem, sense of control and inclusion, physical security 
of household members, their health status, access to services, political enfranchisement, 
maintenance of their cultural heritage, etc.’ (DFID 2001: Section 2.6). Well-being comprises 
several factors and substantially embraces the bottom-up approach of livelihood analysis.  
- The analysis of vulnerability looks into the available cushions against the negative effects 
stemming from the vulnerability context. It demands a holistic view of the interplay between 
contextual and internal factors, and tries to reduce the downside of external factors, with a 
focus on social aspects (Ibid.: Section 2.6). It thus identifies ways of minimising exclusion and 
maximising equity (Ibid.: Section 1.4) and is tightly interwoven with well-being and the other 
livelihood outcomes.  
- The sustainable use of natural resources refers to environmental sustainability in general and 
thereby emphasises the long-term benefits of sensible resource use (Ibid.: Section 2.6). 
Especially in this era of increasing climatic and environmental change, this factor may have to 
be accorded increased attention.  
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Livelihood outcomes are affected by collective and household-level responses, which feed 
back into local conditions, institutions and pathways (DE HAAN & ZOOMERS 2005: 42), as 
well as the wider vulnerability context (TANG et al. 2013: 18). Outcomes will be more 
sustainable in terms of asset gains if an adequate mix of assets for value addition is present; this 
mix is adopted to address potential risks (BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 104). In agriculture, 
appropriate pathways and resultant outcomes of development depend mainly on current and 
potential comparative advantage in terms of three crucial interacting factors: agricultural potential, 
access to markets and population pressure. Agricultural potential includes dynamic aspects such 
as rainfall, altitude, soil type and depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases. Population 
pressure determines the work intensity of agriculture through the land-to-labour ratio and alters 
the comparative advantage of labour intensive pathways and returns on investments. However, it 
is mainly (global/globalised) agricultural markets that dynamically determine the comparative 
advantage of a location’s absolute agricultural potential (PENDER et al. 1999: 36-38) and thereby 
overall livelihood outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate approaches that specifically 
address market rationales; here chain and production network concepts. 
3.2. Markets and Chain and Production Network Concepts 
The origins of chain and production network concepts date back to the 1950s. Chains of 
(agricultural) products were observed by scholars and practitioners, resulting in the ‘filière’ 
concept of the 1970s (ERMANN 2005: 98). It served as a means of understanding organisational 
and spatial alignments of value-adding steps in production, processing and distribution processes, 
by describing linear input-output structures, flows of materials and market values among the 
different segments involved at micro to regional, and eventually to macroeconomic levels 
(BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 208-209; KULKE 2007: 118-119). Simultaneously, and especially 
since the mid-1970s shortly before the term ‘globalisation’ was popularised and global trade 
liberalisation became a more significant issue, IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN was among the 
first to conceptualise the phenomenon of global market expansion and its effects on poverty.  
WALLERSTEIN observed and defined historical, global trade interactions as relevant units 
and reference points for social, economic and political action. The world system that he described 
was a global economic system centred on mercantile exchange, by which he elucidated the 
actions, self-organisation and embedding of economic actors into the context of global markets. 
He attempted to understand the effects of market exchanges and the resultant modifications in 
social systems and thereby historical trends that pre-structure and limit the current scope of human 
action and agency (ZÜNDORF 2010: 10, 43-44). His approach acknowledged underdevelopment 
as a result of structural constraints, of integration into capitalist world trade and resultant unequal 
economic exchanges (BIERSCHENK 2002: 4). He further incorporated spatial, temporal, 
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quantitative and qualitative trade functions in relation to the value gains along a production and 
trade chain, from producers to consumers. WALLERSTEIN thus looked into product chains, 
within which production and distributional processes are interlinked and all involved activities are 
commodified. In these, he saw the key to processes that produce global inequalities (OUMA et al. 
2012: 227; ZÜNDORF 2010: 29).  
It was against this background that the notion of commodity chains then emerged on a 
broader scale (COE 2009: 556). But it was not before the 1990s that the analysis of such 
economic interrelations increasingly served as an avenue from which to comprehend global to 
local linkages. Increased interest stemmed from massively growing trade liberalisation, and thus, 
further and increasing economic globalisation processes (OUMA et al. 2012: 227). A multitude of 
research avenues emerged, some from business-orientated research and others from sociological 
literature, in which chains and later networks were used to conceptualise production systems 
(COE 2009: 556). Further initial theoretical enrichments came from Global Commodity Chain 
(GCC) approaches, which evolved primarily in the 1990s at a time when globalisation processes 
gave rise to the question of the extent to which GCCs would serve as opportunities for developing 
countries or create new dependencies.  
Much of the ideas on GCCs are based on the works of GEREFFI, mostly in cooperation 
with KORZENIEWICZ (GEREFFI & KORZENIEWICZ 1994), who found that conceptual 
renewal was necessary because a growing complexity in production processes and their 
organisation increasingly limited the analytical capabilities of traditional views. Value-adding 
processes that involved several independent ventures in different countries could no longer be 
appropriately grasped and analysed. Conceptual predecessors had failed to considered non-
material linkages, such as information, opportunistic behaviour of actors or the influence of 
governance and power. These aspects and especially issues of governance were later picked up by 
the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 207-211; KULKE 2007: 
119). A further evolution of approaches was prompted by an ever-growing complexity in global 
economic transactions. The Global Production Networks (GPN) perspective emerged, which 
recognised the importance of and expanded the theoretical perspective to incorporate wider (social 
power) networks of production (COE & HESS 2008: 267; PATEL-CAMPILLO 2011: 80).  
These approaches and concepts – aside from the rather technical notion of ‘filière’ – all 
address the question of development. This is reflected mostly in the idea of economic, social or 
environmental ‘upgrading’ of smallholder producers, as pursued since the establishment of the 
GCC approach. Parallel to this and within the broad field of pro-poor or inclusive market 
development, popularly termed ‘making markets work for the poor’ (M4P), such approaches have 
gained further momentum using the label ‘value chain development’ (BATTERBURY et al. 2011: 
4). It is thus necessary to take a closer look at what these concepts encompass and how they try to 
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address questions of development and upgrading. In this regard, special potential in the case of 
agriculture is seen to reside in contract and outgrower farming.  
3.2.1. Global Commodity Chains  
GEREFFI defines GCCs as ‘sets of interorganisational networks clustered around one 
commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-
economy’ (GEREFFI 1996: 2). The concept roughly differentiates between two types of chains – 
producer-driven and buyer-driven chains – each accompanied by power asymmetries that favour 
either side. Thereby, producer-driven chains were characterised by high technological competency 
and capital-intensive production, thus creating a quasi-monopoly with corresponding supremacy 
in control over an entire chain. Buyer-driven chains, on the other hand, were characterised by 
considerable flexibility in exchanging producers should price or quality specifications be 
unsatisfied. Such exchange was possible because of the simple nature of the buyer-driven chains: 
numerous manufacturers could produce their products. Because these manufacturers had no 
access to the end-consumers, they were dependent on so-called lead firms who provided market 
access and thereby controlled the commodity chain and dictated contractual terms, including 
prices. Consequently, buyer-driven chains provided only marginal opportunities to producers for 
value addition, capacity building and independent development (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 209-
210). GEREFFI and KORZENIEWICZ identified four major elements of global commodity 
chains (see also GEREFFI 1995; 1994):  
- An input-output structure covering tangible and intangible flows, and thus, raw materials and 
semi-finished products on the one hand and information and knowledge on the other; 
- A governance structure that determines how and by whom a chain is controlled and how 
resources and value addition are allocated; 
- A spatial structure, a territoriality, that is expressed in the geographical concentration and 
dispersion of the chain and its elements; and 
- An institutional structure that sets the reference frame for the interplay of chain elements by 
embedding these in regional, national and international rules and regulations. 
The GCC approach was well received because it yielded a number of empirical works and 
deepened the scientific understanding of globalisation processes and their spatial effects. 
Nevertheless, its abstract, linear and sequential view was increasingly contested (DIETSCHE 
2011: 29). It became clear that reality is characterised by networks, not chains, of production and 
distribution. Furthermore, the institutional aspects of chains were often neglected and the 
dichotomist view of chains being either producer-driven or buyer-driven became increasingly 
questionable. As a result, further improvements to the conceptualisations were made through an 
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additional differentiation of typologies in global value chain (GVC) approaches (BRAUN & 
SCHULZ 2012: 210-211).  
3.2.2. Global Value Chains 
Similar to its predecessors GVC analysis examines the line of value addition, from initial 
design and production to consumer delivery, thus covering the local, national, regional and 
international level, whereby at each step, the worth of a commodity increases. It looks into 
exchanges among stakeholders within a chain and attempts to explain the effect of revenues 
generated by consumer spending; such revenues are transferred to relative revenues for actors 
along the line (KANJI et al. 2005: 9). The analysis therefore devotes attention to cost structures in 
production, processing, transport and retail, as well as to opportunities for economies of scale and 
scope and the surplus generated for each partner in a chain (RUBEN et al. 2006: 6). The decisive 
difference that GVC analysis brought forth is a more detailed scrutiny of chain governance. 
Basing their assumptions on transaction cost theory, whereby companies minimise their costs in 
acquiring, processing and distributing a product (DA SILVA 2005b: 12-14; DIETSCHE 2011: 24-
25), GEREFFI, HUMPHREY and STURGEON (GEREFFI et al. 2005) found three determinants 
for the type of governance established:  
1. The complexity of transactions in terms of information; 
2. The degree of codification of information for handing over; and  
3. The competency of partners in the chain to live up to requirements.  
GEREFFI et al. (2005: 84-85 and 89) singled out five different forms of GVC governance 
and coordination, differentiating between market-based, modular, relational, captive and 
hierarchical forms. Generally, companies seek to reduce transaction costs under the conditions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism of involved actors. If costs are low, they will tend towards 
market governance; though when costs are high, they will be inclined towards contracting or 
integration to reduce the costs. Transaction costs are thus largely explanatory for the governance 
structures in a chain (TRIENEKENS 2012: 54). Market-based types are characterised by a low 
degree of coordination and power asymmetry, whereas the other extreme – hierarchical forms – 
are fully ruled in a powerful lead firm (GEREFFI et al. 2005: 84-85 and 89):  
1. Market relations are found mostly in classical foreign trade on world markets. With highly 
standardised products, transfer of knowledge is rarely needed. Many consumers face many 
producers, and prices develop in accordance with supply and demand. Transactions are thus 
often based on single sales and feature low complexity.  
2. Modular relations imply some sort of information exchange between actors, even though 
producers work independently. Producers may accumulate some technical and mercantile 
expertise. As a result, some producers progress from component to full suppliers because of 
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their involvement in a producer-dominated chain. In modular relations, therefore, no single and 
powerful buyer, but many buyers and producers, are at work. With the help of turn-key 
suppliers and customers, products may be further developed. Turn-key suppliers may engage 
in contractual agreements with producers and lead firms.  
3. Relational value chains are often based on long-term cooperation, and thus, trust. They are not 
necessarily formalised but imply more connectedness than that achieved with market-based 
relations; nonetheless, such connectedness may also be a sign of the weakness of lead firms. 
They may also be less coordinated and asymmetric in power relations than modular value 
chains.  
4. Captive relations, on the other hand, are characterised by a strong lead firm, which signs formal 
contracts with independent producers. Producers have few but specific tasks under the control 
of the lead firm. The chain is thus heavily buyer driven, and producers encounter difficulties in 
identifying alternatives. Most of the components of a product’s value chain are strictly 
controlled by the lead firm in terms of development, design, organisation from production to 
consumption, quality and efficiency. 
5. Once an entire chain is under the complete control of one enterprise, this situation is referred to 
as a hierarchical chain (GEREFFI et al. 2005: 89; KULKE 2007: 121-122; SCHAMP 2008: 6-
8).  
A special focus of the GVC approach is its examination of the temporal dynamics in the 
coordination and governance of chains, and thereby, the advancement of producers, or rather, the 
acquisition of a more favourable form of governance through the attainment of competency. Many 
scholars have searched for possibilities to advance producers within chains through so-called 
‘upgrading’ (see Section 3.2.4). Still, profound criticism against the approach arose from the fact 
that ‘governance’ and ‘coordination’ are weakly defined and often treated as synonymous 
(DIETSCHE 2011: 31, 33). In fact, the understanding of governance has been extensively debated 
in the literature on GVCs, thereby producing a vast number of definitions (NADVI 2008: 324). 
In general terms, governance describes the institutional structures (including laws and 
norms) by which rules are set and implemented (Ibid.: 324). Governance should be understood as 
the broader institutional structures that guide a chain as a whole. Coordination is the relation and 
organisation of trade-offs among different elements at nodes of chains (i.e. at points where a 
product is exchanged or significantly altered) within the broader governance framework 
(GIBBON & PONTE 2005: 3; PONTE 2007: 4). Governance can influence coordination, 
although the opposite is rare. Such a conceptual divide is important when analysing manifold, 
fragmented and complex chains that may lack distinct lead firms but are practiced by a multitude 
of small-scale enterprises, as can be assumed to be the case in rural Africa. An overall governance 
structure, in the previous sense, may then simply be non-existent (DIETSCHE 2011: 34). Yet 
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capitalist principles governing the chain remain, indicating that coordination arrangements will 
generally be aimed at minimising total production and transaction costs. These arrangements 
depend on the items produced, how they are to be produced (including quality aspects), and how 
physical product flow in terms of quantity and timing is handled (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 
2002: 1021). Another criticism against the approach points to the deficient analysis of the effects 
of institutions and external actors (DIETSCHE 2011: 31, 33), which led to the use of the Global 
Production Networks (GPN) approach. GPN defines governance and coordination as taking place 
in wider sets of actors and institutions, and partly independent of economic rationalities.  
3.2.3. Global Production Networks 
The GPN approach is based on GCC and GVC analyses and largely includes their analytical 
scopes while also encompassing other dimensions (PATEL-CAMPILLO 2011: 80), such as that 
of actor-network theory (COE & HESS 2008: 267). GPN evolved as a result of the criticism 
lodged against GCC and GVC approaches (DARBY 2013: 45), thus it explicitly focuses on the 
institutional and territorial embeddedness of ventures. GPN thereby widens the view of GCC and 
GVC in the sense that it enlarges its predecessors’ analytical frame with social, political, societal 
and cultural dimensions. GPN thereby looks into vertical, often global, interconnections within 
value chains and into local horizontal embeddedness, i.e. a chain’s entanglements with other 
actors in local environments (KULKE 2013: 146). On the basis of the central elements of GCC 
and GVC, the GPN framework additionally ‘emphasizes the complex intra-, inter- and extra-firm 
networks involved in any economic activity, and how these are structured both organizationally 
and geographically’ (COE 2009: 557). Thus, the GPN view encompasses a wider set of actors and 
institutions (including non-commercial actors) (ROSSI 2013: 224) that influence governance and 
coordination in complex production networks, as opposed to the previously proposed idea of 
linear chains. The linear chains remain a part of GPNs, because the approach acknowledges 
vertical exchange relations between producers and companies, but they are situated or embedded 
in wider horizontal entanglements. Among these is the immediate influence of NGOs, 
governments, unions and consumers and even actors who are not directly integrated in vertical 
relations but still exercise power (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 210, 214-216).  
Thus, the distinction between GPN and GCC/GVC is the former’s explicit consideration of 
(extra-firm) networks instead of chains, and thereby, an increasing complexity in governance and 
coordination (COE 2009: 557). Drawing on actor-network theory, GPN emphasises ‘the 
relationality of both objects and agency in heterogeneous networks […], pointing out that entities 
in networks are shaped by, and can only be understood through, their relations and connectivity to 
other entities’ (HENDERSON et al. 2002: 442). In doing so, GPN rejects the classic global-
versus-local and structure-versus-agency dichotomies (HENDERSON et al. 2002: 442). Through 
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such rejection, it invalidates the idea of linear, vertical structures with unidirectional flows of 
power and replaces it with more dynamic structures that contain horizontal, diagonal and linear 
interconnections and multi-directional power relations. It thus advocates for a bottom-up 
perspective that ‘addresses social, political and cultural contexts ‘on the ground’ within which 
production processes are embedded and crucially the agency of those considered in the GVC 
framework to be most powerless’ (DARBY 2013: 45). Thus a GPN can be broadly defined as the 
‘globally organized nexus of interconnected functions and operations of firms and nonfirm 
institutions through which goods and services are produced, distributed, and consumed’ (COE 
2009: 557). 
In the operationalisation of the GPN approach, processes of value creation, enhancement 
and capture are accorded as high a priority as are aspects of embeddedness and power (COE 2009: 
557-558; HENDERSON et al. 2002: 448). ‘Value’ encompasses processes of value generation 
and addition on the basis of technology and knowledge transfer within networks and the binding 
of value in its concrete, spatial and regional context. ‘Embeddedness’ refers to actors within the 
immediate production network and beyond that, the social, political and cultural relations that are 
included in the network in territorial terms. Because these relations may cross global borders, they 
can establish connections to different supra- and sub-national institutional frameworks (BRAUN 
& SCHULZ 2012: 216; KULKE 2013: 146). Understanding the embeddedness of GPNs is 
elementary in terms of the constitution and reconstitution of a network by economic, social and 
political arrangements in the locations that they inhabit, and thus, in the network in a certain 
territory. Therefore, GPN perspectives require a highlighting of the socio-cultural and institutional 
contexts in which economic activities take place (COE 2009: 557-558). These are heavily shaped 
by ‘power’, which is classically categorised in accordance with its source. ‘Corporate power’ 
refers to elements of governance, similar to its definition in GCC and GVC. ‘Institutional power’ 
is understood as the level of influence of (supra-) governmental institutions and actors. ‘Collective 
power’ is attached to civil society actors, such as NGOs or unions (KULKE 2013: 146). The GPN 
approach presents tremendous potential as a tool for understanding the organisational and 
geographical dimensions of a global economy because it carries with it the following major 
advantages: 
- Scrutiny of all actors, not only the producers of goods; 
- Greater flexibility in terms of scale;  
- Consideration of the influence exerted by the socio-spatial context; 
- More detailed articulation of power dynamics; 
- More effective identification of the points where and by whom value is created and captured, 
and therefore, how such value may be enhanced in terms of identifying points of possible 
intervention (COE et al. 2008: 289).  
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Publications have thus far suggested that GPN enables a thorough understanding of the 
influence of governmental policies on economic interdependencies. However, they also show the 
difficulties encountered in grasping the complexity of institutional contexts. The increased 
complexity of the approach brings with it the danger of diminishing its analytical strength 
(BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 216). Indeed, the results of many studies have been indicative rather 
than comprehensive (COE 2009: 561). Moreover, several researchers have identified 
shortcomings with regard to the notion of ‘embeddedness’ and have argued for the need for 
conceptual improvement (see MARKUSEN 1999; OINAS 1997; PIKE et al. 2000). Analysis is 
constrained mainly by the fact that the theoretical foundations of the approach, as provided by 
actor-network theory, lack an exploration into the structural preconditions and power relations 
that shape production networks (HENDERSON et al. 2002: 443). Thus, ‘for GPN research to be 
productive we need a conceptualization that operates at the interface of structure and agency’. 
Furthermore, dualisms of flows and territories, as well as of culture and economy, should be 
overcome. We need an integrative perspective ‘that combines the insights from political economy 
and cultural economy approaches […] to describe and explain the complexities and emergent 
properties of GPNs’ (COE et al. 2008: 289), including a look at relevant actors and their strategies 
(COE & YEUNG 2015; YEUNG & COE 2015: 32). 
Criticism has also been raised with regard to the neglect of intra-firm relationships and 
consumers in GPN analysis (COE 2009: 561; COE et al. 2008: 277, 286). Despite the soundness 
of such criticisms, however, definitive evaluation of the approach is difficult because little 
empirical work has been done and because theoretical discussions about the concept continue. At 
this point, enriched forms of GVC analysis may still be useful or yield even better results for some 
questions arising in the context of economic globalisation (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 216). One 
such question is that of development at the producer level through upgrading. 
3.2.4. Development by Upgrading 
GCC, GVC and GPN approaches, especially since the 2000s, have sought ways to foster 
development through so-called ‘upgrading’ (see for example BAZAN & NAVAS-ALEMÁN 
2004; FOLD & LARSEN 2011; GEREFFI 1999; GIBBON 2001; HENDERSON et al. 2002: 448; 
SCHOLZ 2010). This section takes a critical look at the conception of upgrading. It proposes 
enrichments to the notion, and tries to narrow the concept down to the specifics of the agricultural 
sector to further enrich the theoretical framework of this study, based as it is in northern Ghana. 
3.2.4.1. Concepts of Upgrading 
From a producer’s point of view upgrading is generally concerned with seeking ways to 
alter a chain’s coordination to create a more favourable form, ideally by morphing a buyer-driven 
chain into a form close to a producer-driven one through the attainment of competency and 
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knowledge (DIETSCHE 2011: 31; SCHAMP 2008: 8). It thereby looks for ‘the possibility for 
(developing country) producers to move up the value chain, either by shifting to more rewarding 
functional positions or by making products that have more value added invested in them and that 
can provide better returns to producers’ (GIBBON & PONTE 2005: 87-88). The primary avenues 
to allow for such upgrading are the level of competency and knowledge, governance structures 
and power differences in upgrading prospects and wider regional development opportunities 
(COE & HESS 2008: 268). Upgrading is primarily achieved through economic improvements to 
business features, such as processes, products and functions (FOLD & LARSEN 2011: 42-44); 
thus, most studies investigate the technological sophistication of production, and thereby, value 
addition (MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: 1). Upgrading most often revolves around sheer 
economic advances (MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: 1). Early conceptualisations of upgrading 
addressed economies of scale by arguing for a general expansion of production, particularly for 
territorially limited producers. Other aims were to determine ways of economic sophistication and 
diversification, for example, by incorporating processing at intermediate stages to then enter into 
the production of final goods and new forms of existing commodities. These aims also 
encompassed the advancement of sales and marketing arrangements (GIBBON 2001: 352-354; 
SCHAMP 2008: 10). Such forms of producer advancements can be summarised as ‘economic 
upgrading’, often also referred to as ‘industrial upgrading’ (MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: 1). 
These commonly consist of several improvements to processing (process upgrading), to the 
product itself (product upgrading), and to the functions executed by suppliers (functional 
upgrading). Alternatively, advancements pertaining to the alteration of a chain into a new one 
altogether are understood as chain upgrading/inter-sectoral upgrading. 
In detail, ‘process upgrading’ looks into the greater efficiency of the production process, 
and thus, a more efficient transformation of inputs into outputs, possibly through the acquisition 
of new machines, the implementation of a quality control programme, the shortening of delivery 
times and the reduction of waste. ‘Product upgrading’ deals with possibilities for generating more 
sophisticated commodities by introducing new products, changing designs or improving quality. 
‘Functional upgrading’ means changing a portfolio of activities, including higher value-added 
activities; thus it also involves moving on to different stages (‘functions’) after production, 
suggesting a move into new links of a value chain, possibly resulting in a higher margin for 
suppliers and activities that are difficult to imitate, such as original designs, branding and 
marketing (NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1388; ROSSI 2013: 223). Therefore, when shifting to a 
higher value-added production chain altogether, one can also speak of ‘chain upgrading’ (ROSSI 
2013: 223). Such upgrading can similarly occur through another sub-type of upgrading, i.e. ‘inter-
sectoral upgrading’, whereby firms move into new productive activities by entering a new or 
related industrial sector but applying the knowledge and capabilities acquired in the former/‘old’ 
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sector (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 2002: 1020, 1025; NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1395). Inter-
sectoral upgrading is thus partly similar to ‘product upgrading’, which also includes introducing 
new products, and can be a form of diversification save that it involves a distinct change in sectors 
(e.g. a shift from producing televisions to PC monitors).  
The fact that an enabling environment substantially influences the viability of value chains 
is widely acknowledged, especially in rural areas where producers are often unfavourably 
incorporated into markets (CHOUDHARY et al. 2014: 1059). Thus, another distinction in 
economic upgrading that surfaced with GPN analysis is the level of ‘contractualisation’ of 
arrangements. The analysis examines two dimensions: ‘vertical contractualisation’, in which long-
term relationships or contracts are established between producers and buyers, and ‘horizontal 
contractualisation’, whereby producers organise and cooperate among themselves to advance their 
situation. Vertical forms can bring forth a more solid guarantee of market access, increase the 
overall size of demand and facilitate the creation of more comprehensive market information on 
quality, services and inputs. Horizontal forms, through collective action, can increase revenues, 
reduce costs or reduce individual risks through cooperation. These two forms are often connected 
because collective action, and thus horizontal contractualisation, may be needed to establish 
vertical forms (e.g. the case wherein many smallholders are organised into groups to produce for 
larger ventures) (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 13), thereby helping these ventures deal with numerous 
suppliers and reducing transaction costs. 
All forms of upgrading possibilities come with certain preconditions. They require reward 
structures, roles that offer higher and more stable returns, as well as (maybe most importantly) 
routes for arriving at such roles (GIBBON 2004: 26-30). Furthermore, the initiation of learning 
processes through information dissemination is central (ROSSI 2013: 223). Such achievements 
can originate from lead firms through provision of specific support for their interests and through 
unplanned spill-over effects or imitation, as well as through government or NGO support. 
Producers can then improve their production processes, enhance spectrums and gains, establish 
forms of independent marketing and diversify into other markets and products (SCHAMP 2008: 
10). Apart from economic advances, from a more normative perspective upgrading can also take 
place in environmental and social realms in the form of environmental or social upgrading.  
Very generally, ‘environmental upgrading’ points to a modernisation of production 
technology for increased ecological sustainability. Improved technology often comes with more 
efficient use of resources, both in the economic and environmental sense (BRAUN & DIETSCHE 
2008: 13; DIETSCHE 2011: 37). Strong lead firms mostly initiate environmental upgrading to 
address the ecological concerns of their critical (often Western) customers. Such upgrading is 
driven by economic concerns. The higher the vertical integration in chains, the greater the 
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possibility of implementing more environmentally sustainable forms of production (BRAUN & 
DIETSCHE 2008: 13; BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 243-244). 
‘Social upgrading’ is of critical concern in the context of poverty alleviation and is therefore 
discussed in detail in this thesis. Such upgrading can partly be understood as a conceptual counter-
movement to the dominance of economic concerns in the search for supplier advancements (i.e. 
upgrading), because the wider external effects of upgrading (i.e. social influences) are often 
disregarded in analysis. Upgrading is rarely concerned with direct social issues of poverty 
alleviation. When pursued only in a purely economic sense, it does not mean that the working 
conditions of employees improve in any way or that the larger segments of the population 
involved progress in a manner that goes beyond immediate economic interests (i.e. income). Yet, 
because ideas of economic upgrading seek possibilities for providing ‘better returns’ to 
developing country producers (see before, GIBBON & PONTE 2005: 87-88), underlying 
assumptions point to a connection between economic and social progress in the form of pro-poor 
advancements through technology. This goal can be argued for by neoclassical economic theory, 
whereby technology largely determines labour demand and wages. Under this perspective, 
therefore, economics and social progress are interrelated. This view can be questioned, however, 
because from an institutionalist view, social progress is not immediately linked with technological 
advances but associated with social institutions; through this view, wages are the outcome of a 
bargaining process determined by the relative strength of employers and employees, including 
labour market institutions, such as minimum wages or unions (MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: 2, 
16). Thus, though the presumption of numerous studies dealing with upgrading is that ‘economic 
upgrading brings […] social upgrading’, or general social advances, this connection may actually 
be ‘much less tight’ (Ibid.: 3). Furthermore, economic upgrading lacks the analysis of socio-
economic conditions at the ‘bottom’ of chains, where ‘socio-economic upgrading’ may be crucial 
for human development. Therefore, ‘analysis should break away from normative views of 
upgrading as moving up the value chain’ (PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1648) in purely economic 
terms.  
Little research has been devoted to value chain upgrading and its effects on issues such as 
living standards, wages, work conditions, economic rights, gender equality and economic security 
(MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: see abstract). Addressing these issues in more recent times, 
some researchers have explicitly examined forms of ‘social upgrading’ (BARRIENTOS et al. 
2010; MILBERG & WINKLER 2010; ROSSI 2013, 2010). In these works, social upgrading is 
conceptualised and operationalised primarily by an adaptation of the ILO’s notion of ‘decent 
work’, which has also become the central element of ILO’s declaration on ‘Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalization’. This notion centres on employment, social protection, workers’ rights and 
social dialogue (ILO 2008: 1-2). Thereby, employment should take place ‘under conditions of 
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freedom, equity, security and human dignity, in which rights are protected and adequate 
remuneration and social coverage is provided’ (BARRIENTOS et al. 2010: 7). On closer scrutiny, 
social upgrading is thus defined as ‘the process of improvements in the rights and entitlements of 
workers as social actors by enhancing the quality of their employment’ (ROSSI 2013: 224). As 
the notion of employment indicates, however, such definitions hold only in the context of formal 
occupation. They thereby assume the existence of a capable (and hopefully willing) lead firm, 
which, as was explained, must not necessarily be the case. This could, therefore, be an 
inappropriate approach to examine self-employed smallholder farmers in rural Africa.  
With a perspective more specific to the context of smallholder producers and agri-
businesses in developing countries, BOLWIG et al. (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 17) adopt a more 
suitable definition of upgrading. They argue for understanding it as ‘positive or desirable change 
in chain participation that enhances rewards and/or reduces the exposure to risks’. Somewhat 
similarly, PONTE and EWERT (PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1637) call for ‘a better deal, including 
a balance between rewards and risk’. If this is the case, then one is left with the question of what 
is actually at risk beyond the immediate monetary interest of the ‘deal’. Moreover, risk is as much 
a matter of exposure as it is of coping. Thus the idea of upgrading generally requires a reference 
framework from which the (external) risk that smallholder producers encounter can be 
comprehended, and which should consider internal coping mechanisms. The succeeding section 
explores further potentials and risks that originate specifically from upgrading in agriculture 
through contract and outgrower farming.  
3.2.4.2. Upgrading in Agriculture by Contract and Outgrower Farming 
Contract farming (CF), also referred to as outgrower farming, is a special form of economic 
producer upgrading in the agricultural sector. CF has a long history that dates back to the 
beginning of the 20th century, when sugar cane and peaches were produced on a contractual basis 
for export in Central America. The majority of such export-orientated agricultural production was 
plantation based (DA SILVA 2005b: 11; KIRSTEN & SARTORIUS 2002: 507-508). Decisive 
changes in this regard began to be implemented in the 1970s, during which multinational 
companies sharply shifted from plantation-based models towards outsourcing production to 
farmers (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 17-18). These developments were supported by cheaper 
and faster means of transportation and information dissemination, and by a reduction in trade 
barriers (SIMMONS 2003: 9). Multinational companies increasingly secure their raw material 
base for processing or trade through contracts, may supply technical assistance for production, 
and are concerned with marketing. They espouse these responsibilities because acquiring inputs, 
selling or providing them on credit to farmers, and specialising in logistics and marketing are far 
more productive, lucrative and safer strategies than in-house production. Multinationals retain a 
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strong influence over farmers, despite outsourcing (DÜNCKMANN 2004: 6; EATON & 
SHEPHERD 2001: 17-18).  
Contracting farming (CF) as a form of upgrading is of particular interest because, as 
previously stated, smallholders are frequently incorporated into markets in an unfavourable 
manner (see before and CHOUDHARY et al. 2014: 1059; RAUCH 2012: 2). It was a popular 
strategy for smallholder development for a long period, however, its popularity considerably 
soared in the 1980s, mostly in line with attempts to support export-led growth after structural 
adjustment (THRUPP et al. 1995: 27). Also, as a result of structural adjustment and government 
withdrawal of support for agriculture in many developing countries, hopes were placed on the 
private sector to balance these deficits (Ibid.: 27). CF schemes are generally said to be able to 
increase agricultural production through the provision of knowledge, market access and inputs 
and to thereby unleash the potential of small-scale farmers to enable sector growth, and thus, rural 
development (GLOVER 1984: 170-171; THRUPP et al. 1995: 27). Moreover, growth in the 
agricultural sector of developing countries is most effective in reducing the proportion of the poor 
in comparison with growth in any other sector (WORLD BANK 2007: 6). As with the analysis of 
commodity and value chains, this issue has therefore drawn great academic interest, mainly since 
the 1990s. Farmer integration into agricultural (world) markets, specifically into their commodity 
or value chains, through contractual farming (CF) or outgrower schemes became one of the most 
popular practices to be evaluated by scholars (OUMA et al. 2012: 227).  
CF strategies the world over, and specifically in Africa, are extensively diverse such that 
generalisations (and therefore, theorisations) are difficult to formulate (OYA 2012: 1). The range 
of possible outcomes of CF schemes accordingly varies. Although a few measures have 
effectively alleviated poverty, especially for mid-field and higher-ranking farmers (RAUCH 2006: 
52), a number of cases have fostered misuse and corruption, thereby limiting CF schemes in terms 
of pro-poor effectiveness. The market/value chain integration of farmers, such as that 
accomplished through CF and other means, requires further testing to ascertain whether sufficient 
opportunities in resource-poor environments can be generated (IAASTD 2009a: 23). Competing, 
sometimes conflicting narratives have emerged on determining how farmers can be integrated into 
markets/value chains and what possible pro-poor outcomes may be produced versus the risks 
involved (OUMA et al. 2012: 227). The highly individualised settings within which these 
schemes are placed may not allow for general conclusions to be made about pro-poor effects. 
Specific, often unique, economic, ecological, social and cultural variables are at play, and each of 
these variables can be crucial to success and thus requires attention within the process of research 
(see BEBBINGTON & BATTERBURY 2001; ESCOBAR 2001; IMBRUCE 2007; LONG & 
ROBERTS 2006). The basic elements of CF are explored in more detail below.  
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CF arrangements generally refer to formal or informal contractual agreements or mutual 
entitlements between the parties involved in an agricultural value chain, and specifically between 
producers of a commodity and so-called ‘sponsors’ (SIMMONS 2003: 3) or ‘lead firms’ in one or 
more segments of an agricultural value chain. At each stage of a product chain, traders, processors 
or other actors can more or less actively alter the coordination between segments. Their basic 
ranges of possible influences on CF arrangements include the acquisition and distribution of 
inputs, the production itself and/or the processing and distribution of a product (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Possible levels of engagement of sponsors/lead firms in CF arrangements (own Figure, 
2010, based on SIMMONS 2003: 3). 
Five different models of relations or coordination are generally possible, and these models 
cover a vast range of possibilities. In ascending order and in accordance with the level of 
contractualisation, the main types are informal, intermediary, centralised, multi-partite and 
nucleus estate models. What is typically referred to as CF falls somewhere among formalised, 
centralised and multi-lateral, nucleus/outgrower models. These types are characterised by distinct 
features. In the ‘informal model’, traders often establish relations with farmers through informal 
verbal contracts, occasionally based on a single season. Such a form of CF is very close to 
average market relations and can be considered only as a very casual form of CF, if at all. 
Nevertheless, it also encompasses more moulded, possibly personal relations between producers 
and those further up a chain. Thus, this model is somewhat closer to modular and relational value 
chain set-ups, rather than being entirely based on market relations. In the ‘intermediary model’, 
middle-men arrange contact between farmers and lead firms through formal and informal 
contracts. In terms of contractualisation, this model may go beyond an informal model and extend 
to modular and relational value chain set-ups. In the ‘centralised model’, a central processor buys 
from many farmers or intermediaries with formal contracts as the basis for the interaction. It thus 
implies relational to captive coordination of the value chain. In a ‘multi-partite model’, 
organisations may also include several governmental, NGO and private organisations. 
Coordination of the chain is somewhat similar to the ‘centralised model’, except that more parties 
are involved which could also engage in activities that favour other types of smallholder farmer 
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upgrading. In a ‘nucleus estate model’, sponsors do their own cropping in addition to buying from 
farmers on a formal and long-term contractual basis. Coordination will most likely be relational to 
hierarchical (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 44-56; GEREFFI et al. 2005: 89; KULKE 2007: 121-
122; SCHAMP 2008: 6-8).  
Common to all these models is the fact that all contract forms, whether informal or formal, 
cover basic economic components, among them the allocation of benefits (the distribution of costs 
and gains), the allocation of risk, uncertainty (concerning possible problems) and responsibilities. 
Buyers and sellers of goods negotiate and agree on aspects of their exchange. Scrutinising the 
features of these arrangements then provides insights into exchange and is especially useful for 
describing power relations within chains (KANJI et al. 2005: 9-12; OYA 2004: 10; SIMMONS 
2003: 3). These models’ features are highly individual, yet in accordance with previously asserted 
differentiations, certain general assumptions can be made about power, risk and profit allocations.  
As summarised in Figure 2, the informal model is more likely to come at great default risk 
for farmers because they cannot be certain as to whether their products will be bought at harvest 
time. Whether one can still speak of real CF in this instance is therefore questionable. Yet, 
substantial risk also arises in more formalised settings. Even formal intermediaries, for example, 
are likely to reduce possible incomes for farmers. For good or for bad, however, in such a model 
farmers experience very little external control and influence. Lead firms in these models, if 
existent, are compelled to engage only marginally with farmers to source their products. Thus, 
gains are mostly distributed to traders and intermediaries, whereas responsibilities, risks and 
uncertainties are left entirely to the producers. Only in a more formal CF model, possibly 
including a centralised processor, will the necessary engagement of sponsors increase; and 
thereby, will the risk presented by these be surmounted. Furthermore, because of the reduced 
costs involved in establishing a more sophisticated or more contractualised model, lead firms are 
more likely to attempt to uphold arrangements made with farmers (SCHAMP 2008: 9); their level 
of default risk hence decreases. As sponsors’ levels of required engagements rise, therefore, risk 
and uncertainty are increasingly distributed among all actors involved.  
The same goes for the allocation of responsibilities, but the more centralised the model 
becomes, the more likely that benefits are increasingly shifted to the sponsors of arrangements. 
Farmers are progressively influenced and controlled by external forces. This is especially true in 
nucleus models and when land rights are relinquished to sponsors. External control can expand up 
to a point where sponsors of contract and outgrower scheme arrangements become local 
monopolies and can then exploit farmers’ dependencies, especially when extensive land rights are 
surrendered. Clearly, therefore, the level of contractualisation is only partly a useful indicator of 
the overall advancement or ‘upgrading’ of smallholder producers. Contractualisation may at least 
imply informal, modular to formal, yet captive relationships and can even become hierarchical 
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when land rights are relinquished, but CF value chains will remain buyer-driven. Hence, high 
contractualisation is not automatically correlated with farmer advancements but engenders high 
dependency on the well-meaning and integrity of farmers’ business counterparts (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Risk and power allocation in CF and out-grower arrangements, according to models 
(own figure, 2014, based on DA SILVA 2005a: 15-18; EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 44-56; 
SETBOONSARNG 2008: 7; SIMMONS 2003: 9-12; WARNING & SOO HOO 2000: 5). 
Despite these potential pitfalls, however, the general assumption is that high levels of 
contractualisation can accompany other forms of upgrading, first and foremost in economic terms. 
The possible benefits that derive from such arrangements for producers are found principally in an 
enabling or increase of (global) market access for farmers. New and reliable marketing 
possibilities can arise by granting access to new (world) markets (LITTLE & WATTS 1994: 7; 
MORRISON et al. 2006; RAUCH 2012: 2). Adding CF arrangements to a portfolio of possible 
marketing arrangements can increase competition, and thus, prices for farmers. For example, other 
(centralised) processing facilities as competitors in already existing (intermediary) markets can 
increase demand ‘and so [put] upwards pressure on the equilibrium price […] compared with a 
no-processing scenario’ (ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 5). Monopolistic market structures 
are typically a threat to smallholder farmer development (RAUCH 2012: 4), more so to the food 
security of the most vulnerable. ‘Disproportionate buyer power, which arises from excessive 
buyer concentration in food supply chains (among commodity buyers, food processors and 
retailers), tends to depress prices that food producers at the bottom of those chains receive for 
their produce. This in turn means lower incomes for these producers, which may have an impact 
on their ability to invest for the future and climb up the value chain, and it may lead them to lower 
wages that they pay the workers that they employ. There is thus a direct link between the ability 
of competition regimes to address abuses of buyer power in supply chains, and the enjoyment of 
the right to adequate food’ (DE SCHUTTER 2010: 1). This, as shown in Section 3.1.3.3, is a 
major source of vulnerability, and thus a significant indicator of development. Yet, the same is 
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true in situations wherein no alternatives to engagement in CF schemes are available (IMBRUCE 
2008: 73). Diversity and competition in marketing arrangements are therefore essential for farmer 
advancements. Only then can CF be a viable source of livelihood diversification, as proposed by 
RAUCH (RAUCH 2012: 5, 2006: 52). 
Other means of economic upgrading arise from the fact that reliable pricing, such as that 
possible through contracts, can motivate increased planning reliability for farmers. CF is also 
deemed to exert a positive effect on technological improvements; increased productivity and 
access to inputs, such as fertilisers and high-yielding seeds and chemicals; and mechanisation. In 
theory, this then increases productivity, yields and income. The same goes for access to financial 
support, income and credit. Technological support and transfer can reduce losses and increase 
productivity along value chains. Thus the main potential advantages for farmers lie in product and 
process upgrading. Such upgrading should ideally facilitate the generation of multiplication 
effects in terms of economic prosperity for wider segments of the poor population, and create a 
middle class of farmers in developing countries by enabling easy shifting from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture and, more generally, by helping overcome gender gaps given that 
sponsors may not mind purchasing from either men or women (DA SILVA 2005a: 15-18; 
GLOVER 1984: 170-171; LITTLE & WATTS 1994: 7; RAUCH 2012: 1; SETBOONSARNG 
2008: 7-9). As with upgrading in the broader scope of GVC and GPN approaches (see Section 
3.2.4), the assumption is that economic advancements can lead to social improvements, thus, 
social.  
Technologies provided through CF arrangements ‘such as high-yielding crop varieties, 
agrochemicals and mechanization have primarily benefited the better resourced groups in society 
and transnational corporations, rather than the most vulnerable ones’ (IAASTD 2009a: 23). CF 
arrangements have been occasionally described as fully externally controlled and exploitative, 
whereby farmers function as nothing but simple workers and cheap suppliers of land (CLAPP 
1994: 79 and 81; OYA 2004: 10). The gender mainstreaming effect of CF is likewise questionable 
(BOLWIG et al. 2008: 3). Occasionally, CF arrangements exploit the traditionally lower 
bargaining power of women in developing countries. Arrangements made can also encourage 
child labour when family members are used as a source of work to thereby subsidise an otherwise 
unprofitable production (SINGH 2003: 2). Further criticism points to the loss of farmers’ 
bargaining power, oppression of union involvement and an (inevitable) widening of socio-
economic gaps (IMBRUCE 2008: 1; RAUCH 2006: 52; WARNING & SOO HOO 2000: 21). Yet 
another criticism against CF is its negative effect on environmental resources. A growing number 
of scholars and international bodies have stated that instead of high-input agriculture, ecologically 
sustainable approaches are needed in times of climate and environmental change; accordingly 
therefore, a ‘radical readjustment’ in agricultural policies is needed to fight poverty in a socially 
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and environmentally sustainable approach that extends beyond pure economic advances (quoting 
HERREN 2009: 62; 2009a, 2009b; in reference to IAASTD 2008).  
The degree to which an average contract farming (CF) arrangement may enable the 
achievement of the aforementioned goals is doubtful when examining the motivation of lead firms 
to engage in such goals. Their drive is stimulated mainly, if not entirely, by a reduction of risk and 
of transaction cost that increases shareholder or company value. Through CF, companies 
externalise their risks to a large extent by outsourcing production. Thereby, fewer labour costs are 
incurred, and employment law does not require consideration because farmers are formally 
independent sub-contractors. This situation may result in higher productivity because of the 
committed work of contracted farmers under risk. This increased productivity makes such 
schemes especially attractive to companies that are engaged in the manufacture/sale of high-value 
foods because of their high quality, and thereby, high labour requirements. CF offers more 
substantial flexibility to lead companies because they would otherwise be compelled to purchase 
or rent (more) land were they to desire in-house production. Thus, CF must constitute easy 
indirect access to and control over the land of others. Another motivation is to establish an 
alternative to commodity futures exchanges, which are rarely available in less developed parts of 
the world. Lead companies thereby further try to reduce the periodic price fluctuations that often 
occur in open markets. For these companies, this situation also improves the coordination of a 
value chain for optimal capacity utilisation and better control of compliance with customers’ 
expectations and food safety concerns (DA SILVA 2005a: 19; SIMMONS 2003: 3-6).  
Thus the interests of agri-businesses (i.e. lead firms) centre largely on profit maximisation 
for a specific commodity, but not for the people involved in the manufacture of the good. As 
much as any supply chain integration, CF comes with a product-centred, but not people-centred, 
support system and must therefore be unrelated to and even contradict the requirements of 
livelihood and farming systems. Most often, CF is unconcerned with environmentally sustainable 
production and incorporates actors who fit a chain but does not alter a chain in accordance with 
the needs of people or the environment. It must therefore exclude many, if not the majority of, 
farming households and can rarely contribute to environmental preservation or long-lasting socio-
economic prosperity. Consequently, supply chain integration by itself – such as that achieved 
through CF or more generally through an increased level of contractualisation that may lead to 
other forms of economic upgrading – cannot deliver a comprehensive or sustainable solution for 
the development of smallholder farmers. This deficiency highlights the need to incorporate a 
livelihood systems approach that enables the integration of smallholder livelihood logic into the 
supply chain rationality of markets. Additionally, public-private partnerships are needed to avoid 
the misuse of monopolistic patterns of demand and to create diversity in demand. External 
brokers, and thus multi-partite models, are required to avoid opportunistic behaviour from all the 
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involved parties. Public or private extension services are equally essential to ensure quality 
control and provide incentives for better farming practices and sufficient soil management. All in 
all, a considerable effort is necessary to assure that the poor can benefit from a trend towards an 
outsourcing of production, a responsibility that cannot be left to the private sector alone but which 
requires public support and supervision. With a lack of quality governance in many developing 
countries, donor agencies and the wider civil society are called on to play a crucial role for a 
mutually beneficial value chain integration of smallholders (see before and RAUCH 2012: 3-5). 
3.3. Theoretical Synthesis 
This chapter has so far identified livelihood and value chain/GPN perspectives as suitable 
theoretical approaches to examine pro-poor development through markets. Yet, each comes with 
its specific weaknesses and strengths. This section presents the theoretical synthesis, or new 
framework, used in this study. 
3.3.1. Arguing for a Combination of SLF and GVC/GPN Approaches 
The SLF approach was broadly acknowledged and managed to become a valuable, 
mainstream tool for developmental researchers and practitioners (RAUCH 2006: 52). It has 
become ‘one of the most comprehensive and popular frameworks’ (JAKIMOV 2013: 494) and 
has thus far retained this status (KAISER & ROTHFUß 2013: 2). It is also still the only fruitful 
approach to studying the vulnerability of social groups given that it incorporates social inequality 
and socio-spatial disparity, parts of which derive from power-allocation within society 
(BÜRKNER 2010: 36).  
Yet, within the SLF approach markets often remain ‘a bit of a black box’ (KANJI et al. 
2005: 8), and consequently this poses a severe obstacle to understanding poverty-market 
interactions. Livelihood perspectives have thereby ‘often failed to engage with debates about 
[economic] globalisation’ (SCOONES 2009: 187). Despite the meta-scale background of 
livelihood analysis, critics of the approach highlight its shortcomings in the analysis of global to 
local interrelations. These critics denounce the weaknesses of the analysis of structure-agency 
relations, as well as of power and societal dynamics more generally (MENSAH 2012: 18; 
MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 9; SAKDAPOLRAK 2014: 19). Yet past and present 
understandings of livelihoods strongly emphasise the relevance of interactions between local and 
global contexts. The observance of micro to macro interactions was already an integral part of the 
original livelihood concept (DE HAAN 2012: 348 and 351; DFID 2001). Additional supporting 
arguments can be found in even earlier research. In household studies from which livelihood 
analysis partly evolved, human agency was always understood as occurring within structural, 
possibly global constraints. BÜRKNER (2010: 25) goes as far as to call livelihood analysis a 
structuralist approach. Livelihood analysis can thus successfully negotiate between contextual 
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influences and aspects of self-defined and self-dependent human activity. While criticism of the 
SLF’s deficits with regard to structure-agency and global to local (power) relations appear partly 
inappropriate, it is evident that livelihood analysis lacks the investigation of market performance.  
Global Value Chain (GVC) and Global Production Network (GPN) analysis can facilitate 
such an investigation. Advocates of chain and production network concepts not only claim that 
these can serve as theoretical tools to facilitate a good understanding of how suppliers and 
producers are linked within the broader (global) economy and specifically within certain markets, 
but that they are able to illustrate the structures of labour division and value creation for the 
purpose of identifying sources of inequality, and therefore, development. In turn this advances the 
identification of critical aspects of markets with regard to their practical, pro-poor performance, 
and enables a linking of the political economy to the needs of business administration. Moreover, 
although the basic foundations for these approaches were laid out as early as the 1950s, advocates 
point out that they’ve been expanded considerably and encompassed geographical paradigms in 
their analysis of social change (and power) (BATTERBURY et al. 2011: 4; MÜLLER-MAHN & 
VERNE 2010: 9-10; OUMA et al. 2012: 227; RUBEN et al. 2006: 5).  
Most GVC/GPN approaches still neglect social, thus horizontal, entanglements, as well as 
dependence on broader networks of social relations (OUMA et al. 2012: 228). Chain and network 
approaches can generate useful information on crucial elements of market performance and 
aspects of power asymmetries, but they lack a holistic analysis of socio-economic conditions, 
poverty, and thus, the possible scopes of action and aspects of power at the producer level. They 
may further bias analysis towards market principles instead of humane aspects of development. 
Thus, a future assessment of pro-poor market integration will necessitate a suitable reference 
framework that can grasp the realities of those who ought to be developed, as much as it needs a 
normative compass to evaluate changes. Such an assessment should be based on an indicator 
system that allows for the recognition of practical pro-poor outcomes. Indicators used should 
therefore be concerned with farmers’ livelihood support systems, with a special focus on ‘losers’ 
and the ‘mid-field’ of society (RAUCH 2006: 52).  
Such demands re-emphasise the relevance of livelihood analysis, which examines the 
vulnerability and coping processes of poor people living in developing countries (BOHLE & 
GLADE 2008: 102) and considers both the material and social resources needed to make a living 
(DFID 2001: Section 1.1). Livelihood sustainability can serve as an orientation or as a benchmark 
of pro-poor market integration (RAUCH 2006: 52), whilst GVC and GPN analysis provides an 
understanding of markets and their performance (OUMA & LINDNER 2010: 12-14). A 
theoretical framework that is based on livelihood analysis, including aspects of power and 
involving a serious attempt to upscale findings, can prevent deception by pre-set normative 
visions and the simplification of ideologies of market integration. Livelihood analysis can help 
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base ideas of market-based development on local definitions and priorities, in a manner similar to 
what post-development or alternative development advocates. 
The substantial similarity between livelihood analysis and GVC/GPN approaches supports 
their combination. Both link micro to macro structures and processes, require holistic thinking, 
recognise the occurrence of change as intervention takes place, rely on existing strengths, and 
seek to achieve sustainable outcomes. They also complement each other because, in scientific 
practice, livelihood approaches are often human-/community-centric and thus micro-macro 
orientated, whereas pro-poor market analysis – here understood as GVC/GPN approaches – is 
system-centric and identifies meso-macro links. Furthermore, livelihood approaches have a wide 
scope, examining cross-sectoral types of rural development with a focus on social, natural, 
physical, financial and environmental factors. Conversely, value chains look into economical 
aspects and therefore focus more narrowly on sectoral or sub-sectoral development. Each requires 
the other to explore and exploit potentials for poverty reduction (BATTERBURY et al. 2011: 4). 
By combining the two approaches and thereby maximising mutual enrichments, negotiating 
among market and human necessities, contextual factors and their local perception, it is possible 
to engender valuable insights into the pro-poor performance of market integration. 
3.3.2. Approach Taken 
This theoretical synthesis is based in the SLF but supplemented and thereby enriched by 
GYV and GPN approaches and their aims for (livelihood) upgrading. This combination enables 
comprehension of economic (globalisation) tendencies, market dynamics and potentials, while it 
alludes not only to relevant aspects such as social, institutional and political contexts, but also to 
environmental concerns such as climatic change. For the reasons given before, broader social, 
economic and ecological dynamics and trends – the typical ‘three dimensions of sustainability’ 
(HURNI & WIESMANN 2011: 17) – are observed at the global, national and regional scales.  
In a wider sense, this framework combines insights from several temporal and spatial scales 
and theoretical approaches, focuses on the interactions of these, distinguishes drivers and 
consequences, and takes account of the interplay and multi-directional influences of 
environmental and human conditions/spheres in all scales of analysis. It regards vulnerability as 
being place-based even though it is influenced by larger contexts, and emphasises the influence of 
markets, social and environmental concerns. The framework differentiates between general 
dynamics and direct influences and ways of access among sub-systems. As a whole it forms a 
cyclic process within which dynamics interact to emphasise the evolutionary nature of the 
dynamics and influences encountered. The approach thereby attempts to search for ‘linkages 
between the external and internal dimensions of vulnerability’, as well as ‘responses at the 
individual, aggregate and collective level’ (BRONS et al. 2007: 91). Though the framework puts 
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theoretical and thereby visual emphasis on livelihood analysis, the influence of markets on 
livelihood systems is of central concern. Selected markets, namely those for rice, chili, and tomato 
products, are conceptualised by a hybrid of GVC and GPN perspectives. Chains are embedded, at 
the local level, in any given livelihood system or wider (social) ‘production network’ (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Framework for livelihood sustainability under market effects (own figure, 2014, partly 
based on DFID 2001: Section 1.1; TURNER et al. 2003: 8076).  
External dimensions are conceptualised as the vulnerability context, the external side of 
vulnerability that constitutes itself by variability and change in social/human (including 
economic) and environmental impacts. External dynamics influence and access or specify 
components and their quantitative and qualitative characteristics at the local level. Thus, external 
vulnerability factors are internalised at this level. Through this internalisation, concrete 
components such as social and economic institutions, policies and actors, but also natural resource 
endowments and changes emerge at the local level and become part of the local livelihood system 
in terms of people’s perceptions and concrete spatial expressions.  
Internal vulnerability factors and livelihood coping mechanisms are dynamically exposed to 
these externally generated but partly internalised components, in accordance with the significance 
of these components as well as their characteristics in quantitative (thus, numeric) and qualitative 
terms or meaning. The extent to which livelihoods are sensitive to external stressors is primarily 
determined by the assets that people have at hand when undergoing essential, yet not necessarily 
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strategic or fully rational livelihood pathways as agents. Such determination is attributed to actors’ 
involvement in a wider social network that pre-structures their scopes of action through power, 
primarily through access to assets, which is either granted or denied. Assets available and 
pathways taken thereby constitute ‘the ability to cope without irreversible loss of assets’ under 
‘risks, shocks and stress to which individuals or households are exposed’ (BRONS et al. 2007: 3).  
Internal and external dimensions of vulnerability constitute livelihoods in a certain location, 
thereby expressing themselves in special terms and differentiating people by their degree of 
vulnerability or resilience. Quantities, qualities and the allocation of assets – in terms of social, 
human, financial, physical and social capital – are therefore of primary interest in people’s efforts 
to engage in activities designed to achieve desired livelihood outcomes. A ranking of desirable 
outcomes is defined in accordance with local perceptions, but development will be indicated by 
food security and well-being. Well-bring because it partly includes other dimensions and widens 
the conceptual view. A local definition of well-being also helps prioritisation among further 
outcomes like vulnerability, income, natural resources and resilience to climatic change. 
BOHLE (BOHLE 2011) proposed a modified livelihood framework that adds to the 
conceptualisation of global commodity markets and enables a merging of Global Production 
Network perspectives (part of which are Global Value Chains) with that of the livelihood 
approach. BOHLE looks into social vulnerability and livelihood security, and thereby poverty 
alleviation, with regard to the new market risks involved. He argues that ‘an integrated framework 
for market risk assessment that seeks to link all the major components of vulnerability in an 
integrated manner is still missing’ (ibid.: 44) and proposes that spaces of entitlement, 
empowerment and agency must be identified in livelihood systems to understand the effects of 
possibly risky forms of market integration. He adopts a critical view of markets in terms of 
livelihood outcomes, which he summarises under the concept of ‘real markets’. These markets, by 
their very nature, produce enormous risks and opportunities for certain segments of the 
population. He concludes that such ‘real market’ approaches must study markets as ‘sets of social 
relations structured by institutions, interests and power’ (Ibid.: 49), which create, contest, lose and 
win entitlements within wider, partly non-market contexts, such as economic, social and 
institutional spaces.  
BOHLE builds on the work of WHITE (1993), who criticised the ‘abstract conception of 
the market deriving from neo-classical economics’ as overriding ‘variations in real markets which 
are very important for considering and tackling practical problems of development. […] It also 
abstracts from social, political and institutional aspects of real markets which cannot be dismissed 
as ‘exogenous’ factors but are inherent, and indeed may be essential, characteristics of the 
functioning of markets in the real world. In particular, conventional economic analysis of markets 
by and large ignores or marginalises the presence of power which is a glaringly visible 
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characteristic of real markets’ (Ibid.: 2). Thus in examining economically determined livelihoods, 
the notion of power in its social, political and institutional dimensions is as important and 
necessary as it is in the GVC and GPN perspectives (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).  
Value chains connect actors within real markets and broader institutional structures, and are 
useful for understanding the processes of a market for a particular good. The combination of a 
livelihood approach with value chain analysis is thus a practical approach to understanding ‘the 
opportunities and constraints which small producers […] face in increasingly globalised systems’ 
(KANJI et al. 2005: 22). The approach pursued in this work attempts to elucidate the pro-poor 
effects of market integration by merging a livelihood approach and value chain analysis within an 
examination of institutional power settings, to explore how local institutions influence value 
chains. Value chains are regarded as the practical, concrete expression of BOHLE’s ‘real markets’ 
but are nonetheless also understood in the wider perspective of GPNs, whereby a production 
network is considered as the wider local livelihood system in which production for a value chain 
takes place. In espousing this perspective, this study scrutinises local questions of ‘governance’ 
and horizontal entanglements of vertical chains; the dependence of these chains ‘on broader 
networks of social relations’ is thus an equally important focus of the analysis (OUMA et al. 
2012: 228). Such scrutiny is accomplished by examining the context of institutional policies of 
state involvement, market organisation/governance and local embeddedness of each chain as an 
important but not sole element of livelihood upkeep.  
Understanding the nature of the selected markets necessitates investigation of the material 
and monetary input-output flow of chain segments, their local geographic/spatial/territorial 
extents and chain governance and coordination, including the influence of local, non-commercial, 
extra-firm actors. With regard to smallholder producers’ development potential arising from 
market-livelihood interrelations, further enrichments to the concept of upgrading encompass a 
holistic view of how smallholder farmers’ lives are constituted and how these ought to be 
upgraded according to their own views and articulated needs. This standpoint also implies a prior 
and thorough examination of livelihood systems and desired outcomes, as well as a look into the 
dimensions of inclusion and exclusion of local population segments in these markets. 
Furthermore, rather than artificially segregating important dimensions of upgrading, these are 
brought together under the concept of ‘sustainability’, which partly includes social, economic and 
environmental upgrading. ‘Sustainable’ or ‘livelihood upgrading’ should be understood as a 
process with desirable economic, social and environmental effects, that enables the majority, or at 
least a larger part of the poor to ‘cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or 
enhance’ their ‘capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base’ (CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 1991: 6). Following the sustainable 
livelihood approach, upgrading or downgrading trends and the general effect of value chains are 
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assessed through an enquiry into income, well-being, food security, vulnerability and a sustained 
use of the natural resource base. The latter implies a higher resilience to climatic change on the 
side of small-scale producers and in accordance with the prioritisation of desirable outcomes. The 
concrete research questions that arise from this theoretical framework are discussed below.  
3.3.3. Research Questions 
The central research question that guides this thesis, and emerges from the combination of 
livelihood and GVC/GPN perspectives, is as follows:  
 
What potential for economically, environmentally and socially suitable, thus 
‘sustainable’, development of male and female smallholder livelihoods can be found with 
regard to the agricultural markets of chili, tomato and rice and interventions in these?  
 
 This general enquiry is broken down into the following sub-topics and their accompanying 
questions: 
 
1. Livelihood set-up and dynamics: How are smallholder farmers’ livelihood systems 
organised? What are the historical and contemporary dominant and socially differentiating 
external and internal dynamics of smallholder livelihood systems, and what are their strategies, 
pathways and outcomes? 
2. Market dynamics: What are the dominant dynamics of agricultural market structures and their 
respective value chains with relevance to local farmer livelihoods? 
3. Relevant organisations and institutions: What organisations, institutions and policies are 
involved in the governance and coordination of livelihoods and agricultural value chains at the 
producer level, and what is their effect on the socially differentiated integration of smallholders 
at the local scale?  
4. Social/livelihood embeddedness: How are different value chains socially embedded in local 
livelihood systems?  
5. Livelihood outcomes: Who is integrated into which value chains, and what are the outcomes 
of the interaction of livelihood systems and agricultural value chains for farmer livelihoods?  
6. Obstacles and incentives to sustainability: What factors hinder and promote the sustainable 
outcomes of agricultural value chains for smallholders? 
 
Classified by their explanatory potential, these sub-topics are discussed in accordance with 
selected theoretical elements of the overall approach, as shown in Table 1.  
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Sub-Topic Main theoretical approach 
1. Livelihood set-up and dynamics SLF 
2. Market dynamics GVC 
3. Social/livelihood embeddedness SLF & GVC, GPN 
4. Relevant organisations and institutions SLF & GVC, GPN 
5. Livelihood outcomes SLF & GVC 
6. Obstacles and incentives to sustainability SLF & GVC 
Table 1: Relevant sub-topics and theoretical approaches used  (own table, 2014).  
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4. Methods 
To answer the central research question and its sub-topics ‘from the point of view of low-
income producers […] and to explore the implications posed by the chain’s functioning for their 
livelihoods and well-being and the levers for poverty reduction’ (KANJI et al. 2005: 12), 
qualitative and quantitative methods were used during field research. The main methods used 
were focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews, participant observation and oral 
history examination. These were enriched by spatial approaches, activity mapping and GIS 
analysis, which partly enables a quantification of qualities and an upscaling of findings. Farm 
budgets were formulated to quantify and thereby illustrate the individual economic constraints 
that households encounter. The generated hypotheses were validated by a household head (HHH) 
survey and augmented by the collection of secondary data, particularly an archive survey, and 
literature review. Focus was directed towards those methods that serve the needs of the SLF and 
are the most relevant for the theoretical background and research questions/sub-topics (see 
Section 3.3 and Table 2).  
Sub-topic 
Qualitative  
/quantitative? 
Main methods applied 
1. Livelihood set-up and 
dynamics 
Both 
FGDs with farmers and experts, HHH survey, expert 
survey, participant observation, oral history, activity 
mapping, farmer and expert in-depth interviews, archive 
survey, GIS analysis 
2. Market dynamics Quantitative 
Farm budgets, gathering of secondary data, literature 
review, expert interviews  
3. Social/livelihood 
embeddedness 
Qualitative 
Farmer and expert in-depth interviews, FGDs with farmers 
and experts 
4. Relevant organisations 
and institutions 
Qualitative 
FGDs with farmers and experts, observation, background 
checks and investigation on key actors, finding and 
checking on informants, 
5. Livelihood outcomes Both 
FGDs with farmers and experts, HHH survey, farmer and 
expert in-depth interviews 
6. Obstacles and incentives 
to sustainability 
Both 
FGDs with farmers and experts, HHH survey, farmer and 
expert in-depth interviews, farm budgets 
Table 2: Sub-topics of research and their methodological approach  (own table, 2014). 
4.1. Course of Action and Method Application 
The investigation was initiated with secondary data at hand and previous field experience in 
Ghana. Upon arrival in the field, investigation proceeded by conducting in-depth interviews with 
experts and farmers, farm budgets to understand the practicalities of farming activities; combined 
with semi-structured interviews focussing on the input-output structure of the farmers’ tomato, 
rice, chili and shea production. Farmers were mostly visited individually whilst on their fields 
working. Discussions with farmers facilitated the conceptualisation and formulation of the 
hypotheses and the selection of participants for the FGDs, which covered livelihood systems, 
institutions, environmental change and hazards, and tomato, rice, chili and shea markets. 
Participants were informed of the schedule for the FGDs two days in advance. A reminder was 
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issued before the day of discussion. The participants welcomed the topics for discussion, and the 
outcomes of the FGDs became a major source of information for the succeeding research. Poring 
through and examining the generated data required substantial investment in terms of time and 
organisational skills. At the very end of the research visit to Ghana, a head of household (HHH) 
survey was conducted to verify the previously generated hypotheses. Six professional 
interviewers, each having long-term experience in administering quantitative surveys in the area, 
were employed from the Navrongo Health Research Centre. The interviewers helped with the 
translation of the HHH survey, and were trained for another three days. The questionnaire was 
then pre-tested, and after final corrections, the HHH survey was carried out over the course of 10 
days in Biu, one of the two researched communities. The survey results were later used to re-
evaluate the FGDs and individual interviews, as well as the hypotheses. The survey was also 
administered to those interviewees who participated in the qualitative and farm budget interviews. 
Other methods utilised included participant observation, researcher mapping of village and land 
structures, the collection of secondary data through official means, use of informants, and hidden 
surveillance and investigation of key actors (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Research design and course of action in the field  (own figure, 2014). 
Farmer and expert FGDs and in-depth interviews were the primary sources of data, gathered 
throughout different areas in Ghana, mostly in the north of the country, in the Upper East Region 
(see also Map 1, Chapter 0). More than 150 hours of transcribed recordings were generated. 
Statistical analysis was conducted with IBM SPSS®. Maps and spatial statistics were created with 
ArcMap®. With Atlas.ti®, all the datasets, especially the interview transcripts, were coded in 
accordance with the theoretical framework. Coding was carried out to generate conceptual 
categories for use in later sequencing, comparison and analysis. It was further done, because 
interviewees frequently pointed at coherences between different phenomena. During analysis, 
several codes would then be applied to exactly the same passage, or coded passages would 
overlap, because they were associated with each other. The ‘co-occurrence tool’ of Atlas.ti® was 
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then utilised for a quantitative exploration of the qualitative data, mainly to derive insights on the 
numeric strength of associations made by interviewees between conceptual categories. The tool 
was able to give information on the intensity of associations by calculating a normalised co-occur-
rence coefficient between pairs of codes. It did so by counting text passages that have been 
assigned with at least two codes, to then indicate their level of association through the generated 
coefficient. This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning that these codes never co-occur 
when they are used, and 1 meaning that they are always used together. Such sequencing, 
comparison and analysis of the intensity of conceptual associations gives ‘clues about contextual 
factors and how these factors shape the specific manifestation of a given phenomenon’ 
(CONTRERAS 2011: 5) at individual and group level. It helps to derive insights on general 
coherences and to upscale the findings derived from qualitative individual or group data, by 
examining the quantities of qualitative associations. Doing so gives a more objective idea of the 
relationship between conceptual categories, and allows for easier handling of the vast amounts of 
qualitative data at hand. After identifying the most relevant associations in numeric terms, these 
are explained by selected, individual, meaningful qualitative quotations. An overview of all data 
gathered is provided in Table 3. 
  
Method 
In-depth 
Interviews & 
Farm Budgets 
‘Expert’ & 
Individual 
Interviews 
Farmer 
FGDs 
MOFA/ 
‘Expert’ 
FGDs 
MOFA/ 
‘Expert’ 
Survey 
HHH 
Survey 
Place Biu & Mirigu 
South Ghana, 
Tamale, Biu, 
Mirigu 
Biu & 
Mirigu 
Navrongo & 
Paga 
Navrongo & 
Paga 
Biu 
Result 
Text  
(& numbers) 
Text Text Text Numbers Numbers 
Sample 
Size 
n=47 n=70 n=37 n=2 n=25 n=177 
= 150 hours of transcribed recordings  
Table 3: Major primary data outcome of research by place  (own table, 2014). 
4.2. General Field Access and Interaction  
Owing to contemporary, methodological needs, the context of scientific findings, should be 
illuminated (ATTESLANDER 2003: 108-110; FLICK 2007: 147-149; PRZYBORSKI & 
WOHLRAB-SAHR 2014: 39, 49; ROTHFUß 2009: 177-178; WACQUANT 1992: 51). 
Therefore, this section provides an impression of field access, including the interactions and 
conceptions that accompanied data collection at various levels and with various actors. It thereby 
reveals some of the limitations of the derived information.  
4.2.1. At Community Level 
At the community level in Biu and Mirigu, farmers and their representatives were 
interviewed to understand the livelihood systems and the relevance of markets within these. A 
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major factor in field access at the community/farmer level is the gatekeeper (FROSCHAUER & 
LUEGER 2003: 54). Upon arrival in the focus community of this study, Biu, contact was 
established with a local gatekeeper, Mr. Francis Asangkame. Asangkame, due to his high level of 
education and self-set standards, had already served as an assistant in several research projects in 
the past. He served diligently not only as a translator, but also as an excellent door-opener to local 
hearts and minds, given that he is well known and respected in the community. The initiation of 
the research depended on his help because he established initial contact with locals who may 
otherwise have been unwilling to participate owing to a lack of trust in most researchers. 
Once contact was established, people were generally very welcoming of the interviews, as 
long as sufficient respect, in local terms, was extended to them. In the case of the local leaders, 
especially the chiefs, such expression of respect often meant monetary compensation and the 
provision of beverages and tobacco. The majority of participants appreciated humbleness and 
respect in interaction, especially in the interviews and group discussions. The respect required 
also includes reverence for customs and cultural values. Furthermore, the people appreciated 
minor symbolic help with their work. Helping with weed pulling, for example, extensively eased 
the atmosphere when farmers were interviewed in their fields. Yet, an undeniable observation was 
that the people often showed tired of hearing and having to answer questions from researchers, 
due to the fact that many researchers have visited their village over the last decades. People 
expressed concern over the interviews taking up an excessive amount of their time, yet doing little 
good for them: 
’Many things have happened like this, many books have been written concerning farming and they 
have come to interview us on so many occasions on these sorts of things. So many years it 
happened and they are all saying to us that they’ll help us. So anytime they want to write 
something they will gather us, the poor people, together like this and then they begin to ask us. 
[…] They’ll come […] to interview us on things pertaining to farming, but if there is even any 
help coming as a result of that, we never know.’1 
The people were rightfully concerned with the outcomes of research on their communities. 
They perceived interviews and discussions to be part of an exchange of mutual benefits, whereby 
the benefits for a researcher, in the form of a Ph.D., should be balanced by benefits for 
interviewees. In general, the people were motivated to participate in the interviews and group 
discussions by an expectation of some sort of practical assistance that would result from the 
research. They expressed the wish to be helped by provision of fertilisers or money. Some even 
asked for infrastructure and processing plants to be built or for access to markets to be provided 
                                                   
1 FGD with farmers, 09.10.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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through the donation of trucks. Twice, people offered to hand over their infants to the researcher 
so that they could have a better life in Europe. Thus, because people had high expectations for 
support, the number of people who joined the discussions, for example, was often greater than 
originally anticipated. After the schedule for the group discussions was announced and after 
participants were invited, news about the gathering spread fast within the villages. The number of 
participants also increased because of money initially provided as a form of compensation. Due to 
the rising number of participants, this form of compensation was then switched to food and 
drinks, served during the discussions, which helped reduce the number of participants in the group 
discussions to a manageable size. Nevertheless, the switching of the remuneration, from cash to 
kind, initially aroused frustration. 
People’s idea to acquire help or monetary compensation for their participation in interviews, 
as well as their manner of self-portrayal during the sessions, is partly influenced by previous 
research and NGO projects that have been carried out in the area. People often emphasised their 
suffering by contrasting it with the circumstances and wealth of Western researchers. Such 
suffering may be true, but to a certain extent one could sense that the people actively highlight the 
impression of suffering from severe poverty. The logic behind emphasising one’s poverty became 
more evident when relatively rich local elites, despite their more than sufficient livelihood 
outcomes, started begging for money or other items – a practice that they preferred to carry out in 
public. To some extent, therefore, the participants responded to the questions strategically but not 
necessarily honestly. They were used to hearing questions on poverty and attempted to make 
themselves appear poorer than they actually were, in vain attempts to satisfy the criteria for 
obtaining external help: 
‘They [researchers and NGOs] have polluted people’s minds; they have made them identify 
themselves as poor people. So once they are recognised as poor, then you have to give them 
[help] […] NGOs and researchers resort to giving them the packages for farming or money and 
so they [in turn] get their results. You know, they [the researchers] are often funded by external 
donors and so they need some results to write their reports and to make themselves a name and so 
they trade results for money or other things.2 
Thus, the responses given must be treated with caution. Such prudence is necessary also 
because the socio-economic and socio-cultural differences between the researcher and the 
interviewees are vast. The people were very conscious about public interaction with the researcher 
and gave the impression that handshakes and successful openly expressed requests for money 
were partly used to improve and manifest social standings in the communities. Language barriers 
                                                   
2 FGD with MOFA extension officers, 14.02.2013, Navrongo, Ghana.  
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further increased perceived differences. Moreover, the interviews revealed that people think very 
much in terms of racial categories in the sense that they assign common characteristics to people 
of ‘white’ or ‘black’ skin colour. With the researcher being of Caucasian origin, therefore, certain 
barriers of prejudice needed to be overcome. ‘Whites’ are frequently associated with colonial rule, 
through which the colonised were exploited and mistreated, but they are also associated with 
incredible riches, a happy life, and NGOs and large-scale infrastructural projects, such as the local 
irrigation schemes. Thus, perception of the researcher was not free of historical, yet stereotypical, 
attributes. As an elder person put it: 
‘In the olden days we used to run away when we saw white people, but now we are ok with them, 
we are friends. We now know that even if you touch a white man you would not die, but rather it 
will help you.’3 
‘Whites’ in general are regarded as having the power to bring change to people’s lives, and 
thereby, are considered vastly superior to black people. ‘Whites’ are even perceived as being (the 
only ones) able to create significant change in local lives through their own financial abilities and 
through contact with decision makers on developmental aid. Moreover, one of the interviewees 
stated that he perceives ‘whites’ to be closer to God because their general standard of living is 
higher than that of ‘blacks’ and because ‘whites’ have the ability to build airplanes; through such 
innovation, therefore, they are closer to heaven. White people are also perceived to live a better 
life as a result of morally just behaviour, whereas the people in the villages blame their own 
societal grievances as the reason for their own misfortune and poverty – a punishment from God. 
Yet, these perceived differences were greatly eased by a thorough introduction to all the chiefs 
and local elites; festivities designed to further introduce oneself in a relaxed setting and to 
announce the commencement of research activities; continuous visits to the communities; and 
attendance in all the major social events in the communities, especially funerals. With time, the 
biases that stemmed from the misconceptions diminished. 
The use of bottom-up approaches was appreciated. Participatory research at the grass-roots 
level was especially welcomed, for participants had experienced that researchers, institutions and 
organisations visiting the village acted on hearsay derived from their leaders, instead of 
information from the people themselves. Consequently, they were happy to be able to express 
their own opinions. They also welcomed participatory approaches because they could thereby 
evaluate such external interventions. The people held high hopes with regard to the fact that a 
publication that advocates research in the community can facilitate the entry of more external help 
into the village and the modification of current initiatives into programmes that favour their poor. 
                                                   
3 FGD with farmers, 11.12.2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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In previous initiatives they had been rarely afforded the chance to have their voices heard. 
Furthermore, culture prevented them from bypassing the authority of their leaders and directly 
complaining to officials: 
‘Our culture does not even allow you to complain to them! No matter how we feel the pain, we 
cannot come and complain directly to somebody like you, unless we are given the chance by 
somebody who is friends with you. […] Culture does not allow that in this village and so we just 
have to swallow it or be directly invited and asked critically.’4 
The participants were thankful for the initiated lively discussions and mutual learning 
processes. Exchange regarding mutual problems created a unifying atmosphere among the 
discussants. Women were particularly happy to have their voices heard – another rarity in the 
communities visited. Women often disguised their actual experiences by describing the problems 
that they experience in their own households in more general terms. They often emphasised that 
they were not describing their own life realities and that others present in the discussions should 
not draw conclusions regarding their individual behaviour by what had been said. They were 
afraid that by expressing criticism during the discussions, they would lose their reputation. It was 
also stated that a foreigner conducting research was viewed as an avenue from which they could 
express issues of concern to a more neutral observant. Such a view is attributed to the perception 
of the local leaders and officials as being biased towards their own interests. Participants were 
occasionally afraid to speak their minds because they rightly feared that members of the group 
would pass on critical statements to local leaders:  
‘Surely somebody from our group will go and tell them [the leaders]. It is because these big, big 
people will go and want to block any help that is coming to our village. […] That is why I’m 
asking concerning this research work and writing of a book that is to be exposed to NGOs. […] If 
it so happens that this book is exposed to NGOs and the international community and people from 
outside or wherever, […] how can we, […] which are suffering from this frustration, how can we 
get the help, if it then comes?’5 
The information gathered during the interviews and group discussions with smallholders 
was used to develop critical questions that were later put to local leaders, administration and 
foreign aid organisations. This provided room for criticism that would have otherwise remained 
unarticulated. 
                                                   
4 FGD with farmers, 10.08.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
5 FGD with farmers, 10.08.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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4.2.2. At Administrative Level 
At the administrative level, high-level officials, extension officers and individual experts 
were interviewed. Field access at this level was initiated in Ghana’s capital, Accra. Key players, 
such as the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), diverse government 
ministries, NGOs and expatriate consultants, were contacted for data collection and to establish 
contact with their associates at national and regional levels. Being referred from one (high-
ranking) actor to the next (subordinate) was the most efficient way of proceeding because it 
substantially reduced the time required to establish contact and obtain information. These forms of 
cooperation mostly proceeded informally and were sometimes accompanied by exchange of data 
and at times, the offer of bribes. Government agencies most often requested the provision of a 
project description and an introductory letter. The ministries and government administration at the 
district and local levels, in particular, gave the impression of endeavouring to do their best in 
helping the research progress. The administrator of the local irrigation project, Irrigation 
Company of Upper Region (ICOUR), was interested in exchanging ideas and information and 
provided excellent assistance. The FGDs with the district extension officers from the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (MOFA) helped to establish contact and a base for mutual trust, thereby 
enabling access to other partly classified intra-organisational data.  
Cooperation was most difficult and time consuming to forge at the regional government 
level and more so at the national level. Officials from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFA) were rarely prepared to respond to the critical questions that arose from the village-level 
FGDs. This setback resulted in extreme frustration, especially when the interviews had been 
planned ahead for a long time but had to be repeatedly re-scheduled moments before they were 
supposed to take place. Often, long distances had already been covered to make these interviews 
possible. Yet, certain key actors re-scheduled their interviews more than four or five times. When 
the interviews finally took place, after months of repeated postponement, some of the 
interviewees were unprepared for certain questions. Transparency and the willingness to 
cooperate or respond to questions were low to non-existent at the regional level and partial at the 
national level. This obstacle may have originated due to the ongoing ministry and journalist 
investigations in to corruption and mass smuggling of fertilisers through government officials in 
the region. Consequently, data collection at the regional and national administrative levels 
occasionally necessitated the use of unorthodox methods, such as searching for informants; 
collecting background information on key players, especially on large subsidy recipients; 
surveillance of these players; and acquiring intra-organisational data through unofficial channels. 
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4.2.3. At Trader Level 
Traders were interviewed to help understand tomato, chili, rice and shea value chains, 
whereby the latter were examined and analysed only partly due to time constrains. Traders 
pointed out crucial leverage points within the value chains, as well as major trends and dynamics. 
Initial field access at the intermediary and wholesale trader level was relatively easy. The 
merchants and their (union) representatives frequently gave the impression of being flattered 
when asked for individual interviews or requested to participate in FGDs with their colleagues. 
Even on short notice or whilst they were conducting trade, they took no issue with being 
interviewed directly or arranging additional meetings. On the contrary, they gave the impression 
of being highly motivated and welcoming. Communication with traders was easier than with most 
of the people at the community level because the majority of traders can speak at least some 
English and showed a high level of eloquence due to their professional backgrounds. As a result, a 
translator was rarely required and the interviews proceeded smoothly without much explanation 
needed.  
The data acquired through qualitative individual interviews and FGDs included the drawing 
of timelines for understanding value chain dynamics and trader budgeting. The latter was difficult 
to accomplish because traders were reluctant to disclose their costs and profits. Often, budgeting 
resulted in calculational loss, which may occasionally be possible but invalid as an explanation for 
their professional activities. Thus, the traders downplayed the profits that they earned, especially 
in comparison with the revenues generated by farmers. Calculating whilst inquiring, critical 
probing of the figures given, and a discussion of these in the FGDs were used to generate more 
accurate results. Nevertheless, the figures generated can only serve as an orientation. Far more 
difficult and often impossible was the acquisition of value chain data from large-scale companies 
involved in export, specifically in shea trade and processing. These companies mostly refused to 
be interviewed, and when they were ready to be questioned, they were unwilling to discuss 
figures, particularly profits. Analysis had to rely on estimations and especially on secondary data 
from the NGOs involved in the issue. As a result, analysis on shea value chains remained entirely 
at the village level. 
4.3. Methods in Detail 
Having accessed the social fields at the community, administrative and trader levels, data 
were gathered by multiple methods. This section provides a more detailed discussion of the 
methods used, specifically farm budgets and in-depth interviews, expert and individual interviews, 
and farmer and expert FGDs, as well as the HHH survey conducted and the collection of 
secondary data.  
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4.3.1. Farm Budgets and In-depth Interviews 
Farm budgets, in combination with qualitative interviews, were formulated to gain a better 
understanding of the fixed and variable costs involved in producing tomato, chili, rice and shea; to 
estimate their effects on monetary incomes; and to characterise the livelihoods of those involved 
in the production of these crops. These methods advanced understanding of the social/livelihood 
embeddedness of the value chains and related livelihood outcomes, as well as obstacles to greater 
economic sustainability. Initial budgeting was also favourable for building rapport and easing the 
atmosphere for the raised open-ended questions, which approached the aforementioned sub-topics 
and respective questions in more detail. These were semi-structured and provided explicit room 
for the qualitative interpretation, with help from the respondents, of the numerical facts. The 
farmers were also asked to express their views on the following issues:  
- Access to inputs and outcomes and the difficulties experienced in production of a crop; 
- Trends and changes in production and sales; 
- Governance of and access to the product’s value chain; 
- Their own livelihood outcomes and the role of the crop in achieving these outcomes; 
- Their own and others’ producer-related livelihood characteristics; and 
- Crucial leverage points for the pro-poor development of the product’s value chain. 
Thereby, livelihood trends and outcomes created through interaction with a certain value 
chain were measured beyond simple income-related figures. This enabled the acquisition of 
further qualitative insights into issues such as food security, well-being, sustainability of the 
natural resource base and the effects of hazards, climate change and social vulnerability factors.  
The participants were selected by the size and type of their agricultural production and 
outcomes. Preference was accorded to ‘smallholders’, classically referred to as people who work 
on up to 2 hectares of land (WORLD BANK 2014). This criterion, however, includes an 
excessive number of people in Ghana’s north and could induce a failure to detect existing 
inequalities. The definition of the term was therefore left to the discretion of the agricultural 
extension officers assigned in the regions where the research was conducted. Two group 
discussions and surveys with 25 participants were carried out to more definitively define the 
sample group and to access the right groups of people to participate in further proceedings. 
According to these experts, the ‘poorest in society’ – that is, smallholders and those that represent 
about 40 percent of the population – work on no more than 0.6 hectares of land during the wet 
season (WS) and 0.5 hectares in the dry seasons (DS). These figures naturally differ with regard to 
population pressure and access to irrigation. ‘Average’ farmers easily work on double the size of 
land, whereas ‘rich’ or ‘commercial’ farmers work on up to 10 times as much land, as indicated 
by the experts. To achieve a compromise, therefore, ‘smallholders’ are defined in this work as 
people whose livelihoods depend mainly on agriculture with a generally low asset base and who 
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work on less than 1 hectare of cropland per season. Diverse types of farming households were 
included so that a greater spectrum of patterns of action could be understood and to reach a higher 
level of theoretical saturation. Farmers were selected purposefully or strategically via snowball 
sampling (HAY 2005: 72) to identify typical and critical, as well as extreme and deviant, cases. 
Males and females and small-, medium- and large-scale households of different socio-economic 
levels, in and outside of the local irrigation project’s command area, were interviewed 
individually. Farmers were guaranteed anonymity to ensure freedom of speech and to comply 
with ethical considerations. 
4.3.2. Expert and Individual Interviews  
Assistance was solicited from experts to acquire access to their views as observers familiar 
with the issues indicated in the research (sub-) questions, especially regarding information on the 
interrelation of micro and macro scales. These experts were later also used to gain access to other 
experts and local opinion leaders of different backgrounds. The aim was to gain insights from 
different sub-systems and sub-contexts.  
The term ‘expert’ is not necessarily understood to mean a highly educated and high ranking 
official. Experts are understood in a wider sense that does not discriminate against the experiences 
common to the less privileged of society (see critics such as WEIL 2008; WINTER 2011). 
Following this idea, ‘system-internal expertise’ can provide primary experiences that arise from 
interaction within a system, irrespective of that expert’s societal standing. All people create 
practical, first-hand, subjective experiences, thus heterogenic knowledge can be generated through 
interviews. People possess special knowledge within a certain field, which offers a first-hand 
database for research. ‘Field-internal expertise’ is generated from individuals who are at the 
interfaces, yet also part of the social system. Such experts possess rational, abstract and reflected 
knowledge about larger contexts that go beyond practical understanding. ‘External expertise’ 
refers to versatile theoretical knowledge, often irrespective of any system-internal expertise. 
Nevertheless, transitions are easily possible.  
The information given by a particular expert is not an objective fact but a story told from a 
certain perspective, with varying levels of rationality and scale. The term ‘expert’ refers to people 
being able to deliver ‘field-internal’ and ‘external expertise’. External experts should only be 
defined as such according to their professional specialisation related to the topic of enquiry, their 
formal knowledge and competency, and their possession of at least 10 years of practical 
experience (MIEG & BRUNNER 2001: 6). Experts of different sorts thus assisted in preliminary 
hypothesis testing, as well as in the generation of ideas for the group discussions and the 
succeeding survey. During the course of the research, information on so-called ‘system-internal 
expertise’ was primarily obtained with methods such as FGDs and semi-structured farm budget 
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interviews. Interviews designed to generate information on both ‘external’ and ‘field-internal 
expertise’ featured unique questions that were formulated on the basis of the interviewees’ field of 
skills. The topics covered in the interviews with external experts were as follows: 
- Smallholder livelihood outcomes;  
- Qualities of smallholder interaction within value chains and smallholder assets that are 
required to be part of a certain chain; 
- Qualities of informal and formal contracts within value chains; 
- Views and rationalities of actors within chains; and 
- Set-up of chains and markets. 
The oral histories shared by especially knowledgeable, older village members enable the 
collection of field-internal information and the linking of smallholder actions, responses and 
adjustment to environmental and social change. These interviews were less structured and highly 
adaptable to the respondents’ courses of narration. The following topics were covered to gain such 
intra-field information: 
- Influences of institutions and the environment on farmer asset mobilisation, and thus, 
explanations for certain livelihood strategies and trends; 
- Environmental and climate change; 
- Livelihood trends; and 
- Traditional and contemporary beliefs and norms. 
4.3.3. Farmer Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
FGDs were used to collect first-hand general information and identify issues of concern; to 
generate intermediate hypotheses but also to establish further contact with the participants; and to 
build rapport for further individual in-depth interviews and questionnaire distribution in the 
future. The topics discussed in each FGD were as follows: 
- Land use, general livelihood upkeep and outcomes; 
- Actors and institutions; 
- Climate change and environmental degradation; and 
- Markets for and production of tomato, chili (‘pepper’), rice, shea nuts and shea butter. 
Further discussions were conducted to understand trends of farm gate prices and yields of 
shea trees. The mapping of village land uses and ‘activity mapping’ were performed to identify 
gaps in the coverage of services; to collect information on ‘predefined series of activities, their 
implementing agencies, their target groups, their outreach coverage’; and to ‘quantify the intensity 
of the activities’. Visual methods were used to present and discuss results during the meetings, as 
a visual process is easy to grasp for participants, allowing them to relate physical and social 
information in spatial terms (VON FRANZ & SCHAL 2009: 3). In combination with the digital 
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elevation models of the sites where the research was conducted, transects were mapped and 
enriched by qualitative data. The aim was to later be able to assign location and allocation of 
resources, forms of land use and the constraints and opportunities these bring about for 
livelihoods in different environments along the transect (Ibid.: 3). Thus, the FGDs (including 
mapping exercises) revolved around all the major sub-topics of the main research question (see 
Section 3.3.3). 
The FGDs were moderated with the help of an assistant who was thoroughly trained, 
briefed, supported and occasionally prompted by the researcher. Both the translator and the 
researcher took note of the group dynamics during the discussion. The goals for every discussion 
were to capture findings in retraceable and comprehensible paper form and to explain the findings 
to the researcher. Some sessions within the group discussions assumed more of an interview 
character. Depending on the topic, the FGD results included drawings and mappings, timelines, 
categorisations and sorting and ranking of encountered phenomena. Each session was also 
recorded. Occasionally, photos that depict different phenomena were used for illustration and 
ranking purposes, to help illiterates provide ideas and discuss results. Each FGD lasted for about 3 
hours per topic. 
In accordance with the topic and community, the farmer groups participating in the FGDs 
each consisted of eight (rarely up to 15) farmers (as approximatelly recommended by LAMNEK 
2005: 438). Most participants were recruited during the aforementioned interviews. Each 
participant was asked to produce at least one of the crops relevant to the research (tomato, pepper, 
rice or shea). Each relevant crop that is grown in a certain community was to be represented by at 
least one participant in the discussion. Each group was required to be somewhat representative of 
the diversity of people in each community, although the focus was on ‘smallholders’. The groups 
comprised people coming from one community but from several sections of the community, with 
equally mixed genders and with diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Partakers were ‘everyday’ 
people, explicitly exhibiting the following attributes:  
- Coming of their own free will and accord, although compensation in the form of food and 
drinks were provided during the discussions; 
- Having no monetary or ego-centric motives in mind when participating in FGDs;  
- Not belonging to any powerful elite in the community; and 
- Not directly dependent on any other person in the group.  
Potential participants were contacted individually with the help of knowledgeable 
community members and assistants. Other potential participants were questioned in informal 
interviews to determine the extent to which they were related to others and to which they fulfilled 
the criteria. These interviews intended to ascertain what kinds of groups would be the best 
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participants. The aim was to enable plausibility, not statistical representativeness (REUBER & 
PFAFFENBACH 2005: 150).  
FGDs were used to determine initial ideas of typical, critical, extreme or deviant cases of 
communities and individuals as a way of orientation into the field. They served as an additional 
entry point to the communities’ social field. The degree of rapport built between the researcher 
and the field/people and the site of investigation partly determined which individuals were to be 
more closely examined in the subsequent in-depth interviews. Discussions and rankings permitted 
an understanding of how decisions are made within a certain socio-environmental context, what 
priorities are, and how outcomes of livelihood activities are valued. This study relied mostly on 
FGDs because when well conducted, they are a tremendous source of information on the content 
and tenor of collective orientation structures, informal opinions and institutions and ideologies 
that shape everyday thinking, feeling, decision making and action. This value is attributed to the 
fact that such information is heavily connected with social interaction; thus, it can best be 
observed and studied when such interaction takes place in a group setting. Group dynamics and 
mutual stimulation can generate more genuine information than individual in-depth interviews. 
FGDs represent settings within which interviewees can easily interact naturally, groups reflect 
their own ideas and thoughts, and general consensus is likely to be reached. At the same time, 
researchers may be able to determine how this consensus was reached.  
A highly effective group discussion method is beneficial for inductive and deductive 
approaches, may be used to commence research for the purpose of generating initial ideas and 
testing concepts or to advance later research phases for testing and adjusting preliminary findings. 
This method, however, is most useful when used to generate new hypotheses in an explorative 
manner and when used in an effort to understand the setting within which behaviours and attitudes 
are embedded. Group discussions can also serve as a platform for reflection and learning by the 
discussants involved. FGDs can thereby help make research more interactive, friendly, respectful 
and empowering for participants whilst being beneficial for generating data for research purposes.  
The downside of FGDs, however, is that discussion is heavily differentiated by group 
dynamics, thereby presenting difficulty in comparing several discussions. The social pressure, 
dominance and submission of certain participants have to be skilfully managed, and FGDs must 
be standardised to some extent (CAMERON 2005; DUGGLEBY 2005; HOLLANDER 2004; 
LAMNEK 2005: 408-474; RABIEE 2004; see also SKOP 2006). FGDs are only as good as their 
participants, or rather, as good as the process that underlies participant selection. Although FGDs 
enable the acquisition of insight into generic trends and patterns, they are never fully 
representative of the totality of a target group (GÖLL et al. 2005: 8). Often, details may be 
missing in the explanations that groups provide. Additional problems and limitations occur in 
intercultural research given that an interpreted FGD is ‘a highly complex event, […] a complex 
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communicative setting, [with] specific spatial and temporal constraints and a high degree of 
cultural embeddedness’ (PRZEPIORKOWSKA 2010: 21). Understanding the non-verbal 
expressions of participants seems impossible in the absence of sufficient insight into the local 
context of communication. Constant interpretation additionally delays exchange of thought in a 
group setting that can otherwise be a fast, dynamic, and thereby, far more revealing process.  
Furthermore, the parameters analysed in interpreted FGDs bear on the roles of not only all 
participants and the moderator, but also the interpreter. Thus, the results of FGDs in settings 
(culturally and/or language wise) foreign to a researcher can be of higher fidelity and reliability 
when competent locals using the local language conduct the discussions. A greater degree of 
standardisation can compensate researchers for relinquishing direct control over the discussions. 
Enabling groups to produce manifest results, such as summaries of outcomes in paper form, can 
advance the production of data less subject to misinterpretation by (foreign) researchers. 
Nevertheless, doing so may lead to missing details.  
However, FGDs are highly effective for building initial rapport because participants feel 
safe within their groups. Several FGDs were conducted per topic to gain a variety of views from 
different segments of a population; which allowed for more generic results from a procedural, 
successive and explorative approach (GÖLL et al. 2005: 9-21), and for contact with a diversity of 
people. As the researchers’ insights evolve and progress over time, the aim of research may 
change and adjust to the realities onsite, even as rapport is built. FGDs should be held with 
changing groups until no new data are generated by further discussions, and until theoretical 
saturation is reached within the scope that the approach allows.  
4.3.4. MOFA/Expert FGDs and Surveys 
FGDs and surveys were held with the extension officers of the local MOFA to gain more 
information on field-internal and external expertise and to generate further quantitative data. 
These methods served as a means to compare these forms of expertise with the system-internal 
perceptions of the farmers. The questions and topics covered, therefore, intentionally overlapped 
with those presented in the farmer FGDs and interviews. The extension officers were asked to 
define local, qualitative and quantitative criteria for poverty assessment and to estimate the 
quantitative significance of their definitions. Special focus was directed towards the allocation of 
land given that the discussions with farmers revealed access to land as a major challenge in 
making a living. They were further questioned to: 
- Evaluate the quality, quantity and trends of hazards, threats and environmental change; 
- Evaluate the effects of threats and changes in the environment on coping abilities; 
- Assess the influence of markets, especially of selected value chains, on livelihoods; 
- Supply information on their experience with farmers and their perceptions of them; and 
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- Discuss the problems that arise from daily work routines and from the practical 
implementation of current interventions by the ministry.  
Two expert group discussions, in combination with surveys, were carried out in each of the 
districts where the research took place. For each event, all the extension officers of a given district 
were successfully recruited for the study. These surveys are thus complete censuses. 
4.3.5. Household Head Survey 
The household head (HHH) survey served two purposes: to obtain quantitative, individual 
and aggregated data, and to test the previously generated hypotheses. The survey covered a 
variety of topics already discussed in the research beforehand. Major topics were:  
- Gender relations; 
- Livelihood assets, strategies, land use and outcomes; 
- Tomato, chili, rice and shea nut value chains; 
- General problems in farming and natural hazards; 
- Foreign aid and external intervention accessibility; 
- Livelihood trends; 
- Household decision making; 
- Institutional effects on poverty alleviation; 
- Hypotheses/opinions on developmental issues in the community. 
Only household heads were invited to participate in the survey because they could more 
easily provide information on an entire household, and thus, a large proportion of the examined 
population. ‘Heads’ are defined as the male or female member of a household, recognised as 
being the dominant decision-maker by the other household members. The head of household is 
also defined as the person who bears economic and social responsibility for most or the entirety of 
the household. ‘Household’ pertains to the people who live together in the same house or 
compound, and who cater to one another’s sustenance and living requirements. The degree of 
relationship – i.e. whether they are directly related (definitions partly adopted from GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2012: X) – is of no consequence. Participant households were selected 
by geographically random sampling. The locations of the first interviews were established by 
blind throwing of an arrow onto a map of the village. After each interview, the geographic 
directions to be followed (north/south and east/west) were decided by a coin toss to determine 
which household was to be interviewed next. If that household had already been interviewed, the 
random selection procedure was repeated. In addition, those already interviewed in the individual, 
in-depth and farm budget interviews were again asked to participate in the survey.  
The number of participants in the survey was decided via a method characterised by a 
compromise between efficiency and representativeness. In 2010, Biu (where the survey was 
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conducted) had a population of 3299 inhabitants, accounting for 5.8 inhabitants per household 
(data obtained from the Ghana Statistical Service). The village population grew by about 20 
percent from 2000 to 2010 (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2012: 104; LAUBE 2007: 113). 
At the time of the study (2012), therefore, the population was estimated to be 3431, equal to about 
592 households, each with one head, assuming that household sizes have remained the same as in 
2010 (i.e. 5.8 inhabitants/household). With n=177 household heads in the survey, a confidence 
level of 95 percent at a range of about ± 6.2 percent was reached in the analysis, assuming a 
normal distribution of variables (SACHS & HEDDERICH 2006: 263). Lack of time meant that 
the survey was only conducted in one of the villages visited, in Biu. 
Further limitations but also advantages arise from the characteristics of survey participants. 
Though showing a severe bias according to age, the greater seniority of survey participants in 
comparison to general demographic structures had the advantage of being able to cover larger 
timeframes when they were asked for trends occurring throughout their lifetime. Overall it was 
difficult to find female headed households, as men generally dominate decision making in these 
economic units (see Figure 5). Data was disaggregated according to sex, to see where substantial 
differences arise in terms of perception.  
 
Figure 5: Age and sex of survey participants  (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
4.3.6. Secondary Data Collection and Archive Survey 
To understand the effects and importance of different markets and their attached value 
chains on livelihoods, this study collected countrywide, regional and, where available, local 
secondary quantitative data on economics and poverty-related phenomena; statistics on production 
volume of crops; data on the natural environment and climate and environmental change; and data 
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on households and their land use. Data were obtained from the literature, publicly available 
statistical reports and intra-organisational records. The secondary data includes: 
- Global and regional numeric data on markets, production volumes and general economic data;  
- Country-/region-wide farm gate prices; 
- Organisational/institutional records, contracts and correspondence; 
- Regional and local environmental remote-sensing/GIS data; 
- Estimations of shares of gains within value chains, including farm gate prices; and 
- Estimations of inputs needed for production and their monetary costs. 
Of special interest were the diaries of Catholic priests in Navrongo dating back to 1905 
which were revealed by an archive survey. These priests were among the first Europeans to settle 
in the area. The diary entries were analysed for information on natural hazards, sowing and 
harvesting times, food shortages and famines and major social happenings. The data provided 
insights into major land use patterns, and seasonal climatic fluctuations long before data were 
officially recorded in the area. This contributes to an understanding of long-term livelihood 
dynamics, especially with regard to changing ecological conditions, and further helped to 
triangulate results in a broader historical perspective.  
4.4. Triangulation 
To triangulate data it is useful to classify data according to micro, meso and macro scales 
(ERZBERGER 1998: 80-102). Then, ‘through a continuous alternation of quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of both individual behaviour and objective structures – facilitated by bridge 
hypotheses or similar constructs’ congruent or complementary and divergent results can be 
identified (DE HAAN 2012: 352), to thereby minimise threats to validity. The point at which 
singular individuals and their actions can be separated from the social systems and institutions in 
which collective actors perform, define borders between micro and macro scales. Numbers can 
describe macro to meso scales, express people’s perceptions and illuminate the micro scale. 
Because scales are interwoven, information gathered is sorted according to its contribution to the 
explanation of an either individual or collective phenomenon. Data explaining the actions of 
individual actors must explicitly identify these as a result of their actions. Data that do not directly 
refer to individuals prevents direct validation at that level. The same goes for meso and macro 
scales. Thereby, the following forms of data can be differentiated:  
- ‘Aggregated quantitative data’ does not directly refer to individuals because it is aggregated. It 
offers structural information at the macro scale but not at the micro scale; conclusions cannot 
be drawn on individuals from information of larger groups. Such data often refer to figures, 
classic macro data, GDP figures, population statistics, imports, exports, and general trends.  
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- ‘Quantitative individual data’ are quantitative data with direct reference to individuals, 
providing information at the macro and micro scales. Examples are surveys or panels, and data 
from health insurance programmes. This data summarise individual actions and thereby 
generate insights on larger, evolving structures through numbers.  
- ‘Qualitative individual data’ are micro data that cover actors’ individual coping strategies, 
ways of interpretation, interactions, strategies and constructions of reality. Outcomes are text 
or protocols that originate from interviews and observations. 
- ‘Qualitative structural and institutional data’ provide information on institutions and larger 
social systems as the outcome of the totality of individual actions. Such data can come from 
individuals as carriers of information about larger contexts (e.g. ‘experts’) and can provide 
information on larger scales. FGDs are an example. Such data provides insight into the 
transitions between scales and between individual and structure (thus, the meso level) 
(ERZBERGER 1998: 103-106). 
The combination of these types of data allows the establishment of connections between 
scales or levels of analysis. Data may establish connections to a micro level via quantitative 
individual data, expert interviews or FGDs. Each scale enriches the explanations derived from 
another, and connections between structure and individual actions can be formulated (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Model of sociological explanation (based on ERZBERGER 1998: 120). 
Relations between a social situation and a collective explanandum at the macro level (S1 to 
S2) are needed to bridge hypotheses. Such bridging enables the production of initial thoughts on 
the micro level, where individuals put things into practice (A to Ah and B to Bh). The same goes 
for the meso scale, which embeds these individuals (SG1 to SG2). Bridge hypotheses are 
generated through the reconstruction (R) of reasons for certain behaviour at the scale of individual 
actors, that is, the micro level. Larger socio-cultural patterns of interpretation need to be 
understood through individual perceptions and actions. The macro level serves as a normative 
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orientation for the actions of individuals and shows limits and specific options, whereas diverse 
individual actions at the micro level merge to form the phenomena encountered at the macro level 
(Ibid.: 103-121). 
Triangulation in this form enables ‘studying local-global interactions’ (DE HAAN 2012: 
351-352) as it merges structural and actor perspectives. It minimises threats to validity because 
such ‘between-method-triangulation’ can test previously generated hypotheses (MCKENDRICK 
2009: 130) and pits the specific strengths and weaknesses of each method against those of others. 
It comprises other ways of triangulation, such as data, investigator and theory triangulation. These 
make the re-conceptualisation and continuous, critical evaluation of methods and hypotheses 
necessary (ERZBERGER 1998: 123-149; FLICK 2007: 519-520; FLICK 2011: 12-17; KELLE 
2007; LAMNEK 1995: 252-253, 2005: 158-160), as done in this research (see Section 4.1). When 
outcomes are divergent, even though no serious mistakes are found in data acquisition or analysis, 
new approaches to improving theories must be developed. A research approach may have to be 
modified to once again create complementary results. When triangulation creates a consistent 
picture there is evidence that an encountered phenomenon is appropriately understood and 
described. Qualitative explanations verified by quantitative allocations can then arise with results 
that support the creation of a complex picture proven by numbers (ERZBERGER 1998: 123-149). 
In this research, the HHH survey provided quantitative individual data that ranged from the micro 
to meso scale, thereby reinforcing the qualitative individual data gathered through micro scale 
interviews. Another connection of micro and meso/macro scale was provided by FGDs, as well as 
by interviews in combination with various forms of mapping and secondary data (Table 4).  
Data type Methods Scale 
No. 1: Aggregated quantitative 
Collecting secondary data, maps, value chain data, own 
mapping 
Meso to 
macro 
No. 2: Quantitative individual 
Household survey, individual farm budgets, organisational 
and institutional records 
Micro to 
meso 
No. 3: Qualitative individual 
In-depth interviews, participant observation, oral history, 
field notes 
Micro 
No. 4: Qualitative structural and 
institutional 
FGDs, expert interviews and FGDs, background checks 
and investigation on key actors, finding and checking on 
informants, field notes, mapping, archive survey 
Micro to 
meso  
(and macro) 
Table 4: Data types collected according to method and scale (own table, 2014). 
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5. Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
This chapter examines the livelihood systems of two communities – Biu and Mirigu – 
located in Ghana’s Upper East Region (UER). Both communities reside in close proximity to the 
Burkinabe border and are part of the former Kassena Nankana District (KND), which was 
recently bifurcated into an eastern (KNE) and a western (KNW) part. Mirigu falls in the western 
district, and Biu in the eastern. Both communities lie in close proximity to the former district 
capital, Navrongo (see Map 1).  
 
Map 1: The study areas, Biu and Mirigu (own map, 2014). 
The UER falls within the Sudan Savannah region, characterized by semi-arid climatic 
conditions and having two prevailing seasons, a wet and a dry season (LAUBE 2007: 45). The 
region is situated in the ‘Gurma Upland Plains’, which fade into the ’Oti’ and ’Salaga Low Lands’ 
lying to the south. The landscape fades into the savannah plains of the Upper West Region lying 
west of the villages, while the ‘Atakora Mountain Chain’ is found in the east (SCHULTZE 1955: 
Beilage 1). Overall, the region’s topography is characterized by relatively low, gently rolling 
relief. Mean elevation is 197 m above sea level (MDEMU 2008: 11). Mirigu – being further east – 
is situated at 197 metres, which is a slightly higher altitude than Biu, at about 179 metres above 
sea level. While vast floodplains exist west of Biu, Mirigu has only minor ones and is 
characterised by a higher topographic variability. 
5.1. General and Spatial Principles of Livelihood Upkeep 
Settlement structures are at the centre of all basic livelihood activity in Biu and Mirigu. 
Many thousands of years ago, the first settlements were established on hills (WIDGREN 2010: 
329, 337). Traditionally, land usage forms semi-permanent, seasonal and concentric, circular ring 
patterns, which differ in their intensity of usage according to population density (BARRAL 1968: 
44; CALLO-CONCHA et al. 2012: 14; HAHN 2000: 142-143; HUNTER 1967a: 104, 106, 
1967b: 41; LAUBE 2007: 152; RUTHENBERG 1971: 58-62, 111-112). People have traditionally 
practiced (manure-) intensive, rainfed agriculture in immediate proximity to their houses and have 
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cultivated additional bush farms further afield. The main livelihood securing activity – agriculture 
in Biu and Mirigu – depends on the time of year. During the wet season, from about May to 
October, locals are busy on their ‘compound farms’, meaning that they work on plots which 
immediately surround their housing. During the other half of the year, during the dry season, 
locals practice irrigated farming along intermittent streams, as in Mirigu, or sourcing water from 
the local irrigation project, as in Biu. Tremendous use is made of trees. Agroforestry, especially in 
bush areas is an essential part of the land use systems and agrarian landscapes. ‘Kulturbauparks’ 
(KRINGS 1991) surround settlements with their attached fields. These are cast concentric rings of 
different parklands, of carefully selected and useful trees. These differ in composition of species 
defined by the intensity of their usage which is in turn depends on proximity to settlements (Ibid. 
128; LENTZ & STURM 2004: 408). These parklands are possibly the oldest, still persistent signs 
of labour intensive agriculture in the region (WIDGREN 2010: 334). Today’s landscape is 
anthropogenic, centring on agriculture and agroforestry. 
The vast majority of people, almost 80 percent in Biu and Mirigu, work as farmers (data 
obtained from Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). According to this study’s survey data, an average 
household in Biu will make use of less than three different sources of livelihood income. By far 
most popular is ‘farming and selling of own crops’ and ‘animals’ in combination with ‘casual 
labour for others’. Casual labour is especially important for female-headed households. In Biu 54 
percent of all households, but 62 percent of female-headed ones depend on casual labour for a part 
of their income. Most locals also rear livestock, though the sale of animals is seldom. Many 
occasionally even have to beg others for support in order to survive. Handcrafts and hunting are 
less popular. Only a few people work in the manufacturing sector and even less trade or do other 
activities to secure their livelihoods. Remittances from migrants serve as important incomes for 
over 35 percent of households. This share is again significantly higher among female-headed 
households – by an additional 20 percent. Of smaller importance as income sources, though more 
popular among female-headed households, are trade in everyday commodities and trade with the 
crops of others. Even less significant are incomes generated through regular remittances from 
other villagers, aside fishing or handcrafts. Less than 10 percent of surveyed households make a 
living by more exploitative forms of land use, hunting, and charcoal or firewood production. 
Significantly fewer have some form of formal employment, or live by selling water, renting out 
machinery or off a pension (own survey, 2013, n=177).  
Similarly in Mirigu, people are generally self-employed farmers. Almost all households 
derive their income from the exploitation of their immediate natural environment. However, a 
greater share of people is engaged in non-agricultural activities such as handcrafts. Seasonal and 
permanent migration to the south of Ghana is said to be far more popular in Mirigu than in Biu 
and so more households are likely to depend on remittances from migrants. According to FGD 
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participants, this difference results from the relation of the population to its land reserves. Mirigu 
has a higher population density than Biu. Aside from the intensely populated and cultivated 
compound areas within its settlements, Mirigu has only another 500 ha of ‘less crowded bush 
areas’ or ‘extensively used bush lands’ remaining between it and its neighbouring communities, 
parts of which are said to be uncultivable. Of higher fertility is a stretch of alluvial flood plains 
along the Atankwidi River, where wet and dry season farming is practiced (see Map 2).  
 
Map 2: Illustration of major land reserves and usages in Mirigu (own map, 2013, own FGDs and 
activity mappings, 2012/’13). 
Biu has significantly more land reserves than Mirigu. Its ‘Abusa Bush’ spreads over a total 
of about 6400 ha, parts of which are biodiversity hot spots because they are protected forest 
reserves and give refuge to wild animals such as monkeys, snakes or antelopes. The agricultural 
potential of Biu’s bush area available to locals is decreasing however, because of large mango 
plantations mostly owned by local politicians and established with the help of the government’s 
Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund (EDAIF). The future of a total of 3800 ha 
of bush is immediately at stake, while farming or agroforestry in the proximity of the plantation 
will soon no longer be possible, because of heavy agro-chemical usage on the mango plantations. 
Farmers will become increasingly reliant on agriculture within their village; respectively on dry 
season agriculture at the nearby irrigation project (see Map 3). 6 
                                                   
6 Interview with the plantation manager, 10.11.2013, Navrongo, Ghana.  
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Map 3: Illustration of major land reserves and usages in Biu (own map, 2013, own FGDs, activity 
mappings and further GIS mappings, 2012/’13). 
Most rainfed agricultural production takes place in highly populated areas. In Biu, the 
average farming household will work on about 6 acres of land in the village, as compared to less 
than 4 acres in Mirigu. Over 90 percent of households in Biu and a similar share in Mirigu are 
immediately dependent on these compound farms. Thus wet season agriculture represents the 
basis of people’s livelihood. It is practised quite similarly throughout the area: usage of compound 
lands is extensive, as chemical fertilisers or other agro-inputs are seldom applied in these areas, 
not to speak of mechanical land preparation. Cultivation depends on manuring, composting and 
communal work. Communal work is especially important, because crops grown in these 
compound areas require quite a high amount of labour, especially during the beginning of the wet 
season. Attaining communal work requires investment in social capital, yet it’s not free of further 
financial burdens. Strong alcoholic drinks, drummers and food have to be arranged for neighbours 
willing to help with land preparation (see Photo 1).  
In April, after the first rains have softened the soils and initial land preparation has taken 
place, manure is collected and applied on compound fields. Different varieties of millet are most 
often planted. (Bambaran) beans are manured with compost. Furthermore, groundnuts, maize, rice 
and shea are grown and harvested. Small areas are planted with kenaf, okra or hibiscus. Aside 
from shea, which is harvested from May to September, crops are harvested over the period July to 
December (see Figure 7). 
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Photo 1: Communal land preparation during the wet season in Biu (own photo, 2013). 
 
Figure 7: Cropping calendar for major rainfed crops in Bui and Mirigu (own figure, 2013, own 
FGDs, 2012/’13). 
Rainfed production in the compound areas of Mirigu and Biu is manifold. Millet is the most 
popular crop, and about 90 percent of households in Biu produce different varieties of the crop 
around their houses. Equally important is the gathering of shea, an indigenous tree whose fruits 
come with nutritious pulp and oil seeds from which shea butter can be produced. At least 77 
percent of households in Biu collect shea nuts from their lands. Groundnuts are grown on larger 
tracks of compound land by about 36 to 46 percent of households. Crops such as cow pea and 
bambaran beans are grown in both Biu and Mirigu, but only on an insignificant scale. Most people 
cultivate okra, kenaf and hibiscus around their houses (over 80 percent of all households in Biu), 
but equally on insignificant acreage. Maize is produced on compound lands by about 57 percent 
of households in Biu, and possibly by more in Mirigu. Rice is grown in both Biu and Mirigu. A 
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little over 50 percent of households in Biu grow rice, and roughly 34 percent of plots are used for 
this purpose during the wet season. Mirigu’s farmers estimate the share of rice producers among 
their village’s inhabitants to be less than 25 percent, and expected a smaller share of plots to be 
used. The rice varieties grown to suit local environments also differ. People in Biu produce newer 
introduced varieties of rice, which are high yielding and fast growing, while in Mirigu popular, 
traditional rice varieties, suitable for uplands, are grown. These crops hardly cover over 10 
percent of the land available, and plots are heavily intercropped. For example, in Biu, more than 
92 percent of farmers in the village intercrop with an average of 3.25 different crop varieties per 
plot. Most popular is the intercropping of early and late millet, okra, kenaf and hibiscus. Another 
combination includes cow pea, bambara/‘black’ beans and groundnuts. Seldom combined with 
others is red millet, maize or rice. Crops like kenaf, okra or hibiscus are mainly used to demarcate 
plots. As a result, plots are not only fragmented but are quite mixed and patchy. Fragmentation is 
highest in Mirigu, due to higher population pressure, and is said to be comparable to the centre of 
Biu (see Map 4).  
 
Map 4: Wet season, compound land use with ‘head’ compound and dependents in Biu’s centre 
(own map, 2013, own interviews, 2013, satellite image © 2016 Google and DigitalGlobe). 
The plots in compound areas are patchy and fragmented because the land use interacts with 
settlement structures. These determine field forms and their extents, due to the prevailing 
compound farming system; a result of demographic developments. High population pressure led 
to a dispersed settlement structure, since each farming household needs sufficient lands in order to 
maintain agricultural productivity and outcomes on relatively fragile and infertile soils 
(HASELBERGER 1964: 52). Locals therefore intensify usage of compound farms by manuring 
and intercropping, supposedly in a relatively environmentally sustainable manner (ADAMS 2004: 
133; see also WIDGREN 2010: 324). The size of compound fields, their productivity and long-
term usability is primarily defined by the availability of manure and consequently the number of 
livestock owned. Livestock are kept in kraals surrounded by concentric compound structures in 
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order to protect them and to allow for hoarding their refuse. A concentric ring structure then 
evolves through a nutrient or manure gradient in soils, because manure is spread in immediate 
proximity to compounds and thins out towards the outskirts of plots. Due to insufficient manure, 
hence an overall lack of soil nutrients, high distances between housing structures are needed to 
sustain agricultural production outcomes, which leads to dispersion. This is evident in most parts 
of northern Ghana (EGUAVOEN 2008: 73, 95, 113, 257; HUNTER 1967a, 1967b: 339) and has 
evolved to the degree that the expression ‘village’ no longer tallies ‘with the local settlement 
pattern’ (LAUBE 2007: 105).  
Own mappings of both Biu and Mirigu and own calculation made with these, indicate that 
compound farms are really highly concentrated. Somewhat circular clusters can be found at higher 
altitudes, on the ridges of large tracts of land spreading finger like between the valleys of the 
local, dendritic river drainage system (own mappings and calculations, 2014). Dendritic river 
systems are said to be relatively old in geomorphological terms, since they have been integrated 
into larger drainages through ongoing stream capture over the millennia (AHNERT 2009: 214). 
Therefore, the basic determinants of landscapes and settlements may not have changed much over 
the last couple of thousands of years. Like their ancestors, people nowadays live on and cultivate 
higher lying areas and consciously avoid low lying areas, well aware that settling in valleys is 
dangerous to housing structures and surrounding crops.7 Consequently, by 1966 the average 
compound farm in Biu stood at an altitude of about 173 m above sea level, keeping an average of 
more than 360 m from the next riverbed (calculations based on GHANA GOVERNMENT 
SURVEY DEPARTMENT 1966). Village structures in both Biu and Mirigu are clustered on hill 
ridges. Since 1966 structures have further concentrated, especially in those areas where density 
was already high due to generational succession and population growth (see Map 5). 
 
Map 5: Growth in compound densities (per km²) from 1967 to 2008 in Biu (left) and Mirigu 
(right)(own map, 2014, own FGDs, 2012/'13, data obtained from satellite images © 2016 Google 
and Digital Globe, GHANA GOVERNMENT SURVEY DEPARTMENT 1966). 
                                                   
7 Interview with one of the Chiefs of Biu, 06.11.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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Today, about 55 to 60 compound farms per km² stand in the centre of Biu and 70 to 75 in 
Mirigu. Gradients of densities in both villages run most distinctively from the hilltops towards 
valley bottoms, while gradually fading along higher lying plateaus. In the outskirts of both 
villages the density is about 20 to 40 compounds/km² (see also Map 8 and Map 9). On average, 
the distance between compound farms is less than 180 meters, while in the centres of settlements 
this distance can easily shrink by over two thirds. Village structures that were de-centrally 
concentrated have become more centralised. This has consequences for the long-term usage of 
these areas. Due to spatial concentration and crowding, especially in the centres of villages, fields 
become limited by their neighbours’ land use. With a growing population, fields fragment further 
by means of generational succession making it increasingly difficult to uphold traditional land use 
systems: once circular fields become fragments, slices, strips and patches. Thus, the traditional 
basis of livelihoods, located around compounds, is limited and will continue to shrink with 
population growth. Intensification may be essential. 
Due to fragmentation and the overuse of compound lands, still-available virgin bush lands 
are cultivated. The average household from Biu will cultivate about 2 acres of bush land, whereas 
farmers of Mirigu assume to cultivate even less. Bush areas offer higher soil fertility, because they 
are less overused, and greater freedom of choice in plot location and size. However, the extensive 
bush lands are hard to make use of. The labour or rather the money needed to clear them is huge 
and as a result, only 57 percent of the interviewees in Biu have minor fields in the bush lands, 
while in Mirigu that share is far smaller. Land use in bush lands is quite similar in both Mirigu 
and Biu. More specialised production takes place and intercropping is rare. In Biu, less than 40 
percent of households intercrop on the bush land. Where they do it is with an average of 2.2 
varieties per plot. Almost half of the bush area under cultivation in Biu is used for rice production, 
while in Mirigu maize is mainly grown. Other crops are generally less prominent. Of significance 
is the relatively high percentage of people that use the bush to collect shea. About 65 percent of 
Biu’s household gather shea nuts in the bush land, where more trees are found than in their 
settlements. In fact, people travel up to 15 km to collect shea nuts. Considering the extensively 
used bush and park lands, and concentrated use in close proximity to settlements, the area of 
human influence is enormous. As the potential of these places is limited and decreasing, intensive 
use is also made of irrigable areas during the dry season.  
At present, two major forms of irrigation are practiced: furrow and shallow groundwater 
irrigation (SGI). Furrow irrigation is practiced in Biu at its nearby ‘Tono’ irrigation scheme, 
managed by the Irrigation Company of the Upper Region (ICOUR). Under this scheme’s 
command area, agriculture in the dry season requires comparatively little human labour, since 
sublateral canals simply have to be opened to water fields. The second form, SGI, is practiced in 
Mirigu along the Atankwidi River. SGI is possible on most river beds having sufficiently high 
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water tables during the dry season. Here, farmers will dig into the river beds or construct wells in 
close proximity in order to access groundwater, and then mostly irrigate by bucket. Laborious 
gardens are established in Mirigu on former wet season farms, near river beds. Biu’s villagers will 
mostly go for plots under the local irrigation project, and seldom use bush areas south of the 
project where excess water flows all year round. In Biu, irrigated farming is pursued by about 83 
percent of all households. Without access to irrigation less than a quarter are still able to produce 
during dry seasons. As the labour needs imposed by watering are vast, the overall share of people 
in Mirigu being able to produce during the dry seasons via SGI, is likely to be even smaller. Any 
SGI farming is greatly constrained by access to groundwater, thus a suitable area, aside great 
physical strength. The amount of labour required limits absolute accessibility of SGI, especially 
when sufficient health, strength or daringness to climb into improvised, up to 8 metre deep wells 
is not there. As the local Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) director states8, only 10 to 20 
percent of all households are able to do dry season farming in a place like Mirigu. However, in 
places where water tables are higher, like Paga, larger shares of the population (up to 60 percent) 
can participate in gardening. SGI also narrows farmers’ scope of opportunity, because rice cannot 
be irrigated by SGI and so vegetables like chili or tomato are produced. Livelihood pathways are 
thus necessarily of smaller bandwidth and at a higher level of risk with SGI as compared to 
irrigation schemes. SGI farmers are more vulnerable to a lack of groundwater in the dry season, 
because they depend on the water table. Thus SGI farmers face different and more elementary 
risks in production. Irrigation projects, on the other hand, allow for safer, easier and thereby more 
accessible forms of livelihood outcomes (see Photo 2 to Photo 5). 
 
Photo 2: Sublateral canals at the Tono irrigation scheme near Biu (own photo, 2011) 
                                                   
8 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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Photo 3: Furrow irrigation at the Tono irrigation scheme near Biu (own photo, 2013). 
 
Photo 4: Dry season river dugout near Mirigu (own photo, 2011). 
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Photo 5: Dry season wells with bucket irrigation in Mirigu (own photo 2013).  
During the dry season in Mirigu, chilies, tomatoes and garden eggs (aubergines) are grown 
on small plots, the outskirts of which are often intercropped with okra. Farmers are fully 
specialised in vegetable and tomato production (see Map 6). Chili production may also take place 
in the wet season, when it is limited to local varieties of chili grown close to homes for 
subsistence. In Biu vegetable and tomato cultivation during the wet season is unknown and 
instead takes place on dry season plots, which are far larger than Mirigu’s, continuous, square and 
less diversified in their land use, with few to no trees within fields (see Map 7). The average 
household in Biu uses about 3 acres of irrigated land, whereas in Mirigu the areas used may be 
significantly smaller. SGI gardeners reported average plot sizes of about a fifth of an acre. 
Production in Biu’s irrigated area is characterised by high-inputs and monocropping, pursued by 
83 percent of households, whereas SGI farmers in Mirigu use more manure. Furthermore dry 
season farming in the project’s command area is characterised by rice production, undertaken by 
78 percent of households. Most cultivation starts in the later part of the wet season and lasts until 
the beginning of the next calendar year. Harvests come in from February/March onwards. While 
the harvest of okra and tomato will be over within a few weeks, chili can be harvested for more 
than 2.5 months in a row. Rice production in the dry season starts from January onwards, and is 
ready for harvest by June. Irrigated rice is also grown from May/June to October/November, but 
only in Biu (see Figure 8). 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
94 
 
Map 6: SGI garden of five farmers in Mirigu (own map, 2013). 
 
Map 7: Irrigated fields near Biu (own map, 2013, based on ICOUR data, 2012, satellite image © 
2016 Google and DigitalGlobe). 
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Figure 8: Cropping calendar for major irrigated crops in Bui and Mirigu (own figure, 2013, own 
FGDs, 2012/’13). 
Agricultural production is differentiated as much by gender as it is by geographical and 
other physical attributes. Almost all females, over 90 percent, in Biu and Mirigu, produce shea 
nuts and shea butter, whereas men do not engage in this. On the other hand, females tend to avoid 
vegetable and tomato production and be less engaged in millet, bambaran bean, okra, kenaf and 
hibiscus production. Maize and groundnut production is more popular among women, though 
rather dominated by men, and women engage themselves in the production of rice. These patterns 
are the same for both Biu and Mirigu, however, Mirigu’s women are mostly engaged in 
production of staples like millet, groundnuts and maize instead of rice. Further significant 
differences can be observed when looking at production taking place via the irrigation project or 
in SGI areas. In Biu female-headed households are more engaged in rice production during the 
wet season, and men during the dry season. The reasons for this may include that men are rather 
busy with staples like millet during the wet season. Production, like that of tomato and chili, is 
heavily male-dominated, both on Biu’s irrigation project as much as in bush areas during the dry 
season. Mirigu’s women emphasised their contribution to gardens, though they acknowledged 
male domination.  
Additional variability in production arises over time. Shea production has become 
increasingly popular in recent times. Over the past 10 years, most farmers in Biu, especially men, 
have started to venture into the production of rice on irrigated areas and maize on compound 
plots, whereby the latter often replaced areas of millet production. Declines are evident in the 
production of okra, kenaf, hibiscus and bambaran beans. Production of tomato is decreasing, 
though that of chili by male-headed households is increasing. Overall trends in the production of 
crops like groundnuts are unclear. Significant gender differences arise when looking at rice and 
maize production, whereby the prior is increasingly popular among female-headed households 
during the dry season while maize attracts more male-headed households (see Figure 9). Trends in 
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Mirigu are similar to those in Biu, especially with maize, though less pronounced in terms of 
declines in millet and tomato production and increases in rice. As in Biu, many male farmers in 
Mirigu have started to produce chili in recent years. 
 
Figure 9: Trends in crops (2003-2013) by gender of respondent in Biu (own figure, 2014, n=177).  
The rationale for these trends in agricultural livelihood, as expressed by farmers, is hunger, 
lack of finance and social capital. These three factors are said to be to be the most crucial 
determinants of households’ well-being and general vulnerability, and thereby of livelihood 
pathways and rationales behind the production of diverse crops. The general strategy of 
diversifying production is considered to help deal with risks. While one crop may fail, another 
may survive thereby allowing the household to survive. So, farmers are conservative in their 
general approach to making a living. 96.6 percent of all respondents in Biu would ‘partly’ or 
‘fully’ attest to the idea of risk avoidance by diversification. Therefore, usage of compound land 
and partly also bush plots is manifold, while irrigated areas are often used for specialised 
production. Diversification and specialisation are intertwined. Local farmers pursue a multi-
purpose strategy. As deducted from FGDs and supported with the secondary data, the rationales 
employed mostly boil down to a conflict over cultivation of crops for food or for income. 
5.1.1. Crops for Food or Income  
In this section livelihood pathways are examined by an analysis of local people’s 
hypotheses of crops’ functions for livelihoods. The most popular locally produced crops are 
cereals, legumes, shea nuts, vegetables and tomato. These support either direct food or income 
security, while some fulfil both purposes. 
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In compound and bush areas, millet is grown because it is deemed to yield well on poor 
soils and to be able to withstand droughts. Even on degraded soils and when only able to use 
manure to fertilise the land, millet is said to give good returns, especially late millet, which is why 
the crop is considered to be essential for food security for up to 11 months of the year. In Mirigu 
where fields are generally smaller, however, millet harvests are consumed by May at the latest, 
meaning within only six months. In both Biu and Mirigu, people praise the millet crop for it’s 
over proportionally high energy content, its nutritional value, despite low yields, and its usage for 
the brewing of Pito, a millet beer, which is very popular in the area. Most millet varieties are said 
to be relatively low in cost and fast in maturing, however, not good for making money, which is 
why they are considered a staple. The same is said for groundnuts: these are said to be relatively 
safe to produce, though not necessarily easy in terms of labour requirement. Although considered 
as cash crops by some, in Mirigu, but also in Biu, groundnuts are grown to be eaten and rarely to 
be sold. Crops like okra, kenaf and hibiscus are used as side ingredients for own cooking, though 
in Mirigu people also sell these crops, though with bad returns.  
With all factors being equal, crops like millet, sorghum or groundnuts are the quite efficient 
in terms of yield to input and thus cost, since they require relatively little work – production is 
dependent on animals owned and labour input. These crops require little fertilisers – NPK or 
sulphate of ammonia – and other agrochemicals, though they generally have low yields and 
potential incomes. As they are often cultivated using manure, to the cost of acquiring inorganic 
fertilisers is removed, and cultivation is more sustainable in agro-ecological terms. Overall, these 
crops are thereby perceived as cheap and relatively easy to grow, providing good benefits to food 
security.9 Compound plots, on which these staples are grown in the wet season, thus represent the 
traditional, heavily diversified basis for livelihood upkeep that is partly dependent on social 
capital (communal labour) and manuring to make use of (limited) potential. 
Shea nuts generate further food and income-securing activities on compound and bush 
lands. They have an instant nutritional value as the pulp can be eaten, while the kernels are 
processed and then sold or used later to produce shea butter. This is the most popular form of cash 
crop specialisation and also the only product processed locally. Shea butter is used as the primary 
source of cooking oil, for skin care and also medicinal purposes. Locals state that shea nut and 
butter do not give good returns, especially the nuts, but provide an income during times of critical 
food shortages, including at the end of the dry season and beginning of the wet season. The 
money generated with shea is said to be the major reason for why hunger decreases by May to 
June, the most difficult period before July and the first harvests of early millet. At this time of 
year most other sources of income have been used up. Generally, shea is said to empower women 
                                                   
9 Women from Biu talking about the value of traditional staples during FGD, 07.08.2012, Bui, Ghana. 
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economically and thereby socially, since picking and processing is entirely in the hands of 
females. Though currently nut processing requires large amounts of firewood, shea processors 
also have a positive impact on the natural environment, since most of the trees left standing in the 
villages are shea trees, which women actively protect.  
Maize, grown on both compound and bush lands, serves a similar purpose in Biu and 
Mirigu. It is said to give better returns in terms of yield and pricing than a crop like millet, though 
still serving as a staple crop. Similarly, it allows people to feed on it for almost half a year. For 
this reason maize is especially popular in Mirigu, where locals have few alternative crops, e.g. 
rice, that can serve both financial and food security interests during the wet season.  
Rice pays comparatively well and allows households to be food secure for half a year. In the 
irrigation project’s command area, two crops of rice can be grown within each year. When this is 
the case, it is estimated that five people can eat for almost the whole year off 1 acre of land. Yet, 
also it is acknowledged that the incomes made with rice are most often exhausted after only six 
months. Although seemingly short, this is still one of the longest periods when compared to other 
crops. Rice simply does not yield well outside of the command areas of irrigation projects. 
Situated at a higher altitude than Biu and having a comparatively greater variability in topography 
whilst also having fewer flood plains, the likelihood of high rainfall runoffs is high in Mirigu, 
which lowers attainable rice outcomes. Rice cannot be grown in the dry season using shallow 
groundwater irrigation (SGI), which for Mirigu’s locals is regrettable, since Biu’s people consider 
rice the best crop in terms of production and yield. People often attest that the newer rice varieties 
do not at all suit their taste and are less nutritious, unlike traditional ones. They are grown because 
the varieties are popular among consumers in the south of Ghana. In Mirigu, people regret that 
there are simply too few places suitable for rice production. However, traditional rice varieties in 
Mirigu, though having lower yields, grow well despite being planted on drought prone lands. 
Resistant against environmental stresses, the varieties are said to be highly nutritional. Therefore 
rice is characteristically important for both cash and food in Biu, while it serves as an additional 
staple crop in Mirigu.  
While most traditional staples are low-cost and accessible, the new varieties of rice and 
maize, which partly serve as cash crops, require finances in order to buy the necessary inputs, 
among them inorganic fertilisers and agro-chemicals, and to remunerate greater labour input. 
These varieties require some chemical fertilisers and agro-chemicals, in addition to however much 
manure is added, in order to yield at all. Maize and rice, unlike millet, also require a great deal of 
attention. Furthermore, the needed investment during the wet season comes at a time when the last 
stocks of wet season crops are already used up. Finances are required to purchase the inputs 
necessary to start production, but accessing financial capital is often problematic.  
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Dry season vegetables/tomatoes are said to be the most demanding and ‘fragile’ crops to 
produce. According to locals, tomato and chili require high fertiliser application and consume 
much labour. They are the largest consumers of pesticide and weedicide applications followed by 
cereals like rice and maize, and then staples like millet or groundnut. Chili, tomato and rice 
require exclusive access to irrigated/irrigable land, but then have more assured, greater yields and 
also higher financial incomes. So, although the irrigated areas used for chili and tomato 
production may be seem relatively small, especially in Mirigu, the monetary value of the inputs 
required to cultivate and the potential incomes generated are greater than one would expect.  
Expensive crops like chili or tomato give the greatest returns on investments. Those who 
produce them praise these crops for their ability to generate very large incomes over a fairly long 
period, for example, up to 5 months with chili but less than a month with tomato. These crops 
help people to finance other investments, such as in housing, motorbikes, mobile phones or their 
children’s school fees. The role of these crops is, however, ambiguous, because one cannot 
survive by eating cash crops like tomato or chili directly, due to their short shelf-life and rather 
poor nutritional values. So, as good as these crops are for generating income, they are less useful 
to feed off directly. Since their calorie content is low to non-existent, food security through these 
crops is only attained through their sale that facilitates the purchase of other food items. 
Vegetable/tomato production thereby solely aims at generating an income, and farmers are 
dependent on fast market access to be able to benefit, unlike with other crops that allow more 
flexibility.  
Thus dry season tomato and chili production is entirely market-orientated and market-
dependent, if it is to recover its costs. Those growing tomato or chili are market–orientated, 
commercial farmers. They are less dependent on subsistence agriculture or willing to take greater 
risks as compared to those doing rice and maize, and even more so as compared to those content 
to farm purely rainfed staples. Producers are prepared to encounter great risks. For example, just 
one day of inattentiveness, possibly due to sickness or any other reason, can spoil a whole harvest 
due to a lack of water, especially where SGI is practiced. People believe that chili and tomato are 
very risky crops because successful production is difficult. Environmental stressors like crop 
diseases or a general lack of fertilisers can limit yields severely, if sufficient and adequate inputs 
are not at hand. Thus, in all regards, the most profitable forms of agriculture come with the 
greatest risks (for details on environmental risks and constraints see also Section 5.2). Tomatoes 
additionally have the problem of being even more perishable than chilies, thus they depend even 
more on fast and reliable market access. Because such markets are not always available, tomato 
production is not deemed as profitable as it could be. More traditional crops like shea, millet, 
groundnuts, and bambaran beans, on the other hand, are most often highly nutritious and have a 
much longer shelf-life. Shea nuts and butter can, it is said, be stored for years. Furthermore, 
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groundnut, pearl/early millet, bambaran beans and shea products hold comparatively more 
calories than meat, eggs or milk. However, their farm gate prices and especially yields are often 
low. Only products like rice or maize compromise on the value/cost ration, and especially rice and 
maize have high attainable calories per acre. Judging by their calorific content and according to 
locals, there is an overall conflict between food-orientated and commercially-orientated 
approaches to production, with the exceptions being rice, maize, partly groundnuts and also shea 
(see also STADLMAYR et al. 2010; USDA 2015). 
Only a few crops can serve dual purposes, i.e. immediate food and also income, namely 
rice, maize and partly groundnuts. Other crops are generally produced for either purpose. Chili 
and tomato are purebred cash crops, although tomato is an exception as its market has severely 
dropped in recent years. Tomato is still, however, considered a potentially valuable crop, 
especially in Mirigu. Overall, such cash crops are difficult to produce as they are costly in terms 
of inputs and labour demanding. The exception in this regard is shea, especially in terms of 
required investment, because most equipment is already present in households. Overall it is clear 
that expensive and laborious cash crops are grown during the dry season, often by men, while 
more easily produced staple crops are grown in the wet season, with more women participating. 
Thus, wet seasons serve food security and depend on favourable rain patterns, while dry seasons 
help generate incomes which are then used to attain higher food security and well-being, 
depending on markets and the ability to irrigate.  
Consequently, a poorer and more vulnerable person – among which many are women – is 
more likely to grow a product that is cheaper and safer, and to put food security before monetary 
income. Depending on social capital, such a person would produce a pure staple crop. On the 
other hand, maize and rice, cash and staple crops, must be grown to generate an income. 
However, financial capital is needed to allow the possibility of generating more financial capital, 
which may result in increasing inequality. Farmers have to consider trade-offs between 
subsistence/staple and cash crops, if staples have to be sold to finance cash crop production. The 
overall ranking of crops with regard to food, income security and ease of production, as defined in 
the farmer FGDs, is shown in Table 5. Details on possible incomes are given in Section 5.3.5 and 
more product-specific in Chapter 6. One further issue raised by locals, that of conflict potential, 
arises from the fact that the production of contemporary cash crops, which are a strive for money, 
conflicts with traditional forms of land use that aim at generating well-being and social capital 
through the growing of staples.  
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  Biu Mirigu 
Crop 
Dry/Wet 
Season 
Food 
Security 
Income 
Security 
‘Ease’ of  
Production 
Food 
Security 
Income 
Security 
Bambara groundnut WS 7 8 6 3 – 
Chili/‘pepper’ DS 9 1 10 – 1 
Cow pea  WS 6 6 5 – – 
Groundnuts WS 3 4 3 2 – 
Millet  WS 2 5 4 1 – 
Maize  WS 4 3 7 4 3 
Okra, kenaf, hibiscus DS 5 10 2 6 2 
Rice  DS/WS 1 2 8 5 4 
Shea nut & butter DS/WS 8 7 1 – 5 
Tomato DS 10 9 9 – 6 
Table 5: Ranking of crops by to food and income security and ease of production as far as attained 
(1=’best’, 10=’worst’, top 5 in grey, top 3 circled/bold, own table, 2014, own FGDs, 2012/’13). 
5.1.2. Crops for Social Capital and Well-Being 
The social capital of households partly depends on their food and income security. Food and 
income security strengthens solidarity amongst household members, who are then more ready to 
cater for others from the household in times of crisis, e.g. through sickness or general food 
shortages.10 Outcomes attained are thus reciprocal. Agricultural cycles are related with traditional 
norms and values, which interacting with social capital, facilitate or undermine the optimisation of 
food and income security. Traditional agricultural practices are perceived as elementary to 
household well-being and cannot be abandoned easily; the motivation to produce certain crops is 
not only derived from the idea of maximising food and monetary incomes over time on a given 
piece of land. Farmers and those concerned with agricultural extension in the area perceive 
livelihood-securing activities to be ‘rather a way of life than business’11. Especially compound 
land use is seen as more than just a way of making a living through agriculture, for it gives 
meaning to people’s lives. In fact, land use is an elementary part of traditional beliefs (for details 
on education and religion see Section 5.3.4). Such a lifestyle demands investments in social 
cohesion to attain well-being and mutual help, which in turn requires obedience to social norms as 
reflected in agricultural land use.  
Millet and groundnut are among the most important crops affiliated to tradition. Millet is an 
elementary part of local, traditional beliefs. It is said to be the first crop that mankind made use of 
and is referred to in the people’s traditional history of creation. Millet and other crops are needed 
for ceremonial purposes during festivities throughout the dry season. To be usable for ceremonies, 
these crops should be self-produced not bought. Additional crops deemed to be ‘traditional 
                                                   
10 Interview with a farmer, 24.03.2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
11 As was permanently stated in farmer and expert FGDs and interviews.  
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staples’, with these functions, are beans, shea butter, and groundnuts. Furthermore, cow, sheep, 
goat, chicken and guinea fowls are required all year round to make sacrifices and as gifts.  
Festivities can be a severe burden on household food supplies and monetary incomes. 
During the main period of farming, from April to November, soothsayers are consulted to know 
what kind of crops should be sown when. Although less frequently practised nowadays, this may 
require a sacrifice to be made by pouring libation with drinks made from millet. Compound and 
bush lands are often only released for use by landlords, when such traditional offerings are made. 
In December Christians celebrate Christmas by coming together to eat and celebrate. Rice and 
meat is served, as it is at Easter or at birthday celebrations. Towards January, people often sit 
around fires in the evenings and early mornings, eating groundnuts, telling stories and warming 
their bodies from the relatively cold weather that prevails at this time. Harvest festivities begin in 
springtime. To those who believe in tradition, sheep, goats, chicken and fouls must be sacrificed 
to local gods and spirits. People invite each other to eat and celebrate.  
Furthermore, marriages mostly take place from January to May, and celebrations last 
between a week and a month, depending on the wealth of the groom’s family. Society is male-
dominated and patrilocal, meaning women generally move to live with their groom’s family, 
where they are supposed to serve the household under their husband’s supervision. During 
marriage preparations, the bride requires entertainment with drumming, songs and dancing. To 
welcome the bride, people come from across the village, and are served with food and drinks by 
the groom’s family. Large amounts of groundnuts, alcoholic drinks and meat is expected. Births 
and especially deaths are also celebrated with animal sacrifices and the pouring of libations.  
Official funeral celebrations take place between January and April. For about two to three 
weeks expensive rites are performed for those having died within the last years, sometimes many 
years ago. Partly because of the costs involved, celebrations may be delayed for quite some time. 
The scale and expense of the rites depend upon the dead’s reputation in society. Generally the 
expense is a severe burden on finances and food stocks, more so than marriages, which is why 
many do not perform them. Animal and other sacrifices are made by the elders of a family, 
whereby they seek blessings from the dead for future marriages. Principally everybody is invited 
to join. Bambaran beans, millet, shea butter, groundnut and rice are served to those within the 
family circle, and neighbours and friends are served afterwards. In addition to funeral 
celebrations, widowhood rites are performed on women who became widows and for these rites, 
shea and wild herbs are needed (see Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Community events in Biu and Mirigu (own figure, 2014, own FGDs, 2012/’13). 
Traditional beliefs touch as heavily upon the annual cycle of festivities as they do upon 
decision-making and thereby livelihood pathways (see also Section 5.3.4 for quantities). 
Qualitatively, religious dogmas have an impact on livelihoods and the rationales employ in 
pathways. Beliefs touch upon land use. In both Biu and Mirigu one local landlord administers the 
rainfed compound and bush areas as an ‘Earth Priest’. In the eyes of the locals, plots of land, 
especially on wet season compound fields, are similar to churches, in the sense that they are 
headed by the highest priest in town, the landlord. He in turn promotes the production of 
traditional crops. Land uses are therefore indicators of obedience to norms and values, because 
there is a belief that if people don’t follow customs, by planting certain traditional staple crops, 
this will anger their gods. People will then blame non-conformists even for their own misfortune. 
Thus disobedience to land use norms challenges social capital. One of Biu’s chiefs, a highly 
innovative farmer in the community, explains that a disregard of norms is understood as a break 
with culture and thereby of community spirit: 
‘That’s just our culture: the millet is there to feed our family! With such culture, you can never 
say that you want to be part of it, if you then do not do it. No! You do those things to keep our 
culture! You can't say that because of the fact that you are now looking for money, you forgot 
your culture. We have many old people here and for them it is important. […] So, if they want it, 
you still have to farm millet!’12 
A change in land use, such as the trend from millet to increased maize production, is 
considered as a breaking of social norms and thus causes conflicts within households. Indeed 
crops, especially on wet season compound fields, are signboards of a household’s compliance to 
                                                   
12 Interview with the Kodima chief, October, 2012, Tono Irrigation Scheme, Ghana. 
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general norms, which in turn is needed to acquire communal labour at the peaks of farming 
activities (HAHN 2000: 144). People characterise one another by the crops they grow. Because 
traditional crops are deeply integrated into annual agricultural and life cycles, the elderly people, 
who form a large share of the traditional believers, connect a change in land use to a loss of 
traditional values. This brings disagreement between two segments of society: between 
traditionalists and (Christianised and often better educated) younger people. Many young people 
in the village have started to refuse to produce traditional staple crops, because they no longer 
offer sufficient outcomes, especially money, to satisfy their needs. This leads to conflict with 
traditionalists, who often reside within the same household. The elderly are reluctant to confess 
that traditional crops have become insufficient to serve people’s needs, because by doing so they 
would indicate that their traditional beliefs are outdated and need abandoning in order to improve 
livelihoods. The most reported conflict, in both Biu and Mirigu, was about growing rice and 
maize instead of millet: 
‘No matter what my father will say or how much he will insult [me], I will not go for millet again! 
[…] I told him that it is no good if I break my back [work hard] without getting money, but have 
made his gods happy. […]So, I help him with his field [of millet] and am sure that […] we can 
attend the celebrations. […] It is not good enough if we buy [these crops]. They must be grown by 
us! So, it becomes a problem.’13 
Changes in land use are often understood as a change from subsistence, food (millet) 
production to more commercially-orientated cash crop production. Thus traditional beliefs may 
conflict with market rationalities, and traditional norms and values may withhold locals from 
attaining higher incomes and food security (see also Section 5.3.4 on religion). A large part of 
agricultural activities – major livelihood pathways – are guided by norms and values expressed in 
annual festivities, and encouraging production of traditional staple or subsistence crops. Much of 
the harvest of crops grown during the wet season is used during important annual festivities, 
which fosters social inclusion and upholds cultural values. Traditional staples contribute 
significantly to social capital, and thereby to well-being.  
5.1.3. Major Issues Encountered in the Agrarian Cycle 
All investments and incomes by farming households made over the year are closely related 
and cyclically interwoven. Commonly the outcomes of groundnut, maize or rice will finance dry 
season production, while the outcomes attained in the dry season will be used to buy inputs for the 
following wet season. When chili and tomato production during the dry season is not an option, 
only shea allows the generation of an income to finance wet season inputs.  
                                                   
13 Young, male FGD participant from Biu, 15.09.2012, Biu, Ghana.  
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It is hard to abstain from the production of traditional staple crops. Those who do might 
deprive themselves of the social capital required to substitute mechanisation by manual labour 
during the next wet season. To produce staple crops in the wet season, furthermore, requires 
money that can be made in the dry season with non-traditional crops. Outcomes are often limited, 
therefore, due to the circularity of investments. A general lack of assets means that the outcome of 
one crop not only finances the next, but also determines the start of the next crop’s season. 
Therefore, either suboptimal production circumstances in terms of inputs or delays in production 
are frequent. Minimising inputs can lead to insufficient yields and affect quality and thereby 
attainable farm gate prices. Delays at the start of a season, until sufficient means have been 
gathered, has a similar effect and wider consequences, because it leads to further shifts and 
shortenings in agricultural cycles over the year and can affect later crops’ yield and quality. Thus, 
aside from climatic calamities, a lack of finances can contribute to an overall delay in farming that 
again lowers livelihood outcomes. Especially, optimal dry season production is especially difficult 
due to the often marginal returns of wet season farming.  
In Mirigu as much as in Biu, farmers wanting to produce dry season chili or tomato will 
have to start preparing during the period when their wet season (staple) crops are yet to be 
harvested. The harvest absorbs tremendous amounts of labour at a time when no finances are at 
hand. Thus, workers are needed to initiate dry season production, though at this time hardly any 
are available because people are busy in their own fields and only a few people are able to pay. 
The likelihood of delays is thus higher in dry season chili or tomato production than for other 
crops, specifically rice, for which work starts after wet season crops have been harvested. Delays 
occur in the start of wet season farm activities, specifically in Biu. Farmers tend to shift back the 
start of their wet season production, because they are still busy with harvesting rice from the 
previous dry season. In the case of dry season rice production in Biu, harvests fall at a time when 
migrating birds can easily destroy the crop within hours, thus farmers must maintain a constant 
presence in their fields, leaving them little time to start wet season activities. Moreover, the 
likelihood of flooding at harvest time is high and farmers may delay the start of production even 
further, when waiting for floodwaters to subside. That farmers seemingly give priority to dry 
season rice production over wet season staples, suggests the contribution of rice to eventual 
livelihood outcomes is locally important. Farmers most likely concentrate on rice because it gives 
better returns. This has consequences for the wider farming community, because when the 
majority of people are busy working on their rice they do not have time to help others in 
communal, manual labour, which is needed for wet season staple production. Thus a wider section 
of the population is forced to delay starting activities, which can affect food security.  
In Mirigu rice production in the dry season is not an option. Farmers become idle having 
finished their dry season production early due to water tables being too deep to reach. Harvest of 
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dry season chili or tomato is therefore mostly completed before work on wet season farms begins. 
Financial difficulties arise when school fees need to be paid at a time when harvests have hardly 
been brought in. This frequently leads to pupils dropping out of school when their debts are not 
settled. In Biu financial constraints can have an even longer lasting impact. Water levies must be 
paid before one is allowed to use the local irrigation scheme. The consequences of not being able 
to pay for irrigation levies are harsh: it can lead to a late start in the agricultural cycle, or the loss 
of rights to plot usage under the scheme. If farmers are not able to pay on time, their fields may be 
given to others who have that ability. Issues of delays within agrarian cycles and the resulting loss 
encountered in yields and thereby income and food security, centre on a lack of finances that 
deprives locals from the ability to purchase agro-inputs. Despite the fact that 46 percent of locals 
in Biu think that ‘the chance of being able to buy enough farm inputs at the right time’ has 
increased over their lifetime, monetary-based inputs are perceived as ‘severely’ or ‘extremely 
problematic’ to attain. Locals perceive the purchase of fertiliser and other inputs for land 
preparation and use to be more problematic than any basic natural capital endowment or hazard to 
production that may arise from climatic changes. Only access to land, mostly irrigated, and soil 
fertility is of higher concern to farmers in Biu (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Severity of issues within agrarian cycles/natural capital endowment and usage in Biu 
(own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
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Inequality in usage of land – the most basic asset upon which one can build – amongst 
locals is severe. In Biu 20 percent of all households have no access to the land under the 
government irrigation project and about 40 percent of all households are not able to use bush 
lands. Under the irrigation scheme as well as in the bush, values of the Gini index in land use are 
at least 0.52, which is very high even by international standards. On the highly populated 
compound lands inequality is also evident, but lesser and at least everybody has some land to 
cultivate. So, while there are few large land-owners, especially among local authorities such as the 
chiefs and their families, the majority of households are actually deprived of equal access to land, 
especially the most productive and safest areas like irrigated ones. Access to dry season 
production is particularly exclusive, far more so than wet season farming. In Mirigu inequality is 
estimated to be far lower, despite it being more crowded.14 In any case, inequality is always most 
pronounced in areas where dry season production takes place (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Inequality in land use in Biu (own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Inequality seems to be growing: about 40 percent of those interviewed in Biu said that 
conflicts over land have ‘severely’ increased over their lifetime. Further inequalities arise with 
regard to gender. On average male-headed households in Biu use much more land than female-
headed ones, notably about 1.3 acres more (a 3rd) on the irrigation project, 1.5 acres more (a 6th) 
on the compound lands and almost 0.8 acres more (almost double) on bush lands. The irrigation 
project and the land under its command – prime assets – are firmly controlled by men. Women 
must rely on rainfed bush lands and the gathering of shea:  
                                                   
14 Own survey, 2013, FGDs and survey among all KNW MOFA officers 
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‘There are more male than female farmers in general and especially under the irrigation project, 
because the land belongs to the men and they will give only little to their women. The men will 
rather let them do other crops at the house, if they give them some [land] at all.’ 15 
Correspondingly, women in Mirigu attest to a severe allocation bias in plot sizes by gender. 
When considering inequality within each gender group in terms of land use, inequality is 
generally less severe among women than among men. Women are more equally poor. In Biu, 
differences in land usage correlate with settlement location. Those in the centre of the village have 
about a quarter more lands around their homes and 144 percent more land at the irrigation project, 
as compared to those residing at the borders of the village. Those on the outskirts depend more on 
bush lands, of which they use about 25% more. Socio-economic differentiation is high and 
marginalisation processes in the allocation of land worsen the plight of the most vulnerable, 
especially women. The returns of agricultural developments are allocated on an unequal basis and 
continue to increase socio-economic differences especially because the safest (and most 
productive) areas – irrigated/irrigable areas – are seemingly highly exclusive places to do farming 
and locals are unable to intensify their usage of small (unirrigated) plots.  
Despite these issues there is a clear trend towards more input intensive and better paid crops 
that can serve as both staple and cash crops, and towards the abandonment of crops that can only 
serve as staples with their comparatively smaller input requirements. Men tend to grow more 
expensive, cash crops. Consequently this may lead to a further (gendered) divide of the prosperity 
gap, because not everybody can afford the production of cash crops. Increased differences in 
attained outcomes are also likely to result from the fact that major changes in natural capital 
endowment are evident, which seemingly cannot easily be compensated by poor farmers. First 
and foremost, fertility of the soil is declining severely, while most people are not able to buy 
fertilisers. Crop failures due to hazards like floods and torrential rains have also generally 
increased. Thus a majority of locals, unable to purchase fertiliser and with too few animals to 
provide sufficient manure, and especially those farming marginal land, are likely to experience 
problems. The natural resource base upon which land usage is based is eroding, mostly for the 
poor (see Figure 13). 
The usage of compound and bush land is increasingly becoming difficult, mainly due to 
insufficient numbers of livestock, hence manure. An average household in Biu will own little 
more than two cattle, less than one donkey, almost eight goats and sheep, about 20 chickens and 
guinea fowls, and also some pigs to generate manure and thereby fertilise plots. Female-headed 
households own fewer, on average just 1.4 cattle on average and about six goats and sheep, and 13 
chickens and guinea fowls. Yet averages may be misleading. In fact, a little less than 50 percent of 
                                                   
15 Interview with a female MOFA extension officer responsible for Biu, 03.02.2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
109 
all households do not own a single cattle or donkey. 10 percent of Biu’s inhabitants possess over 
55 percent of all large livestock. Similarly though less distinct, 50 percent of all households own 
just 12 percent of all goats and sheep. Even poultry allocation among households shows severe 
inequality, whereby half of all households own about 18 to 19 percent of all fowl in Biu (own 
figure, 2014, n=177). Furthermore, animal holdings are declining (see Figure 14). 
Correspondingly, farmers in Mirigu claim that animals are now exclusive assets to possess, 
especially for women. Locals are unanimously convinced of the fact that most animals have been 
lost to disease outbreaks, because since 1998 public vaccinations stopped as a result of structural 
adjustments. Farmers no longer have sufficient workforce at hand to collect manure, because their 
children attend school and thus cannot look after animals nor help gather manure.16 As a result, 
animals are allowed to roam freely during the dry season, which is why their manure is hard to 
gather as compared to former times when they were kept in kraals. Also, children's school fees are 
costly, which led many households to sell their animals in order to come up with the required 
expenses. Famers are forced to work with inorganic fertilisers that they find hard to acquire. 
 
Figure 13: Major trends in natural capital endowment as perceived by household heads in Biu 
(own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
 
Figure 14: Trends in animal holdings as perceived by household heads in Biu (own figure, 2014, 
n=177). 
Overall most households perceive their livelihood activities within agrarian cycles as based 
on luck, independent of their own efforts. An overwhelming majority of Biu, 76 percent, is ‘fully’ 
convinced of the fact that ‘farming is like playing the lottery’, in the sense that outcomes are not 
                                                   
16 Participant of FGD, 11.12.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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only highly variable, with a good chance of losing, but that its outcomes are beyond their control. 
Only 5 percent of locals would disagree with the above statement, while another 19 percent agree 
‘partly’. As farmers explained, such attitudes are an elementary part of self-perception, since 
locals value a highly variable natural environment.17 In Mirigu, perceptions in this regard were 
even more pronounced, due to the danger of drought caused by a lack of irrigation. The next 
section, 5.2, examines the environmental assets of locals, because all produced livelihood 
outcomes are said to be natural capital/resource based. Then, section 5.3 will examine the man-
made assets required in the valorisation of natural capital, followed by section 5.4 that derives 
insights on overall outcomes. 
5.2. Environmental Assets 
Local environmental assets are perceived as a great source of vulnerability, as people’s 
livelihood strategies, livelihood outcomes are directly dependent on them. People regularly 
associate this vulnerability to an overall degradation of their natural resource base, related to 
environmental changes. In this section natural capital is further examined for Biu and Mirigu. The 
section is divided into four parts, with the first two providing an overview of soil endowments, 
related sustainable land use, and the livelihood impacts of changes to soil. The third and fourth 
parts examine climatic properties and changes, again in the context of sustainable land use and 
livelihood impacts. The section allows further conclusions to be drawn regarding the agricultural 
pathways – land-based strategies – pursued by locals in terms of basic, strategic orientation, and 
the limitations imposed upon farmer livelihoods in making use of their natural environment. 
5.2.1. Soil Properties, Changes and Sustainable Land Use 
Soils in the tropics exhibit very distinct features (NORTCLIFF 2010: 14). Problems arising 
in tropical agricultural systems differ from those experienced in temperate areas, and will 
generally be more pronounced when not adequately dealt with (HÜLSEBUSCH 2007: I). The soil 
potential in sub-Saharan, savannah environments is generally limited, since it is relatively 
infertile, hard to manage and depletes more easily than in other regions of the world. As a result, 
farming ‘can only be sustainable, if the primary rules of this natural system are 
respected’.(KILCHER 2007: 35). Monocropping and industrialised/western-style agriculture 
severely harms fertility and the ecological balance of sub-Saharan soils (Ibid.). Specifically, the 
soils of the Upper East Region are already classified as relatively bad for agriculture. As 
compared to other parts of Ghana, they are more acidic, have less organic matter, and have less 
nitrogen, phosphorus and calcium available for plant growth (MOFA 2011a: 2). Low soil organic 
matter, which can be provided by manure, and low availability of plant nutrients are ‘major 
                                                   
17 Farmer from Mirigu during FGD, 17.09.2012, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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bottlenecks to agricultural productivity’ in the region (USAID GHANA 2011: 5). Farmers are 
thus comparatively disadvantaged at the international and nationwide level. Recent data obtained 
from the Ghanaian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research suggests that soil properties in 
the areas surrounding Navrongo, thus Biu and Mirigu, are also poor by regional standards18 and 
greatly affected by human impact (MOFA 2011b: 22).  
Pastures and forests have been largely deforested and fallowing practices have almost 
vanished, while population grew tremendously over the last century. As a result, fertility and the 
organic matter content of soils has continued to decrease (LAUBE 2007: 7, 46, 48; LAUBE et al. 
2008: 4, 5, 8). Soil losses through erosion have further reduced top soil depth, and thereby nutrient 
stocks and water holding capacity, which affects crop productivity (AMEGASHIE et al. 2012: 
78). Land clearing, total crop harvesting, burning of organic material for land preparation, and 
insufficient manure application further aggravate the problem. All of these practices adversely 
affect the physical and chemical properties of soils, and thus lead to declines in crop yields 
(ANIAH et al. 2013: 28). Therefore, soil fertility, specifically its organic matter content, ‘is one of 
the main constraints that limits agricultural food production by smallholder farmers in northern 
Ghana’ (BECX et al. 2012: 495), and may have ‘serious implications on the livelihoods of the 
people as the land is the major resource from which they eke their living’ (YIRAN et al. 2012: 
204). If these trends are not altered, farmers may find themselves ‘in a trap of declining crop 
yields’ (DALTON et al. 2014: 65). Furthermore, with a low level of organic material in soils, 
good production and yields are difficult to obtain. Infertile soils with a low content of natural 
antibiotics, further amplified by the overuse of pesticides or underuse of organic material, tend to 
an increased occurrence of pests and parasites that take advantage of the resulting plant weakness. 
Given the population dynamics of pests, already heavily amplified by prevailing climatic 
conditions (KILCHER 2007: 35), chili or tomato production is greatly endangered. Most 
traditional crops, like millet, sorghum, groundnut and shea, are less threatened (BOFFA et al. 
1996: 120; BRINK & BELAY 2006: 25; MOFA 2011b: 42-43). A general lack of organic 
material also lowers the quality of crops (FINCK 1982: 171), and specifically chili or tomato (DA 
SILVA et al. 2008: 8; DAGNOKO et al. 2013: 1111; WILLIAMS et al. 1995: 248).  
There are significant deviations in soil quality at the local level, partly as a result of soil 
endowments and crops grown. Deviations in soil endowment are basically a result of topography. 
Higher lying upland soils are rather light textured, sandy and therefore well drained (LAUBE 
2007: 199). Lowland soils, often flood plains, are heavy and inhibit drainage, but are generally 
more fertile. In total, three major soil types are most relevant to farmers in Biu and Mirigu19. Each 
                                                   
18 As based on data obtained from CSIR, 2013. 
19 As based on digital maps obtained from CERSGIS, University of Accra, 2010. 
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is used at different times of the year for varying products. Rainfed, wet season/compound and 
bush farming in both Biu and Mirigu takes place on relatively fragile, poor soils, called Gleyic 
Lixisols, typical of Savannah zones (see also ADU 1969). In Biu, these soils are also used for dry-
season farming in the command area of the irrigation project. Secondly, small spots of Lithic 
Leptosols soils are found in Biu, also used for wet season farming, though hard to handle. The 
third type of soil, Eutric Fluvisols, is far more fertile and resilient. This soil is used for dry season 
chili or tomato production and occasionally for rainfed rice production in Mirigu, as well as for all 
year rice production under the irrigation project and for some chili or tomato further south. 
The first soil type, Gleyic Lixisols, creates major problems for extended cultivation as it is 
difficult to maintain favourable soil physical conditions. ‘Significant changes in soil chemical and 
biological properties occur following forest or bush fallow clearing and cropping. Soil organic 
matter declines sharply during the first few years under cropping and the effect is more 
pronounced with intensive continuous cropping. [...]. The arbitrary application of exotic, high-
input food crop production technologies on these fragile soils therefore often leads to rapid 
chemical, physical, and biological degradation’ (KANG & TRIPATHI 1992: Chapter 1.7.1). 
Thus, soil conserving procedures have to be followed, such as the use of terraces, ploughing of 
contours, mulching and the growing of soil covering plants. Agricultural production on these soils 
may require the use of fertilisers, especially the use of N and P fertilisers, although the nutrients 
derived from fertilisers are quickly washed out again. Low pH-levels may have to be adjusted by 
liming or the application of organic material, e.g. manure. Burning of the vegetation cover is to be 
avoided as this reduces the amount of organic matter. For the same reason perennial plants are 
recommended over annual ones. The use of heavy machinery can further endanger the soil 
structure and lead to quick deterioration. Minimum or zero tillage is recommended as well as 
agroforestry, and crop rotation. Preservation of the surface soil and organic material is of highest 
importance (MDEMU 2008: 10; TAKESHIMA et al. 2013: 5; ZECH & HINTERMAIER-
ERHARD 2002: 72).  
The next most frequently found soil, Lithic Leptosols, is also severely vulnerable to erosion. 
Slopes can be cultivated with several crops, mainly by terracing with the removal of stones. 
Agroforestry or a combination of arable crops and trees under strict control holds further promise. 
These soils are generally problematic in handling, since ‘excessive internal drainage and the 
shallowness of many Leptosols, can cause drought even in a humid environment’ (IUSS 
WORKING GROUP WRB 2007: 82-83) and further lack organic material (MARTIN & 
SAUERBORN 2006: 121). Management is easier with the third type of soil, Eutric Fluvisols. 
These soils are of good natural fertility and are attractive dwelling-sites on river levees. Microbial 
activity is stimulated for just a week each year, which is enough to help mineralisation of organic 
matter and thereby allow a regeneration of soil quality (IUSS WORKING GROUP WRB 2007: 
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79). This soil is rather easy to handle, but like most other soils, it depends on additional manuring. 
Manuring is the key to soil fertility and the sustainable use of the natural resource base.  
Soil management further depends on the crops grown and their compatibility with natural 
capital endowments. With regards to the features of the most common wet season crops that are 
grown on uplands, thus on Gleyic Lixisols and Lithic Leptosols, traditional land use is mostly 
well adapted to soil conditions because it preserves surface soil and organic material. Some of the 
crops grown on these lands can help to uphold and improve soil properties, however, groundnuts 
are less recommendable because they support soil erosion (MDEMU 2008: 10; TAKESHIMA et 
al. 2013: 5; ZECH & HINTERMAIER-ERHARD 2002: 72). A traditional product like pearl 
millet for example, is very tolerant of various soil conditions, can grow well in light and acidic 
soils, and is suitable for soils that suffer from salinity or a low nutrient status. Such millet 
cultivars also provide excellent protection from soil erosion and even fix plant nutrients such as 
nitrogen within soils (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 63 and 130-131). Further popular crops that allow 
for nitrogen-fixation are again traditional staples, groundnuts and beans. All of them are also 
relatively tolerant to the prevailing soil conditions. (Ibid.: 148, 225, 215, 124). The least 
challenging traditional staple crop, in terms of soil suitability, is probably sorghum. It grows 
almost equally well on heavy or light, loamy or sandy soils, as it is generally adapted to poor soils 
and grows well in areas ‘where many other crops would fail’ (Ibid.: 171). Equally suited are most 
forms of agroforestry, specifically shea gathering. The shea tree is native to the region and thereby 
fully adapted to soil conditions (BYAKAGABA et al. 2011: 16). It also tolerates stony sites and 
lateritic subsoil (BOFFA et al. 1996: 111; ORWA et al. 2009: 2). Shea plays ‘a significant role in 
soil and water conservation and environmental protection because the trees are able to limit 
erosion of soils severely (ORWA et al. 2009: 4). Nevertheless the shea tree is vulnerable to 
extinction, due to timber, firewood and agricultural production (BYAKAGABA et al. 2011: 15).  
The impact of exotic crops like maize and rice upon soil is more difficult to manage. Maize 
requires great supplies of organic matter and nutrients, yet unlike most traditional wet season 
crops, it heavily drains soil nutrients. Moreover, it causes severe erosion and water losses. Thus 
upland soils, when used to produce maize, need adequate conservation measures (BRINK & 
BELAY 2006: 233). Consequently, a trend towards more maize production may lead to a higher 
environmental impact in terms of soil nutrients and degradation through erosion.  
Similarly, rice production is only partly suitable to the soils of the area, especially when 
grown on uplands but less so when grown on lowlands. Though fairly resistant to a wide range of 
soil conditions, cultivation of rice is still sensitive to these (MABE et al. 2012: 9). Rice cultivation 
is most suited (and typical) to alluvial, lowland soils (IUSS WORKING GROUP WRB 2007: 79), 
because sandy upland soils are less productive than finer-textured lowland soils (BRINK & 
BELAY 2006: 116). Also, sandy uplands are difficult to puddle, leading to greater infiltration of 
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water than could otherwise support plant growth, and making their potential for rice cultivation 
low to moderate. Such soils also contain high levels of free iron, which can cause iron toxicity and 
thereby lower yields drastically (MOHAPATRA 2014: 30; TAKESHIMA et al. 2013: 5). Only 
traditional varieties are tolerant to iron toxicity and general soil infertility (LINARES 2002: 
16361) and these generally do better on a wider set of soils (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 108). Soil 
conditions for rice are generally best in wet lowlands (MOORMANN & BREEMEN 1978: 30-31, 
33, 110, 113-114; REHM & ESPIG 1976: 22).  
Even more constraints are faced in the production of chili or tomato. Upland soils used for 
their production are mostly suitable only with regards to soil structure. Both tomato and chili 
prefer a medium textured soil with good drainage and no backwater (BOSLAND & VOTAVA 
2012: 100; DA SILVA et al. 2008: 8; MOFA 2010: 1; ZOSCHKE 2008: 39). In lowlands soils are 
far more compact, and so unsuitable for chili or tomato production during the wet season. This is 
less of a problem in places like Mirigu where chili or tomato production on such soils is practised 
for just half of the year, and a reduced drainage may actually be desired since it decreases 
watering requirements. More problematic for chili or tomato production in the area is the pH of 
the soil, as well as the organic material content and nutrients (BOSLAND & VOTAVA 2012: 
100; DA SILVA et al. 2008: 8; ZOSCHKE 2008: 108). Only the lowland areas used during the 
dry season are suitable in these regards. Here ‘flooding stops acidification and tends to increase 
pH values’ (MOORMANN & BREEMEN 1978: 136), while soils are generally more fertile. On 
upland soils, however, significant problems arise with regards to organic material, which is very 
much required for both chilies and tomatoes. Both crops thus require application of manure (DA 
SILVA et al. 2008: 8; ZOSCHKE 2008: 116). Tomatoes and especially chilies are quite 
demanding on soils, since they use up a lot of nutrients (ZOSCHKE 2008: 116, 132) which are 
seemingly hardly ever replaced.  
Overall in terms of soils and their usage, it is clear that most traditional staples are well 
adapted to local conditions and can partly even improve them, while exotic crops and especially 
chili or tomato are relatively unsustainable in agro-ecological terms and require vast inputs. The 
environmental stresses encountered in tomato and chili production are significant which is why 
pests and diseases are generally widespread (ASANTE et al. 2013: 98). Traditional crops are at 
least fairly resistant because environmental conditions are more suited to their demands, which 
reduces the level of constraints encountered and allows the production of quality crops (BRINK & 
BELAY 2006: 63 and 131; CHANDRASHEKAR & SATYANARAYANA 2006: 299; 
DAGNOKO et al. 2013: 1111). In all regards, exotic crops and especially tomato and chili are far 
more endangered from suffering under environmental conditions than many traditional staples 
(MOFA 2011b: 31-39).  
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The application of manure appears key to a more sustainable farming. It increases yields 
and thereby improves food security. It augments soil organic matter content, raises pH, improves 
nutrient exchange and water holding capacity, and permits stable intensified production. When 
used in combination with inorganic fertiliser, especially nitrogen, it serves to reduce the negative 
effects of fertiliser, particularly acidification and the increased removal of nutrients other than the 
one supplied by the fertiliser (WILLIAMS et al. 1995: 248). As indicated previously, the quality 
of crops, specifically of demanding chili or tomato, could equally be improved. However, these 
requirements for more sustainable production are often not met and thus severe degradation of 
soils and accompanying impacts on livelihoods may instead be evident. 
5.2.2. Livelihood Impacts of Soil Changes 
Farmers in Mirigu and Biu characterize their soils, with reference to Gleyic Lixisols and 
Lithic Leptosols, as having become infertile and ‘dead’. These soils are used for wet season 
production and for areas under irrigation. As previously mentioned, infertility of land is 
characterised as a ‘severe’ to ‘extreme’ problem by more than 75 percent of Biu’s households. 
Since farmers measure the condition of soils in terms of yield, they primarily attest a decrease in 
fertility and thereby food security and subsequently income. There is reason to believe that 
agriculture has a generally high impact on soil condition.  
Overall, depletion of rainfed soils is said to be greater in Mirigu than Biu, because the 
rainfed compound and bush lands are more crowded and locals believe, in a worse state than those 
of Biu. But, the most severe forms of soils degradation actually take place on Biu’s irrigated 
fields, followed by the areas used for dry season production in Mirigu and then the rainfed areas 
in Mirigu and Biu. This relates to the crops grown. Exotic crops like most chili or tomato are 
highly affected by soil depletion, while most staples and generally grains, especially traditional 
crops, are said to suffer less. In Mirigu soil regenerate through annual flooding, while, according 
to farmers and the regional Environmental Protection Agency (EPAG), soil depletion is 
continuous and thereby more intense at Biu’s irrigation scheme.20 Biu’s uplands mostly consist of 
overused fragile Gleyic Lixisols. Farmers and government officials like MOFA and ICOUR 
representatives claim that these soils, as a result of locals’ land use, have acidified and thereby 
depleted to the point where they no longer produce sufficient quality tomato and chili.  
As a result of losses in soil fertility, especially due to a lack of organic material, soil born 
disease is said to be increasingly widespread, especially in chili or tomato production. The spatial 
concentration of chili or tomato production at the irrigation scheme, and general infertility of the 
soil allows disease to spread easily and destroy major parts of the harvest. Occasionally up to half 
of the yield is said to be lost. As chili or tomato are important cash crops, degradation of soils is 
                                                   
20 Interview with the regional EPAG director, 23.02.2011, Bolgatanga, Ghana.  
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thus an environmental and livelihood problem, as it effectively lowers attainable food security, 
and thereby income and livelihood opportunities. Plant diseases affect tomato, chili, rice and shea 
production (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Trends in crop diseases as perceived by household heads in Biu (own figure, 2014, 
own survey, 2013, n=177). 
As a result of soil degradation, farmers in Biu and some in Mirigu point out that they have 
to increase their use of inorganic fertilizers each season, which is a problem to already financially 
distressed farmers. Consequently, the ‘poor’ claim to not know how to deal with losses in soil 
quality. Higher fertiliser usage may further promote a degradation of soils. Yet, farmers in both 
Biu and Mirigu acknowledge that there are certain pieces of land that still do quite well, especially 
the lowland soil Eutric Fluvisol. Perceived as quite fertile, these areas are prone to seasonal 
flooding but regenerate relatively fast, and so the effects of soil degradation are far less prominent 
for irrigated rice in Biu and dry season chili or tomato production in Mirigu. Farmers attest that 
these soils quickly regenerate as a result of alluvial deposits, and that soil pathogens are destroyed 
when submerged in water. 
The majority of farmers in both Biu and Mirigu believe that soil fertility has decreased 
because they have over-used inorganic fertilizers on crops such as chili or tomato and have made 
use of mechanical non-traditional forms of land preparation, while applying less organic fertiliser 
to soil. Locals characterised these practices as being the antithesis to their traditional forms of land 
use, which depended entirely on manual, communal labour and manuring. The farmers were eager 
to underline that their observations on soil degradation are the result of long-term observation. 
Contemporary forms of land use are considered to break with religious beliefs and traditional 
norms and values, eventually leading to a loss of divine affection, thereby to soil degradation, 
natural disasters or generally reduced outcomes in agricultural production. Farmers most 
frequently state that inorganic fertiliser applications ‘have killed the mother soil’ and that applying 
manure and preparing land manually instead of using mechanical means, such as tractors for 
ploughing, can only preserve the natural fertility of the ground. Consequently, they indirectly 
point to cooperation among people, in other words social capital, as a determinant of the 
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sustainability of outcomes of agricultural production and thereby people’s poverty status. The 
farmers believe healthy and productive soils are a result of manual, communal labour.  
Local extension officers and irrigation project management backed the farmers’ views on 
the worsening effects of more industrialised forms of agriculture. All farmers and experts agreed 
to the fact that traditional forms of agriculture, now undergoing severe changes, had once been 
sustainable and that traditional, societal norms and values had helped preserve soil quality. 
Furthermore, for both Biu and Mirigu, extension officers attest that people are turning to more 
exploitative forms of land use because traditional practices are fading away. As an expert and 
local from the area puts it: 
‘When we were young, tradition used to have a lot of influence on the sustainability of farming, 
because it was a taboo to use tractor and to use fertilisers and instead we would all work together 
and work on the land and spread our manure. They said that the gods would be angry if you do 
otherwise and use the inorganic fertiliser on the land. But with time things have changed […], 
which is very, very difficult for our soils.’ 21 
Agricultural practices are relatively unsustainable at the irrigation scheme in Biu and in 
parts of Mirigu. The irrigation project’s command area is characterised by all-year-usage with no 
fallow period, due to a growing local population that increases the need for permanent use of the 
project’s lands. Monocultures and over-use of agrochemicals including inorganic fertiliser may 
have worsened tomato quality and destroyed organisms in soils, contributing to the occurrence of 
pests and diseases.22 Because irrigation gives assured returns unlike rainfed production, farmers 
are willing to apply larger amounts of inorganic fertilisers, which is why soil quality at the 
irrigation scheme is the worst. The fertiliser used is often the cheapest most acid variety, sulphate 
of ammonia, because farmers lack money to buy the appropriate ones. These further acidify soils 
and decrease their quality by affecting soil structures. Farmers also have difficulties in applying 
the right type of fertilizer at the right stage of plant growth, which worsens product quality, unlike 
with manure, whereby nutrients are supplied according to plant needs.23 Unlike at the irrigation 
scheme, wet season farming is heavily diversified in Biu and Mirigu, and possibly more 
sustainable because of more frequent manure application.  
Production of dry season chili or tomato in Mirigu is more sustainable than in Biu due to the 
greater variety of crops being produced. In Mirigu manure is applied to dry season crops (as well 
as wet season), whereas fertility on Biu’s irrigated lands is most often generated by chemical 
                                                   
21 Interview with the regional GAWU director, 19.02.2010, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
22 Interview with the regional EPAG director, 23.02.2011, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
23 Interviews with ICOUR project manager, monitoring and extension units, the MOFA director Paga and his monitoring 
officer, MOFA extension Navrongo, 2010, 2012, 2013, UER, Ghana. 
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nourishments. In Biu, 89 percent of all households apply chemical fertilisers to their irrigated 
fields every season, as much as they use pesticides and fungicides. Only 15 percent of households 
also apply manure, either once a year or every two years. Farmers never mulch (84 percent) or 
apply compost (86 percent). Applying manure is said to be more popular in Mirigu, where 
farmers’ acreage is generally smaller, and where people have greater difficulties in acquiring 
inorganic farm inputs, due to their poverty status. Moreover, accessibility of government support 
to acquire inorganic fertilisers is said to be easier in Biu than in Mirigu. Thus a lack of 
government service may help sustain soil conditions in Mirigu.  
Yet, farmers state that inorganic fertilisers, pesticides and weedicides are a prerequisite for 
the production of new, high-yielding crop varieties, especially chili or tomato during the dry 
season. Farmers in both Biu and Mirigu frequently emphasise that without manure they cannot 
uphold or revamp soil quality, as traditionally done. Since farmers have fewer animals than in 
former times, they cannot turn to these as a buffer in times of need and are thus more dependent 
on the outcome of wet season production. Further degradation of soils is caused by farmers not 
changing the plot they are working on or the crops grown. Farmers at the irrigation project in Biu 
never rotate their crops (98 percent) and never give their fields a fallow period to regenerate (89 
percent). The poor, especially on the irrigation project, do not have the possibility to acquire 
different lands, which is increasingly problematic in the context of population growth: 
‘We can never shift to another place to give the land a break! If you would not use that field, when 
will you then use it again? Another one with money will overtake it! […] So if you leave your 
place, where should you then go? Whose place are you going to take? […] I cannot pay 
exorbitant prices for another plot! […] It keeps on getting worse, but there is no option!24 
According to MOFA extension officers responsible for both Mirigu and Biu, soil erosion is 
a factor leading to a worsening of soil quality in terms of agricultural production, especially when 
hardpans occur due to unsuitable, mechanical land preparation. Lands are said to be too fragile to 
be ploughed by machinery, the number one reason for hardpans and a loss of organic top soil and 
erosion, which must then be compensated by costly inorganic fertilisers or preferably through 
manuring, to avoid drastic cuts in yields.25 However, many farmers in Biu and Mirigu use bullock 
ploughs to cultivate their lands. About 45 percent of households in Biu plough with bullocks, 
while tractors are used by little more than a third. In Mirigu manual labour is most often practised 
for land preparation. Whatever the case farmers fail, claim MOFA officers, to plough along 
contour lines in order to decrease erosion. Furthermore, many farmers, in both Biu and Mirigu, 
frequently burn crop residues to clear their field for the next season, which further reduces the 
                                                   
24 Participant of FGD, 20.04.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
25 Interview with a MOFA extension officer, 14.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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share of organic material in soils. They do so partly because there is not enough labour force at 
hand, since children are in school and because communal labour has become less popular.  
Not surprisingly, farmers and government extension officers frequently point out that a 
major step to improve soils could be made if only farmers were able to apply more organic 
material, i.e. manure to soils. In Biu, about 98 percent of households claim that the quality of 
crops could be better if only they could add more manure or other organic material to soils. 
MOFA extension officers are convinced that manuring could decrease the incidence of soil 
degradation and disease and therefore limits the amount of farming chemicals that have to be 
used, which would lead to an overall lower impact on the natural resource base. They underline 
that manure can hardly be overused, unlike inorganic fertilisers, and though less efficient, could 
improve the water holding capacity of soils making them less prone to drought. With regard to 
crops disease, farmers in the FGDs pointed at possible improvements of soils through the 
application of manure, making them less prone to malady. Thus, overall, the issues faced by local 
farming households are aggravated by partly unsustainable forms of land use on top of an already 
poor soil condition and climate endowment, which in combination impose further limitations and 
risks and thereby limit livelihood outcomes.  
Government officials also acknowledge, however, that due to a lack of objective soil tests 
they are factually oblivious to the real state of soils. Soil management, by testing soil properties, 
but also liming, the large-scale application of manure or any other programme to deal with soil 
changes do not take place in Biu or Mirigu. These are simply not possible because of a lack of 
government funds and personnel. The irrigation project’s management currently only begin to 
deal with the above issues by advising the use of leguminous crops such as soya beans or 
groundnuts and by recommending farmers to use more manure in order to improve soil quality. 
Specifically the planting of leguminous crops like groundnuts or soya beans is said to be a viable 
strategy to improve yields while allowing the production of crops. Furthermore, government 
officials recommend but cannot force farmers to have fallow periods. The management officers 
acknowledge that this strategy is unrealistic because irrigated lands are so rare and yet so popular 
that conflicts among irrigation users have become common. However, the management of both 
ICOUR and MOFA is well aware of the deteriorating effects of worsening soil quality and has 
been requesting, for a ‘long time’, the support of other government agencies such as the Soil 
Research Institute. Due to a lack of government finances, the officers remain unaware of the 
objective situation of soils at the scheme, as well as for mass outbreaks of plant disease. 
According to high-ranking officials, unsustainability of government activity may relate to 
agricultural policies followed at the regional level, often the result of structural adjustments which 
included withdrawal of government support for agriculture (as much as for livestock), most 
evidently in Biu:  
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‘Until about 10 years ago we were bringing in chicken droppings to mix with the soil and improve 
its quality, especially in the uplands where tomato is grown. But, that system is gone because now 
we are trying to be a profitable company and the government wants us to encourage the use of 
inorganic fertiliser, because they see it as modern.’ 26 
Agricultural development, according to one regional MOFA director, is nowadays heavily 
donor-dominated by institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF or foreign development 
agencies. Their policies focus almost entirely on westernising and industrialising agriculture, 
mainly through use of inorganic fertilizers, mechanisation and often unsustainable agricultural 
products. At the same time there is currently no project in Biu or Mirigu concerned with 
advancing more eco-friendly forms of agricultural production. Interventions do not consider 
traditional land use systems that were sustainable in terms of their impact on the natural resource 
base, and instead go for high-input cash crops that need inorganic fertilisers, worsening soils in 
the longer term: 
‘Our course of action here depends entirely on government policies that are often a result of 
negotiations with our donors from abroad. So, if government policy is not aiming at 
sustainability, there is not much we can do about it. Looking at how to produce compost and 
manure on a large scale and at a lower cost, fostering contour ploughing, representative testing 
of our soils and helping us with disease outbreaks, at least finding out where they stem from, 
would make sense, but polices mostly only aim at subsidizing inorganic fertiliser.’27 
Local extension and irrigation management officers point out that an acre of land requires 
about 4 to 5 tonnes of manure per year, which is more than what accrues in the average farming 
household. Therefore reductions in soil quality alter according to socio-economic standing, for the 
number of animals owned and thereby the manure owners have at hand is related to the wealth of 
a household. Financially secure farmers have the ability to pay higher prices for quality land, 
while those with little financial backing often farm marginal, mostly infertile lands. Soil 
degradation therefore affects those with reduced financial abilities. 
Socio-economic standing also determines farmers’ environmental impacts. Commercial 
cash crop production is said to be based on short-term interests and thus exploitative in terms of 
its impact on natural resources. Aside from their ability to apply large amounts of fertilisers and 
agro-chemicals for input-demanding exotic crops, large-scale farmers are highly mobile in terms 
of the areas they farm. Some intentionally search for virgin lands because these offer greater 
yields, more assured outcomes and better quality crops, due to the greater fertility of the soil. 
                                                   
26 Interview with the ICOUR Managing Director, 20.04.2010, Navrongo, Ghana. 
27 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana.  
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When lands are exhausted and no longer suitable for crop production, the rich are able to move to 
other areas while the poor are stuck with their plots. Thus richer farmers contribute to the 
destruction of the environment in a larger way than the poor. Those with financial backing are 
able to acquire virgin lands, which pays well in the short run, because they can afford land 
reclamation. Socio-economic differentiation also impacts soil erosion, since those who are 
financially better off can pay higher prices for contour ploughing. Hired tractor operators tend to 
work fast, rather than consider environmental impacts, and hardly anybody can afford to insist a 
tractor operator to consider conserving measures while carrying out his work. Overall, it is the 
relatively advantaged households in society can afford to produce commercially orientated crops 
and thus contribute to induced environmental impacts.  
The better-resourced groups in society are also better able to cultivate chili or tomato 
because they can afford the relatively expensive inputs. These better-off farmers are likely to use 
more inputs inorganic fertiliser, allowing them to reduce use of organic manure. However, 
because the poor are less likely to be able to afford inorganic fertilisers, they are also more likely 
to use more manure and thus uphold soil fertility. For the poor, ‘digging in green manure crops 
and collected leaves, composting, etc.’ might be back breaking work but the returns are no longer 
only marginal (BLENCH 1999: 11). Such practices seem increasingly essential to allow farmers 
to make a decent living, and should not be too quickly dismissed (as done by LAUBE 2007: 49). 
5.2.3. Climatic Properties, Changes and Sustainable Land Use 
The climate in Ghana’s north is variable throughout the year. During the dry season hot and 
dry tropical air masses prevail, and following these, tropical, maritime and thus wet air masses 
lead to heavy rainfall in the wet season. Rains normally start in April or May and end in 
September or October. As a result of this distinct seasonality, the Navrongo/Biu-Mirigu area is 
characterised by having the highest climatic extremes with regards to annual rainfall, temperature 
and variations between seasons in Ghana (MACMILLAN 2007: 16-17; MDEMU 2008: 8). The 
hottest months are March or April (sometimes 40-45°C), the coolest August (26°C). Mean annual 
temperatures are around 28-29°C, while the absolute minimum (15-18°C) occur in December. 
Since 1961, average annual rainfall in Navrongo was only 899 mm p.a. (data obtained from the 
Ghana Meterological Service, MDEMU 2008: 8, 10-11). Climate is especially harsh in the area 
thereby allowing an effective growing period of just 150/160 days (MOFA 2011a: 3). Though 
highly erratic in spatial and temporal terms (CDKN 2014: 18), most of the annual rains fall 
between July and September, leading to drought in some areas and floods in others (see Figure 
16). Especially as a result of rainfall peaks, flooding occurs regularly. This is most evident in 
Biu’s vast flood plains, at the irrigation project, but also in Mirigu, most often in September and 
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occasionally in August and October.28 So, floods are of further significance for crop survival, 
suitability and thus livelihood outcomes.29 In fact, publications and government documentation on 
the matter suggest a causal chain of extreme rainfall events, which lead to more flooding and 
cause an increased vulnerability of households, specifically for farmers’ crops and also their 
housing structures (ARMAH et al. 2010; NADMO 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; TSCHAKERT 
et al. 2010: 491). 
 
Figure 16: Long-term (1980-2005) average rainfall (mm), relative humidity (RH); potential 
evapotranspiration (PET) and temperature (T) for Navrongo (MDEMU 2008: 9). 
Basic limitations on farmer livelihoods are imposed by general climatic conditions. Crop 
tolerance to flooding and drought are met only by some of the crops popular in the area. In terms 
of crop suitability to climatic endowments, millet is the most appropriate crop to grow. Millet 
cultivars actually have one of the lowest water requirements of all known cereals. Also 
temperatures of the area are optimal for the plant’s growth (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 63, 124, 
131). Furthermore, all forms are millets are very much tolerant to drought (WEBSTER & 
WILSON 1998: 43). Drought-tolerance is actually one of the major reasons for why millet is 
produced in the area (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 63; KONRAD & SAUERBORN 2013: 280; 
NGELEZA et al. 2011: 4; WEBSTER & WILSON 1998: 263). Somewhat similar are traditional 
staples like groundnuts and bambaran beans. Both crops are well adapted to production in the 
dryer tropics and are equally drought tolerant (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 215; WEBSTER & 
WILSON 1998: 269). Also very much suited to the climatic pattern is shea (CHALFIN 2004: 47; 
ORWA et al. 2009: 2) (IPGRI & INIA 2006: 4). The growth of shea is independent of direct 
rainfall, since rainfall has little effect on yield (BOFFA et al. 1996: 115). However, a good 
(ground-) water supply, such as that found along seasonal watercourses, is elementary for the 
trees’ survival (BYAKAGABA et al. 2011: 15). Shea tree populations have been subject to 
increased pressure from drought (BOFFA et al. 1996: 111, 120). 
                                                   
28 Based on data obtained from ICOUR, 2013. 
29 Participant of FGD, 15.03.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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Many of these seemingly suitable, traditional staple crops, like millet cultivars, are being 
replaced by maize. Maize is suitable in terms of its rainfall, temperature and sunshine duration 
requirements, yet when temperatures rise too high, a reduction in yields is likely. Maize is far less 
tolerant to drought than millet (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 233). Despite being able to take 
‘considerable heat and drought’ (WEBSTER & WILSON 1998: 261), maize still reacts more 
sensitively and is also intolerant to waterlogging/flooding (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 233). Thus, a 
trend towards growing more maize instead of traditional staples must be considered as a trend 
towards a more risky form of livelihood upkeep.   
This is even more so when looking at other exotic cash crops, such as tomato or chili. For 
these, requirements are even more difficult to meet. In the case of tomato, temperatures as well as 
rainfall are problematic through most of the year, though ample sunshine partly favours their 
production. Optimal temperatures for the germination of seeds and greatest growth efficiency only 
prevail from June to late January. Throughout the year, temperatures are too high for best results 
in plant development after germination. From February to May, occasionally even June, 
temperatures are frequently so high that tomatoes grown during these times acquire an 
unfavourable yellow-orange colour. Moreover, in late March and early April, fruit abortion may 
regularly occur due to the same reason (data obtained from the Ghana Metrological Service, 2013, 
DA SILVA et al. 2008: 6). Excessive flower (blossom) drop reduces yields drastically (MOFA 
2010: 1). Additionally, rainfall limits the times suitable for tomato production (BROUWER & 
HEIBLOEM 1986: Chapter 4). Ample water is available throughout half the year, but since wet 
leaves promote diseases (DA SILVA et al. 2008: 11), the crop is actually unsuitable for wet 
seasons. Incidence of pests and diseases and fruit rotting increase with high humidity through 
rainfall (MANZANO & MIZOGUCHI 2013: 12). Too much water supply alone can cause 
cracking of the fruits (PEET & WILLITS 1995: 67). As a result tomato production is limited to 
four months, during the dry season, from November to February.  
The climatic demands of chilies are quite similar to those of tomatoes (BOSLAND & 
VOTAVA 2012: 100). Yet chili is more sensitive to temperature, especially low temperatures. 
Best temperatures for germination prevail only from June to the end of January (BOSLAND & 
VOTAVA 2012: 100; ZOSCHKE 2008: 93). Good enough temperatures for pollination and 
resulting fruits is given all year (ZOSCHKE 2008: 111). It is the same with temperatures for fruit 
setting (BOSLAND & VOTAVA 2012: 100). Only from March to April temperatures are likely 
to be too high. However, if temperatures become too high during cultivation, as happens 
frequently in April and sometimes May, plants may drop their flowers and leaves, and fast rotting 
spots can occur on fruits. Too much direct sunlight can also easily burn flowers, leaves and fruits 
(data obtained from the Ghana Metrological Service, 2013, ZOSCHKE 2008: 117, 125 and 131-
132). February to May, when most chili is produced, is thus suboptimal for the crops. 
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Furthermore, as with tomatoes, chilies require constant watering, but too much as well as too little 
should be avoided. When too dry while flowering and fruiting, abnormal aborting of flowers and 
fruits can occur within a single day. However, when kept too wet, roots can easily rot (ZOSCHKE 
2008: 39 and 115). Uncontrolled watering, however, does not have as grave effects on fruits as 
with tomatoes, as chili actually requires a little more rainfall than tomato (MIDA 2012: 3). Thus, 
cultivating chilies during the dry season, when temperatures are often too high for optimal results, 
is not recommended. Waterlogging even for short periods, such as occurs during the wet season, 
can cause leaf shedding and thereby destroy production entirely (FAO 2014). Moreover, many 
pests and disease found on tomatoes, which occur during the wet season, are equally a threat to 
chilies (ZOSCHKE 2008: 129).  
Controlled irrigation is always essential for chili or tomato. Drought and moisture stress is 
generally ‘one of the most significant environmental stresses causing huge loss’ and vegetables 
are by far ‘more sensitive to drought as compared to many other crops’ (KUMAR et al. 2012: 1). 
However, chilies have the ability to adapt and produce quality crops in a wider range of 
environments (BOSLAND & VOTAVA 2012: 99), and are thus less seasonally and 
environmentally confined than tomatoes. Chilies are more robust than tomatoes with regards to 
pest and disease (DAGNOKO et al. 2013: 1110) and less impacted by drought, since the critical 
periods for water supply are shorter than with tomatoes. Moreover, the most popular genotype of 
chili being planted (‘Capsicum Chinense’) is said to be partly drought tolerant (KUMAR et al. 
2012: 5 and 7).  
Rice differs (MABE et al. 2012: 9). With regards to temperatures, rice demands are most 
often met in the area (VERGARA 1992: 15, 23). Only from December to February, during the dry 
season on irrigated plots, can low temperatures at night be a ‘big constraint to rice production’ 
(MOHAPATRA 2014: 30), especially when sensitive growth periods fall in the first months of the 
year when it is relatively cold. Rice production is defined by the availability of water and its 
retention, which is a greater factor for yields than temperatures. The advantages of growing rice in 
an aquatic milieu, compared to pluvial milieus, are several. Firstly, most rice varieties are hardly 
drought tolerant and so, cannot be grown during the dry season outside of irrigation project 
command areas, because water demand is too great. Secondly, successful land preparation is far 
easier with a constant water supply. Thirdly, weed control is improved through flooding, because 
it destroys unwanted plants (MOORMANN & BREEMEN 1978: 30-33). Constantly irrigated 
lowland rice thus has the greatest yields and can be done all year round, followed by rainfed 
cultivation on bunded fields, and lastly upland/dryland rice on unbunded fields. The latter two are 
only possible in the wet season (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 115; CHANDLER 1979: 18-20; 
ICOUR 2013: 13; MOFA 2011a: 11; data obtained from the MOFA, 2013, MOFA RADU 
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BOLGATANGA 2013: 1; MOORMANN & BREEMEN 1978: 32-33; REHM & ESPIG 1976: 
21; WEBSTER & WILSON 1998: 260).  
Drought is still the number one problem for rice cultivation outside of (low lying) irrigation 
projects, under rainfed (wet season) conditions. The rice crop depends mostly on water in the 
upper part of the soil, which loses its moisture through evaporation. More than 20 consecutive 
days of drought usually damages the crop severely. Generally, rice is one of the least drought-
resistant food crops, though that varies heavily according to variety, as does yield (MOORMANN 
& BREEMEN 1978: 30 and 32-33). Only traditional varieties of rice are known for their climatic 
hardiness, yet newer ones have greater yields (LINARES 2002: 16365). For example, newer 
varieties like ‘Jasmine 85’, which about 95 percent of farmers at the irrigation project now 
produce, are not at all drought tolerant but quite high yielding when grown under irrigation 
(RAGASA et al. 2013: 26; TAKESHIMA et al. 2013: 3, 7). Traditional varieties under rainfed 
conditions are better at tolerating water fluctuations, even drought (LINARES 2002: 16361), so 
farmers preferably grow these outside of irrigation project command areas. Flooding from too 
much rain is not a problem for rice as it’s a semiaquatic plant and thereby partly adapted to 
flooding. Some varieties can easily withstand submergence for more than a week (MOORMANN 
& BREEMEN 1978: 155), especially older varieties (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 107). Only 
‘rapidly rising floodwater is a hazard to rice cultivation, whenever it occurs’ (MOORMANN & 
BREEMEN 1978: 156). 
Thus most traditional crops, in all regards, are well suited to contemporary climatic 
conditions and regular calamities specifically frequent droughts and floods. The producers of rice 
and maize, by contrast, are at greater risk of suffering from losses. Most endangered is chili or 
tomato production, since it most likely takes place under unfavourable climatic conditions that 
cause yield and quality declines. The chances of encountering unfavourable climatic conditions 
may increase with a change in climate.  
Generally, the region is characterised by highly alternating annual amounts of rainfall on 
top of seasonal variation and thereby incidents of floods and droughts. Over the past 200 years, 
there have been distinct phases in West Africa’s rainfall patterns. Below normal rainfall occurred 
from 1820 to 1840, above average from 1870 to 1895, followed by below average from 1895 to 
1920. Since then, for the past 100 years, patterns have become more variable. Until the end of the 
1940s, two or three years of below-average rainfall were normally followed by several years of 
average or higher precipitation. Since the 1950s the length of the periods within which long and 
continuous deviation from the average amounts occur have prolonged to between 5 and 10 years. 
Ample rainfall was received in the 1950s, and strong drought was experienced during the 1970s 
and 1980s (STRAHLER & STRAHLER 2002: 610-612). After that followed a period of 
relatively increased precipitation, leading some to promote the idea of a ‘Greening of the Sahel’ in 
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the 1990s and early 2000s, in contrast to the foregoing assumption of continuous desertification 
(TSCHAKERT et al. 2010: 476). Thus over a large time scale the duration and character of phases 
of either rainfall or drought have become more pronounced.  
Downpours have become more erratic in spatial and temporal terms, and there is also 
evidence that the start of the rainy season has shifted to the later part of the year and will continue 
to shift (CDKN 2014: 18). Local studies reveal shifts, since the early 1960s, from April to May, 
and an increased occurrence of dry spells during the rainy season. Rainy seasons and thereby 
growing periods may be shortening (ANTWI-AGYEI et al. 2012: 326; LAUBE et al. 2011: 759). 
In the future a further shift in the onset of the rainy season may take place, from the 140th day of 
the year in 2000, to the 171st day in the year 2040 (LAUX et al. 2008: 130). Average temperatures 
in West Africa are likely to rise by 3°C to 6°C until the end of the 21st century (CDKN 2014: 18). 
Some studies further underline the increased risk of more pronounced, extreme climatic events, 
like droughts and destructive floods (BOKO et al. 2007; TSCHAKERT et al. 2010). As incidents 
of flooding are on the rise, they are often understood as a sign of climate change (ARMAH et al. 
2010; TSCHAKERT et al. 2010: 491).  
Changes in climate endanger crops primarily due to their agro-ecological compatibility to 
general, static climatic patterns, as characterised before, and the abiotic and biotic stresses thereby 
encountered by them. Stresses generally increase as higher temperatures and more unreliable 
rainfall may ‘lead to a larger diversity of pests and diseases’ (FETENE et al. 2011: 4) and can 
further ‘exacerbate the spread of crop diseases and [negatively] alter the pest-plant relationship’ 
(MOHAPATRA 2013: 40). Due to their adaptability to droughts, the yield of traditional staples 
like millet is least affected by climate-induced fluctuations (USAID GHANA 2011: 153). Shea is 
better equipped, not only because it yields independently of direct rainfall but also because higher 
minimum temperatures coupled with early flower onset can contribute to higher yields (BOFFA et 
al. 1996: 115). Crops like rice ‘lie at the other extreme exhibiting much wider variation in 
productivity year to year’ (USAID GHANA 2011: 153). Rice yields are affected adversely by 
increasingly unfavourable changes in climatic factors, which is why ‘farmers need to adapt 
effectively to climate change’ (MABE et al. 2012: 9). Similarly, attaining sufficient yield and 
quality in chili or tomato production also becomes difficult, because temperatures are already 
often too high.  
The impacts of climatic change and associated hazards on crops and thereby farmer 
livelihoods remains vague, since ‘specifically for Ghana, […] little agreement exists on future 
precipitation amounts or seasonality; some GCMs [Global Circulation Models] project increased 
precipitation in the northern three regions and others project decreases’ (USAID GHANA 2011: 
2). Consequently, authors are less convinced of changes in the occurences of extreme events such 
as heavy rainfall. It is also unclear if the recovery of rainfalls, that had initially decreased over the 
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20th century, may be due to natural climate variability or anthropogenic climate change (CDKN 
2014: 11, 18). However, it is certain that the area is likely to suffer from rises in temperature and 
droughts (CDKN 2014: 18; USAID GHANA 2011: 2). More droughts would come with greater 
risk, and the Upper East Region is most sensitive in this regard. Subsistence farmers in the region 
are heavily dependent on their rain-fed agriculture and crops require sufficient rainfall for growth 
(ANTWI-AGYEI et al. 2012: 329, 333). Coupled with the already poor state of soils, decreases in 
rainfall may well worsen food insecurity in the region (ANTWI-AGYEI et al. 2012: 329 and 333).  
Local Climatic Change 
Both locals and scholars believe that changes to rainfall seasonality, as indicators of 
climatic change, began in the 1950s and 1960s. However, elderly people emphasise that there has 
always been great variation. An assessment to allow a comparison of subjective impressions and 
objective facts is difficult, because climatic data has only been collected since 1961, whilst there 
are not many people still alive to report on previous times. Thus a detailed understanding of the 
changes in local climatic seasonality is limited by a lack of attainable data. Data on longer 
timeframes can be derived indirectly, for example, from the documentation of the sowing times of 
millet and of incidents of severe flooding and drought, as captured in local missionary’s diaries. 
Missionaries were highly observant in noting down when their followers did not attend church! 
This happened when they were busy preparing their lands and sowing their crops, namely millet, 
after the first rains had set in. Missionaries frequently noted, in their official diaries, the 
occurrences of famines and food shortages among other socio-economic phenomena. Their 
records therefore help to gain an impression of overall trends in climatic changes.  
Observations of local rainfall patterns over the 20th century – through an analysis of the 
local church diary (covering 1905 to 1950) in combination with farmer FGDs (covering 1951 to 
2013) – make evident that phases of higher occurrence of floods, and possibly higher 
precipitation, have generally staggered with periods of drought in the Biu-Mirigu area. In more 
recent times, according to experts/MOFA officials and farmer FGDs, flooding is said to have 
become more frequent. An overall trend towards more flooding seems evident, accompanied by a 
decreased occurrence of famines and food shortages (see Figure 17).  
The occurrence of floods, relative to droughts, may have increased, especially since the 
later part of the 1980s. Equally, according to meteorological data collected since the 1960s, below 
average rainfall occurred often in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and partly in the early 1990s, 
which turned to above average precipitation around the year 2000. When looking at trends in total 
and average amounts of rainfall, variations are occasionally quite heavy. Yet overall, according to 
five-year-trends in total amounts, rainfalls these have neither decreased nor increased 
significantly, at least from 1961 until 2007 in Navrongo.  
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Farmers and ICOUR and MOFA officials estimate that the overall amounts of rainfall have 
not changed much. In Biu though, an almost equally large number of people say that the absolute 
amount of rainfall has either become less, has remained the same, or has increased. This 
inconsistency in perspectives on trends reflects the patterns found in meteorological data. Annual 
variation may be great, but minor fluctuations visible in longer-term rainfall patterns contradicts 
the trend towards more precipitation as concluded by looking at patterns of flood and drought (see 
Figure 18 below and compare to previous Figure 17). Similarly, locals are somewhat divided over 
perceived changes in climatic patterns. 46 percent of Biu’s households believe that episodes of 
torrential rainfall have increased over their lifetime, while another 55 percent believe that the 
number of extremely hot days per year has increased. Analysis of available temperature data 
(1967-2004) did not reveal any significant trends over.30 Perceptions contradict one another, and 
are perhaps more a matter of farmers’ interpretations than fact. 
 
Figure 17: Timeline of floods, droughts and famines/food shortages (black boxes, with year) in 
the Biu-Navrongo-Mirigu area (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2012/’13, sources as mentioned). 
 
Figure 18: Annual (green) and 5-year moving average rainfall (red) in Navrongo from 1961 to 
2009 (own figure, 2014, based on data obtained from Ghana Metrological Service, 2013). 
                                                   
30 As based on data obtained from the Ghana Metrological Service, 2013. 
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Another indicator of climate change is the delay in the timing of seasonal rain onset. By 
analysis of rainfall patterns, LAUX et al studied the timing of the onset of the rainy season in the 
region. They define the start of the wet season as a minimum of 25 mm of rainfall within five 
days, coinciding with a minimum of 0.1 mm of rainfall on the starting day and at least another two 
days within the five-day period, and coinciding with no dry period longer than a week within the 
following 30 days. They used a fuzzy logic approach to enable modelling, as their criteria did not 
return sufficient onset dates (LAUX et al. 2008: 331-332).  
When applying their criteria at the local level, using data from Navrongo meteorological 
station – the closest to Biu and Mirigu – no clear trend in the seasonality of rain patterns for the 
timeframe 1961 to 2007 is visible. More data is required. The only one conclusion that can be 
made is that the onset of the rainy season has shifted towards the beginning of the year, not 
towards the end. The data from Navrongo suggests a delay in seasonality occurred during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, but since then rains have started to set in early. Local level realities, 
therefore, may greatly contradict regional and nationwide assessments on climate change. This 
may point at severe changes in seasonality, and it also gives reason to believe in the uncertainty of 
contemporary GCMs (see Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19: Onset of wet-seasons in the Navrongo area, sowing time of millet and incidents of food 
shortages (own figure, 2014, based on FGDs and as calculated based on data obtained from the 
Ghana Metrological Service, 2013, and criteria used as defined by LAUX et al. 2008: 331-332) 
In contrast to scientific criteria used, locals define the onset of the rainy season by the 
planting date of millet, the first agricultural product to be planted within the rainy season. The 
onset is nowadays said to take place earlier than scientific criteria would suggest. While the 
average onset date derived for the timeframe looked at was the 161st day of the year, millet is said 
by local farmers to be sown somewhere between the 135th to 145th day of the year. Farmers point 
out that in exceptional cases they may wait until June, around the 183rd day of the year. The 
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incoherence of the scientific results and subjective impressions of farmers affirms that neither 
scientific nor subjective findings may be clear when looking at the local level. Farmers in both 
Biu and Mirigu are eager to attest that the start of rainy season farming activities has shifted to the 
later part of the year, by about one or two months, from April to May or occasionally even June or 
July, depending on the year looked at. Yet, farmers never attest a delay in the end of the rainy 
season. So the rainy season as a whole may be becoming shorter while the same annual amount of 
rainfall occurs, as suggested by officials. As a constant amount of rain falls within a shorter time 
period, locals perceive delayed onsets as droughts and increased amounts of precipitation with the 
remaining rainy season as flooding. It is apparent that local seasonal shifts occur accompanied by 
a concentration of rainfall and floods.  
According to an analysis of church records there were great variations in rainfall patterns in 
the first half of the 20th century. The perception of elderly people that rainfall patterns have not 
changed over their lifetime and that high variations are normal occurrences, may be correct 
because elders refer to a longer timeframe of observation than younger people. 1905 to 1915 
witnessed many incidents of late starting rainy seasons and consequently losses in agriculture 
accompanied by famines. Up to the early 1920s was characterised by relatively early onsets and 
probably a higher food security. The trend changed again in the late 1920s, followed by early 
onsets again throughout the 1930s. Until the end of the 1940s, the start of the rainy season may 
well have become delayed again. So, when comparing the timing of sowing back then with what 
is said to prevail today, it becomes evident that a severe shift towards the end of the year may 
really have occurred (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Sowing times of millet from 1905 to 1950 and in 2012/13, and incidents of food 
shortages and famines in the Navrongo area (own figure, 2014, based on own FGDs and as 
calculated based on CATHOLIC CHURCH NAVRONGO 1905-1920, 1921-1950). 
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5.2.4. Livelihood Impacts of Climatic Change 
Negative trends in future food security, especially for those without irrigation, are likely 
because farmers already point out that one major reason for lower yields is the delay in wet season 
production. Farmers and experts point out that a delay in the onset of the rainy season leads to an 
overall shorter growing season, increased incidents of drought at the beginning of the season, and 
thus increasingly limited outcomes of production. Therefore, years of food shortages and famines, 
as mentioned during FGDs, are often associated with late rainy season onsets, especially when 
coupled with an overall low amount of rainfall as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. It can be 
deducted that there may be a strong, historic connection at the local level between increasing 
delayed onsets of rains, droughts, and the occurrence of food shortages. Flooding is never 
associated with food security, neither in historic church diaries nor by locals themselves. With 
regard to Biu and Mirigu and the former KND, it is unlikely that flooding really affects crops and 
thereby food security much. Drought is considered a far smaller problem than flooding in Biu, 
because people have access to easily irrigated lands, which explains why the incidents of food 
shortages and famines may be declining, assuming that the positive impact of the irrigation 
project spans beyond village borders because of all-year food availability in the region. Increased 
total precipitation may even have improved agricultural outcomes for non-irrigated areas.  
Flooding is a hazard for locals, yet unlike drought it is often confined and therefore of 
smaller overall significance. It endangers only production in the lower-lying areas, i.e. the plains 
lying west of both Biu and Mirigu. The most ‘frequently flooded’ areas are found close to the river 
and especially at Biu’s irrigation project, where rice is produced. Most housing and thereby wet 
season staple production is far away, though in recent times floods have affected such areas, e.g. 
the 2010 flood. Torrential rains rather than floods threaten housing structures (for details see 
Section 5.3.2). In the case of agricultural production, flooding decreases the area available for 
crop production, for example by limiting access to bush lands (see Figure 21, Map 8 and Map 9). 
 
Figure 21: Vertically exaggerated land use profile of Biu from south-west to north-east (own 
figure, 2014, distances in meters, own FGDs, 2012/’13 and data from GLOWA Volta Project). 
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Map 8: Biu’s sections, its ‘centre’ (purple), irrigation user density and infrastructure with 
exposition to flooding in 1966/2010 (own map, 2014, based data obtained from ICOUR, 2012, 
satellite images © 2016 Google and DigitalGlobe, GHANA GOVERNMENT SURVEY 
DEPARTMENT 1966). 
 
Map 9: Mirigu’s ‘centre’ (purple to blue) and infrastructure with exposition to flooding in 
1966/2010 (own map, 2014, based on satellite images © 2016 Google and DigitalGlobe, GHANA 
GOVERNMENT SURVEY DEPARTMENT 1966). 
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From the middle of August onwards, due to the dangers of crossing the local river, farmers 
in Biu stick to their compound wet season production and irrigated areas. Likewise, farmers in 
Mirigu mostly farm only on their crowded compounds. Those hit by floods are mostly the poorest, 
as a result of inequality in land allocation. Spatial marginalisation is most evident among 
inhabitants of Biu in flooded irrigated lands, because here many work on less than half a hectare, 
while the well-drained and relatively deserted uplands are safer to farm. These irrigated uplands 
were once used by large-scale tomato farmers, which have in recent years gone into the 
production of rice. Their fields are less likely to be hit by flooding and if, like in 2010, will 
recover much faster than lower areas. The likelihood of flooding events is thus dependent on 
socio-economic structures and specifically on land allocation (see before, Map 8). The ability of 
the irrigation system to deal with flooding is also relevant. Its capacity to discharge flooding has 
greatly decreased since construction, mostly due to siltation. Floods have thereby become more 
likely for those spatially marginalised in lowland areas. In Mirigu the poor are said to have rather 
small, infertile lands more exposed to threats from the natural environment, especially floods. 
Since smallholders are often concentrated on relativity small lands, in both Biu and Mirigu, they 
lose almost everything when hit by disaster unlike richer households who have several plots in 
multiple areas and have thereby diversified their risk. It is especially those who lack land and who 
are generally worse off that are forced to live and work in areas affected by flooding. Being hit by 
flooding, but also by drought, is dependent on the location of housing and fields which is often a 
result of the finances and gifts that one can give to other land owners, which constrains the 
options of the vulnerable:  
‘A beggar has no choice! Anytime we go to beg others for their lands, those who own it, give us, 
the beggars, the valleys – where it easily gets flooded – or sometimes those places that are quickly 
dry. Those who own the land will want to keep the best for themselves.’31 
Thus, socio-economic differentiation leads to changes in the risk imposed upon locals by 
the natural environment, especially flooding. It severely alters the risk people face in the 
production of different crops, as much as their achievable outcomes. Furthermore, in recent years 
farmers in both Biu and Mirigu have tended to shift their farming activities closer to areas more 
exposed to flooding. The reasons include the location of the irrigation project in Biu, the 
overcrowding of all compound areas, and the increasing popularity of dry season production. 
More people are nowadays producing chili or tomato during the dry season in the lowland areas 
south of Biu’s irrigation project and along riverbank lands in Mirigu. Farmers are more likely to 
use these places during the wet season, when flooding occurs, because they have already invested 
                                                   
31 Participant of FGD, 25.09.2012, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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in clearing the area. Those who are severely affected by flooding, which is mostly those spatially 
marginalised and those who work on relatively small plots, will try to sell their animals to cover 
up for the losses made during the wet season. Farmers are then dependent on friends and family in 
order to cope with adverse effects.  
The institutional setup that could alleviate the effects of hazards, for example the National 
Disaster Management Organization (NADMO), is described as extremely problematic – as highly 
inefficient and underfunded – by farmers as well as government officials. Farmers perceive 
disaster relief aid as being allocated unfairly. Government and farmer interviewees further add 
these institutions suffer from quality, quantity, elite capture and nepotism based on blood relations 
or political grounds. Aid coming in through non-government development organisations (NGOs) 
is distributed independently of government planning and has its own ways and foci of distribution. 
Lacking coordination with government agencies, as local government officials claim, they are 
equally distorted by social allocation mechanisms at the village level. Thus, when affected 
households require help from friends, support is largely dependent on social capital. For example, 
according to the survey, more than 60 percent of households who suffered destruction of their 
housing or crops have received help via friends and family, while only 25 percent were supported 
by the government agency NADMO. Less than 4 percent were helped by other means, while a 
little more than 11 percent got no assistance at all. Support by friends and family mostly consists 
of provision of labour, money, food or building material. Attaining social capital and being able to 
use it beyond the immediate support provided by biological relatives, is crucial in times of severe 
crisis, since this is the primary source of help when natural disasters occur. In this regard, the 
upholding of relationships by females with their places of origin can be used to attain help, if 
these areas are not equally affected by disaster. For households having many female members, 
this broader social safety net helps in coping with the effects of disasters. 
Farmers may find it hard to adjust to changing rainfall patterns because traditional 
indicators used to determine the onset of rains are becoming more unreliable. For example, trees 
that would flower shortly before the start of the rains supposedly no longer do so. Disharmony of 
indicators and factual climatic seasonality challenges household decision-making in making use 
of the natural environment. Traditional indicators can hardly be substituted by education, due to 
an overall low level of school attendees and literates (see Section 5.3.4). More advice from public 
institutions like MOFA’s extension services is thus necessary to prevent climatically induced 
yield losses. However, as with help in the aftermath of disasters, such support is not available to 
most farmers. 
The start of rainy season farming activities with regards to staple crops on traditionally 
managed compound and bush lands was once largely institutionalized. Aside from allocating 
lands, the local landlord – who by tradition is also religious authorities – would announce the best 
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dates to sow after having consulted the gods. However, the loss of landlord’s powers is reflected 
in the fact that people instead tend to concentrate on government managed irrigation lands and 
non-traditional crops like chili or tomato or maize that do not hold any cultural value. Non-
traditional crops are less subject to traditional norms and values, and thereby to announcements 
made by the landlord. With these traditional values fading, the onset of rainy season farming 
activities is more individualized and therefore diversified among households. As a result, farming 
is becoming less and less a communal effort. These tendencies foster a social divide among 
community members, because poor people are heavily dependent on the help of others through 
communal labour, thus human capital, to be able to deal with the most strenuous steps of 
agricultural production such as land preparation during the wet season. When people no longer 
work in seasonal unison, it becomes harder to coordinate household and community members for 
collective efforts, leading to mismatches of rainfall seasonality and farm work.  
Individualisation tendencies are further fostered by the fact that livelihood outcomes from 
wet season production have shrunk. As local priests and Ghana Agricultural Workers’ Union 
(GAWU) officials point out, for those farmers without access to irrigation projects, solidarity 
within society may be declining because people are becoming more concerned with their own 
survival. The extended family system and resultant social security net that once helped households 
to cope with the effects of hazards like flooding has nowadays partly vanished. Oftentimes it is 
reduced to self-help among those living in the same household.  
Due to individualisation, growing insecurity in the prediction of rainfall patterns, and a lack 
of coordination among farmers, people may have to sow their crops several times, which in turn 
demands more available seed at the beginning of the season. Thus, greater stocks of seed have to 
be kept in order to be able to sow several times, which in turn reduces household food grain 
stocks. Occasionally farmers will have to sow seed up to three times. Therefore, people will be 
more reluctant to eat what they have left from the previous season, and start reducing their 
consumption of grain/seed from April onwards. This is a contributing factor towards hunger 
during these times. As burdens increase, individualisation tendencies may be fostered in pursuit of 
survival. Furthermore, farmers attempt to limit risk by cultivating smaller areas at the start of the 
season and then increasing production when they are sure of rains. This can reduce the success of 
intercropping systems, because if the first crop to be sown is delayed, it becomes too late for other 
crops to be sown on that plot. Plants sown again have smaller yields as they grow in the shadow 
of drought survivors.  
Many crop cycles fit into the duration of the rainy season with difficulty because a 
maximum of 150 to 160 days is the normal timeframe for the growth of crops (MOFA 2011a: 3). 
Farmers in Biu and Mirigu state that, because of delays in wet season farming, especially over the 
past five years, there is now often insufficient time within the season to grow slow maturing, 
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traditional staple crops such as millet, yet sufficient time to grow other, fast maturing crops like 
maize. Millet is said to be especially sensitive to late sowing and will not perform well when the 
season is not met well enough. Traditional products like late millet or old varieties of rice are said 
to depend on rainy seasons that can be used in their fullest extent. Consequently people feel the 
need to change to fast growing crops.32 The local MOFA and irrigation scheme management 
officers have introduced some such crops. According to their growth period, these crops do better 
under shortened growth periods. In comparison, traditional crops need over a month longer than a 
crop like maize and almost double the time it takes faster growing varieties of groundnuts or 
Millet. One can deduct that effective growth periods may have shrunk by 42 to 63 days, 
depending on the type of maize variety referred to (see Table 6). A shortened rainy season, under 
more-or-less constant amounts of total annual rainfall, logically increases the probability of floods 
and (perceived) droughts which can further decrease the effective growing period, e.g. people 
must wait for a hazard to pass before continuing their work.  
Crop Growth Period (min. days mentioned) 
Late Millet (old variety) 147 
Rice (old variety) 105 
Maize (old variety) 105 
Groundnuts (old variety) 98 
Bambara Beans (old variety) 91 
Soya Beans  91 
Red Millet 91 
Rice (new variety) 91 
Maize (new variety) 84 
Groundnuts (new variety) 77 
Pearl/Early Millet  70 
Table 6: Growth periods of major rainfed crops (own table, 2014, own FGDs, 2012/’13).  
Shortening of the time period available for crop growth contributes to the trend towards 
planting of faster-growing crops. However, the suitability of new varieties and also those crops 
grown in the dry season is questionable. Firstly, the newer varieties of most crops are said to be 
less nutritious than the older ones. Secondly, the MOFA states that a lot of new crops (or varieties 
of these) have never been tested in local environments but are still distributed to farmers. Thirdly, 
as stated by MOFA officials, research on these crops tends to concentrate on high and fast 
yielding (input intensive) varieties, but does not account for the circumstances within which 
certain crops are actually cultivated, and thus newer varieties may be incompatible to the realities 
of locals. For example, farmers abandoned an improved variety of millet introduced by the MOFA 
because it turned out to be unsuitable for the production of local, alcoholic drinks, as it does not 
ferment properly. The main issue however, is that all faster growing varieties are require the 
application of fertilisers and often farm chemicals, which not everybody has sufficient funds to 
                                                   
32 Participant of FGD, 20.04.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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purchase (for details see Section 5.3.5). Consequently, only those who are less financially 
constrained can deal with a delay in the onset of rains by financing the inputs needed for crops 
like maize or new rice varieties. Another option locals make use of is increasing agricultural 
production during the dry season, specifically chili, tomato and rice (in Biu only), which is even 
more input demanding. Many require time to gather sufficient finances, leading to delays in 
production and smaller yields:  
‘The poor suffer most from the change in rains, because everybody is graduating from all other 
crops to things like maize, thinking that that is the fastest crop that can also give you good yields 
when the rains finally come. Others go and do the gardens [dry season vegetables/ chili or 
tomato] to get something extra. Now, even if you try to do the maize or rice or vegetables and you 
are poor, then you have no fertilizer. So, it means you have done zero work [not achieved 
anything] and so it is the rich who are favoured. Only the rich have been able to change over the 
trend of events.’ 33 
Consequently, the poor are most often confined to their old compound farming system 
where they produce their safe, traditional, indigenous crops. As they cannot spend much on inputs 
they cannot get high yields or value out of their produce. Even if they were able to go for 
improved varieties, they would not want to risk their entire livelihood in doing so and are 
therefore likely to stick with the crops they are used to. Traditional crops, however, do not pay 
well, which is why climate change, a shift in the rainy season, has created economic and thereby 
social barriers between locals.34 Therefore, fertilizer subsidies are regarded as helping locals to 
deal with the effects of rainfall changes, because they allow the poor to able to grow faster 
maturing and input-intensive dry season crops. However, as indicated previously, the gains from 
fertiliser application is severely limited under current circumstances because of the effects on soil 
quality.  
MOFA extension officers also state that the poorest in society are reluctant to go for faster 
growing varieties of crops because they lack experience with these and are afraid of worsening 
outcomes. In the most rural areas, people are even unaware of the fact that ‘improved’ varieties 
exist, and even if aware, are unable to access them. The majority of farmers rather recycle seeds 
from the previous harvests. Only famers at the irrigation project, in Biu, have better access to 
improved seeds because of a concentration of extension services. People that are able to acquire 
advice from the MOFA or ICOUR thereby find it easier to adjust to a shortening of the rainy 
season. The same goes for better-educated farmers, who are more likely to take advice from 
extension officers. A lack of education is said to make people reluctant to change their production 
                                                   
33 Participant of FGD, 29.01.2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
34 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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pattern, because new crops require knowledge on how to cultivate, since the practices required for 
a successful harvest can differ substantially from those needed for traditional crops. 
5.3. Man-Made Assets  
This section examines the endowment, access and usage of man-made livelihood assets, 
namely physical, human, financial and social assets. Physical assets are mainly in the form of 
infrastructure, which helps the population to counter natural conditions. Possible beneficiaries of 
these are quantified through a look at demographics. Local educational levels and trends in health 
issues are examined to enumerate and describe human capital and its qualities. Finally, the section 
takes a look at locals’ finances and human interactions framed by social relations.  
5.3.1. Basic Infrastructure and Services 
Road connections going north via the district capitals Navrongo and Paga, across the border 
to Burkina Faso, are of key economic significance for both study communities in terms of 
physical assets. These roads are well established; probably the most frequently used routes in the 
country for international travel and commerce. Ouagadougou, the Burkinabe capital, can be 
reached in about six hours. Asphalted roads also go south, to connect Navrongo with Bolgatanga, 
the regional capital. Further southwards a road connection is available though it is occasionally 
interrupted by heavy rainfall or armed robbery. When conditions are adequate, the capital Accra 
located in the very south of Ghana – where the main buyers of local agricultural products reside – 
can be reached within 12 to 13 hours of travel. ‘Minor’, gravel roads, often impassable once rains 
have set in, connect villages. Within villages diverse ‘feeder roads’, most of which are actually 
trails or dirt tracks, allow the transport of goods.  
The district capital Navrongo has the largest market in the area, held three times a week. 
Smaller markets are found in almost every settlement throughout the area. Navrongo is 
characterised by a concentration of socio-economically important infrastructure: primary and 
secondary schools (public and private), a teacher training college as well as a university for 
development studies. Though there are various schools and small clinics in smaller villages, such 
as in the two study communities, concentration of services also accounts for most social 
infrastructure, such as public and private hospitals, health centres, a health research centre, a 
maternity home and an orphanage.  
Navrongo can be reached relatively easily from Biu and Mirigu, though vast differences 
exist with regards to the time this can take. Eastwards Mirigu is connected to the district capital 
via several improved feeder roads, yet the Atankwidi River cuts these off for half the year during 
the rainy season. Despite the fact that a large metal bridge was erected to circumvent this problem, 
for the past seven or so years the bridge stands incomplete such that only pedestrians, if willing 
and able, can use it. When travelling by vehicle during the wet season, a vast detour must thus be 
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taken southwards in order to reach Navrongo. Better is the connection from Biu to Navrongo. Not 
only has Biu two minor roads that allow all-year transport to Navrongo, the irrigation project is 
also equipped with concrete roads. Thus the village is connected to major market towns and 
service centres at the regional and national level.  
Besides roads, mobility is also limited by vehicle. Market based production is often 
dependent on traders willing to travel to communities. By far the most common form of transport 
is slow donkey carts: almost 54 percent of Biu’s households have access to a donkey cart, while 
bicycles are equally common. By donkey cart it takes almost an entire day to travel from places 
like Biu or Mirigu to and back from Navrongo, whereas it takes half as long by bicycle. 
Otherwise, faster transport is mostly rented from individual providers, since less than 14 percent 
of all households have access to motorbikes and less than 2 percent have access to a car or can use 
a truck for transport. Even fewer are able to take taxis (0.6 percent). More popular is transport by 
rented, motorised tricycles, which are accessible for about 17 percent of households. Thus, the 
level of motorisation is fairly low, especially for females.  
Mobile telephones and thereby internet connectivity – for those with can afford it – is 
available across most of both villages. Clean water supply is relatively unproblematic, as there are 
about nine manually driven boreholes in Biu and about 19 in Mirigu.  
In both Biu and Mirigu infrastructure is concentrated along an east-western axis, along main 
roads situated on hill ridges with two rather distinct poles of higher infrastructural densities, 
forming a dual concentric village structure. Centres revolve around local stations, where most 
public interaction takes place and smaller buses, taxis and motorised tricycles stand by for 
transport, surrounded by small shops, bars, small-time traders and locals selling some of their 
agricultural products or readymade food. Shops serve as sources of a small variety of everyday 
commodities and partly also for agricultural inputs. Electric grinding mills can be used for the 
processing of crops. Similar to infrastructural services, most higher value housing including that 
of the local authorities, such as chiefs and the landlord, are concentrated at village centres. The 
land value is high along the main roads because this is where electricity is supplied – where it is 
safe from flooding. However, blackouts are frequent and most households cannot afford 
electricity (see also Map 10). 
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Map 10: Major infrastructure and houses in central Biu and Mirigu (own map, 2015, roads and 
rivers partly based on data obtained from CERSGIS, University of Accra, 2010). 
With regards to educational and health facilities, Biu and Mirigu are each equipped with a 
small clinic and several schools. Furthermore, a variety of churches exist alongside traditional 
shrines – holy places – of which there are several in both communities. Mirigu, unlike Biu, is 
home to a mosque, a police station and the local area council. Biu, on the other hand, has a 
warehouse to store and weigh rice, large rice silos and mills at the irrigation scheme (see Photo 6 
and Photo 7). So, Biu is better equipped than Mirigu in physical capital at the community level.  
Not only does Biu have access to an irrigation system, its villagers can also take advantage of 
further infrastructural services, equipment/machinery and agricultural inputs provided by ICOUR. 
Yet within Biu not everybody is able to access these things. 70 percent of interviewees in Biu 
describe as an ‘extreme’ problem the prices that need to be paid for the renting of ploughs, while 
another 27 percent characterise these prices as ‘severe’. Tractors and power tillers/cultivators are 
accessible only to 38 percent of Biu’s households, and combine harvesters to less than 2 percent. 
Only bullock ploughs are more common, being accessible to about 46 percent, although female-
headed households find it harder to access them. Significant gender differences in accessibility are 
found with regard to bullock ploughs (-14 percent), tractors (-7 percent), power tillers/cultivators 
Central Biu: 
Central Mirigu: 
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(-8 percent) and Motor Kings (-7 percent). On top of that, no female-headed households were 
found that were able to use combine harvesters. Female-headed households claim that low levels 
of mechanisation are either ‘severe’ or even ‘extreme’ problems in their farming. The local 
irrigation management should help farmers to access mechanised farming services, however, most 
of the machinery available through ICOUR – large shares of which once came from foreign 
donors – has broken down and is used to provide spare parts that otherwise cannot be obtained 
(see Photo 8). All of ICOUR’s infrastructure and mechanisation services lack quality and 
quantity. 
 
Photo 6: ICOUR rice silo near Nasia  (own photo, 2011). 
 
Photo 7: ICOUR rice scale and mill near Nasia  (own photo, 2011). 
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Photo 8: Broken and dismantled equipment at the ICOUR workshop (own photo, 2011). 
The irrigation project near Biu is probably the most prominent piece of physical capital in 
terms of infrastructure in either village. Though Mirigu has no access to the system, there is a 
small irrigation dam to be found in the village, yet it broke down years ago and is no longer used. 
That is problematic, because irrigation systems can double agricultural growth periods while at 
the same time providing a more easily accessible basis for livelihood improvement than shallow 
groundwater irrigation (SGI). For Mirigu’s people alternatives to SGI are not available. Moreover, 
hardly anybody has access to a pumping machine and so people are primarily dependent on 
human labour. In Biu less than 20 percent of households own such machines, while less than 4 
percent have no access to the irrigation system. Therefore, easy, all-year irrigation is only 
accessible at the irrigation project, which is a major factor in overall livelihood outcomes. In fact, 
Biu’s local irrigation project has drastically improved food security over the past decades, mostly 
by making those that have access to it independent of climatic calamities like drought. Though 
droughts have been experienced since irrigation was established, in Biu they are perceived to have 
been of minor impact, unlike in Mirigu. Actually, before the establishment of the irrigation 
project, droughts were mostly accompanied by hunger and famine.  
It took farmers quite some time to adapt to the practice of irrigated agriculture. For 
example, in 1994, almost 10 years after the irrigation project had started to run, there was a severe 
food shortage cause by drought, because agricultural production on irrigated fields was not yet as 
popular as it is today. People refused to work in irrigated production because it did not suit their 
cultural practices and because they did not know how best to use it. Thus, establishing and 
educating people on new agricultural practices, i.e. advancing human capital, has improved food 
security. Furthermore, one can conclude that it takes more than just infrastructural delivery to 
combat hunger and general livelihood development; cultural/societal values are also active in 
shaping attainable livelihood outcomes. Having seen the potential that government irrigation 
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brings for livelihood improvements in a neighbouring village, farmers in Mirigu almost constantly 
allude to a lack of irrigation as the reason for their relatively higher poverty and food insecurity. 
Especially, when comparing today’s situation to that of pre-irrigation times, improvements in 
livelihood outcomes become clear: 
‘There was a time before the irrigation project was built […]. The droughts sometimes used to 
turn us all into horrible animals, when we did not have food! […]I pray that it never comes back 
again! […] If you were sick, you had to die! […] You cannot share food which you don’t have and 
it is better to give to those who still have a chance […].People acted like horrible, horrible 
animals. They were scrambling for food! They were fighting over it with their lives! Friends 
became enemies and families fell apart. We had no soap, no food and sometimes even no water’.35 
Yet, the potential of Biu’s irrigation project is limited and shrinking due to breakdown of 
infrastructure. Its efficiency is now said to be around 40 percent, according to the irrigation 
scheme management, meaning that about 60 percent of all irrigation water is lost due to poor 
canals. Government dam rehabilitation efforts took place during the dry season of 2007/2008, but 
rehabilitation of the canals was prematurely stopped because funding was insufficient and ran out 
before substantial improvements could be made. While the main canals were partly rehabilitated, 
sub lateral canals have increasingly suffered from water losses, which have by now outweighed 
prior rehabilitation efforts. Flooding has continued to damage canals and, as much as drought, 
now causes severe calamities in smallholders’ lowland areas (see Photo 9).  
 
Photo 9: Broken sublateral canal serving low lands near Biu (own photo, 2011). 
                                                   
35 Interview with elderly farmer, 26.03.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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During the dry season, droughts occur on those plots dependent on broken down canals. In 
2014, dry season production had to be suspended because of too little rain during the wet season 
coupled with increasing losses from poor infrastructure. The further away fields are from the main 
canals, the less water they are likely to receive:  
‘The crowded low lands in the project area actually face two problems: flooding in the wet season 
and severe difficulty in getting water in the dry season, because the infrastructure is breaking 
down. So, those who can will rather go to the uplands which are closer to the main canals and 
therefore easier to irrigate, especially during dry seasons’. 36 
Smallholders in Biu are already fighting over access to water due to the irrigation project 
being so run down. The irrigation system demands constant presence at one’s irrigated plots to 
assure one’s turn in watering and to make sure others will not divert water to their own fields. 
Those in the crowded lowlands, elderly people and generally those not able to hire labour are said 
to be the most affected by this situation. It is, however, a general problem, since 68 percent of 
Biu’s households perceive insufficient water provision at the irrigation scheme to be a ‘severe’ to 
‘extreme’ problem in farming (see before, Figure 11). The issue of water shortage is further 
enforced by the fact that rice is nowadays cultivated on well-drained uplands, which were 
previously used for less water-consuming tomatoes. Uplands, therefore, now require about twice 
the water they needed before. Degradation of the irrigation system is a somewhat self-energising 
process, further amplified by land inequality and changes in land use.  
Farmers in both Biu and Mirigu are at risk of becoming victims of elite capture, due to a 
high concentration of lands among a few large landowners. This gives rise to increasingly 
deepened socio-economic differentiation. Yet, farmers from Mirigu attest that the general lack of 
access to irrigation has made them more ‘equally poor’, thus there is said to be less socio-
economic differentiation within the community. Marginalised farmers find it hard to improve their 
livelihoods, a component of which is further defined by poor housing infrastructure. 
5.3.2. Housing Infrastructure 
A good house is a basic necessity of life and one of the most significant contributors to local 
poverty, since it is the most expensive item for households and a prerequisite for good health and 
well-being, in turn needed to make use of the surrounding lands (UN-HABITAT 2010: IV). 
Housing defines locals’ vulnerability and moreover, general well-being. This sub-section 
elaborates upon the principles of housing, locals’ housing endowment, and the effects of housing 
on livelihoods.  
                                                   
36 Interview with the ICOUR Tono project manager, 23.05.2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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The main principles of local housing are based on traditional architectural concepts.37 Since 
medieval times, architectural styles in the very northern, savannah regions of Ghana have been 
dominated by mud plastering often in combination with adobe and natural materials. As the 
spherical (mud/adobe) bricks are the basis of buildings, traditional farmsteads are predominantly 
circular in nature (PRUSSIN 1974: 192). Also, a history of violence has left its marks on 
traditional architectural styles, because people needed to find protection from slave traders and 
horse mounted warriors and wild animals (WIDGREN 2010: 329 and 337). Forced labour 
migration and soldier recruitment in colonial times further increased the need for some sort of 
protection, which is why traditional farmsteads resemble round, miniature castles (LAUBE 2007: 
106), partly built according to military principles. Among these are inward facing doors and 
windows, walls behind the entrances to rooms that serve as barriers for entering enemies, 
fortification of entrances and further enforcements at hand to be put up. Walls, forming a kraal in 
the middle of the compound where cattle can be secured, enclose rooms, storages, granaries and 
barns. Flat, platform roofs can be used to observe the surroundings.  
Surprising considering the relatively weak structural strength of buildings is the under-
utilisation of durable stone structures, despite the omnipresence of granites in the region and the 
apparent need for protection. However, special tools for cutting and trimming would be required, 
and would be more time-consuming than mud construction. Moreover, building sophisticated, 
durable, squared-stone constructions without machinery at hand is only possible where (harder) 
stone is available for dressing another (softer) stone (PRUSSIN 1969: 10). Local traditional 
architecture reflects social norms and philosophical principles, such as the temporality of life and 
ancestor worship (HAHN 2000: 138-139). Traditional concepts of architecture do not, therefore, 
necessarily embrace a need for durability and permanence (PRUSSIN 1969: 10). As characteristic 
of hoe farming societies, most housing structures are ephemeral, thus semi-permanent, round, 
mud compound houses, mostly consisting of materials from the natural surroundings (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 377-378; KRÖGER 2010: 19; RUTHENBERG 1971: 26, 58-62, 
111-112; SCHWARZ 1988: 88).  
Due to their semi-permanence, traditional compounds are to a large extent sustainable, 
though perishable. Adapted to local necessities, they are an important part of local culture. Mud 
constructions are highly adaptive to changes in household size through marriage, birth or death. 
Materials are cheap, so value flows for construction remain within villages. As most resources 
used in construction come from the natural environment, structures are recyclable. They leave no 
                                                   
37 Traditional here refers to architectural styles that were documented in the early 20th century. It should not imply the notion 
of historical stagnation or lack of change, but the basic architectural types defined here, are still relevant for the rural parts of 
West Africa, especially northern Ghana. 
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construction waste and thereby sustain fertility and health of surrounding fields. Aside from this, 
the clay material used in buildings has outstanding properties suited to the local environment and 
offering protection from heat and pathogenic germs. Mud, the primary material used in local 
construction, is fairly water resistant as it dries to form cement-like coats.  
The circular form of buildings increases structural stability, since edges are subject to 
higher wind speeds and dynamic pressure. Wind stress would otherwise lead to erosion, especially 
of the weather side (SCHRÖDER 2010: 300, 342, 351). Additional plastering, which consists of 
manure and a special liquid derived from plants together with shea nut oil, increases water 
resistance (KUNZE 2003: 22). On the other hand, any sort of adobe or mud building is severely 
endangered by water, which is why buildings are not built in flooded areas. Wind-driven rains and 
rainstorms erode the structural strength of buildings since they are wet and weaken walls from top 
to bottom. Therefore protection against wind-driven rains by use of wind barriers is very helpful 
in the conservation of outer walls. If bricks are not laid properly, water can frequently penetrate 
walls even though a building seems well made. Moreover, insufficient compression of clay bricks 
and their laying, leads to structures being not very stable. Unlike the with additional coating 
applied to the outside, it is not common to mix plant materials or juices or other materials into the 
bricks in order to harden them (KUNZE 2003: 22-23). A lack of roofing material leads to 
increased surface erosion from rain, weakening constructions in little time. Run off hindered by a 
building can cause further destruction. Soil erosion in the surroundings of facilities additionally 
has a negative impact on foundations and structures (see MANU et al. 2008: 4-5). Constant 
maintenance is essential for the strong structure of any clay building. However, houses are often 
poorly maintained. When following necessities and avoiding water prone areas, and with decent 
workmanship on foundations, roofing and sufficiently thick walls, adobe and mud buildings have 
withstood centuries despite extreme rainfall (SCHRÖDER 2010: 237, 247, 275-277, 294).  
The major issue with traditional mud housing is that buildings collapse frequently. 82 
percent of surveyed households in Biu had houses that had partially or fully collapsed at least 
once during the past 10 years (own survey, 2013, n=177 households). Similar issues with housing 
collapses were reported in Mirigu. The vast majority of houses stand outside of potentially 
flooded areas (see before, Map 8 and Map 9). Thus in both Biu and Mirigu, torrential rain and 
especially wind driven rains are said to be the most severe threat to traditional mud structures 
because they soak walls and roofs, which is why immediate land use around farmers’ houses is 
often a key element in protection:  
‘The crops that surround our compounds […] can protect the house from winds and especially 
wind-driven rains that would otherwise hit the walls directly […].Walls of kenaf, okra and millet 
that surround our compounds, can soak up a lot of water from the ground and so the foundations 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
147 
as well as the walls of our compounds will become harder and easily dry after heavy rains. That 
way compounds will not collapse so easily.’ 38 
Wind and water stresses, especially wind-driven rains, are dealt with by planting tall crops 
such as okra, kenaf or millet besides outside walls. Thus the structural strength of traditional 
housing is partly dependent on a functioning compound farming system surrounding the 
settlement structures. Since these fields are increasingly fragmented and since traditional, tall 
growing crops like millet are gradually becoming less popular, such protection is becoming 
patchy and the dwellings are increasingly more vulnerable to erosion. People have also become 
more conscious of the benefits of concrete masonry and metal roofing. According to farmer 
FGDs, any household whose house collapses during the wet season may remain homeless for 
considerable time, sometimes months, because reconstruction depends on support by family and 
friends, thus social capital. However, friends and family, if at all, only have time to help during 
the dry seasons. During the dry season even, people are busy with irrigated dry season production. 
Thus affected locals and their kin are left to choose between rebuilding their houses and assuring 
income and food security. The homeless are often forced to spend their nights in a local school or 
church. As a result, permanent, concrete housing is considered a high priority and has in recent 
years become a very desirable norm:  
‘When your child […] comes to tell you that he wants to have money in the pocket and to build a 
block [concrete house], you can’t stop the child. When you advise him that he should rather stick 
to our traditional housing, the child will tell you that you are archaic.’39 
Durable housing has become a main livelihood strategy and substantial capital is raised for 
it, though many cannot really afford to do so. The financial capital required to construct a small 
shelter room that can withstand heavy rains (as much as flooding), easily equals about the whole 
annual income attainable by farmers. Zinc roofing, the primary element of durable shelter, is 
relatively cheap and so more common. However, durable, concrete walling is hardest to finance, 
even if own labour inputs are provided (see also Table 8). This is not to negate that the 
construction of traditional compounds does not also require vast inputs. However, the main 
materials used for traditional construction can be gathered freely and neighbours are easier to 
convince of support, when compared to helping construct a concrete building. People feel more 
obliged to help freely in the upholding of cultural identities as reflected in traditional architecture.  
Durable housing is understood as a sign of modernity yet also of wealth and prosperity, 
while mud structures signal an upholding of tradition but also poverty. The allocation of different 
                                                   
38 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
39 Interview with a Farmer from Biu, 12.01.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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types of housing must therefore be considered in terms of social inequality and general 
vulnerability. Many households in Biu and Mirigu can thus be considered fairly vulnerable, since 
housing structures are most often made of mud/clay. In Biu, a third of all inhabitants live in 
traditional clay/mud compounds, while about 68 percent of all houses have partial zinc roofing. 
Only about 3 percent have a fully zinc-roofed clay house, while another 7 per cent live in concrete 
houses with full metal roofing. This is roughly the same in Mirigu (own survey, 2013, n=177, 
FGDs, see Photo 10). 
Permanent, safe, durable, concrete settlement structures dominate the centre of both Biu and 
Mirigu. In Biu, about 30 percent of all houses at the ‘centre’ are made of concrete, mostly 
standing along the main road together with most infrastructure of wider socio-economic 
importance. In the more flood-affected outskirts, less than 4 percent of buildings are made of 
concrete. So, structures that are generally more vulnerable stand in areas more prone to risk. 
People at the centre of Biu are simply better off and can pay a higher price for land at the centre of 
the village, also the case in Mirigu. Being affected by collapsing housing is thus a question of 
socio-economic differentiation. Vulnerability in terms of housing is high and growing, especially 
in the outskirts of villages where flooding can become a further problem. Consequently, higher 
amounts of financial capital are required to help locals improve this basic necessity of life. 
 
Photo 10: Traditional compound structure cross section (upper left), mud compound (upper right), 
roofed square compound (lower left), concrete house (lower right) (own photos, 2011 and 2013). 
5.3.3. Demographics, Health and Labour Force 
The Upper East Region (UER) is a crowded part of Ghana, almost comparable to some of 
the most crowded regions found in the very south of the country. Generally the most crowded 
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areas of UER are situated in the east, while less populated areas lie further west. In comparison, 
the former Kassena Nankana District (KND) is a relatively average district in terms of population 
density, although this greatly increased over the 20th century (data obtained from Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2013). Population within the whole region has doubled since the 1960s. Yet outmigration 
has also been a crucial factor in population trends. Growth rates during the 1960s were relatively 
low, and during the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic crisis made it less attractive for people 
to leave, which is why far higher growth rates in population occurred from 1970 to 1984 (LAUBE 
2007: 113). The period from 1984 to 2000 was characterised by SAPs and ERPs. In combination 
with persistent outmigration, this era of economic readjustment and downfall in the Upper East 
led to relatively little population growth, even a shrinking of in the KND. Since 2000 population 
growth at the regional level has decreased. However, contrary to trends at regional level, the 
districts in which Biu and Mirigu are situated have attracted greater growth in recent times (see 
Table 7 for absolute numbers).  
Year UER KND (East & West) 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 1960 468638 93397 
1970 542858 99006 
1984 772744 149680 
2000 920089 149491 
2010 1046545 177400 
Table 7: Population change in in the region and district of the study areas (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2012: 104; LAUBE 2007: 113). 
The overall population density in the UER has on average increased by more than 123 
percent between 1960 to 2010 (calculation based on GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2012: 
22; LAUBE et al. 2008: 7). Taking into consideration data dating back to 1931, an average 
increase of more than 200 percent may seem realistic (SCHULTZE 1955: Beilage 2). Today, the 
region has achieved an average density of more than 118 people/km² (GHANA STATISTICAL 
SERVICE 2013: 53). The majority of growth in population density likely took place in the 
research areas in the early decades of the 20th century (SCHULTZE 1955: Beilage 2), and after 
construction of irrigation projects in the 1980s (LAUBE et al. 2008: 7). Thus population pressure 
has vastly increased over the last half a century, mostly shaped by political and economic trends 
with outmigration serving to relieve pressure for distressed locals.  
At the local level, total population and population density vary heavily from village to 
village. Throughout the Upper East Region, population density follows an east-west gradient, thus 
higher densities are found in Mirigu, while the least populated areas start to commence in Biu and 
to its south-west. Total population is hard to estimate and compare, because community census 
borders heavily vary by topographical maps of the area, people’s perception and personal 
impressions on the ground. Census data proclaims a total of 5085 inhabitants in what is formerly 
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known as Mirigu (and quarters), and 3299 inhabitants for Biu.40 More assured are numbers 
derived from this study’s population density mapping, whereby up to 55 to 60 compounds per km² 
are found at the centre of the Biu compared with 70 to 75 at the centre of Mirigu. Thus, with an 
average of 5.8 inhabitants per compound in the Upper East (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 
2012: 22), densities of up to 348 people/km² in Biu and 435 people/km² in Mirigu are possible 
(see also Map 8 and Map 9).41 Notably, the average household would be 44 percent greater if 
large shares of the local population had not migrated, specifically females. Livelihood outcomes 
are often insufficient to cater for needs, and migration is a common strategy to address this. A 
significant share of households, mostly female-headed ones, depends on remittances generated by 
migrated family members.  
The demographics of Biu and Mirigu are both shaped by a young and growing population, 
with an average age of 25. Cohorts of people below 15 easily make up more than a third of the 
local population, while older ones, especially those of 20 years and older, make up a relativity 
small share of the inhabitants. There seems to be a decrease in growth when it comes to the 
youngest cohort, the 0 to 4 year olds, indicating demographic change in northern Ghana. Data 
from 2013 backs the assumption of demographic transition, whereby the 0 to 4-year-olds now 
represent only 9 percent of inhabitants, meaning the cohort may have shrunk by another 3 percent 
since the last census (own survey, 2013, n=177). Marks in the population pyramid (see Figure 22) 
point at the cohorts born in the early 1970s and early 1980s, which are those in the age ranges 55 
to 60 and 65 to 69-year-old. 
These marks were probably left by forced labour and soldier recruitment during the second 
world war, partly explaining why the 65 to 69-year-olds are relatively underrepresented. 
Furthermore, famines in the early 1950s, late 1970s and the early 1980s had an equally limiting 
effect on population growth. Therefore 55 to 69-year-olds make up less than 2 percent of the local 
population, as do those born in the early 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, population grew 
rapidly when the irrigation project started to run in the 1980s and became more popular in the 
1990s. Recent cohorts have become smaller when compared to previous ones. Interviewees often 
state that they have, in recent years, changed their reproductive patterns in favour of fewer 
children; partly as a result of improved access to contraceptives, but also with the aim of meeting 
financial requirements imposed mainly by school expenses. In earlier times, large numbers of 
children went along with large social capital and they served as social safety nets. Nowadays 
education serves as a means of securing livelihoods: 
                                                   
40 As based on spatial data obtained from Ghana Statistical Service, 2013. 
41 Own survey and mapping, 2013. 
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‘We thought that if you had many children, you would be well respected in society. […] But we 
have learned that too many children can be a problem […]. Where are you going to get the money 
from to send them to school? How will you feed them? Today you can rather be proud if you are 
able to send your children to school […]! Big men today are those that have been educated.’42 
 
Figure 22: Population pyramid for Biu and Central Mirigu in 2010 (own figure, 2014, data 
obtained from Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). 
In the past quantities of human capital were correlated to qualities of social capital. Yet, 
people nowadays put emphasis on the education/human capital of each child instead of trying to 
outweigh future risks by sheer numbers (of children). Population pressure may continue to 
increase for some years to come, but then it will likely come down due to general trends in norms 
and values as well as trends in the withdrawal of government support for education. On the other 
hand, several limiting factors to population growth have nowadays been eradicated. Severe 
famines and the outbreaks of different human diseases, such as meningitis, measles, smallpox or 
mumps that severely decreased population growth during the 1940s and 1950s are nowadays 
uncommon. Population growth is also aided by better health services, e.g. the eradication of 
measles epidemics, which killed up to a third of children, in 1992 (Figure 23). 
Future trends may be shaped by classic demographical changes, similar to industrialised 
countries, if lowered birth rates coincide with lower mortality rates. This is not to say that people 
in the region no longer suffer from disease, though deaths have massively reduced due to 
government health infrastructure, insurance and irrigation. Malaria, guinea worm, elephantiasis, 
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted infections and disease as well as leprosy are still 
common. People are prone to suffer easily preventable diseases such as diarrhoea, acute 
                                                   
42 FGD participant, 18.12.2012, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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respiratory infections and intestinal worms, while vitamin A deficiency, iodine deficiency 
disorders, iron deficiency diseases and iron deficiency anaemia have high prevalence. On a 
region-wide level, 27 percent of children under five are underweight. Recent challenges have 
included outbreaks of meningitis, cholera, yellow fever and anthrax (see also GHANA HEALTH 
SERVICE 2012: 17, 50). There are indications that the establishment of irrigation facilities has 
partly increased incidents of elephantiasis and malaria in a range of 1 to 2 kilometres of these 
schemes, due to the breeding grounds they provide for mosquitos (SONGSORE 2011: 321). 
Pressure on health with regards to mosquito-borne disease is thus high in Biu.  
 
Figure 23: Timeline of famines/food shortages and disease in the Navrongo-Mirigu-Biu area (own 
figure, 2014, sources as mentioned). 
Socially induced diseases are also very prominent. From the early morning onwards, on a 
daily basis, numerous people in the villages can be found utterly drunk in one of the many bars in 
the communities. A total of 87 percent of all those questioned belief that alcoholism is a serious 
issue in their village, especially prevalent among men, and thereby a major threat for local 
development. Alcohol decreases the level of rationality employed in decision-making. Chronic 
alcohol misuse can lead to severe neurological and thereby memory disorders. Serious alcoholics 
are further ‘at increased risk of developing other psychiatric disorders such as anxiety, depression 
and psychosis, the severity of which is exacerbated by sensory deprivation’ (KOPELMAN et al. 
2009: 152). Even worse is that alcohol is perceived to be a major reason for domestic violence, 
which renders the wives of unsuccessful farmers vulnerable to psychological and physical trauma: 
‘These things happen day in and day out. We women can even prepare food for the man and be 
kind to him, but if the man wants to sell some of the food stuffs to buy drinks and you the woman, 
you would not agree to that, that is where the beating then starts. […] You […] would want to 
protect the family and the children but the man doesn't care. He wants to go and drink and so 
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fighting will definitely come! […] The men are frustrated […] with farming and so they drink, but 
the drinking is really the cause of all this violence.’43 
Externally and internally induced pressure on health is still high. The alcohol addicted cause 
grave misfortune for their wider family while depriving themselves of their own human capital. 
Aside from Protestant churches and Muslim mosques preaching unconditional abstinence there 
are no institutions to help deal with alcoholism. Overall a lack of good health and nutrition leads 
to low life-spans, and moreover deprives people of making full use of their potentials in livelihood 
upkeep. Economic activities pursued – livelihood pathways – are mostly if not entirely based on 
hard labour. Moreover, livelihood upkeep requires the labour power of most household members, 
which is why even one dropout – due to disease – can threaten livelihood outcomes, especially if 
it occurs during crucial phases of agricultural production cycles. Already, averagely 4.59 
household members cannot work, but depend on others for their survival. In female-headed 
households the dependency ratio is about 57 percent, while it is about 63 percent in male-headed 
households. Most dependents are either too old or too young to contribute to household incomes.  
Dependence on at least one child (below 16) as a source of labour is common at least in 
every second, average household. Children are said to be needed for land preparation, for the 
rearing of animals or to gather water from boreholes. They are thus primarily used to generate 
immediate household outcomes, as nine of every ten working children pursue his or her work 
within the household. People are dependent on communal labour, since 71 percent of Biu’s 
households have ‘severe’ to ‘extreme’ difficulties in acquiring paid labourers to meet the labour 
requirements imposed by different crops. Therefore, agricultural intensification that aims at a 
reduced human labour input is important with concern for dependency ratios and to further boost 
land use efficiency for a still growing population. To further help deal with constraints, education 
– parts of which come from faith communities, i.e. Christian or Islamic institutions – is essential. 
5.3.4. Education and Religion 
Allowing one’s children to be educated is of highest priority to locals and also indicates 
prestige. People are ready to suffer from hunger and a lack of finances to be able to send their 
children to school. This is because locals perceive education to be a major factor in determining 
livelihood incomes, thereby also outcomes and overall potentials. Education can alter traditional 
household hierarchies, specifically household decision-making processes. Furthermore education 
is required to help locals deal with the constraints of environmental changes, because certain 
forms of societal knowledge, such as natural indicators of seasonal change, are ceasing to 
                                                   
43 Female FGD participant from Biu, 09.11.2012, Biu, Ghana.  
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function, while the primary assets of agrarian livelihoods, such as soils, are becoming degraded 
and eroded. 
There are two public and two private schools at the centre of Biu, one a private nursery and 
primary school, the others Junior High and two primary schools. In Mirigu there are six schools in 
total, none of which go beyond Junior High level (see Map 10). Yet formal educational facilities 
in both Biu and Mirigu lack quality. Public schools, upon which about 83 percent of pupils 
depend, are characterised by a lack of personnel, huge class sizes, broken chairs and tables. The 
aged schools are severely overheated in the day-time, while suffering from insufficient roofing 
whenever it rains (see Photo 11). Private schools better in all regards, but less than 17 percent are 
able to come up with the required fees. Even public schooling is already constrained by financial 
resources, because although education is supposedly free in the region, the truth is that people 
have great difficulties to come up with the required school equipment, like pencils, paper, 
additional books, and school uniforms. Consequently, almost every second household in Biu has 
at least one child (below 16) that cannot attend school. School attendance among children 
growing up in female-headed households is slightly higher than the average, suggesting that 
females may better cater for children when in charge. 
Yet overall educational levels are low. About half of Biu’s population received no formal 
education or only attended nursery level. About another third did not make it beyond primary 
school. About a tenth managed to attend Junior High school or secondary schools. Colleges were 
visited by less than 1 percent and even fewer, 0.3 percent, went to university. Among girls 
educational levels are generally worse. In Biu only about 40 percent of school attendees are 
female. They are less likely to access education and especially higher levels. Formal education to 
boost human capital is thus an exclusive asset (see Figure 24). 
 
Photo 11: Public school building in Biu (own photo, 2012). 
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Figure 24: Education levels among Biu’s inhabitants (without university attenders, own figure, 
2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Improvements to the quality and quantity of education seem important. At the most basic 
level, it ought to be assured that at least public education is really free. At present a lack of 
uniforms or books can deprive students of school attendance. However, since the share of current 
school attendees among the under 16 year olds is far greater than the total share of population that 
has never received formal education, overall education levels are improving. Other sources of 
education are limited, since the possibilities of media usage are mostly confined to radio and 
mobile phone. About 80 percent of households own neither: 15 percent have a TV, less than 6 
percent read newspapers, 6 percent own a PC, and just 3 percent access the internet. 
The vast majority of locals are illiterate. Less than a third of all household members are able 
read and write. Locals possess greater oral skills, meaning that on average almost all households 
(98 percent) have somebody among them that can speak another of the many languages spoken in 
the Upper East Region, such that they could conduct business in that language. About 60 percent 
are able to do the same in English or another, southern Ghanaian language. French is basically 
unknown, with less than 1 percent of households having somebody able to speak it. Other 
languages than the native one, mostly regional ones, are spoken by less than 10 percent. Female 
household heads are generally able to communicate in a greater variety of languages, since their 
share among the households able to speak English or a southern Ghanaian language is 
significantly larger.  
Due to such language skills, both men and women are thereby able to engage in a great 
variety of economic exchanges. Yet with such illiteracy, it is likely that economic exchanges may, 
at least on the side of farmers, be characterised as having little rationality in decision-making. 
Locals frequently emphasise that the commercialisation of agricultural production is still a 
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relatively recent phenomena. For example, most farmers state that barter trade was the most 
common form of economic exchange until about 30 to 40 years ago, and continues today, even 
though money has become more common for transactions.44 During farm budget interviews with 
locals, it became clear that farmers are often unaware of the fact that their production is, in sheer 
monetary terms, unprofitable though they might be able to feed themselves somewhat sufficiently 
for some time after harvests. Without the ability to calculate gains and losses in production, and 
with a lack of records on the inputs invested, the likelihood of farmers encountering losses 
without them even noticing are high, as a formerly illiterate woman from Mirigu put it: 
‘I would not have thought so, but all this time I was really losing money. When I had learned how 
to read and write and after my good friend here told me how to do my calculations on the farm, it 
was like I was stepping into the light. It opened my eyes and then I could see, but I did not like 
what I saw! [Laughing] It helped me a lot to better strategize the little money I have for my crops 
and to explain my side to the traders when they come here.’45 
The inability of farmers to rationally maximise profit is the most prominent mantra used to 
describe the mind-set of farmers among most government officials, especially at the MOFA. 
Experts were trying to emphasise that reasonable business opportunities could not be taken 
advantage of by farmers because most agricultural production is embedded in a cultural (belief) 
system that followed logics partly independent of market-based rationalities (see also Section 
5.1.2). Though officials also attested to the fact that farmers would be interested in maximising 
their yields and thereby outcomes, including in monetary terms, they were trying to express that 
most rural farmers lack planning skills and act on a rather short-term basis instead of applying 
comprehensive, strategic concepts to their agricultural production. They simply miss evolving 
crop market potentials and thus continue to live at subsistence levels.  
It may be correct to point to the limitations of rationality employed in decision-making, 
specifically when it comes to increasingly popular cash crops that demand a minimum 
consideration of costs and achievable incomes. However, this is the perception of a well-educated, 
westernised government elite, and their argumentation is equally useful to cover up their 
negligence in fulfilling their responsibilities. The officials are playing a blame-game. Farmers 
may be maximising their profits using the little resource endowment they have.  
Furthermore, concepts of profit do differ. A farmer producing at a heavily diversified 
subsistence level will primarily talk of a profitable production in terms of feeding his/her 
household. In this sense, subsistence farmer decision-making may be highly rational in regards to 
everyday practicalities, even if it fails to account for market. Government officials may devaluate 
                                                   
44 Elderly participant of FGD, 10.01.2013, Biu, Ghana.  
45 FGD participant, 26.04.2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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and thus ignore the realities of farmers. Moreover, with an average ratio of about 2500 farmers to 
one MOFA extension officer, the likelihood of getting suitable advice with problems on one’s 
farm is vastly limited, aside from the fact that extension services are said to severely lack in 
quality. Government officials may be overestimating the possibilities that exist in farmers’ 
production systems while downplaying their own inefficacies.  
Nevertheless, over the past three years about half of all farming households in Biu have 
received general training in better farming through the MOFA or ICOUR. Less than 40 percent 
have received practical help or advice with a concrete problem on their farm. Though these 
numbers are relatively high when compared to the extension-farmer ratio, it is equally so that 
among those not having received any support, 50 to 60 percent do not even know that these forms 
of help exist! Thus, about a quarter of all households are cut-off from any sort of possibility to 
enhance their level of ‘rationality’ employed in agriculture, as defined by government officials.  
Farmers in both Biu and Mirigu frequently emphasised that their general lack of education, 
especially with regard to literacy levels, deprives them of attaining information on government 
and NGO trainings, subsidies or other support. Those willing to improve their level of education 
are unable to do so, as thresholds are set too high on the side of development agencies. The 
uneducated are dependent on trustworthy and willing literates to acquire support or to gain an 
understanding of business arrangements to be made with these or others. Within the study 
communities, literates are invested with a lot of power and consequently attain higher livelihood 
outcomes, greater wealth. Equally at the household level, it is nowadays those educated few, 
possibly even children, who are consulted as to how to make better use of lands. Thus education 
can invert traditional hierarchies, specifically within households where educated individuals can 
serve as knowledge monopoly holders and selective disseminators of it. Indeed, major forms of 
attaining knowledge are based on social capital, since over two-thirds of respondents state they 
receive advice with problems on the farm from family or friends. Societal knowledge, often 
derived from tradition, is of great importance. 81 percent of households ‘fully’ or ‘partly’ agree 
that ‘it makes sense to plant certain crops, because our forefathers also did them’ while only 19 
percent reject this idea. So, decision-making is shaped by societal factors, specifically religion.  
The greatest share of people is actively religious, since in Biu only 3 percent consider 
themselves as atheists. The vast majority of people are convinced that external, higher powers 
play a significant role in determining their livelihoods. Among those formally denominated, 
Protestants form the greatest group of believers (58 percent), out of which the majority follow 
quite a conservative evangelical belief system, as they attend the Church of Pentecost or the 
Presbyterian Church. The second biggest religious group is the ‘traditional believers’ (23 percent, 
especially males), followed by Roman Catholics (16 percent) and Muslims (0.4 percent). Thus, at 
a basic level, human capital is heavily shaped by colonial influences in the form of Christianity 
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and traditional beliefs. In Mirigu, the share of Muslims is higher, as is also expressed by the local 
mosque within the village centre (see Map 10). The locals, however, are quite flexible in the 
handling of their belief systems and to a large extent, one gets the impression that religious 
philosophies are actually based on a mélange of practically applied faiths. This is summarised in 
an FGD partly concerned with traditional beliefs and their influence on livelihood upkeep: 
‘We have no problem with Christianity! It is only that the Christian pastors constantly talk about 
death. […] I don’t like that too much, but if it is so important, then we may as well do what they 
tell us, to also make the white man’s god happy. So, we will make sure that we have a good 
afterlife by going to church on Sunday. However, many believe that if you want to make sure that 
you also have a good life today, then you must also worship our traditional gods. They are the 
original gods of our land and only they can help to get what you need today.’46 
The influence of traditional beliefs is of special importance to farmer livelihoods because no 
matter one’s religion, this governs land uses to a large extent. People care greatly about how 
others perceive the crops they are growing. Though traditional believers represent only a minority 
of household members, three-quarters of Biu’s respondents say that their land use is at least partly 
determined by traditional religious intentions, thus deeply embedded, social motives. Indirect 
influence of traditional norms and values on land use is vast. Traditional believers are mostly 
elderly people, often considered as household heads and always well respected in household 
decision-making (see before, Figure 5). More than 53 percent ‘fully agree’ that certain crops must 
be produced in order to ‘pacify […] god(s)’. Among these are traditional staples like millet and 
others needed for annual festivities (see also Section 5.1.2). The agricultural system is deeply 
socialised. Due to a reliance on cooperation, farmers are hardly fully independent producers, but 
depend on communal or group consent and in a wider sense on common norms of production. 
Beliefs thereby promote sustainable land use – unlike government agencies – because they define 
the type of crops to grow and ways of agricultural intensification, such as through manuring 
instead of inorganic fertiliser usage.  
Most traditional crops with religious value, like millet or shea, are crops highly adapted to 
the local environment, require only manure, and are required for many traditional purposes. These 
crops simply must be produced. Almost two-thirds of respondents would ‘partly’ or ‘fully’ attest 
that disobedience to traditionally-set norms in land use lowers their attainable livelihood 
outcomes, as they believe that ‘bad harvests can be a result of sinful behaviour of the people in 
the village’. Notably, about 42 percent of female-headed households reject that idea. Women feel 
less dependent on these traditional norms regarding land use. They are very active in the 
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preservation of trees to safeguard their shea. Traditional beliefs and thereby land use systems aim 
at environmental sustainability through trees, because beliefs inhibit their indiscriminate felling. 
93 percent of those questioned ‘partly’ of ‘fully’ attest to the idea that ‘spirits live in trees’, which 
is why they ‘cannot be cut down’ without prior consultation of spiritual authorities like the 
landlord. All the presently sustainable forms of land use allow only marginal incomes. People 
would rather their finances improve than to consider the environment. As reflected in crop trends, 
environmentally sustainable values have been partly replaced by monetary ones.  
5.3.5. Finances 
Financial capital is perceived as a major asset in shaping general well-being, vulnerability, 
food-security, future prospects of children (for education), thereby also human and social capital. 
Its possession shapes general livelihood outcomes. Overall dependence on agricultural markets is 
high – 80 percent of all households in Biu and probably similar shares in Mirigu depend upon 
selling their produce. Irrigation projects support the commercialisation of agriculture, since the 
share of those dependent on sales among those with no access to the irrigation project in Biu is 30 
percent below the average. Those deprived of furrow irrigation, including all of Mirigu’s 
population, are in all regards most likely to remain subsistence farmers, as they are cut off from 
the potential benefits of market developments in irrigated crops. Financial capital is of further 
relevance because times of financial deficits correlate with times of food shortage. Thereby food 
security is generally worse in a place like Mirigu, when compared to those with access to 
irrigation, such as in Biu. However, as much as it is desired, financial capital is considered hard to 
attain.47 Financial capital is indeed scarce, with more than 90 percent of Biu’s households 
claiming that they will experience times of ‘very severe financial problems’ throughout a year. 
This goes for savings as much as liquid financial capital. 
5.3.5.1. Outlines of Savings 
A general lack of finances is primarily apparent when looking at long-term savings in the 
form of animals. It is relatively uncommon for locals to have bank accounts, and animals are 
considered to be the primary form in which savings are made and multiplied. Farmers use them as 
a bank account and a form of security. They do not sell their animals just to make a profit, rather 
they use the earnings to pay school fees, dowry or to invest in housing.48 This implies that saved 
financial capital is a rare form of capital. There is probably no other that is allocated as unequally. 
It accounts for small and large animals; however, it is most evident for bigger livestock like cattle 
                                                   
47 Consent statement of participants of FGD in Biu with regard to the relevance of financial capital in making a living, 
03.04.2013, Biu, Ghana.  
48 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 12.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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and donkeys. When assigning monetary values to the animals owned49, the mean average a 
household in Biu will have saved is 5679 GH₵ (with a range from 0 to over 47000 GH₵). Though 
the average may seem relatively high, about half of all households have savings of less than 2700 
GH₵, and a quarter of the total have less than 1000 GH₵, There are just a few very rich locals 
whose wealth biases the mean average severely. In fact, the ‘richest’ 10 percent of all households 
possess about 43 percent of all savings in Biu, while the lowest 10 percent have close to none 
savings at all (see Figure 25).  
 
Figure 25: Allocation of savings in Biu (own figure, 2014, as deducted from numbers on animal 
ownership, numbers from own survey, 2013, n=177, and calculations based on MOFA data).  
To put this into practical perspective: even if locals were to invest their entire savings in 
housing, about 42 percent of Biu’s households would not even be able to construct an emergency 
shelter to surely withstand growing incidents of torrential rainfall (see Table 8 and also Section 
5.3.2). Similarly, liquid financial capital is constrained. 
Inputs (incl. sundries) Costs (GH₵)* Costs (€)** Costs (%) 
Zinc Roofing 200.00 87.00 9 % 
Concrete Foundation & Walls 1135.00 494.00 48 % 
Woodworks  350.00 152.00 15 % 
Labour Costs 660.00 287.00 28 % 
Total 2345.00 1020.00 100 % 
* Prices as at 22nd December 2012 and provided by a local construction company. 
Table 8: Costs of one emergency shelter, a flood- and rain-proof room with 10m² of space and a 
maximum capacity of 6 people (own table, 2014, own expert interview, 2013). 
                                                   
49 Based on average prices in the 4th quarter of 2012 attained from MOFA data, 2013. 
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5.3.5.2. Outlines of Liquid Financial Capital 
The deprivation of many locals is evident when considering liquid funds used for daily 
livelihood upkeep that can later be turned into savings such as animals and be used for housing. 
The poor are hindered from improving the utilisation of their most productive resource, natural 
capital, because they cannot afford investments. Having to pre-finance farming seasons requires 
vast investments to latter be able to capitalise on these, by selling of the thereby produces crops. 
Most find it ‘extremely’ problematic to attain the inputs needed (see before, Figure 11), which 
must be regarded as a major obstacle to improved livelihood outcomes. Their acquisition is even 
more problematic than acquiring rainfed or even irrigated land. This poverty trap, based on a lack 
of financial capital, has a self-reinforcing effect. Fertilisers often make up the largest share of the 
costs of production. Other chemicals include herbicides, fungicides and insecticides. While seeds 
are often produced by locals themselves and mechanical ploughing may be substituted by own 
labour or hired personnel, such substitution is almost impossible for fertilisers and other farm 
chemicals. Income polarisation, in a broader sense, is caused by most locals not attaining 
sufficient inputs at the right time to increase yields and thereby monetary incomes. A popular 
strategy of those having sufficient money for fertilisers is to buy publicly subsidised ones at a time 
when few others require them, meaning lower prices are paid and timely inputs can be made to 
further increase possible incomes. Those struggling with their finances buy fertilisers when their 
price is high, and thus they miss the subsidies.  
The most popular and relatively cheap cash crop in Biu, irrigated rice production, further 
illustrates the situation. Assuming that farmers make full use of the average 3 acres they cultivate 
at the irrigation scheme, while providing labour themselves, farmers have to invest a maximum of 
about 1110 GH₵ (roughly 485 €) at the beginning of the rice season. Assuming that seed and land 
preparation is also substituted by own work, thus excluded from the calculation, an investment of 
678 GH₵ (about 296 €)50 is required. Such low investments are already characterised as 
‘extremely problematic’ for most locals. Because allocation of land is highly unequal among 
locals, it is most likely that the majority has fewer funds at hand than Table 9 may suggest. For 
example, irrigation levies (90 GH₵/39 €) are problematic for farmers in Biu, and thus have major 
effect on the very basis of livelihood outcomes. One of the greatest factors in land allocation is 
said to be the reallocation of lands from those unable to pay levies to those with funds and proven 
ability to use irrigated plots intensively, i.e. commercial farmers/local elite.  
                                                   
50 1€ = 2.29 GH₵ as at 22nd December 2012. 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
162 
Inputs Per acre (GH₵) 3 acres (GH₵) Share (%) 
Irrigation Levy 30.00 90.00 8 % 
Land preparation  120.00 360.00 32 % 
Seed 24.00 72.00 6 % 
Fertilizer: N.P.K. 112.80 338.40 30 % 
Fertilizer: Sulphate of Ammonia 48.00 144.00 13 % 
Agro-Chemicals 35.40 106.20 10 % 
Sum 370.20 1110.60 100 % 
Table 9: Primary costs of production for irrigated rice at average intensity and an expected yield 
of 2 tonnes per acre (own table, 2014, based on data obtained from ICOUR, 2013). 
Just paying the irrigation levy is already problematic for many, sometimes resulting in the 
loss of land at the irrigation scheme. Thus, a lack of just 30 GH₵ per acre can, at certain times, 
make a household lose its right to easy dry season irrigation. In Mirigu, constraints imposed by 
fees charged by the local landlord for dry season cultivation in proximity to the river have a 
similar effect. Credit and support is thus essential just to maintain one’s livelihood, not to speak of 
improving it.  
5.3.5.3. Sources of Credit and Support 
The poor have only a few formal sources of support, specifically credit. Banks are hardly 
ever an option, but public institutions like ICOUR and the MOFA, as well as USAID, provide 
support and vertical contractualisation in agricultural production through freely credited inputs, 
most of which are inorganic fertilisers. The government, through ICOUR and MOFA, is active in 
distributing fertiliser subsidies to locals, but officially only during the wet season. These subsidies 
give a general 50 percent discount on fertiliser prices and reach about 42 percent of male-headed, 
but less than 30 percent of all female-headed households in Biu. These government agencies are 
content with their ‘Block Farming’ (BF) programme, which is part of the ‘Youth in Agriculture’ 
initiative and provides subsidised fertiliser on credit. Arrangements in the Block Farming project 
are based on formal contracts and reach about 26 percent of Biu’s households, whereby an almost 
equal share of recipient households are male- and female-headed. 
On the other hand, inputs and money coming from friends and family as credit are more 
widespread, reaching about 40 percent of Biu’s households. Depending on the social relationship 
between lender and borrower, credit interest can range from free to exorbitant. Credit lent within 
households is usually interest-free. However, in rice production it is common that cheaply 
attained, subsidised fertilisers are used to ‘sponsor’ farmers at the onset of the rice season in 
exchange for a share of the forthcoming rice harvest. This is fixed at the market prices prevailing 
at the beginning of seasons. Intra-community sponsors thus first bet on rising fertiliser prices, and 
then rice prices, both of which are highly lucrative. Even without a difference in rice prices, the 
sponsors can thereby easily obtain a margin of about 40 percent without having to bear as much 
risk and effort in rice cultivation themselves, while bypassing the issue of land scarcity and being 
able to monitor their outsourced production in close (spatial and social) proximity. 
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Equally popular are credits from traders. More than another third, almost 38 percent of all 
households in Biu and especially females, receive money or inputs, mostly fertilisers and agro-
chemicals as a comparatively cheaper seasonal credit from a buyer of their products. Such credits 
are the most prominent form of direct support to both female- and male-headed households. When 
farmers are able to produce a good enough quality harvest, such forms of outgrower farming 
provide mutual benefits. Traders may forward cash for inputs like fertilisers or sprays, which 
farmers could otherwise not afford, whilst farmers are willing to forward their produce on credit 
and patiently wait for traders to sell the product.51 Such a form of contract farming is evident in 
the production of many crops, especially cash crops. Commonly, inputs, especially fertilisers, are 
given out on credit or in the form of cash, which is later paid back with interest and in kind. 
Credits from traders reach a slightly larger share of people than many other forms of 
external help, like government fertiliser subsidies or development aid, while showing significantly 
less bias according to gender. When considering sources of external help that provide inputs prior 
to (guaranteed) sales, inputs given by traders on credit are more important than USAID and 
government efforts. Only the government fertiliser subsidy reaches a similar share of people, but 
only among male-headed households, followed by Block Farming. Overall, about 30 to 40 percent 
of local households are thus provided with some practical form of external support, inputs on 
credit, in their business endeavours. Yet, no form of help reaches a majority of locals, despite 
about 80 to 90 percent of non-recipients, mostly women, knowing about these programmes. Thus, 
most of these initiatives have in common that they are hard to access. Right of entry is especially 
difficult for females, so women rather use their social capital to acquire credit and support 
informally through friends and family. If not provided, they may be hindered in the production of 
certain crops, mostly high value ones.  
5.3.5.4. Crops and Possible Incomes 
Farmers associate major inputs for agricultural production and general access to markets 
with financial capital, money, and also human capital, labour, according to different crops. Input 
requirements and thereby financial and labour requirements naturally vary by crop type. At a 
basic level, access to the production and then market of a crop, a livelihood pathway, is defined by 
the initial investments in financial and labour terms required for meaningful production, which 
relates to a long-term, more strategic perspective: 
‘If you do not have the money and the time to do a thing like the pepper [chili], then you better not 
be doing it at all. It will not turn out well for you! You need the fertilisers, the sprays and all that, 
or it will just die one day! […] So, you need the money […] at the right moment. […] At first, I 
                                                   
51 Interview with a farmer from Biu, 26.10.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
164 
could not do that and so I was wise not to have tried like some of my friends who are now down 
[have failed]. So, me, I did the rice first, which is cheaper but will yield and yield and yield! Then 
I started migrating into the pepper. […] It is now that the pepper can fetch me plenty!’52  
With differences in the levels of initial investment needed in crops and with altering gains 
made possible by investments – whereby, in numeric terms, higher investment is most often 
rewarded with higher net returns per season – one can characterise the level of economic 
upgrading of livelihood pathways accordingly. Farmers that work on more sophisticated and more 
expensive crops may have shifted ‘to more rewarding functional positions or by making products 
that have more value added invested in them and that can provide better returns’ (GIBBON & 
PONTE 2005: 87-88). As was already indicated with regards to farmer rationales (see Section 
5.1), a basic and practical distinction can be made between crops like tomato and chili, crops like 
rice or maize and traditional crops like millet and groundnut. The latter gives the smallest yield 
but requires little initial investment and has a relatively high market value per kilo. Tomato and 
chili on the other hand promise far greater returns, though they are hardest to finance and manage. 
The other crops like rice and maize are found between these extremes. Especially maize is 
attractive, with a promising ratio of initial costs to net returns. What all of these crops share, is 
that producers are, theoretically at least, able to pay themselves or their employees the usual wage 
of about 6.00 GH₵/man-day, even if farmers were to sell their product at the exact producer price 
without any net return (common wage in 2012, see ICOUR 2013: 10). That is significantly higher 
(+25 percent) than the minimum wage of 4.48 GH₵/man-day (KPMG 2012: 13). When 
considering net returns per acre and assuming that nobody is employed for production, double the 
common wage is easily attainable for farmers themselves (see Figure 26). 
Yet in reality the yields of socially and spatially marginalised farmers vary greatly, and 
when considering production outside of irrigated areas, it is likely that yields may be lower still 
when calamities like flood or drought occur. Most responsive to such are tomato and chili, 
followed by rice and maize, and then millet and groundnuts. However, the average numbers used 
in the above calculations give a useful impression of the input-output-situation (based on yield 
estimates and farm bugets attained from MOFA Accra, 2013, and MOFA 2011a, 2013a). When 
not considering irrigation levies, or replacing these with similar fees charged for land use, the 
calculations are also transferable to Mirigu, though it is important to note that when looking at dry 
season production, labour requirements will be far higher in the case of Mirigu’s SGI production. 
So, it will be harder for SGI farmers to acquire sufficient incomes or at least minimum wages. 
But, one can assume that high incomes are still possible among those having access to quality 
                                                   
52 Based on field notes and interview with a male farmer from Biu, 11.12.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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land and finances to make use of the agricultural inputs required. That goes for the production of 
most grains and tomato or chili, with the exception of traditional crops due to low yields. 
 
Figure 26: Average costs of selected, irrigated crops, expected yields, prices and net returns per 
acre in the 4th quarter of 2012 at common wage of 6 GH₵/man-day (own figure 2014, based on 
ICOUR, MOFA and USAID ADVANCE data, 2013). 
When looking at shea products, a typically female-led traditional cash crop, inputs and 
outcomes differ greatly. Though prices fetched per kilo are the highest among all crops, 
production of nuts and butter requires larger investment in equipment. In sum, the equipment 
needed to produce nuts and butter can cost slightly more than an acre of chili (easily more than 
1,000 GH₵/). However, when done properly shea processing can allow more than 3 tonnes of nuts 
or about 750kg of oil to be produced each year (extraction rate of about 25 percent), independent 
of rains and without necessarily needing to be in possession of lands when nuts are plucked in 
uninhabited areas, the ‘commons’. Moreover, many women already have most of the equipment at 
hand as they use it to prepare food. Once the equipment is available, variable costs of production 
are comparatively insignificant. Most equipment will depreciate at a fairly slow rate, lasting at 
least a year if not two, and further inputs like firewood and water, milling are relatively cheap to 
come by and are easily available. The labour input required is in fact the greatest single 
production cost, which has to do with the amount of time spent in gathering and de-pulping. It is 
not possible to attain a minimum wage of 4.48 GH₵/man-day, not to speak of 6.00 GH₵. Women 
in shea production are at best able to pay themselves a wage of about 30 GH₵ per 100 kg of 
processed nuts, which translates in to a wage that is more than a quarter below the official 
minimum and almost 47 percent below the usual. When further processing self-produced nuts into 
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shea butter, overall a higher income can be generated but this caters for about 55 percent of the 
minimum and about 41 percent of the common wage (see Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27: Estimated prices and production costs of ‘optimal’ shea nuts processing and butter 
production at minimum and common wage in 2012 (own Figure, 2014, own FGDs, 2013). 
Consequently, those who process shea must be desperate for money and turn a blind eye to 
equipment depreciation. Only then can minimum wages be attained for the processing of nuts and 
butter from mid-season onwards. Another viable possibility is to specialise in butter production 
and to buy the required nuts. Then shea butter production becomes partly economically-sound in 
terms of one’s own wages but only at the expense of paying nut processors below the minimum. 
Shea production is thus good for emergencies but nothing one could build a better living out of.  
Price variability is also extreme for other crops. Attainable prices generally differ by 
location. Farmers state that as a result of differences in product quality, farm gate prices in Mirigu 
are often higher for tomato or chili as compared to Biu, though lower for rice. This is because 
quality rice requires irrigation, controllable and high amounts of water, while a lack of irrigation 
as found in Mirigu requires watering by bucket which favours quality tomato and chili because 
these cannot be overwatered as is the case with furrow irrigation in Biu. Furthermore, prices of 
tomato and chili fluctuate wildly – are highly volatile – according to seasonality, while a crop like 
rice encounters changes in pricing throughout the year though comparatively smaller ones. 
Consequently, price risk in tomato and chili and therefore in Mirigu, is higher than in rice and 
therefore in Biu. Tomato and chili farmers must be relatively punctual to profit from market 
prices. Moreover, due to a lack of cooled storage facilities, specifically tomatoes are most 
dependent on timely sale. 
Similar issues arise when looking at shea nut and butter production. Though prices do not 
differ by location, according to season prices can alter up to 100 percent for nuts and about 20 
percent for butter. Prices of both nuts and butter drop harshly during the harvesting season of nuts. 
Thus shea production, especially butter production, is profitable only during the off-season, 
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because prices rise significantly (see Figure 28). Therefore, shea nut and butter producers sell 
during times of high pricing, as their produce is otherwise almost valueless. However, farmers 
often miss the most profitable timeframes, because they start production relatively late. Major 
selling times then coincide with rather low farm gate prices for chili, tomato and rice. Throughout 
the first half of the year, when unable to produce tomato and chili there are hardly any income 
sources attainable and so locals face a lack of finances and food as seasonal cash flows are 
interrupted (see Figure 29). 
 
Figure 28: Estimated farm gate prices of rice, tomato, chili and shea in 2012 (own figure, 2014, 
own FGDs, 2013). 
 
Figure 29: Major (coloured) and minor (shaded) selling times of selected crops and their major 
planting times (‘P’) (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177 and FGDs). 
The potential to attain better market prices – by delayed or early selling of produce – is 
limited by overall household assets and livelihood outcomes. A lack of these favours a late start in 
production and fast selling at harvest time, which can then again further delay the beginning of the 
next cropping season. Aside from overall limitations in assets and outcomes, further constraints in 
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attainable market prices are imposed by the relatively high and continuous investment required in 
products other than shea. Lands must be prepared for the next season, but since farmers sell their 
crops at a low price, future investments are blocked. This continues to affect farmers because 
when they need more time to acquire finances, they delay production, and keep on lagging behind 
for many crop cycles to come.53 This vicious circle ensures that harvests cannot coincide with 
times of high prices.  
Although locals appear to be in a poverty trap, overall market trends are said to be positive. 
Despite the negative effects attributed to globalisation tendencies over the previous decades (see 
also Chapter 2), farmers attest to positive change. More than 50 percent of Biu’s household heads 
even claim that globalisation tendencies do not at all or only partly affect their chances of selling 
their crops. Overall market demand has grown tremendously for both male- and female-headed 
households. Looking back over their lifetime – on average the past 50 years – over 72 percent are 
convinced that the number of buyers of their crops and thus the demand for their work has 
significantly increased. Furthermore, people are of the opinion that popular forms of cash 
cropping – rice, chili and also shea – are increasingly profitable, possibly with the exception being 
tomato and below-average improvements in shea markets. Most significant income advances are 
said to be made in chili and rice (see Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30: Trends in financial capital and its major sources, as perceived by households in Biu 
(own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Similar trends are evident when looking at more recent dynamics. From 2005 to 2012, real 
farm gate prices at least doubled for the most popular cash crops, despite a high inflation of on 
average 12.64 percent. Most constant was growth in prices for shea butter, chili and rice, while 
crops like shea nuts and tomato have instead rather encountered severe ups and downs. The 
biggest improvements in prices are for chili, followed by shea butter, rice and tomato. 
Developments in shea nut prices could, on the other hand, have been negative in some phases of 
the last few years. When only considering the more recent past, these must equally be considered 
as positive. Nevertheless, increases in shea butter prices outweigh those made in nuts, its 
                                                   
53 Interview with a farmer from Biu, 23.02.2010, Biu, Ghana. 
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preliminary product. So, while it is increasingly rewarding, though at a very low level, to produce 
shea butter, this is only partly true for nuts. Since it seems evident that butter production can only 
be economically sustainable when nuts are bought at prices that only allow for appalling wages, 
market dynamics put a severe damper on the livelihood outcomes attainable by the lowest part of 
the shea value chains, the nut processors, women. At the same time these dynamics favour further 
segmentation between nut and butter processors in terms of specialisation, overall socio-economic 
situation and hierarchies between the two. With shea being a typically ‘female crop’, these 
dynamics suggest that developments in financial capital are possibly polarised among female-
headed households (see Figure 31). These are estimated values, it is worth remembering, and can 
only be understood in terms of their basic direction. Limitations arise because economic 
exchanges are heavily shaped by horizontal and vertical social interaction and cooperation. 
 
Figure 31: Annual inflation and adjusted growth in farm gate prices of selected crops in Biu and 
Mirigu (own figure, 2014, own FGDs, 2012/'13, inflation rates based on WORLD BANK 2014). 
5.3.6. Social Interaction and Cooperation 
The social capital that farmers use to advance their livelihoods is assumed to be the basis of 
social interaction and cooperation. In reference to institutional contexts, interviewees associate 
social capital with its vertical form, specifically a conflict of local elites with less privileged 
community members, or of local leaders versus their subordinates. Social capital is thereby 
strongly associated with financial capital. Needed for land preparation and crucial in times of 
crisis, social capital is used for decision-making processes in household units as much as it is for 
decisions that affect the whole community. Thereby, deficits in social capital are associated with a 
lack of organisation by the most vulnerable parts of society, which leads to further problems in 
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hierarchical relationships. The following sections first and foremost analyse and describe the 
importance of social capital and its general allocation within and between households, and then 
with regards to hierarchies within villages. 
5.3.6.1. Horizontal Social Capital 
Social capital in its horizontal form is an asset highly prized by locals. The vulnerable 
depend on it in times of crisis. Mutual bonding within household units, for example, serves as a 
social safety net for the aged, since almost no elders receive retirement pay. Social obligations 
among villagers do not stop at the borders of blood relations. At least every second household will 
have a minimum of one non-relative living with them. While an average male-headed household 
tends to cater for another 0.59 people from outside their immediate kin, female-headed ones will 
averagely accommodate another 0.82 people. 
Still, 45 percent of all heads of household, and 52 percent of female heads of households, 
‘fully’ believe that the extended family system – whereby mutual support is provided beyond 
immediate, often biological relatives – ‘is a thing of the past’ and that the nucleus family 
nowadays serves as a social security net. Another 35 percent of female-headed and almost 40 
percent of male-headed households agree ‘partly’, while only 17 percent reject this idea. Another 
third of male and female interviewees claim that general cooperation and help among community 
members has decreased over their lifetimes. Yet almost 45 percent attest no change, while about 
another third claims that cooperation has increased. FGD participants explain contemporary 
individualisation tendencies with a reference to rising financial burdens – mainly in terms of 
rising costs for agricultural inputs and school fees – and describe systems of support as based on 
the functional logics of mutual exploitation: 
‘You will see that we help each other out a lot, because we all depend on getting help to do our 
farming, to eat. But really, if you look more closely, you will see that it now has limits. […] We 
were closer together in previous days because we did […] not have such high expenses!’54 
Somewhat following the logic of social capital multiplication and diversification with the 
aim to exploit societal connections, more than 65 percent of households are ‘fully’ convinced of 
the idea that ‘one must try to become friends with many different people, so that there is always 
somebody there to help, when a problem occurs’. In total, another third of households interviewed 
agree at least ‘partly’ to this idea, while only a minority of 6 percent disagree. Thus households 
actively and intentionally diversify their social assets to widen their security nets. 93 percent of all 
male and female heads of households ‘fully’ agree that concrete benefits should derive for 
themselves, from having friends or relatives in favourable, social positions. Another 7 percent 
                                                   
54 FGD participant, 09.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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agree at least ‘partly’, while less than 1 percent rejects the idea. To do so, people are ready to 
exploit potential benefits even to the disadvantage of their fellow citizens. If there is an 
opportunity at hand 74 percent are at least ‘partly’, if not ‘fully’ convinced that they will make 
sure to ‘grab what they can’, even if that causes ‘problems for others’. That many residents of Biu 
and Mirigu survived severe famines in the past helps explain this broad prevalence of attitudes. 
Thus, horizontal social capital can undermine the livelihoods of others and their options.  
Horizontal social capital varies by one’s position within a household, and is primarily 
dependent on age and sex. Older men have often managed to attain the most favourable social 
positions and also basic decision-making processes at household level are in fact biased, if not 
inverted, by gender and seniority. While the average age of Biu’s inhabitants is less than 25, the 
average age of those recognised by others within households as being the major decision-makers 
is double this, at 50 years. The share of decision-makers rises according to age cohort, though 
they represent shrinking shares of the total population (see before, Figure 5). Men are most 
associated with general household decision-making, even within female-headed households, 
taking ‘decisions that affect the whole family’, especially the selling of main assets like animals, 
and regarding land use, and the selling of crops (see Figure 32). Due to their low social capital 
base, women are often forced to provide the greatest amounts of labour. Women additionally cater 
for children, clean and cook, whilst also working on shea, own staple crops, and others’ cash 
crops.55  
 
Figure 32: Gender and household decisions in Biu as perceived by household heads (own figure, 
2013, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Responsibilities to fulfil religious duties are primarily associated with men. Women are 
primarily associated with attempts to stabilise and increase social bonding, within and between 
households. For example, women often take care and speak in the interest of their children. Men, 
on the other hand, are strongly associated with physical violence and conflicts within households 
and with others in the village. More than 71 percent associate risky behaviour with men, 
compared to 23 percent that equally attribute it to women. Just 6 percent associate it with women 
                                                   
55 Interview with USAID ADVANCE management, 12.04.2013, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
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only. In combination with an overwhelming majority of 85 percent associating alcoholism – as 
much as consumption of marihuana – with men, it is clear that sub-optimal decision-making is 
likely to result from the unequal allocation of horizontal social capital, used for monopolising 
power among men.  
Gender differences at the household level arise from the fact that society is patrilocal. 
Women have to involve themselves in yet unknown social fields after marriage, while men 
continue interaction on common grounds and with the backing of their socially and physically 
close relatives. While this may lead to spatially wider and more diversified social security nets 
among females – as has been shown in reference to locals dealing with the adverse effects of 
flooding and drought – women enter new social fields without many possessions after marriage. 
In fact, wives are considered to be men’s assets, as they are said to be ‘property of their 
husbands’, an idea to which 64 percent agree ‘fully’, another 25 percent ‘partly’ and only 11 
percent disagree, almost as much among male-headed as among female-headed households’ 
respondents.  
If women do not obey social norms and values, like male domination, they can be branded 
witches and expelled from the village. The greatest share of people, ‘partly’ of ‘fully’ believe in 
the idea that women have the potential to ‘become witches that possess negative, magic powers’. 
28 percent believe this to be ‘fully’ true, 43 percent at least partly. Just less than a third rejects the 
idea. Interestingly enough, among female-headed households the share of people ‘fully’ backing 
the idea is quite similar though 10 percent more reject it fully. Women frequently undergo 
humiliating and inhumane widowhood rites performed alongside annual funeral celebrations, in 
which they must prove they have not used black magic to cause their husband’s death. After 
having undressed, a gourd will be used to pour boiling hot, herb water onto the widow’s head. The 
degree of her burns determines her share of the responsibility for her husband’s death. Women 
can then be excluded from village festivities, and branded as witches, which leads to a withdrawal 
of mutual support. They may further be forced to leave the community and migrate to one of the 
witch villages in the region, if found guilty. 44 percent of all households in Biu are ‘partly’ or 
‘fully’ of the opinion that such ‘rites should be performed on women’. Even 35 percent of female 
interviewees agreed with it. There is more than sufficient room to argue for a grave and deeply 
embedded, moreover an internalised, societal oppression of women. This may limit potentially 
positive outcomes for children, especially those of the most vulnerable households.  
Social capital is of further relevance for attaining external support in agriculture. The 
money or other inputs provided by family or friends, including free support with labour and 
advice, is essential to finance agricultural production. Social capital for these activities can be 
generated by cherishing societal norms and values and by complying with inherited forms of land 
use. Traditional, non-mechanised forms of land use create further social capital, as communal 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
173 
work can increase bonding, thus horizontal social capital among locals. This may partly grant 
further access to mutual support, ‘horizontal forms of contractualisation’, and improve 
agricultural production and livelihood outcomes for both men and women, though it could also 
limit the individual’s potential in pursuing innovative forms of land use. The poor are especially 
reliant on communal work. Better-situated households can afford to pay workers, however, most 
of their work is completed using free labour attained by social capital. When looking at the 
production of tomato, chili, rice, shea nuts and butter, it is clear that none of these activities are 
ventures pursued by individual, economic actors. Rather they mostly depend on social interactions 
because they often require unpaid labour. 
Male-headed households receive slightly more voluntary help – people working without 
direct compensation – than female-headed households. Thus community social structures again 
favour men. Yet crops considered as typically female and traditional, like shea nuts and butter, are 
dependent mostly on free labour. On average, almost 64 percent of all workers helping with the 
production of shea nuts in female-headed households worked without payment of any kind. More 
so, at least twice as many people help freely in the production of shea butter, when compared to 
those who charge for help. In male-headed households, people also receive relatively big support 
in the production of chilies, since almost 57 percent of their helpers work for free. Yet, the level 
of social capital invested in producers of the crop is two-sided. They are said to lack social capital, 
since their product does not have any affiliation to traditional land uses. Normative conflicts 
between subsistence agriculture and more market orientated livelihood pathways are indeed most 
evident when looking at tomato or chili production. Especially in Mirigu, farmers frequently talk 
about the fact that people would regard their money made with cash crops like chilies and tomato 
as being ‘dirty’, mainly because it lacks uses for traditional purposes/cultural affiliation. On the 
other hand, there is quite some resentment or jealousy present in perceptions of farmers of cash 
crops like chili:  
‘They'll say you people have gone to make your dirty monies, your useless monies […]! […]They 
only look at the monetary grounds. They will not consider money as dirty when an armed robber 
brings it to them. But people will criticise that we're enjoying dirty money. […] I thought people 
will rather say that we should teach them how to farm pepper and so on, but they rather sit at 
home and then insult. […] People have a lot of wicked intentions against us because they are not 
used to the pepper. It is not custom to do it like with the millet.’56 
Those products done primarily by women are the most dependent on subsidised work 
attained through social capital. Female-headed household show a greater dependency on social 
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capital. Looking at remittances from migrants, female-headed households are by far more 
dependent on external donations (+ 19 percent, Ø 37 percent) despite the fact that about the same 
share of household members has migrated as in male-headed households. Horizontal social capital 
spans beyond village borders, especially for women, and provides a crucial source of income, 
especially for those having insufficient lands or agricultural inputs to intensify production. 
Horizontal social capital is of special significance to women, because they are most dependent on 
making use of social capital to attain work, vertical social capital, among their colleagues.  
Compared to their male counterparts in terms of income sources, female-headed households 
are more dependent on casual labour (+12 percent, Ø54 percent). They depend on good horizontal 
social relations to access these. This may indicate that women are more likely to become 
subordinate workers than prosperous farmers. Their seemingly weaker social capital basis in its 
horizontal form may deprive them of attaining greater amounts of vertical social capital. Usually 
men have larger acreages and more money and so they hire the women as laborers.57 Males are 
also the primary external representatives of households, and so the management of vertical 
relationships or bonding ties is firmly theirs. For example, though 53 percent of interviewees 
claim that going to political leaders for help is as much a man’s task as it is a woman’s, 42 percent 
tend to associate it only with men and 5 percent with women. This is especially the case when 
going to the landlord or chief, going to government agencies or NGOs for support, and when 
speaking out on community problems in public.  
5.3.6.2. Vertical Social Capital  
Several authorities/institutions of relevance for vertical social capital and livelihood 
advances within Biu and Mirigu were mentioned in FGDs. All are male-headed and it seems that 
males are not only more likely to become the employers of females and control contact to the 
most important institutional authorities, they also embody them. Among authorities of primary 
local significance are chiefs that nowadays represent the lowest level of jurisdiction, a landlord 
that administers rainfed lands, elders that support community decision-making, the assembly man 
who is the only ‘democratically’ elected authority, farmer organisations, government and 
development agencies and traders of various crop seeds and inputs. These are examined below, 
keeping in mind their perceived significance for livelihood sustainability. 
Basic Authoritative Structures 
There are three chiefs in Biu, each administering a section of the village – Seenza, Kodima 
and Jaago – whereby the chief of Seenza is superior to the chief in Jaago and contests over 
paramouncy with the chief of Kodima. In Mirigu there is only one paramount chief with various 
                                                   
57 Interview with USAID ADVANCE management, 12.04.2013, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
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subordinates. The chiefs are generally acknowledged as being there for and ‘leading the people’, 
but locals are also quick to emphasise that chiefdom is a recent phenomenon, and that the ‘real’ or 
‘traditional’ political head of communities is the paramount landlord (a.k.a. ‘Earth Priest’ or 
‘Tengnyam’). In pre-colonial days landlords not only administered land, they were equally the 
only religious and political leaders of communities (TONAH 2008: 116). The colonial 
administration tried to replace them with more allegiant functionaries, chiefs (BERRY 2008: 46), 
to establish indirect rule. Since 1883 land administration was formally placed under the 
jurisdiction of these newly introduced authorities (AMANOR 2008: 63), who then also became 
political representatives, partly overtaking the roles of landlord. Nevertheless, landlords continued 
to this day to administer land according to customary laws , though in competition with the newly 
made chiefs, especially in Biu (TONAH 2008: 128).  
Chiefs were, however, able to capitalise on their positions and to commercialise their power 
through the introduction of compulsory labour, which since colonial days has often created a 
major disconnect between the chiefs and common folk (SONGSORE 2011: 88-90). Today, the 
landlord still administers and thereby partly grants or denies access to all rainfed land, aside from 
fulfilling his role as a religious authority. But due to the growing powers residing with chiefs, 
many locals nowadays consider the landlord as ‘rather being there for the land’. In Biu, the 
landlord has managed to retain a vast level of political authority, because the chief of Seenza is his 
brother, which is why they can closely coordinate their actions against their common rival, the 
chief of Kodima. With Kodima’s chief arguing for a further separation of powers – to take 
paramouncy himself – this situation caused violent clashes in the 1990s (LAUBE 2007: 137-139) 
and, as locals state, has remained a subliminal conflict between leaders and their immediate 
supporters; nowadays carried out by the strategic allocation of external support such as that 
provided by development agencies (see Section 6.3 for details). 
Government agencies like the MOFA or NADMO are active in agricultural development in 
the villages. NADMO is responsible for bringing disaster relief to the community whenever 
necessary. MOFA deals with the advancement of agriculture, most often by providing input 
subsidies, subsidised fertilisers, advice or training. In the case of Biu, MOFA endeavours are side-
lined by ICOUR, responsible for managing the local irrigation scheme. Development 
organisations (NGOs) frequently patronise both Biu and Mirigu. Currently the most prominent 
one is USAID, which tries to advance local agriculture in rice. To receive their support, most 
farmers are organised in Farmer-based Organisations (FBOs), parts of which are members of the 
local farmers’ union, the Tono Irrigation Cooperative Farmers’ Union (TICFU). FBOs were 
initiated by the MOFA (and ICOUR) with the aim to ease subsidy distribution to a large number 
of farmers and, if given on credit, to spread liability among group members as a form of collateral. 
FBOs continue to serve as platforms for other such forms of help, like USAID interventions. 
Livelihood Systems under Investigation 
 
176 
Leaders of FBOs and TICFU representatives are often responsible for allocating subsidies and 
organising sales with large-scale buyers attracted by organisations like USAID. They are thus 
invested with quite some additional powers that enable them to be actively involved in pro-poor 
development. 
Power Levels, Pro-Poor Engagement and Major Issues Faced 
Biu’s households were asked the level of power that authorities and institutions have to 
change their everyday life. All believed that the greatest potential to change their lives lies in the 
local irrigation system management. 43 percent consider the project manager most important 
because he allocates land at the project. 33 percent consider Kodima’s chief most important, while 
31 percent consider NGOs and 30 percent the landlord most important. Just behind these are 
various government agencies, namely NADMO (28 percent), ICOUR (26 percent) and MOFA 
extension (22 percent). Of little significance is the local assembly man; the only democratically 
elected representative. Yet, less than 16 percent believe substantial powers are invested in him. 8 
percent consider the elders percent to have powers, and even fewer, 4 percent, think the same of 
FBO leaders. Significant differences exist between the local chiefs, whereby the chief of Kodima 
is perceived to exhibit far greater power than the other two chiefs. 33 percent of those questioned 
believe that Kodima’s chief possesses great power, while only 7 percent would associate such 
power with the chief of Seenza and even less (just 1 percent) with Jaago’s chief.  
Noteworthy are differences observed in the perceptions of female and male heads of 
households. Generally, female-headed households tend to perceive all institutions to have greater 
levels power than they actually do. For example, while almost 29 percent of female-headed 
households would say that the average political or administrative institution in Biu has ‘great 
power’ to change their lives, only 19 percent of male-headed households would say the same. 
This supports a point raised in a FGD, that female-headed households feel more dependent on the 
external support brought forward by local authorities.  
Overall, the institutional assistance available for locals is quite variable. The chief of 
Kandiga in Biu, who is described as especially powerful, is also ‘greatly’ engaged in bringing 
pro-poor help to the village, namely via USAID, according to more than 45 percent of those 
questioned. Less than 5 percent think the opposite. No other institutions engaged in Biu can boast 
of similar support. The two other (powerless) chiefs in Biu are, on the contrary, hardly ever 
associated with bringing in such help; they are often characterised as being ‘poor and uneducated, 
yet fair’. Their lack of knowledge of the English language, their lack of personal transport and 
overall assets, as well as their resulting lack in connections to the regional capital, where most 
foreign aid interventions and government subsidy dispatchers resign, are said to be the decisive 
factors for why these chiefs are unable to acquire more external help.  
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Of further significance in terms perceived of pro-poor engagement are – in descending 
order – NGOs (esp. USAID), NADMO and the ICOUR project manager, ranging from 34.5 to 24 
percent in terms of showing ‘great’ pro-poor engagement. Just 12 to 17 percent associates pro-
poor engagement with the assembly man, the landlord, MOFA and ICOUR extension services, 
and less than 8 percent with FBO leaders or village elders. Aside from NGOs and the Kandiga 
chief, there is a significant polarisation of perceptions. For example, 15 to 23 percent of all those 
questioned attest no pro-poor engagement at all with regards to the assembly man, the ICOUR 
project manager, NADMO, the landlord, ICOUR extension officers or FBO leaders. Even more 
pronounced are differences with regard to MOFA extension services. While roughly half of 
respondents believe they are engaged in helping the poor, more than 28 percent believe they are 
not at all engaged. The role of Biu’s primary public institution engaged specifically in agricultural 
development may thus be ambiguous. 
Other private entities with relevance for vertical social capital are traders of crops, some of 
who reside in the village, others coming from Southern Ghana at harvest time. Of greatest 
relevance are traders of cash crops like tomato, chili, rice and shea. Overall these range in the 
midfield in terms of their perceived power and pro-poor engagement. With the exception being 
those engaged in tomato, traders of most other products, like chili, shea and rise, are perceived to 
be more engaged in fighting poverty than community or government officials. 
Starting with a look at traders, vertical social capital in business relations is important 
because good personal relationships with (mostly female) traders are a primary determinant of the 
conditionality under which market access takes place, by financial capital is generated. As a 
teacher and large part-time farmer from Biu states, social capital is required for profitable, 
economic transactions: 
‘It all depends on the personal relationship between the farmer and the market women. If you 
establish a good relationship, they can come to buy yours and will leave others’ [crops]. That is 
why some are able to get a very good market […]. Surely, if you have a good relationship you will 
get a lot of money and they may even help you with other things.’58 
Aside from providing finance in contract farming arrangements (see Section 5.3.5), 
merchants may be deeply embedded in society and show an interest in the personal affairs of their 
business counterparts, which is highly appreciated among locals. At critical times, merchants are 
able to provide support, such as by providing food or even housing material that can be costly in 
northern Ghana.59 Relationships to traders of agricultural products is thus generally characterised 
by a certain degree of mutual trust and cooperation. Despite issues with tomatoes, trends in 
                                                   
58 Interview with teacher from Biu, 24.04.2010, Biu, Ghana. 
59 Interview with Anna Antwi, food security consultant, 01.03.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
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farmer-trader relationships are generally very positive. Farmers perceive that the overall 
‘sweetness of business interaction’, the quality of relations, has vastly improved (see Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33: Trends in the 'sweetness of business interaction' (0 = ‘bad’ to 10 = ‘great’) in Biu 
(above) and Mirigu (below) with regard to selected cash crops (own figure, 2014, own FGDs). 
Farmer-trader relationships are altered by many of the afore-mentioned public and private 
institutions. For farmers in Biu and Mirigu, ‘business relations’ often subsume all interactions 
with an economic background be they with traders, government agencies (ICOUR, MOFA) or 
entities like USAID. Locals do not differentiate between these since the various actors are all 
involved in advancing or conducting trade in agricultural products: 
‘People think that they [NGOs} just want to do business! […] They will see these people as 
someone to do business with, but not an organisation here to help the poor in general, and it is 
true! […] It pays me very, very well. Ha ha! It is the same with MOFA and ICOUR. People do not 
care about where they come from. They care if they can help them in their business!’60 
The initiatives of traders and government officials to help locals through credits (see before, 
Section 5.3.5.3) are endangered by popular livelihood strategies. Whether support in the form of 
inputs on credit is formally attained through public sources or informally through traders, they are 
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always expected to be paid back. Locals are generally opportunistic in their search for 
improvements to their livelihood outcomes. Entities like MOFA and traders constantly have to 
watch out not to become victims of betrayal. However, interviewed traders speak of far smaller 
losses than government officials from bad return rates, roughly about a third for new buyers 
entering the local markets and less than 15 percent for established ones. Willingness to betray 
private actors is also high and prevails among the majority of local farmers; even if these actors 
support the farmers! Many respondents state their willingness to betray their public or private 
business partners, independent of how deep their interactions actually are. When support is 
granted, people are more reserved in attempting a scam. However, informal or formal contracts of 
any sort are never a full guarantee for the fact that farmers will feel in any way obliged to stick to 
conditions previously agreed upon, because a vast majority would still feel tempted to ‘cheat’. 
People indicate a greater willingness to betray traders than government agencies, but the 
differences in numeric terms are almost insignificant when people are asked whom they would 
deceive (see Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34: Willingness to betray government and private entities among the thereby supported and 
the general public in Biu  (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
When only considering female-headed households, the tendency is to attempt to cheat 
government officials, possibly because females are anyway disadvantaged in attaining support. 
Opportunism deriving from a self-exploitative ‘hand to mouth mentality’ could prevail as a major 
livelihood strategy by farmers, which could disrupt the emergence of favourable forms of vertical 
social capital that allow for improved market access and, with regards to relations to traders, 
further necessities. At best, willingness to betray is said to derive from an overall high level of 
poverty, especially hunger, among certain sections of local population: 
‘To me, very poor people cannot think of the future. […] If I am hungry and you bring a small and 
a big bowl of food, because of my hunger, I will take the big bowl so that I will be fully satisfied, 
at least for the moment. […] If another market woman comes with higher prices we prefer her, 
even if somebody else has supported us before. We go for the bigger bowl, forgetting that if you 
take it today, tomorrow when you are hungry again, you can't get any […]. It is because the 
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farmers don't understand, they don't think rational […]! Because of the hunger they take the 
bigger bowl, forgetting that they will have nothing the next day. […].So, you take what you can!’61 
Fraudulent deceit by the farmers is anyhow not punishable. As high-ranking MOFA 
officials frequently state, ‘no government would or could ever take their own farmers to court’.62 
Moreover, even for a private individual, it would take too long to do so, because the judicial 
system is most often characterised as being highly inefficiency and corrupt. Severe limitations are 
thus imposed on trader-farmer business relations, meaning that levels of contractualisation 
continue to depend upon social capital, thus mutual trust and respect, aside quality and price 
requirements imposed by market demands. 
Yet farmers often characterise themselves as the ones being cheated in trade with most 
agricultural products and in their dealings with government officials. There is thus mistrust on 
both sides. In the case of agriculture, mistrust primarily stems from the fact that it is extremely 
hard to trace accurate farm gate prices and shares along the value chain. Farmers generally 
criticise a great lack of transparency in commerce. At the farmer level, products may be sold in 
wooden and plastic crates, plates, boxes, different types of sacks or ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ 
calabashes, each with a different weight and price. There are further differentiations according to 
the buyer and season. Some buyers will want to ‘overfill’ packages while others will not. In the 
shea butter trade there are certain units of packaging that change in weight over the year, not in 
price; or sometimes in both. Drying of produce is another problem when wanting to measure 
prices according to weight. It took over five full working days to measure the average weight of 
each of these varieties of packaging according to crop and season, to later calculate and compare 
prices. In doing so, it turned out that farmers have little clue of the actual weight and thus per kilo 
price of their produce. One is left to conclude that agricultural market transactions at the village 
level are generally far from having any sort of transparency. Traders are quite reluctant to use 
scales because it greatly narrows their possibility to alter prices in their favour. Thus while it is 
true that most traders should be considered potential fraudsters, harsh critique expressed must be 
understood in terms of farmers’ underlying rationales, educational limitations and ideas of 
fairness: 
‘My people here will always feel cheated because they do not think. […] How then can you tell me 
that the money is not good, if you cannot tell me how much you spend? Also, they think that 
because they have suffered so, so much, then they should at least get something more out of it. 
[…] They [the traders] just come here with their big money, buy, go down south and sell and live 
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62 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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a happy life, while the sun is scorching us. […]The perception is that any price they give us can 
never be enough and so we feel that they are cheaters.’63  
Fraudulent behaviour also prevails in the higher-ranking classes of local society. At most of 
the FGDs in both Biu and Mirigu participants continuously emphasised that local elites – chiefs, 
the landlord, political and group and union leaders as well as local big-shots – would deprive their 
subordinates of livelihood opportunities, such as those arising through MOFA or USAID. An 
overwhelming share of the people, 73 percent, ‘partly’ or ‘fully’ believe that their ‘leaders do not 
act and speak in favour of whom they are to represent, but rather pursue their own agendas’ with 
the aim of increasing their individual benefits and those of their friends and family. Just less than 
a quarter would contest this idea. Another 63 percent of all questioned ‘fully’ attest to the idea 
that, due to elites, ‘whenever help comes here […], it always goes to the wrong people, instead of 
the ones who really are in need of it’. An additional 27 percent agree with this ‘partly’, while 10 
percent do not agree.  
Interventions are channelled entirely through the local elites. The deeply embedded societal 
oppression and lack of political participation by the poor, empowers elites.64 FGD participants 
believe that the strategically important positions that local elites hold are caused by the 
misallocation of external help.65 Male elites hold several positions at the bottlenecks of 
interventions, since they can be FBO and farmers union and vegetable association leaders, large-
scale farmers, chiefs and assembly men at the same time, thereby access government and NGO 
support and be given the responsibility to distribute help among ‘their people’. For example, the 
chief of Kandiga, who is relatively well educated and highly mobile, is the secretary of the local 
union and a big-time farmer, while being equally responsible for the allocation of input subsidies 
and further services. As his superior – the union president, big-time farmer, head of the vegetable 
union, rice farmers union and local transport union – explained, diversification is an elementary 
part of the local elites’ livelihood strategies.66 
Locals do not dare to raise such issues when meeting with government or NGO officials 
because they are afraid to lose the little support they could still receive. Those who have brought 
external support to the village or those made responsible for further allocations actively 
monopolise their contacts and the powers thereby invested in them. They make use of the fact that 
people generally believe in an idea of exclusive and monopolisable ‘friendship’, especially in 
vertical relations, whereby outsiders such as officials cannot be approached proactively as they are 
                                                   
63 Interview with an FBO leader from Biu, 19.09.2012, Mirigu, Ghana. 
64 Farmer from Biu during FGD, 10.11.2012, Biu Ghana. 
65 Participant of FGD, 11.12.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
66 Interview with the union president and secretary/chief of Biu, 20.02.2010, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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already close with others. Moreover addressing such problems can be difficult, if not dangerous, 
to livelihood upkeep, since the majority of people are ‘fully’ convinced that they would face 
trouble if they were to speak out against their superiors, specifically their chiefs and the landlord. 
That goes for about 39 percent of male-headed households and, moreover, for 54 percent of 
female-headed ones. Only about a quarter to a third of respondents rejects this idea, while another 
fifth of male respondents and another quarter of female respondents agree ‘partly’. People are also 
afraid of the fact that they could be disadvantaged when it comes to the allocation of land through 
the landlord, or when facing legal disputes within the village. 62 percent of household heads, 
mostly males, are ‘fully’ or at least ‘partly’ of the opinion that ‘public demonstrations, like 
protesting on the street and speaking out openly against problems can only take place when 
leaders support the cause and allow people to do so’.  
The top-down approaches pursued by government and more recently, by development 
organisations, lead these entities to remain unaware of the local political relationships that 
undermine the long-term successes of projects due to a lack of grass-root participation, especially 
by the poor. The MOFA management states that most development initiatives, as a result of 
government withdrawal since structural adjustment, are nowadays run by NGOs and foreign 
donors. This has not improved the pro-poor effect of development interventions, as they do not 
involve the poor in their projects. Farmers are reluctant to pursue the projects, and they end-up 
benefitting the upper strata of local society:67 
‘The NGOs may not ask us about the problems we encounter during [...]. They only bring 
assistance through one man but they don't find out from the grassroots whether their help has 
really gotten to them [the poor]. No supervision at all! […] Our culture does not even allow us to 
approach them, no matter how much they feel pain. […] Culture does not allow that in this village 
[…]. Even if, […] we would be punished one way or another by our leaders.’68 
A tight net of social interdependencies, often the basis of survival for the most vulnerable, 
hinders the emergence of social movements. Nepotism, elite capture and exploitation of the poor, 
abusive forms of vertical social capital based strategies, have a firm grip on local society when it 
comes to external interventions. These projects have become a major obstacle to broad-based 
development in both communities under investigation. Thus, while the vulnerable and poor 
depend on social capital for their survival, a similar strategy at higher ranks of local society 
induces and increases parts of the vulnerability of the poor. Vertical social capital may be 
consciously exploited to cement social (horizontal) standings, possibly to the disadvantage of 
others. It specifically affects market access, which is what external interventions aim to do. Social 
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capital is said to rise according to the level of other assets, aside from being fixed by gender. 
Though traditional norms may conflict with striving for monetary outcomes in agricultural 
production, financial capital has the ability to generate vast amounts of social capital. Those men 
who were economically successful, it is said, often become local leaders.69  
Mostly richer men hold the most important positions in local community decision-making, 
meaning that women have a hard standing in society, similar to their role in the household. When 
it comes to taking decisions that affect the whole village, 47 percent ‘partly’ or ‘fully’ believe that 
‘women have no say’, though 54 percent oppose this idea. The circle of women included in 
community decision-making is quite exclusive. When looking back at their lifetime, about 42 
percent of female-headed household heads claim their ‘chances of being heard in community 
decisions’ has increased, which is almost twice the share compared to when looking at men only 
(27 percent). Women’s levels of vertical social capital appear to be improving, though from a very 
low basis. 
This is similar with the poor. 58 percent of all household heads questioned ‘partly’ or ‘fully’ 
agree to the fact that ‘poor people have no say in community matters’. Moreover, no matter how 
keen interviewees are on emphasising their poverty (see Section 4.2.1), they regard poverty a 
traditional taboo. Until today it can be considered an offence if one’s poverty becomes so obvious 
that one would feel obliged to help. In fact, when ‘a person exposes his/her poverty to others in 
the village’, almost 44 percent of interviewees feel at least ‘partially’ offended, and about a third 
‘severely’ offended. However, the vast majority of people (56 percent) do not mind at all. Yet, 
when asking for opinions on the counterexample, the majority of those questioned would say that 
‘one should not try to hide his or her riches so others in the village become jealous’. Only about a 
quarter disagrees ‘partly’ and about a third totally. Thus, the better-situated segments of society 
are provided with further social capital, while the disadvantaged are additionally deprived of it.  
A lack of horizontal social capital derived from overall low livelihood outcomes, limits 
vertical social capital accumulation. Vertical relationships are increasingly steepened by the fact 
that norms and values may systematically enforce a widening of social capital and thereby 
prosperity gaps. Since the poor are underrepresented in community decision-making, the room to 
change this situation is limited. The poor try to convert vertical relationships into horizontal ones 
by trying to become personal friends with decision-makers and seeking public demonstrations of 
their successes, e.g. by handshakes with authorities in open places. Yet, this is done on an 
individual basis. Organisation among the excluded, poor and vulnerable is in fact fragile and 
undermined:  
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‘If we, the poor, go and organise ourselves to speak out on these problems pertaining to our 
poverty, somebody from our group will secretly go and tell our leaders. Before we know, they will 
be aware of what we are up to and will punish those who have taken the lead to organise the 
poor, while the one who cheated on us will become their friend!’70  
Interestingly enough, the most critiqued leaders are equally those said to engage in bringing 
help. Thus, one can conclude that the pro-poor engagement of most local elites and the institutions 
they represent must not be an end in itself but can serve as a way to further increase socio-
economic differences, because it is often monopolised and deviated.  
5.4. Major Livelihood Outcomes and Opportunities 
The farmers of Biu appear better situated than those of Mirigu. Differences in socio-
economic standing – between lower and upper classes of society – are smaller in Biu where the 
share of middle class farmers is larger. Looking at the social strata, MOFA extension officers in 
the districts estimated that in both Biu and Mirigu an equal share of locals are considered ‘lower 
class’, about 40 percent of inhabitants. Another 30 to 40 percent are considered ‘middle class’, 
and 20 to 30 percent ‘upper class’.71 
This section distils further reasons for the differences in overall livelihood outcomes and 
tries to find leverage points for an improvement of these. The section examines the livelihood 
outcomes locals obtain, food and income security, well-being, and the sustainability of natural 
resource base usage. It derives summarised insights on the overall state of perceived vulnerability. 
5.4.1. Food and Income 
Food and income security are the primary determinants of livelihood rationales. Aside from 
own production, food security is obtained through income, the main entitlement factor. Locals are 
precariously equipped with both food and income. 78 percent of Biu’s respondents state they 
annually experience seasons of hunger or food shortages. The deficit is generally greatest from 
February to June, with accumulations from March to May, during the dry season with a clear peak 
in April. In Biu, hunger lasts mainly for about three months a year. More than 20 percent of the 
population endure longer times of food shortages, some up to half a year, in rare cases up to 9 
months. As locals state, income and food security interact because finances entitle access to food 
and so income-secure people are equally said to be food secure; but, not the other way round. 
Overall there is a moderate correlation between the duration of phases in food and income 
security (r=+0,579, n=177). Over the year prior to the research, just 6 to 7 percent of Biu’s locals 
                                                   
70 This statement was frequently used in FGDs with focus on livelihoods and institutions in Biu. Similar statements were 
made in Mirigu, whereby participants were hardly ever ready to disclose the names of the people referred to, out of fear that 
these could seek revenge for doing so.  
71 Own survey, 2012, among all regional MOFA extension staff. 
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faced financial problems though not suffering from hunger at the same time; which is thus a 
relatively tiny share, the elite of locals. Only at the beginning of the year, in February and March, 
is that share significantly higher at about 15 percent of female-headed and almost 11 percent of 
male-headed households. Thus, female-headed households may be better able to overcome food 
shortages, as the correlation of income and food is less significant among women when compared 
to their male counterparts. Otherwise the seasonal pattern of food shortages is almost identical 
with that of financial endowment for both male- and female-headed households. Throughout the 
year, with the exception being the most crucial times of hardship, female-headed households are 
most often below average in terms of the share experiencing times of severe deficits in terms of 
income or food. The duration of phases of general financial scarcity and hunger is shorter for 
female-headed households, lasting on average about three months and six days, as compared to 3 
months and 17 days for male-headed households. While female-headed households often 
experience one or two months of shortage, male-headed households suffer up to five (see Figure 
35). Overall, trends in livelihood outcomes in terms of nutritional and financial deficits are 
positive. Locals have managed to improve their overall situation drastically; females 
comparatively better than male headed-households. However, about a fifth of female-headed 
households perceive they have stagnated in terms of access to food and money (see Figure 36). 
The fact that female-headed households now do better than their male counterparts is 
surprising considering that women are severely disadvantaged in endowment and access to most 
assets. Despite an overall severely lowered base, women are seemingly able to provide better for 
their household members than their male counterparts. This is already reflected in the household 
tasks associated with women, yet they also seem to be more efficient in making use of the little 
they have on top of their more altruistic completion of household tasks. Thus societal oppression 
of women, which partly leads to an overall lower asset base among women, deprives a wider 
share of the population – part of which is male – from higher financial incomes and resource 
efficiency. As much as females attest a positive change in their societal standing, the majority of 
female interviewees are of the opinion that times of money shortages have generally decreased 
over their lifetime, in fact slightly more so (+3 percent) as compared to males. This trend is two-
sided. Though a larger share of females, overall, may have been able to benefit from the fact that 
financial incomes have increased, the share of those reporting the opposite – more times of money 
shortage – is also larger than among male-headed households (+8 percent). It is similar with 
trends in food insecurity. Developments in terms of incomes are thus positive overall, but there is 
evidence that livelihood upkeep has become harder for some. 
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Figure 35: Seasonality of 'severe'/'above normal' lack of finances and times of hunger among 
female and male headed households in Biu  (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
 
Figure 36: Trends in food and finances as perceived by female and male household heads in Biu 
(own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Socio-economic gaps may therefore be widening, also in financial terms and also in terms 
of food security, partly because women produce badly paid crops such as shea. Yet, in Biu, 
relatively constant advancements in income and food security have been made over previous 
decades. Positive trends are evident among all cohorts of interviewees, including those born in the 
1930s. Independent of the cohort looked at, with the exception being the eldest one, a clear 
majority is always of the opinion that both food and income shortages have reduced over their 
lifetime. The situation is different in Mirigu. Six months of insufficient food and money supply 
are said to be common for the majority of people. General livelihood trends are similar, though far 
less distinct, due to a higher insecurity in production resulting from a lack of easily accessible 
irrigation that can safeguard from drought, in combination with a higher population density. So, 
the differences in livelihood outcomes and trends evident when comparing Biu to Mirigu may 
stem from dissimilarities in access to irrigation. 
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Financial income to assure food security through cash cropping is tightly linked to 
irrigation. The people of Biu and Mirigu attribute positive livelihood trends to the access to it. 
Farmers state that the duration and quality of hunger is different for those with access to 
irrigation, since such households have more food and a more constant money supply over the 
year. So, there may be evidence that access to government irrigation promotes basic pro-poor 
effects, mainly because it is by far easier and safer to irrigate with furrow irrigation than by 
shallow groundwater irrigation (SGI), bucket or even pumping machine. Other than SGI, 
government irrigation also allows farmers to irrigate larger areas and an additional harvest of rice, 
which is good for both food and income security. Mainly by increasing these outcomes, the 
irrigation project could thereby have helped to create a larger middle class of farming households, 
or at the least, to have improved the situation of those having access. Yet, the pro-poor effect is 
not so clear when one takes effective food and income security into account.  
When comparing those households in Biu who farm in the dry season to those who do not, 
results are surprising. About 82 percent of those who do dry season agriculture experience hunger, 
while 59 percent of those who do not farm in the dry season do not. There is not much difference 
in terms of the duration of shortages. Among those experiencing a lack of food in Biu, many do 
dry season farming and experience longer hunger seasons than those not practicing irrigation. The 
most extreme cases, in terms of the duration of food and income insecurity, are however always 
among those who do not have access to government irrigation. Yet overall there is no significant 
correlation between actual size of irrigated land and the duration of food shortages or even times 
of insufficient income. Access to land and thereby inequality in land use is thus possibly not the 
decisive factor in livelihood outcomes like income and food, though relevant for perceived well-
being. There is only a weak correlation when considering merely irrigated lands. Seemingly, 
access to land and irrigation can improve food and income, however, greater land areas used in 
compound and bush areas can sometimes have the opposite effect. As a result of generally low 
correlation coefficients, it is clear that there are other decisive factors at work. Access to an 
irrigation project, easy dry season farming, and access to land help farmers, however, they do not 
guarantee improvement (own survey, 2013, n=177, see also Table 10). 
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Total land used to months of food shortage -0,018 
Irrigated land used to months of food shortage -0,190 
Compound land used land used to months of food shortage +0,101 
Bush land used to months of food shortage +0,007 
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 Total land used to months of money shortage -0,128 
Irrigated land used to months of money shortage -0,200 
Compound land used to months of money shortage -0,021 
Bush land used to months of money shortage -0,163 
Table 10: Pearson correlations of land uses and the duration of food and income insecurity (own 
table, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
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That neither land nor government irrigation are the decisive factor for livelihoods is backed 
by a comparison of money and food shortages between female and male-headed households in 
Biu. Female-headed households better improve their livelihoods than male-headed ones, even 
with fewer lands, a lower asset base and crops that allow rather smaller incomes, in the case of 
shea even just marginal ones.  
The fact that women are less likely to drink and fight, have roles within households 
orientated towards the needs of the most vulnerable household members, especially children, and 
are risk-averse in agricultural production are all factors that support female-headed households’ 
livelihood outcomes. Male-headed households tend to more expensive and risky production. Both 
men and women do staple and cash crops, but women are more likely to produce products that can 
serve both food and financial requirements72. Seemingly, women’s risk-averse and less money 
dependent pathways are rewarded by greater food security. Women are able to generate incomes 
by producing shea nuts and butter even though this may not pay well. Decreases in hunger and 
financial constraints coincide with the time when shea nuts are harvested best, in June/July.73 Yet, 
this is only a temporary solution, which becomes clear when comparing worker or shea processor 
incomes to that of pure agriculturalists, since the latter can easily achieve much greater incomes.  
Women have a variety of forms of income generating activities. Since females are more 
engaged in casual work for others and receive more remittances from migrants, they may be able 
to make a better living by diversifying sources of livelihood. In Mirigu where only SGI is possible 
– which can be less accessible than the government irrigation system due to the labour involved – 
and where the possibilities to work on the fields of others during dry seasons are more limited 
because there are not as many farmers engaged in dry season production, hunger seasons and 
times of financial deficits are longer than those experienced in Biu. So, in terms of gendered 
livelihood outcomes with regards to income and food in Biu, it can be concluded that women may 
really be more efficient in upkeep, but that they also draw from sources that allow them to make a 
better living overall, within which irrigated lands play an important role in providing further 
sources of income. Indeed, the ‘poorest’ in Biu are possibly better off than the poorest in Mirigu, 
because those without the possibility of working on their own fields during the dry season may 
have the chance to work on the fields of those who have land, i.e. immediate neighbours and 
friends. In Biu casual work for others is of great importance to improve and uphold livelihoods, 
especially for females and for those with no access to any dry season production. Through casual 
work for others, women attain comparatively lower incomes, as they are workers and not 
investors/employers and thus receive small payment, but in doing so they partly externalize the 
                                                   
72 As based on Interview with USAID ADVANCE management, 12.04.2013, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
73 Interview with a female shea processor, 14.02.2013, Biu, Ghana.  
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risks encountered in agriculture to those employing them. Incomes are partly independent of one’s 
own agricultural production and can further alleviate constraints faced in own farming activities: 
‘In the olden days [the past] if a fellow [somebody] doesn't carry [collect and sell] firewood he or 
she will not get money into his pocket, but today we just go to others for casual labour at the 
canal [the irrigation project] and make money for ourselves. So we can all now get money to buy 
food and fertilisers and then grow our own crops.’74 
However, the state of social capital among the poor and vulnerable, and especially women, 
makes it unlikely that casual workers are able to defend their interests against their employers. 
That is partly because the future share of the population reliant on attaining such worker incomes, 
and thereby the demand for labour opportunities, will increase reducing the wages being paid. In 
the long term these people would be better off if they had the possibility to do their own farming, 
for which they will need land, especially irrigated land. Given the level of inequality in access to 
land, social tensions are likely to arise in the future because socio-economic differences will 
become even greater if land allocation is not reformed. To aim for more broad-based poverty 
alleviation without land reallocation requires tackling the usage locals are able to make of their 
natural capital for which they need finances for inputs.  
With most problems at the very base of agricultural production – soil infertility and a lack 
of animals – the access to costly, inorganic fertilisers appears to be the greatest determinant of 
basic livelihood outcomes, independent of gendered pathways. The duration of food and income 
shortages correlates with locals’ ability to access inorganic fertilisers. It is thus evident that 
periods of scarcity are shortest among those having fewest problems in acquiring fertilisers. Those 
with ‘little’ issues in acquisition face financial constraints for less than one month and food 
deficits for less than two weeks a year, while those with ‘extreme’ issues are food insecure for 
about two and a half months and encounter financial deficits for more than three months of a year 
(see Figure 37). Developmental interventions content with fertiliser subsidies thus hit the spot 
conceptually when it comes to immediate food and income security. 
If a wider share of locals had equal access to fertilisers, broader based poverty alleviation 
may be possible. That is principally the case because those crops in need of most fertilisers also 
generate highest yields and incomes. Moreover, such crops still suit climatic patterns during the 
wet season. It is similar in the dry season, with the advantage that crops like chili and tomato can 
be harvested at a time when food and money deficit is greatest. Allowing more farmers to venture 
into the production of such crops could allow income diversification and thereby improved 
incomes and less food constraints. A wider share of locals may be able to benefit if production 
                                                   
74 Female interviewee, 05.02.2013, Biu, Ghana.  
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increased through fertilisers will then require more casual workers. Incomes thereby directly or 
indirectly advanced could then be used to foster wet season production. Interventions can thus 
improve livelihood security in the scope of existing possibilities to deal with changes or shocks 
(ELLIS 2000: 42). However, because most development interventions are content with fertiliser 
subsidies. So they do not directly advance the most prominent form of economic diversification 
pursued by women, shea processing, which also protects the environment and supports economic, 
thereby societal empowerment of repressed women. Furthermore, these kinds of interventions 
may not be justifiable in the long term, mostly because of their high dependence on fertiliser, a 
lack of organic material in soils, and non-existent soil management that undermines the 
environment. 
 
Figure 37: Duration of money and food shortages according to attested difficulty in attaining 
inorganic fertilisers in Biu (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
5.4.2. Natural Resource Base Usage and Resilience to Climate Change 
The sustainable use of natural resources and resilience to climatic change is of vast 
importance in the long-term. Yet to locals, protecting the environment is in no way an end by 
itself, although they acknowledge its importance. Livelihoods depend mostly on insufficient 
agricultural outcomes derived from precarious land-based pathways; the use farmers make of their 
scarce and poorly equipped natural capital. Land allocation is highly unequal, especially for those 
lands that have the highest quality, especially irrigated land. Because land uses are generally 
characterised by large inequality, basic risks in production are unevenly spread. Those with 
comparably little land – the majority – are likely to incur substantial problems when their small 
production suffers from losses. This is the case especially for the irrigation project, which could 
help people withstand droughts during the wet season and allow for dry season production. Thus 
the potential of land for broad-based, pro-poor development is greatly underutilised, especially 
during the dry season. What further aggravates the situation for smallholders is the fact that the 
irrigation system is severely run-down, leading to more potential floods and also droughts. 
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The quality of the natural resource base is primarily constituted by the quality of soils used 
for agricultural production in combination with rainfall patterns. Based on both, soil and climate 
attributes, farmers’ ways of livelihood upkeep are disadvantaged on a nationwide and global level. 
Consequently, farmers in the study areas are forced to live with an overall increased degree of risk 
in agricultural production and limited outcomes. Ongoing changes in the natural environment 
further aggravate the situation. Two partly interacting phenomena affecting farming activities are 
a degradation of soils and a shift in the onset of the rainy season, the latter as an expression of 
climate change. Only shea producers are partly decoupled from these major farmer livelihood 
determinants and instead depend more on land-reserves, bush lands with trees and intact 
agroforestry-systems that foster environmental sustainability.  
With a young and still-growing population in both villages, pressure on bush lands will 
increase until population pressure starts to decrease as a result of demographic transitions. So 
major degradation processes in the local environment are likely to be initiated in bush areas, 
which are often ecological hot-spots. Of greatest impact in this regard – aside from population 
growth – are publicly subsidised export promotion programmes in the form of mango plantations, 
lying south of Biu. These dynamics illustrate a general problem evident when looking at who is 
most responsible for local environmental degradation. With the mango plantations, it is a small 
class of local elite that generates the greatest share of environmental degradation. Those 
responsible for establishing new farms on what was once virgin land, in bush areas, are the better-
situated people that can afford to clear these areas. Biu’s poor are forced to seek land in bush 
areas because they cannot access the irrigation project. Thus socio-economic inequality as a result 
of elite-capture is partly responsible for the ongoing destruction of Biu’s last land reserves.  
While many poor locals produce more relatively environmentally friendly and well adapted, 
traditional staples that consume little fertilisers and therefore have little negative impact on soils, 
those who are better equipped asset-wise go for less environmentally sustainable forms of 
irrigated tomato or chili production during the dry season, mainly to acquire money. It is 
relatively easy for farmers to work on many traditional staples and useful tree fruits like shea, 
however, financial thresholds do not allow everybody to partake in the very lucrative production 
of cash crops, mostly crops like chili and tomato. While soil degradation is partly addressed or 
countered by traditional staples, among them millet or agroforestry products like shea, exotic cash 
crops like tomatoes or chili increase degradation processes. Crops like rice and maize compromise 
in terms of costs, risks and environmental sustainability. An ecologically suitable alternative is 
more extensive shea production. Farming practices on compound lands in Biu and Mirigu, where 
most traditional staples are manured, must be regarded as most sustainable in environmental 
terms. However, production at the irrigation scheme and partly by SGI and in bush areas is less 
justifiable, especially in terms of given soil attributes. Yet, since SGI in Mirigu takes place on 
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flood plains, the production may be less destructive as compared to what happens in most parts of 
Biu’s irrigation scheme. Nevertheless, also in SGI areas, soil degradation has an influence on 
attainable incomes, by limiting tomato or chili yields and quality, thereby also affecting food 
security by limiting financial incomes. So, locally, man-made environmental degradation in the 
form of soil degradation largely comes from a partial break-down of traditional farming systems 
and newer forms of more unsustainable cash cropping, mostly pursued by an elite of local 
farmers. This worsens the possibility of improving the most vulnerables’ livelihoods in the long 
term, by decreasing soil quality while allowing only short-term improvements according to 
financial endowment.  
Soil degradation is also problematic because if dry season cash crop production becomes 
increasingly insufficient, the incomes thereby produced will no longer help locals to deal with 
reduced outcomes of wet season production (and vice versa) which stems from a change in 
climatic seasonality. Changes in climate are most often associated with a change in agricultural 
cycles and thereby livelihood seasonality. Climate change is often understood as drought 
prevailing at the beginning of the season. Since equal amounts of rain fall within the remaining 
season, environmental changes are also associated with heavy rains and floods once the rainy 
season starts.  
It is not clear if climatic changes are just a return to a situation already encountered, that 
there is a degree of cyclicality in patterns. However, at present a shortening of the rainy season is 
directly associated with changes in people's land use. Farmers are turning to faster growing 
varieties of crops, which not everybody can afford. Especially the MOFA and farmers in Mirigu 
claim that overall food security has reduced because the outcomes of rainy season production 
have become insufficient. These tendencies are found in Biu although partly alleviated through 
people’s access to the government irrigation project that offsets the effects of drought. 
Consequently those poorly equipped with assets, especially financial and physical capital, suffer 
increased losses. Though most extensively grown traditional staples are well equipped to deal 
with soil quality reduction and calamities within growing periods, the season duration may no 
longer suit the growth periods of many traditional staples.  
Changes to the natural resource base do not only limit farmer outcomes but lead to socio-
economic polarisation. Most evident in Biu, inequality in access to land is a major determinant of 
livelihood pathways. Marginalisation processes ensure the most vulnerable encounter the most 
incidents of flooding and drought; hazards that are made worse by climate change. In Biu, upland 
soils suitable for the production of tomato or chili are in the hands of a few large farmers that now 
grow rice. Thus most smallholders have to grow rice in lowlands, and thus encounter high(er) 
incidents of flooding. As upland soils in Biu are well drained but nowadays also used for rice 
production, increased water consumption of the irrigation scheme and consequently drought in 
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lowland areas used by smallholders, results from a change in land use among large-scale farmers, 
local elites, as the irrigation system deteriorates.  
Another livelihood effect caused by climatic changes are the effects upon housing structures 
of increasing incidence of torrential rains, yet not flooding as popularly claimed. In fact, torrential 
rain leading to housing collapse impacts far more people than floods, because rain is less spatially 
confined than floods, while most housing structures of the poor are weakly equipped when it 
comes to durability against rainfall. Housing vulnerability is further increased by changes in land 
use, specifically by population growth, fragmentation of plots and a trend away from (tall) crops 
like millet that used to protect mud structures from wind-driven rains. Land use trends endanger 
both ecological sustainability and housing sustainability, a major determinant of vulnerability.  
The improvement of soils through manuring and other forms of organic material application 
enhances the water holding capacity of soils safeguarding from drought and general soil fertility 
leading to higher yields. If more industrial forms of agriculture are desired by governmental and 
developmental institutions – despite the fact that the local environment is only partly suitable – at 
the least there should be an entity dedicated to helping deal with the adverse effects on soils and 
on the environment as a whole. In any case, adding organic material/manuring is indispensable 
because this addresses the adverse effects of inorganic nourishment. 
Public and foreign development organisations have yet to address environmental changes. 
Where they’ve attempted, they’ve done so indirectly and thereby environmentally unsustainably, 
by providing inorganic fertilisers. The degradation of natural resources cannot be sufficiently 
addressed by resource poor farmers themselves, so support is required. That government policies 
are not in line with environmental nor social needs creates a situation that imposes a special 
disadvantage on the poorest among farmers, even though these are the least involved in soil and 
environmental degradation. Government and development assistance action is in this context blind 
to what is happening on the ground. Government agencies in the areas are underfunded and 
dependent on externally imposed courses of action, unsuitable to the problems faced in natural 
environments and often incompatible with the realities of the vulnerable. Government’s role in 
environmental changes may even have worsened the situation. If a lack of soil quality mainly 
comes from a deficit of manure, which is most often associated with the fact that vaccinations are 
no longer free, then government withdrawal, as a result of structural adjustment, has partly 
fostered environmental changes that have limited food security and have possibly also 
undermined market potentials. 
So, further key steps in improving smallholder livelihoods could be made by readdressing 
of government policies and external development interventions to environmental concerns and 
adjusting them to local needs, whereby approaches could consider traditional land use systems 
and a holistic understanding of famer livelihoods in planning and implementation. Furthermore, 
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testing of soils followed by action upon results has to follow. Greater financial support to 
government agencies is needed if they are to identify and combat environmental changes, 
specifically in soils. Alternatives to industrial agriculture, such as sustainable land use practices, 
must be made increasingly attractive in commercial terms. Special potential could lie in the 
cultivation of traditional staples, leguminous crops and agroforestry, specifically in shea. If (only) 
such crops were more viable then environmental and economic sustainability – preserving the 
natural resource base and generating income – could (at least partly) go together and not 
contradict, as they currently do. Furthermore, if traditional wet season staples were more 
lucrative, these could serve to improve access to and production of dry season crops. The 
improved incomes generated could allow locals to invest in durable housing and, until then, 
traditional crops could help to protect traditional, mud housing structures from growing incidents 
of torrential rain.  
The following points may help farmers deal with changes in rainfall seasonality that alters 
the incidence of droughts and flooding. Primarily, more research should be done on changes in 
rainfall patterns at local level since they may heavily vary from assessments made on national and 
regional level. Furthermore, programmes must then be put in place to help deal with climatic 
changes. Within such programmes, further research should aim at traditional staples, as they show 
greatest potential in being resilient to climatic calamities, but require improvements in terms of 
faster growth periods. Here, more irrigation projects could be a solution, as a wider part of the 
population could participate in its usage thus alleviating farmers of their dependency on rainfall 
patterns while still allowing fallow periods to protect soils. Irrigated dry season production could 
be supported by governmental and developmental agencies, to decrease dependency on wet 
season agriculture. Programmes should further be prepared to help farmers deal with higher 
incidents of flood and drought. Crop varieties should be developed that are more suitable to 
climatic and social realities, thus, fast growing crops that require little inputs, while being more 
compatible with traditional beliefs, land usages and forms of production. Alternatively, access to 
fertiliser must be improved if agencies continue to supply and promote high yielding crop 
varieties. More extension services could foster learning processes of a broader section of society, 
allowing for greater spread of improved crops.  
Addressing the specific needs of the most vulnerable by incorporating them in project 
planning and implementation is another key step to attain higher livelihood sustainability for the 
majority of locals. Contemporary development interventions may improve livelihood security on a 
short-term basis, but they do not lead to higher livelihood resilience overall, because they 
undermine the natural resource base and do not target those that would mostly require a 
restoration of functions of their survival system (drawing from BÜRKNER 2010: 24). Moreover, 
the vulnerable attest increasing inequality as a result of external interventions, which severely 
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lowers local well-being. Grass-roots monitoring is essential, which requires more and in-depth 
involvement of government and developmental organisations, to grasp allocation mechanisms and 
channels at the local level. Social issues, specifically inequality in livelihood assets and outcomes, 
are equally important issues to consider when compared to environmental constraints. Of special 
importance are dimensions of social inequality as well as marginalisation processes, both of which 
contribute to people’s well-being. 
5.4.3. Well-Being 
Well-being is defined as quality of life (JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 576), partly in 
non-material dimensions. Among these dimensions are social status and identity (ETZOLD 2012: 
76), sense of control and inclusion, access to services, political enfranchisement and maintenance 
of cultural heritage (DFID 2001: Section 2.6). To analyse these aspects, this section presents 
indicators surveyed alongside insights on social capital (see Section 5.3.6). 
Generally speaking, levels of well-being in both Biu and Mirigu are low, as the livelihood 
securing, agricultural activities pursued are not a result of freedom of choice. Feeling of external 
control is high, primarily because of growing environmental constraints beyond the influence of 
most farmers, especially the case in Mirigu. In Biu, 46 percent of households ‘fully’ agree, 28 
percent ‘partly’ agree, and less than 25 percent disagree that they would rather make a living 
outside of the agricultural sector, if only they could. The basic reason for this perception is 
grounded in the fact that outcomes of agriculture are so meagre, most significantly in terms of 
food and income. Nevertheless, survey participants are also convinced of the fact that, as 
compared to former times, the ‘overall quality of life’, ‘chances to escape poverty’ and thereby 
the ‘chances of living a happy life’ have increased over their lifetime. Especially female 
respondents attest positive change (see Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38: Trends in major well-being indicators as perceived by female and male household 
heads in Biu (own figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=177). 
Male and female-headed households in Biu are very optimistic about livelihood trends, 79 
percent are ‘fully’ and another 29 percent at least ‘partly’ convinced that their ‘future looks 
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bright’. Yet, farmers from Mirigu attest a higher deficit in well-being when compared to Biu’s 
farmers, and they are also more pessimistic about trends.75 The higher dependency on increasingly 
variable rainfall, translates into lower financial and food security and a higher dependency on 
factors beyond the control of locals, further exacerbated by climatic change. Well-being is low in 
Biu and Mirigu, but specifically in the latter due to a lack of irrigation services. Similarly, the 
association people have with well-being in Mirigu is of a far more elementary nature that the 
associations drawn among people in Biu. While farmers in Mirigu raise issues like food security 
and financial capital, when asked for crucial factors to their well-being, those in Biu will associate 
assets like horizontal and vertical social capital and generally tie well-being less to other 
livelihood outcomes as much as to factors beyond their control, contextual vulnerability. Although 
sheer access to public irrigation may not be the only key to more food and income and thereby 
quality of life, it is important in making people secure, optimistic, self-dependent, all of which are 
of utmost important to well-being.  
It is a matter of well-being rather than a question of contemporary household survival that 
people from Biu complain about inequality in access to irrigated lands. People value equal 
opportunities as they are driven by an aim for social sustainability. The great appreciation they 
have for social capital – by itself a major determinant of well-being – can additionally be 
interpreted that locals are highly observant when it comes to differences in current and future 
socio-economic endowment and opportunities. Yet equal opportunities are not givens. A lack of 
social capital inhibits the attainment of further asset endowment and of higher resilience to 
vulnerability factors, like natural hazards and external development support. Overall social capital 
is reducing because livelihood pathways are getting increasingly monetised, in terms of 
agricultural production and in the pursuit of livelihood outcomes. This affects mostly women and 
the vulnerable because these groups are often worse equipped in terms of assets to deal with 
external changes, and experience growing dependency on external support while not being able to 
access that support as well as others.  
Of further significance in this context are differentiations made according to gender and 
socio-economic differentiations in terms of vertical (/political and economic) and horizontal social 
capital. Well-being, in terms of political enfranchisement and inclusion is higher for males and 
elders, while being rather low for women and those perceived as poor/vulnerable, which is partly 
a result of cultural values. A culturally-based system of oppression lowers the overall 
development potential. A lack of female empowerment in society reduces the overall attainable 
level of well-being, not only because women form half of the local population, but because they 
are rather willing to give support to others, helping in the reallocation of assets. Similarly, as a 
                                                   
75 Female farmer during FGD, 17.09.2012, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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result of a lack of organisation among the poor and the general disregard brought forward to those 
perceived as such, wider shares of the public feel excluded from community-decision making, 
which deprives them of equal access to livelihood opportunities and improvements, and thereby 
well-being. Well-being among women is further reduced because they feel more dependent on 
external interventions, yet they receive fewer of these. Women as much as the poor and 
vulnerable know about these happenings, but are not able to change the trends of events. This 
situation is taken advantage of, thereby (re-) produced, by the local elite. Exploitation is, however, 
often reciprocal, though based on uneven grounds.  
Spatial marginalisation processes, which are a result of elite land capture, lower well-being. 
These processes make those affected more dependent on contextual variables like flooding, 
climatic changes and soil degradation, effectively lowering income and food security. Due to land 
allocation and a lack of financial capital, the poor have less freedom of choice as to which crops 
to produce. Especially costly tomato or chili best grown on the lands of those understood as the 
local elite, could effectively improve well-being by increasing livelihood outcomes in terms of 
income. But, in terms of cultural heritage, they are currently only partly compatible and more time 
to become better incorporated into societal valuation systems is required. In this context, making 
traditional staples and especially shea more economically viable could also lead to improvements 
with regard to well-being, gender equality, general cooperation, social capital or horizontal 
contractualisation, by taking more account of cultural values and forms of already inherent 
economic specialisation. It is mainly food-securing activities that are combined with an upholding 
of cultural/societal values, but this is not possible with the production of popular cash crops like 
maize, rice and especially tomato and chili.  
5.4.4. Summarised Insights Generated on Overall Vulnerability and Potentials 
Overall vulnerability is a result of the interplay of manifold external and internal factors of 
livelihoods deriving from an interaction between a social and a physical/environmental sphere, 
within which people find themselves with the aim to make a living. Social, thus political and 
mostly economic, and environmental drivers at global, national and regional scales are 
transformed into results at the local level, through individual reasoning and action. According to 
the sensitivity of people, which is defined by their assets endowment and access, contextual 
vulnerability factors boil down to concrete exposure of locals, which then challenge or support 
livelihood pathways, thus adaptation processes and thereby livelihood outcomes. To grasp these 
interactions according to the insights derived so far, while not neglecting local perceptions, 
analysis makes use of all qualitative material attained locally over the course of research and the 
relationships therein expressed (see Figure 39). 
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Figure 39: Major associations between relevant elements of vulnerability, as based on code co-
occurrences in all qualitative data (own figure, 2014, own survey, n=150 h of recordings). 
Livelihood pathways and outcomes in Biu and Mirigu show almost equal dependency on 
factors arising from social and natural/physical spheres, exogenous factors or ‘stressors’ (Figure 
39) (BOHLE 2011: 48). As a result of the irrigation project in Biu, which comes with a greater 
endowment in government services, the tendency would be to emphasise social stressors over 
environmental ones in the case of Biu, and other way around in Mirigu. Thus, at a regional scale, 
the majority of people in northern Ghana will show higher exposition to threats from the natural 
environment, mainly because public irrigation is not widespread. Yet, the contribution of societal 
factors is not to be underestimated, especially not in combination with environmental constraints. 
5.4.4.1. Transformation, Results and Potentials of Environmental Factors 
In terms of environmental vulnerability, qualitative associations point at negative 
environmental changes that manifest in a change in rainfall times, thereby incidents of flood and 
drought and torrential rains in combination with soil degradation processes, which challenge 
livelihood upkeep due to their effects on yields, food, income and housing. With regards to 
climatic endowments and changes, it is confirmed that the start of the rainy season has shifted to 
the later part of the year (CDKN 2014: 18) and so rainy seasons and thereby growing periods are 
shortening (ANTWI-AGYEI et al. 2012: 326; LAUBE et al. 2011: 759), though it is unsure if 
they will continue to do so (as was indicated by LAUX et al. 2008: 130). The same goes for the 
occurrence of dry spells within rainy seasons and temperatures. However, studies rightfully 
underline the increased risk of more pronounced, extreme climatic events accompanying changes 
in seasonality, like droughts and floods (BOKO et al. 2007; TSCHAKERT et al. 2010). These 
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hazards do not just accompany a change in seasonality, they result from it, because with similar 
amounts of rain falling within a shorter timeframe, more droughts may prevail at the beginning of 
the rainy season and more floods will occur with the onset of rains.  
Though other studies suggest differently (CDKN 2014: 11, 18), there is sufficient reason to 
be convinced of changes in the occurences of extreme events such as heavy rainfall. So when 
hazards such as flood are said to be on the rise, such trends are rightfully understood as a sign of 
climate change (ARMAH et al. 2010; TSCHAKERT et al. 2010: 491). Similarly to projections of 
most Global Circultaion Models ‘on future precipitation amounts or seasonality’ (USAID 
GHANA 2011: 2) prognosis must remain vague. In accordance with other studies (CDKN 2014: 
11, 18), it also remains unclear if rainfall patterns are due to either natural climate variability or 
show unusual extremes caused by human impact.  
The assumptions on the impacts of hazards resulting from climate change are also poorly 
understood. It has to be underlined that the quantitative and qualitative capacities of NADMO 
need to be greatly enhanced (GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010: 49). However, a causal chain 
of extreme rainfall events, flooding and increased vulnerability of households, specifically for 
farmers’ crops and housing (ARMAH et al. 2010; TSCHAKERT et al. 2010: 491), is not 
confirmed and remains uncertain. The vast majority of houses and crops produced – those crops 
of primary value for food, though not income security – stand away from potentially flooded 
areas. In the case of threats to housing – shown to be a basic necessity of life, a most expensive 
item for households and a prerequisite for good health and well-being (UN-HABITAT 2010: IV) 
– changes in land use combined with higher incidents of torrential and wind-driven rains has the 
greatest impact on livelihoods through the breakdown of traditional housing structures. Housing 
and village structures are not just randomly scattered or dispersed, but meaningfully centralised on 
hill ridges where they have traditionally stood for millennia (WIDGREN 2010: 329, 337). 
Settlements have begun to spread into flooded areas due to population growth and unequal access 
to land plots. Of larger impact is the concentration of village structures that causes fragmentation 
and an overuse of soils.  
The combination of population pressure, a lack of manure, and exotic, high-input food crop 
production technologies on fragile soils has led to ‘rapid chemical, physical, and biological 
degradation’ (KANG & TRIPATHI 1992: Chapter 1.7.1), mainly because the ‘primary rules’ of 
local natural systems are not being respected (KILCHER 2007: 35). Especially low soil organic 
matter, and thereby the availability of plant nutrients are not only bottlenecks to productivity in 
terms of quantities (USAID GHANA 2011: 5) but also determinants of product quality. Lack of 
organic matter constrains food production (BECX et al. 2012: 495) with serious implications on 
livelihoods (YIRAN et al. 2012: 204). Farmers are ‘in a trap of declining crop yields’ (DALTON 
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et al. 2014: 65), further worsened by a trap of declining quality. Soil exhaustion may be a greater 
hazard to livelihoods than flooding or even drought. 
Preservation of the natural resource base, though not a greatly desired livelihood outcome 
by itself, is acknowledged as the key to maintaining long-term outcomes like income and food 
security. Thus increased efforts must be made to facilitate environmental sustainability, although 
some authors dismiss this (BLENCH 1999: 11; as also done by LAUBE 2007: 49). Farmers 
motivated by greater incomes could venture into more environmentally friendly forms of 
livelihood upkeep, specifically in agriculture and agroforestry. For this, farmers require support to 
ease financial constraints. Their traditional crops – with which land uses have been proven to be 
relatively environmentally sustainable (ADAMS 2004: 133; see also WIDGREN 2010: 324) and 
well adapted to local environments (BRINK & BELAY 2006: 63 and 131; CHANDRASHEKAR 
& SATYANARAYANA 2006: 299; DAGNOKO et al. 2013: 1111) – are both environmentally 
and economically sound. Principles of traditional forms of land use (as layed out by BARRAL 
1968: 44; CALLO-CONCHA et al. 2012: 14; HAHN 2000: 142-143; HUNTER 1967a: 104, 106, 
1967b: 41; LAUBE 2007: 152; RUTHENBERG 1971: 58-62, 111-112) deemed to be sustainable, 
have to a large extent been preserved at the local level as societal norms (as was proclaimed by 
HAHN 2000: 144), though these are fading away in some areas. These could be applied and 
thereby saved from extinction. This could accompany economic empowerment of the poor, and 
increasing cooperation amongst locals.  
It is of utmost importance to improve or at least maintain and manage soils, yet government 
and development agency initiatives are nowadays advocating practices that do the opposite. In the 
eyes of locals, interventions are closely linked, mainly because they are effectively alike as both 
provide inputs – environmentally unsustainable fertilisers – for cash crop production. The narrow 
focus of interventions disallows them from addressing environmental vulnerability factors. The 
effects of trends in the natural environment are left to be addressed by farmers themselves, even 
though these have a more direct effect on livelihood pathways and outcomes, by altering 
livelihood seasonality – times of agricultural activities – and land usages (see also Figure 39). 
External interventions hardly cushion against the negative effects of environmental vulnerability, 
while no such project addresses these effects directly. So development of adaptation strategies that 
increase resilience (WASCAL 2010: 11), such as more traditional, yet environmentally and 
socially sustainably intensified forms of land use, is of high priority. These must further 
incorporate social or rather socio-economic aspects of vulnerability. The environmentally 
vulnerable are those: 
- Without access to public irrigation, 
- Living in traditional housing and those living in fragmented centres of the village, 
- Living in flooded village outskirts (where land prices are cheaper) 
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- Exploiting local soils by unsustainable forms of agriculture, 
- Not having finances or external support to bypass environmental constraints, 
- Content with exotic, high-input crops such as tomato 
- No longer preserving parts of their traditional forms of land use 
- With the greatest lack of animals for manuring, 
- That do not diversify their income sources. 
5.4.4.2. Transformation, Results and Potentials of Social Factors 
Major external, societal factors can be summarised as (positive) trends in markets in 
combination with government and non-government interventions at the local scale. These are 
important because they support locals to generate income. Financial capital or income is the major 
asset people make use of for survival, while it is also considered as a primary livelihood outcome. 
Improvements in finances can boost well-being and food security and allow locals to invest in 
durable housing. Money is essential to improve human capital, when considering education, 
another primary determinant of livelihood pathways. Vice versa, human capital in the form of 
good health is fundamental to make a living in agriculture. Financial capital is, however, the only 
factor in livelihoods that has a hybrid characteristic or dual importance, because it serves as a 
highly desired asset useful to substitute most others as much as an economic outcome in itself. It 
really is the most significant influence on strategies/pathways pursued (SCOONES 1998: 7-8). 
Economic vulnerability, also expressed in levels of incomes, side-lines defencelessness to 
ecological factors, as indicated by LAUBE et al. (2011). Yet emphasis should be put not only on 
global economic factors devastating markets and thereby livelihoods (also also done by LAUBE 
et al. 2008; PAASCH 2008; SCHRAVEN 2010: 18-21; SEND FOUNDATION 2008; 
SONGSORE 2011: 263). As shown by farmers’ basic perceptions of globalisation tendencies and 
markets, income trends and trader-farmer interaction, markets have not necessarily failed as 
proclaimed (by LAUBE et al. 2011: 753). A general de-intensification of agriculture and 
generally low farm gate prices (LAUBE 2007: 75; SONGSORE 2011: 173-180, 264, 281-284) 
cannot, or can no longer be attested. On the contrary, over the last 30 years, since structural 
adjustments, prices and qualities of farmer-trader interactions have vastly improved and farmers 
do not necessarily feel greatly hindered by global competition, though objective constraints exist. 
Markets have thus, at a general level, often enhanced local adaptive capacities, whereby those of 
tomato may be an exception. Yet it is only partly helpful to conceptualise vulnerability factors 
separately. The interaction of environmental and economic/societal contextual factors – in local 
land use – is a factor in livelihoods.  
Scarce access to quality land and insufficient money are the most important assets in 
defining sensitivity to external stresses, because positive market development can be made use of 
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and environmental stresses can be dealt with when the ability to acquire agricultural inputs is 
given. Thus farmers’ attempt to adapt to climatic changes by engaging in increasingly 
competitive, globalised markets (LAUBE et al. 2011). These attempts are not necessarily hindered 
by markets themselves but by the financial ability of locals to engage in these crops in 
combination with (social) land allocation mechanisms and accompanying social and spatial 
marginalisation processes. Locals aiming for higher incomes alter land use trends, with natural 
capital being the basis to do so. Crops produced conflict with environmental sustainability, 
specifically with regards to soils, and thereby undermine the socio-economic potential of 
livelihoods in the long-run. So, environmental changes are not adequately dealt with and are 
further increased by the actions of locals themselves.  
It is thereby a matter of local, internal coping mechanisms that hinders farmers in northern 
Ghana from greater livelihood sustainability, which also expresses itself in vast gender 
differences. Suppression of the poor and vulnerable, especially women, lowers these groups’ 
household outcomes. Participation in positive market trends is not possible for all local producers, 
in fact only for a minority. While (externally defined) market dynamics are generally perceived as 
having shifted towards more favourable terms of exchange – local incomes have grown – such 
trends are undermined by a lack of assets, social marginalisation, and interventions that are 
unfavourably, socially embedded in vertical terms.  
Interventions are problematic because they are associated with severe abuse in the form of 
elite capture and neglect of social realities (see also Figure 39). Support is accessed by those in 
possession of vast social capital, parts of which derive from finances and land. Differentiations in 
assets and thus societal power, which cannot be addressed by locals, are seemingly not considered 
by most external development interventions. Large obstacles to sustainability are thus found in 
interventions’ concepts of local development, as they do not provide incentives to more 
sustainable forms of natural capital usage, especially for the poor, and do not speak of political or 
economic empowerment. On the contrary, it seems they widen socio-economic gaps and possibly 
increase environmental impacts as a result of their form of support and specifically because of a 
lack of grass-root participation and monitoring. Interventions thereby foster further livelihood 
polarisation in combination with present environmental constraints and in a context of change 
further exaggerated by marginalisation processes. Consequently, contemporary government and 
development agency policies are only partly in line with pathways aimed at well-being. When 
interventions become victims of local elite capture, they effectively lower well-being and 
contribute to the vulnerability of the poor. This points at internal, societal coping mechanisms as 
primary determinants of how externally imposed vulnerability affects locals. Vulnerability is not 
immanent because it objectively exists as a contextual threat, thus it is crucial to examine how 
locals are able to deal with these according to their societal position.  
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Social allocation mechanisms alter and often overshadow most natural phenomena. 
Consequently, livelihoods cannot be deemed to be sustainable according to their social context, as 
primarily necessitated in vulnerability evaluations (BÜRKNER 2010: 24). Livelihoods can neither 
be considered as being pushed sufficiently into that direction, though improvements are evident in 
many livelihood outcomes. Capacity or help to ‘cope with and recover from stresses and shocks’ 
and possibilities to ‘maintain or enhance […] capabilities and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base’ (CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 1991: 6) is not 
generally given. The socially vulnerable are especially those: 
- With the most lack in assets, especially finances, that cannot venture into lucrative and fast-
growing crops or in doing so produce debt as a result of prior underfunding,  
- Underfunded farmers doing highly perishable crops for volatile markets like tomato, 
- Working on shea, 
- Hindered from accessing external support, 
- With smaller holdings who are equally spatially marginalised, 
- Responsible for large (extended) families,  
- Physically or otherwise disabled that cannot work themselves to make a living, 
- In conflict with the chiefs, 
- Locally most suppressed, namely women, children and those perceived as poor, 
- Not covered by social safety nets, 
- Uneducated that have no money for schooling and are challenged in decision-making by 
environmental changes and the need to strategize finances for market access. 
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6. Markets 
The access people living in the villages of Ghana’s Upper East Region (UER) have to 
monetary incomes comes mostly through diverse agricultural activities. Therefore, agricultural 
markets and interventions in such markets are crucial to livelihood development. To understand 
pro-poor outcomes requires examination of how markets practically perform, how they are set up, 
and how government and foreign aid agencies intervene in them at and beyond the farm-gate level 
to increase farmers’ incomes. This chapter combines the previous chapter’s livelihood analysis 
with a more specific value chain and production network perspective. Value chain approaches are 
the main tool for enhancing agricultural development since about 2006 (GOVERNMENT OF 
GHANA 2010; OUMA et al. 2012: 227; YARO 2013: 12), but they must be understood within 
broader production networks and livelihood systems (see also Chapter 3).  
Of special importance for livelihood development are the markets of tomato and chili, 
because these are major cash crops produced in both research communities, Biu and Mirigu. Of 
further major significance in Biu is rice production. Shea is another product of high relevance for 
locals. It is traditionally of importance for women and to household food security at crucial times 
of the year, however, it offers insufficient income to improve livelihoods in the long term. 
Currently no interventions are taking place at the village level in the Shea sector, thus analysis of 
Shea will not pursued further. 
Tomato and chili are two of the earliest purebred cash crops introduced to the area. Rice, 
though common for centuries as a traditional staple, became more widespread as an additional 
cash crop after independence in the late 1950s. Producers and markets of all three crops have 
received varying, yet fairly significant government support and protection since the time of 
independence. These support mechanisms, however, ceased when structural adjustments were 
implemented. Since then, most farmers were unable to hold pace with changes in agricultural 
policies as they were exposed to international competition while suffering from support 
withdrawal. Interventions at the dawn of the post-SAP period started to again support tomato 
processing. However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful, which made farmers concentrate 
on farming chili. The government then focussed on cereals like rice by raising import duties and, 
partly in cooperation with development agencies like USAID, further supporting and subsidising 
agricultural production (see also Section 2.5). The partly globalised markets of tomatoes, chilies, 
and rice, and dynamics encountered within markets at the national and local levels, parts of which 
result from publicly funded, post-SAP policies in combination with development agencies, are 
examined in this chapter. 
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6.1. The Tomato Market 
A small minority of locals at Biu’s irrigation scheme produce a tomato cash crop, while 
farmers in Mirigu, where people are generally less well of than in Biu, grow tomato under shallow 
groundwater irrigation (SGI) during the dry season. Tomato products have always had to deal 
with stiff, global competition; however, this competition became more decisive due to trade 
liberalisation efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As will be 
shown, competition in tomato is side-lined further by cater-like structures within the market. 
Government programmes have tried to alter these trends, by intervening at the market level, and 
by creating government market outlets. These attempts have mostly failed, however, due to 
reasons explained in this section. 
6.1.1. General Overview 
Alongside chili, tomato is one the most important cash crops grown in Ghana nowadays 
(GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 298). Moreover tomato is an especially important 
cash crop in northern Ghana. Its local origins date back to the beginning of the 20th century, when 
it was introduced alongside dry season gardening by catholic missionaries (CATHOLIC 
CHURCH NAVRONGO 1905-1920). After independence, in the early 1960s, dry season 
products like tomato were supported to allow the rural north to develop. Policies included 
protective duties, publicly funded input support and out-grower schemes, and provision of large-
scale irrigation projects with market access linked to publicly funded, import-substituting agro-
industries (ADU 1969: 17-18; AHWOI 2010: 5-6; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 56; FAO 1970: iii, 
1; LAUBE 2007: 64; LAUBE et al. 2008: 9). However, the industries ran into major difficulties 
since their establishment, and thereby remain uncompetitive in the eyes of producers and 
consumers (FAO 1970: 2; SCHÜRMANN 1967: 4-11). The industries were characterised by 
underperformance and vast overspending, which further diminished government resources and led 
to the partial collapse of these industries from the mid-1970s onwards. Facilities had to formally 
close after structural adjustment, as donors of SAP and ERP funds saw no reason to further 
protect the tomato processing industry. The tomato factory, earlier mentioned in chapter 2, 
survived without government protection and support for only one season, until 1988/1989, 
although prior to that it had already experienced severe troubles for decades. Therefore, only a 
few years after the Tono irrigation project had been completed, to feed local agro-industries, the 
tomato processing plant closed due to an acute working capital shortage (CHRISTIAN AID 2003; 
VOSCON ASSOCIATES & MAGNA CONSULTING 1997: 6). Tomato paste imports from 
industrial nations rose in the following years, due to trade liberalisation efforts pursued alongside 
SAPs, leading to concern raised in scientific and NGO publications about the impact of this 
practice on local farmers (LAUBE et al. 2011: 753; PAASCH 2008; SEND FOUNDATION 
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2008; SONGSORE 2011: 263). The restoration of the local tomato paste factory was initiated at 
the onset of the currently prevailing, post-adjustment era, despite its vagarious past but just shortly 
before elections (AHWOI 2010: 9-10; KYEREMATEN 2007: 77; WHITFIELD 2011b: 31, 32). 
The attempts remain relatively unsuccessful (ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010).  
Ghanaian production of tomato has somewhat skyrocketed since the late 1960s. While 
about 20,000 tonnes were annually produced during the 1960s, 16 times as much was recorded in 
2012, about 321,000 tonnes. Production has however, encountered severe ups and downs. 
Production rose considerably during the early 1970s, a time of vast government spending that also 
led to the establishment of tomato processing factories. Yet production then remained stagnant 
over that decade. Drops in production were encountered with the introduction of SAPs in the 
1980s, throwing production levels back to those achieved 20 years before. From the late 1980s to 
the late 1990s, however, production levels rose drastically. By the time the Tono irrigation 
scheme was completed, the government processing venture was officially closed. Tomato 
production stagnated again at a relatively high production level, but encountered several 
throwbacks coinciding with ECOWAS trade liberalisation efforts in the early 2000s. Fresh tomato 
started to be imported from Burkina Faso. Furthermore, imports of tomato paste began as SAPs 
and ERPs set in. Paste imports rose until they reached about half of the level of domestic 
production in 2007. In recent times, 2011/2012, the major sources of tomato paste imports are 
China, followed by subsidised European paste from Italy, partly also Germany and the UK, as 
well as paste from the USA, South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia. Fresh tomato imports come from 
only a few countries, primarily Burkina Faso and despite growth in international competition. 
From 2007 to 2012, annual domestic production rose by another 178 percent, from 180,000 to 
321,000 tonnes. Even more, minor exports of paste occurred from 2002 onwards with periodical 
increases and decreases until 2008, though on a rather insignificant scale (see Figure 40). 
 
Figure 40: Production, imports and exports of tomato products in Ghana (own figure, 2015, based 
on FAOSTAT 2014). 
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Production of tomato in Ghana has increased while imports have also risen. In this context 
it is important to accept that tomatoes produced for either the fresh market or for further 
processing of paste can be considered and treated as being separate commodities, whereby 
markets are equally separate. Tomatoes used for either fresh consumption or paste processing 
require different inputs in production to attain substantially different tomatoes that vary 
accordingly in potential outcomes for producers. Generally, tomato for the fresh market pays 
better per kilo than tomato for paste, which requires further processing and thereby comes with 
higher overheads for processors and thereby lower farm-gate price for farmers (ROBINSON & 
KOLAVALLI 2010: 4).  
Farmers interviewed in Biu and Mirigu (who on average look back over the past 50 years, 
see before, Figure 5) claim they have always sold to traders of the fresh product anyhow. That is 
primarily so because they state that most tomato production in the region began/became most 
popular far after processing of paste had ceased. It was only later, when the local government 
factory was revamped, that locals had the chance to enter paste markets. Thus, paste has never 
mattered to local farmers and developments in fresh tomato imports are far more significant for 
livelihoods than paste imports. At present, the best statistics available on the usage of 
domestically produced tomato are based on MOFA estimates. According to these, 95 percent of 
all tomato on Ghanaian markets is sold freshly on local markets, about 3 percent is processed into 
paste, and 2 percent is exported. Of fresh tomato, the vast majority is sold in southern Ghana’s 
large urban centres – the country’s ‘golden triangle’– markets in Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi and 
Kumasi. Additional important markets are found in regional capitals throughout the country.76  
As reflected in the countries of origin of fresh tomato imports, the decisive difference in 
fresh to paste markets is that the range of traders supplying fresh tomato is greatly limited by the 
perishability of the product, unlike when looking at paste. Fresh tomato is highly perishable and 
forms of cooling or storing them hardly exist. Thus the range of traders and thereby competition 
in fresh tomato markets is limited by the shelf life of tomato under the harsh climatic and road 
conditions of the West-African region. Domestic tomato paste production however, has to 
compete with global agro-industrial players that are often highly subsidised in their country of 
origin and certainly better equipped to compete on global markets. This may explain why, on a 
nationwide level, Ghanaian (fresh) tomato production did not suffer much from globalisation and 
liberalisation tendencies that expressed themselves in growing imports. Of course these imports 
meant that domestic paste production had to face stiff competition from global markets. That 
production of tomato actually decreased, as found in the study area in northern Ghana, is then a 
                                                   
76 Interview with the MOFA administration, 05.03.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
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contradiction. Thus, production of tomato drastically increased on a nationwide level while 
decreasing in Northern Ghana. 
6.1.2. Local Structure and Geography 
Inconsistencies between national and local trends are explainable by considering the 
seasonality of production throughout the West-African region. This seasonality exposes Northern 
Ghana to high international competition in trade with the fresh product. Cultivation of tomato 
takes place across Ghana, mainly in the forest-savannah transition zone of central Ghana, but also 
in the northern savannah and coastal savannah zones. Each zone has different seasons of 
production according to agro-ecological zone and local access to irrigation.77 As a result, there are 
three main tomato seasons in the country. Season in the study area, the Upper East Region, and in 
neighbouring Burkina, falls between December and March. Between May and July tomato is 
harvested in central Ghana, the Ashanti and the Eastern Region. Then August to October is 
tomato season in the south of Ghana, the Greater Accra region (ASUMING-BREMOONG & 
ASUMING BOAKYE 2008: 15). Due to this seasonality, nationwide market supply of fresh 
tomato differs greatly throughout the year. Generally, domestic, nationwide supplies are more 
than abundant in August and September, but severe shortages occur between March and July 
(Ibid.). Ghana’s tomato market is characterised by an annual ‘intermittent glut – to – shortage – to 
– glut situation’ (MONNEY et al. 2009: 7). The very north of the country, the study areas, harvest 
at a time when market supplies are inadequate and prices could be most favourable, December to 
March. Yet this is also the only region where harvests coincide with those of international 
competitors, Burkinabe farmers.  
The issues arising from liberalisation in the fresh tomato trade are a specific problem of 
northern Ghana, while being rather irrelevant for the south of the country. While domestic imports 
of fresh tomato are insignificant in comparison to production on a nationwide scale, it is the 
impoverished north of Ghana that is most affected by these imports, while the rest of the country 
produces fresh tomato far more independently of competitors. Therefore, farmers in the study 
areas attest a decrease in tomato production as a result of a loss of tomato market access, because 
traders nowadays prefer to buy in Burkina Faso. Though on a national scale imports from Burkina 
Faso seem insignificant, during harvesting times in northern Ghana they actually made up 30 
percent of all tomato sold domestically in 2010, as approximated by MOFA authorities.78 In 2012 
and 2013, customs interviewed at the Burkinabe border in Paga spoke of 30 to 40 trucks per day, 
each with about seven tonnes of produce, from December to June, until the rains set in Burkina. 
That equals over 45,000 tonnes a year, equivalent to 15 percent of national production, passing 
                                                   
77 Interview with the MOFA, 05.03.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
78 Interview with the MOFA, 05.03.2010 and 04.04.2013, Accra, Ghana. 
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along one of two major road connections going to Burkina Faso.79 Tomato could also come from 
Benin, Niger and Nigeria (OECD 2009: 99), because Ghana is a major horticultural market hub 
within the ECOWAS region, especially for tomato (GHANAVEG 2014: 39). However, it doesn’t 
because local traders have blocked off competition, for example from Togo (see also LAUBE 
2007: 207-208), while buying either in Ghana or Burkina Faso themselves80. Therefore, 96 
percent of all imported, fresh tomato in 2012 came only from Burkina Faso (HCID 2015). 
The National Tomato Trader Association (NTTA) deals with fresh tomato imports, 
wholesale and retail. Most of the sourced fresh tomato, varieties like ‘70’, ‘Roma’ or ‘Pectomech’ 
(AWO 2010: 127), is sold on open-air, consumer markets alongside tomato paste. The few 
western-style supermarkets in Ghana mostly source Egyptian or Dutch tomatoes. Open-air 
markets are divided into large sections, according to the products sold. Areas where tomato 
products can be bought are supervised by the NTTA, by the so called ‘tomato queens’.81 The 
NTTA thus controls both fresh tomato wholesale and retail, aside large shares of retail of tomato 
paste, whereby the prior is of greater value for producers and traders and of higher popularity 
among consumers. Thus, markets of fresh and tomato paste are not entirely separated, but heavily 
dominated by (those into production of and trade with) the fresh product. For the NTTA, 
commerce in fresh tomato is not only a matter of farm gate price, but also of tomato shelf life, 
thus distance between markets and producers under the current conditions of transport. Therefore, 
while many publications on Ghanaian tomato markets point at price competition initiated by 
globalisation tendencies as being the decisive factor for NTTA chain participation (LAUBE et al. 
2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 2011; PAASCH 2008), government analysis points at tomato quality, 
as reflected in post-harvest losses along the whole chain of tomato, from producer to consumer. 
Losses range between 30 to 40 percent of total production per year. The latest governmental 
assessment of this undertaken in 2008 speaks of up to 176,000 tonnes lost per annum, which in 
2008 topped the amounts of tomato being imported from Burkina Faso by a third.82 
The most up-to-date analysis on domestic, horticultural value chains states that post-harvest 
losses are by far the most urgent issue for market operators in Ghana (GHANAVEG 2014: 37). 
With little that can be done about the quality of road conditions by merchants themselves, and 
high investments and running costs encountered for cooled trucks, one of the easiest ways of 
lowering losses during transport is by buying tomato that lasts and can endure the severe stresses 
of rough transport under semi-arid to tropical conditions. Thus traders travel slightly further to 
buy quality tomato in their neighbouring ECOWAS market, Burkina Faso. According to local 
                                                   
79 Interview with a custums officer, 09.01.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
80 Observation and interviews with several market queens of the NTTA, 21.02.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Interview with the MOFA, Horticultural Division, 19.02.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
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farmers and various experts interviewed, Burkinabe tomato is grown on soils of higher quality and 
with more application of manure, which leads to better, harder fruits, as explained later in detail. 
Traders prefer these tomatoes, because they ‘travel better with little spoilage during transit’ which 
‘brings better returns’ than local ones that are watery and ‘easily squashed’ (MOFA 2009: 1). 
Tomatoes from Burkina Faso ‘not only have a better overall taste and appeal, but also tend to 
retain these qualities longer’ and so ‘imported tomatoes are generally more lucrative for traders 
than those grown by local producers’ (VENUS et al. 2013: 33). This led to a collapse of market 
access for northern farmers. However, access partly recovered over the last decade (see before, 
Figure 33). Presently traders from Tamale, located about 200 km south of the study areas, 
patronise local farmers. They say they come only when they are unable to afford the trip to 
Burkina Faso. The traders buy lower quantities and pay a worse farm-gate price than those that 
once came from further south.83  
Alike problems with quality had been reported in the past. They made locally produced 
tomato paste unattractive to Ghanaian consumers, while government was still heavily involved in 
agro-industries. Yet, despite that the NTTA started to prefer Burkinabe fresh tomatoes over local 
ones, attempts were made to reintroduce tomato processing, to serve as an outlet for fresh tomato. 
The government revamped the regional tomato factory in 2006, the Northern Star Tomato 
Company (NSTC) in Pwalugu (see Photo 12). To support this endeavour, the government teamed 
up with a private player from southern Ghana. ‘Expom’, formerly ‘Trusty Food’, a co-partner of 
the Italian tomato giant ‘AR Industrie Alimentari S.p.A.’ set foot in Ghana in 2003, in its free 
trade zone in Tema, near Accra. The company supplied the West-African market with tomato 
paste brands such as ‘La Perla’, ‘Walgusto’, ‘Russo’, ‘La Bianca’, ‘Bonne Mama’, most of which 
are common throughout the country. Expom dominated the Ghanaian tomato paste market and its 
exports heavily, as there was no other source of tomato paste in the country.  
Just 7 percent of the tomato used by Expom for production came from domestic supplies. 
According to an interview with the Ghanaian Food and Drugs Board, the little Ghanaian tomato 
paste that was produced and exported, really derived from previously imported paste.84 93 percent 
of Expom’s paste were said to have derived from the canning/repacking of imported tomato paste, 
namely subsidised bulk tomato paste from China. Expom sold this on the ECOWAS markets as a 
Ghanaian brand. Yet, out of at least 900 tonnes of paste running through the company each year, 
about 75 percent went to Nigeria while just a quarter was sold on the Ghanaian and other 
ECOWAS markets. The major customer in Nigeria was ‘Sosaco, part of the ‘Wantamal Group’, a 
leading provider of fast moving consumer goods, owner of famous tomato paste brands like 
                                                   
83 Diverse FGDs with farmers in Biu and Mirigu and interviews with NTTA members from Tamale. 
84 Interview with the head of the Food and Drugs Board, 25.02.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
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‘Gino’ – which is also common on Ghanaian markets – and thereby the largest distributor of 
tomato paste in retail packs in West-Africa. Sosaco exported to another 26 countries in Africa 
(AR 2011; EXPOM 2011; GHANAWEB.COM 2005; GSA 2010; ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 
2010: 1; WATANMAL GROUP 2012).  
 
Photo 12: The NSTC paste factory in Pwalugu, UER, Ghana  (own photo, 2010). 
Back in Ghana, Expom has made efforts to source an increasing share of tomatoes from 
domestic markets. It sold know-how and machinery to the government for the revival of the 
NSTC and later bought bulk tomato paste from the government company. Expom was in fact the 
NSTC’s only customer for bulk tomato paste, which it bought at prevailing world market prices. 
However, the NSTC meanwhile ceased to operate. It seemingly could not compete with global 
prices, as growing amounts of paste were brought into the country, parts of which were imported 
by its ‘partner’ Expom. Furthermore, high overheads that resulted from too high a water content 
in local tomatoes in combination with governmental mismanagement, rendered processing 
completely unattractive.85  
The Ghanaian tomato value chain structure as a whole and its geography remains heavily 
dominated by southern Ghanaian tomato production for the NTTA, with minor integration of 
northern Ghanaian farmers, vast imports from Burkina Faso and minor ones from Egypt and the 
Netherlands, paralleled by Chinese paste (re-) imports from global and ECOWAS markets. To 
regain better tomato value chain access, farmers in northern Ghana will have to live up to the 
standards imposed by Burkinabe or world market counterparts, depending on whether fresh 
tomato or tomato for paste should be produced in the future. Drying tomato is thereby not an 
option because returns are then too low for profitable production. Paste and fresh tomato value 
                                                   
85 Interview with the NSTC farm operations manager, 15 03.2010, Pwalugu, Ghana. 
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chains come with different opportunities. No tomato paste factory will ever be able to pay higher 
prices per kilo than the fresh market, due to the overheads that arise from processing. Only the 
production of larger quantities could allow for greater farmer incomes overall, which would 
require an increase in farmer yields and thereby vast efforts by any entity taking up paste 
processing.86 Yet, competing in global markets via paste may be more difficult than facing 
competition within only the West-African context through fresh tomato markets. The great 
advantage that could arise in terms of development for northern Ghana is that a profit-orientated 
management of the tomato factory would require vast year-round supply of tomato and thus allow 
all-year production and assured market access for farmers, unlike the fresh tomato trade that 
prefers producers closer to markets in the south whenever tomatoes are in season in such areas. A 
running factory in Ghana’s north would promise substantial growth in (nationwide) tomato 
production. Yet both alternatives – fresh and paste markets – require improvements in product 
quality (see Figure 41).  
 
Figure 41: The Ghanaian tomato value chain (own figure, 2015, own expert interviews, 2010,  
AMAKYE et al. 2008: 70; AMANOR & PABI 2007; CLOTTEY et al. 2009; FAOSTAT 2014). 
Hope that private sector engagement in tomato processing can reindustrialise Ghana’s north 
arises from the offers made for further investments. Firstly, as government processing was largely 
unsuccessful, Expom jumped in and offered to take over the NSTC in 2009 for one million US$. 
This amount is just one-fourth of what the government had paid to Expom for its consultancy 
services and machinery for revamping the factory. The government found Expom’s proposal 
‘laudable’, but was not ready to sell at such a small price (MOFA 2009: 2). In any way it seems 
                                                   
86 Interview with Anna Antwi, food security consultant, 01.03.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
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Expom meanwhile closed down. Since then another offer has been made by a southern Ghanaian 
company called ‘Mercury Tomato Industries’ (MTI), which proposes formation of a public-
private joint venture with NSTC (MOTI 2012). Furthermore, there may be potential to revive 
trade in fresh tomato.  
The sub-sections below will compare the alternatives farmers (could) have at hand – being 
production for the fresh market and past production for either Expom or MTI. Although some of 
these alternatives are no longer at hand, they give an impression about the conditions under which 
different tomato value chains could work, allow identification of crucial leverage points in the 
chains, and thereby help to assess the degree to which they could provide or limit the scope of 
opportunity for development through tomato in Northern Ghana. Access to chains, required 
monetary inputs, and resulting outcomes of chain participants are examined.  
6.1.3. Access, Inputs and Outputs 
Farmer access to the fresh tomato value chain in Biu and Mirigu is primarily defined by the 
lack of financial abilities of farmers to venture into production with the aim to make money. 
Access to the value chain is primarily associated with financial and natural capital. The reason the 
most vulnerable people in Biu and Mirigu cannot participate in tomato production is because it is 
so heavily capital and labour intensive. Farming is also male dominated because of high labour 
constraints in tomato and specifically in SGI farming. Farming tomato also draws on social 
capital, as it is not a traditional crop. Also, in Biu most upland suitable for tomato is now used for 
rice, which means that neighbouring fields can no longer be used for production of tomato 
because they would be flooded. Thus a majority of locals would have to venture back into tomato, 
to thereby convince the irrigation system’s management to switch upland land use back to tomato 
production.  
In both Biu and Mirigu the timely start of the tomato seasons is difficult. Since the optimal 
time of starting tomato (October) clashes with the harvest of previous crops, only those who can 
pay for labourers or acquire free labour are able to do quality tomato production, assuming that 
quality also depends on a favourable climate. With an ongoing shift in climatic seasonality this 
may become harder. Moreover, early rains setting in by February can destroy harvests. Potential 
outcomes of tomato value chains are already more variable as compared to any other crop: 
‘Tomato, it can fail you significantly. […] It will do what it wants and you will regret doing it and 
it will then fail you brutally. But, rice or pepper will fail you […] only little.’87 
If tomato production is successful, farmers primarily associate it with income, thus further 
financial capital. However, farmers acknowledge that they undermine the natural resource base in 
                                                   
87 FGD participant, February 2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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the long term, as production is not environmentally sustainable under current conditions. 
Furthermore, both Biu and Mirigu’s farmers tend to (need to) clear increasing amounts of (scarce) 
virgin lands for tomato production, as doing so increases crop quality, makes less likely that their 
production suffers from soil disease, and saves on fertilisers. Improving soil quality in areas where 
tomato production currently takes place could limit the ongoing destruction of land reserves, 
because such farming is so demanding on already poor soils. Tomato’s perishability increases 
vulnerability because reliable and fast market access is required, which is beyond the control of 
locals (see Figure 42).  
 
Figure 42: Intensity of associations made between tomato chain access and assets required (left) 
and chain outcomes for farmers’ assets and livelihood outcomes (right) (own figure, 2015, 
according to co-occurrence coefficients, own interviews and FGDs, 2012/’13, n=150 h). 
Of all the assets required for value chain access, when finances for fertilisers and suitable 
land are at hand, quality of land most affects yields and farm gate prices for tomato. As soil 
quality is said to be worse in Biu than Mirigu, farmers have a lower yield and worse quality 
tomato, thus lower average farm gate prices, despite spending more on agro-chemicals and 
especially fertilisers. Farmers in Biu make higher investments in farm inputs and hired labour, 
while farmers in Mirigu invest more in terms of their own efforts. They dig wells and irrigate by 
hand, often manure lands, have even less access to mechanisation; but they are rewarded with a 
greater net return (see Figure 43).  
Overall the costs and profits for tomato farmers in Biu and Mirigu differ from official 
estimates, mostly in terms of estimated farm-gate prices and tomato yields. When assuming the 
minimum wage for farmers or their workers in 2012, a margin of about 40 percent was still 
possible in Biu, 68 percent in Mirigu or a weighted average of 63 percent in total, which is very 
close to the officially estimated farmer margin of 67 percent. Break-even prices are officially (and 
on average) reached at 0.30 GH₵/Kg (in Biu at 0.43, Mirigu at 0.27 GH₵/Kg). Locals in Mirigu 
thus have more room in manoeuvring with prices. Farm gate prices dropped severely in 2012, 
from about 1.7 GH₵/Kg in January to 0.51 in February, continuing thereafter at a low price. It 
was thus extremely lucrative to sell at the very beginning of the season. Generally, as ICOUR data 
suggests, it always pays best to sell at the very beginning of seasons, when few sell. In this regard 
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people from Mirigu have higher chances to be ‘on time’ as unlike Biu’s farmers, they are not busy 
in rice fields at the time when tomato should be prepared.  
 
Figure 43: Illustration of tomato production costs, expected yields, average prices (January-March 
2012) and net returns per acre at minimum wage of 4.8 GH₵/man-day (own figure, 2014, own 
survey, 2013, n=6 and *based on ICOUR and MOFA data, 2013). 
6.1.3.1. Fresh Tomato Trade 
Local farmers compete with Burkinabe farmers to sell tomato to the NTTA, whose traders 
nowadays comes from Tamale. Those traders supplying southern markets like Accra via northern 
Ghana or Burkina Faso can often pay higher farm gate prices, because consumers (can) pay higher 
retail prices. In fact, in 2012 retail price was about 4.83 in Accra (Agbogbloshie), while being 
only 1.58 GH₵/Kg in Tamale. Therefore, the most lucrative form of sourcing tomato could derive 
from regaining the favour of Accra/southern traders. To access potential benefits, a primary 
economic factor is then farm gate pricing. In terms of production, there is indication at the 
nationwide level that tomato (excluding labour) is most costly to produce in southern Ghana, 
followed by production in the Upper East Region, and then central Ghana, the Brong Ahafo 
Region (Ibid. 12). For an international comparison, there is not much data available. But, 
government sources concerned with the competiveness of tomato in Ghana’s north say that there 
is indication that farm gate prices paid are occasionally lower in northern Ghana than in Burkina 
Faso. For example, in the dry season of 2008/2009 the NTTA imported tomatoes from Burkina 
Faso valued at between 0.44 GH¢/kg (lowest farm gate price) and 2.22 GH¢/kg (highest farm gate 
price) (MOFA 2009: 1). At that time, prices at the Tono irrigation scheme were between about 
0.32 GH¢/kg (lowest farm gate price) and 0.70 GH¢/kg (highest farm gate price) (data obtained 
from ICOUR, 2010). Burkina Faso tomatoes were thus, at times, up to three times as expensive as 
those produced under the Tono irrigation scheme, when comparing the highest farm gate prices 
recorded. When observing average wholesale prices from 2009 to 2011, one can see that at the 
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beginning of the year, during tomato harvesting season in the study areas, prices are generally 
lower in Bolgatanga – the regional capital of the Upper East – than in Burkina Faso’s Po (see 
Figure 44). 
 
Figure 44: Tomato wholesale prices in Ghana (2009-2011) and Burkina (Po, 2008-2010’) (VAN 
WESENBEECK et al. 2014: 5). 
Prices, therefore, are possibly not the greatest factor in value chain access. Even if farmers 
in Burkina Faso receive just 72 percent of what is paid in Ghana – as traders have indicated during 
FGDs and as used for further calculations – the overall profit of wholesalers in retail prices is only 
marginally larger than when to compared to Ghanaian tomato. Wherever bought, about 60 percent 
of (given) consumer prices go to wholesalers as profit, while retailers make less than 10 percent. 
In Ghana an average of just 6 percent goes to farmers. Burkina’s occasional advantage in farm 
gate pricing is clearly limited by additional costs, among them higher expenses for transport, 
customs and police bribes, duty, monies to be paid to middle men that may subcontract further 
commissionaires, aside from the extra time spent on the road and slightly higher wages for 
loading. Another key variable in traders’ rational is a factual increase in farm gate price that 
results from post-harvest losses due to bad quality of tomato. 30 to 40 percent of tomato from 
northern Ghana spoils along the way (35 percent used for further calculations), whereas traders 
have estimated spoilage to affect just 15 percent of those tomatoes sourced in Burkina Faso. 
Consequently, these losses lower wholesale or farmer margins, respectively room for negotiation. 
Given the overall allocation of profits and thereby power within the chain, it is likely that such 
issues will give traders the upper hand. If quality were to be the same, farm gate prices in Burkina 
Faso would be slightly lower, but the fact that differences in post-harvest losses are so vast should 
be considered an expression of overall risk encountered by wholesalers. They are not willing to 
take this risk when imports promise even higher incomes (see Figure 45). 
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Figure 45: Composition of the average kilo retail price of tomato from northern Ghana and 
Burkina Faso, sold in Accra from January to March 2012 (own figure, 2015, based on own 
calculations, own trader FGDs, 2013 and ESOKO data, 2013). 
The overall composition of retailer prices of tomato bought in northern Ghana and 
transported to Accra can vary greatly, such as when looking at the 2007/2008 seasons. An average 
of 20 percent of retail pricing went to farmers, while 80 percent was left to wholesalers and 
retailers. Thus in 2008 the northern Ghanaian farmers’ shares in retailer prices were similar to 
what they were at the time of this study in Burkina Faso. It appears to be increasingly 
unfavourable for southern buyers to buy tomato in the study area. On average, 9 percent of the 
final retailer price went to farmers, 13 percent to wholesalers and 8 percent to retailers as profit. 
Overall a profit of roughly 30 percent was generated along the chain. Almost half of all profits 
went to wholesalers, while farmers and retailers were left with about a quarter each. Thus 
wholesalers, directed by tomato queens, had enormous influence on the value chain; they literally 
reigned over it, as the NTTA controlled three–quarters of all profits. Wholesalers of the NTTA 
seemingly managed to attain an even more favourable position within the chain, as they shifted 
profit allocation in their favour to the disadvantage of farmers and retailers.88 However, 
wholesalers faced increasing risks when daring to buy soft tomato in northern Ghana or travel 
further to Burkina Faso. Furthermore, retail prices fluctuate by season and so profits vary. From a 
wholesaler’s point of view, higher risks justify higher shares of profits. Thus transport risks must 
be dealt with first of all, which boil down to an improvement of local tomato quality by improving 
soils with organic material, in order to advance value chain accessibility for farmers in Mirigu and 
Biu. This is hard for individual farmers to achieve and thereby requires government assistance by 
more ‘close-to-nature approaches’, if not at least by providing organic material: 
‘It [the inorganic fertilizer] forces the tomato to mature fast […]. The thing becomes soft and 
watery and the shelf life is very, very low. But, when you use only manure, the shelf life is about 
two to three times longer. […] Why isn't everybody doing it? Well, it's […] the animals, the high 
                                                   
88 Own calculations based on data obtained from ICOUR, 2010. 
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mortality of livestock, not many people have got big animals […]. Then there is the haulage. […] 
But if it's inorganic fertilizer, […] you can even carry it on your bicycle.’89 
Back in 2010 those farmers still successful in selling their tomato strongly emphasised the 
positive effects of manuring. When asked why traders preferred farmers in Burkina Faso, locals in 
Biu and Mirigu referred to improved tomato quality resulting from manure usage and less 
dependency on inorganic fertilisers. Though knowing of the practice, they were, however, not 
able to copy this example due to a lack of manure.90 Participation in tomato value chains thereby 
depends on access to manure and thus animals, which directly favours better-off farmers 
(livestock owners). However, NTTA’s value chain partly gives small-scale producers, such as 
Mirigu’s, the opportunity to provide high quality produce through their small but sophisticated 
gardens, although there are only limited income opportunities. Though not intending to do so, the 
NTTA rewards farmers for more environmentally sustainable production, which also favours the 
production of other crops throughout the year. Successful interaction with the NTTA may thus 
partly create islands of environmental and economic sustainability that could allow for increased 
resilience to environmental change.  
Quantity is a further factor on the side of farmers, though a relatively mild one when 
compared to processing scenarios. Farmers and traders constantly express that, since tomato 
production in northern Ghana decreased, the likelihood of attracting traders at all has become 
smaller – a self-amplifying process. Wholesalers are afraid of being unable to instantaneously fill 
their trucks with sufficient produce, which would render their activity unprofitable: while waiting 
for more tomato to be brought, previously loaded tomato would spoil. One truck load, shared by 
about two traders each, conveys at least 125 crates or 7250 kilograms of tomato, which brings an 
average profit of over 10,000 GH₵ per trader-trip. On average at least 2.5 acres of tomato fills one 
truck, or 1.8 acres in Mirigu and 3.5 acres in Biu. As most farmers are unable to produce 
sufficient amounts by themselves, wholesalers, if they come at all, demand farmers to synchronise 
their production with others, to organise themselves to be able to conduct loading and trade within 
the shortest time possible. One farmer’s risk thereby becomes another farmer’s. Risks are 
increased for individual farmers within such forms of (forced) horizontal contractualisation 
because if someone’s harvest fails or when tomatoes are not ready to be harvested at the agreed 
upon date, this can mean a loss of customers for all farmers involved. As cooperating farms can 
be spread across various areas, the likelihood that at least one of them will be affected by some 
natural disaster, disease or pest is great.91  
                                                   
89 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
90 Interview with a farmer from Biu, 12.03.2010, Biu, Ghana.  
91 Interview with a farmer from Biu, October, 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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Quantity of production is thus an issue to tackle when wanting to assure future success of 
northern Ghanaian farmers in fresh tomato value chains. A properly run farmer-based 
organisation would be required that includes more than just a few local producers trying their best 
to fill a single truck. Farmers must increase cooperation among one another and, moreover, plant 
at the same time to then harvest together. That, however, if done on a larger basis, reduces farm 
gate prices. Farmers are actually, therefore, more interested in harvesting at a time when nobody 
else is to attain greater prices. Thus social organisation among tomato farmers is limited. It would 
require a vast degree of cooperation among farmers, a working association, to coordinate farmers 
with traders in ways that allow everybody to partake in selling whilst also evening out seasonal 
production and thereby price differences. Under the current setup it is unlikely that tomato 
farmers can achieve this. Farmer coordination in terms of the quantities produced is of even 
higher importance, when looking at tomato processing and the paste market provided by NSTC, 
as a factory needs to be supplied all year round regardless of farm gate prices. 
6.1.3.2. Public Tomato Processing 
The most recent data for the Northern Star Tomato Company’s (NSTC) activities date back 
to early 2010, when the government company last bought tomato. The NSTC bought fresh tomato 
at a fixed price of 0.13 GH₵/KG, which at the time was less than a third of the average, yet 
fluctuating price offered by the NTTA. By selling to the factory, tomato farmers had the chance to 
make a margin of only 10 percent on their invested capital. Through processing, a kilo of local 
tomato was then transferred into about 0.063 kg of paste, meaning about 16 kilos of fresh tomato 
were required to produce 1 kilo of paste, which was far below national and international 
standards.92 It was, in fact, almost twice as much as was needed when looking at Ghana as a 
whole. ROBINSON AND KOLAVALLI (2010: 10) estimate the normal national ratio of fresh 
tomato to paste be to 8:1. The main issue with tomatoes bought by the NSTC was their low 
quality and high water content, because a low content of soluble solids (as expressed by Brix 
values) determines the industrial/processed yield (DA SILVA ET AL. 2008: 17). Paste was sold to 
Expom for 1.4 GH₵/kg, the prevailing world market price at the time, where the product was 
canned, labelled and distributed. Thereby, and when looking only at the difference of bought fresh 
tomato to the selling price of paste, NSTC made average losses of about 0.66 GH₵ per kilo of 
paste produced and sold to Expom. 
Yet further costs for running the factory occurred. Based on estimates from 2010, 
production costs of one kilo of tomato paste were about 3.59 GH₵/kg, thus 2.08 GH₵ for the 
buying of fresh tomato and an additional 1.51 GH₵ for processing. By comparison, the cost of 
imported tomato concentrate from China was at 1.99 GH₵/kg and thus by far cheaper 
                                                   
92 Interview with the NSTC farm operations manager, 15 03.2010, Pwalugu, Ghana. 
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(ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 3). The factory could not compete with paste imports, 
mainly due to the low content of soluble solids (brix) in local tomato varieties. 57 percent of costs 
comprised buying tomato. The local varieties used were not at all suitable for processing, which 
was thereby only possible because of government subsidies. The second largest cost of 
production, about 27 percent, came from transport of tomatoes to the factory. Additional costs for 
water, labour, electricity, and maintenance depreciation of equipment are of minor impact on 
processing overheads. When taking the costs for tomato buying and processing and subtracting 
the price the NSTC gets from Expom (1.4 GH₵/kg paste), NSTC produced losses of 2.19 GH₵/kg 
paste. As NSTC’s production was about 150 tonnes of tomato paste, this translates into losses of 
more than 300,000 GH₵. As said, that was less than what should or could have been produced 
within a day, but if the factory had run as it was supposed to the losses would have gone into the 
millions (see Table 11). 
Item 
Costs 
(GH₵ per kg paste) 
Share of costs  
(%) 
Fresh tomato (16 kg at 0.13 GH₵/KG) 2.080 57.9 
Water  0.336 9.4 
Fuel  0.960 26.7 
Labour 0.100 2.8 
Electricity 0.016 0.4 
Maintenance of equipment 0.076 2.1 
Depreciation of equipment 0.025 0.7 
Total cost 3.593 100 
Table 11: Estimated costs of NSTC’s processing of 1 kilo of tomato paste in 2010 (own table, 
2011, own survey, 2010, and ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 3). 
The refurbishment of the factory has already been a costly undertaking (more than 4 million 
US$/6 million GH₵ at the time). Under the running conditions explained, huge amounts of 
government money were spent while farmers only received small incomes. It would have been 
more profitable for the factory not to run than to do anything at all. Quality of tomato is not 
sufficient, as higher brix results in higher processing/industrial yield and brings down production 
cost. Production, as it is until now, is only legitimate when viewing it as a form of subsidy, which 
is lucrative to farmers when compared to losses made by the factory, but certainly not when 
compared to possible profits farmers could attain when selling to the NTTA. Yet, selling to the 
NTTA was often not possible, which was the reason for the government’s intervention to 
revitalise the factory. Sadly, selling to the factory was just as unreliable as selling to the NTTA 
and, as a result of insufficient funding and planning, caused losses for farmers when neither the 
NTTA, nor the NSTC could buy any longer. Thus, government intervention in processing was 
unsustainable and uneconomic, under current trade regimes, and hardly helped local development 
in the long term. Unlike the government, private entities may be better equipped to handle 
competition, as under greater pressure they assure an economically sound production. 
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6.1.3.3. Private Tomato Processing 
Expom offered to take over the NSTC in 2009 (MOFA 2009). Expom planned to replace 
local tomato varieties by new high-performance, hybrid plants, the ‘Nemagiant F1’ tomato, which 
would have come from the Italian company ‘United Genetics’, a company that designs and 
distributes hybrid seeds worldwide. The tomato would have been suitable for industrial processing 
as well as selling on the fresh market. The seed was somewhat adapted to local climatic 
conditions, as it was reported to perform well in Tunisia, Algeria, Togo and also southern Ghana. 
However, it performed less well in rainy times, which is at least half the year in northern Ghana. 
Furthermore, soils determine yields. Ideally these should be of medium to clay composition. Poor 
or degraded soils could limit yields severely. Another limitation is that the variety is a F1 hybrid, 
which would have meant farmers would have to buy seed each season. F1 hybrids are bred to give 
a high yield in the ‘first generation’, hence the name F1, but the seed gives a low yield if planted 
again. Thus re-using the seed would lead to segregating plants with fewer resistances to pests and 
disease and would reduce yields. Furthermore, optimal yields with the F1 seeds could have only be 
achieved with application of pesticides, to combat fungi and worm attacks, despite the fact that 
the seed is supposed to show tolerance against Verticillium Wilt, Fusarium Wilt (both fungi), 
root-knot nematodes and bacterial spot. However, the plant is not resistant to Tomato Yellow Leaf 
Curl Virus (TYLCV), possibly the major tomato disease frequently occurring in the area. An 
insect control programme is in fact the crucial factor for the success of the F1 seed variety in order 
to avoid transmission of diseases such as TYLCV. Thus large amounts of agro-chemicals would 
have to be used on plants.93  
Production costs would have risen drastically due to fertiliser and agro-chemical usage. 
When comparing Expom’s suggested costs, as defined back in 2010, to that of average costs of 
tomato production in 2010, overall cost of production for Expom would have been more than 
twice as high as for the NTTA, without considering farmers’ labour input as Expom did in its 
official offer. Production was supposed to result in higher yields, a maximum of 80 tonnes/ha 
once cultivation had reached its full potential, instead of the currently prevailing 5 to 10 tonnes/ha 
(2 to 4 tonnes/acre respectively). Expom expected yields to be 30 tonnes/ha in the first and second 
season, 50 tonnes/ha in the third and fourth season, and reach a maximum of 80 tonnes/ha in the 
fifth and sixth season of production, as farmers’ knowledge about growing of the variety 
increases. Farm gate prices would have changed accordingly, starting with a price only slightly 
above the breakeven point of 0.14 GH¢/kg at 30 tonnes/ha and almost no margin to attain for 
farmers. Thereby, Expom’s production model could not have been as profitable as regular 
production for the NTTA, due to the low farm gate price, but only in the initial seasons. Once 
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yields would have increased to 50 tonnes/ha in the third season, through Expom’s support, 
production would have become economically viable for farmers, allowing big incomes despite 
that farm gate prices would have decreased. However, for the first two or three seasons, for a 
maximum of one year, farmers would have needed financial support to maintain comparable 
income levels. Only at the maximum yield of 80 tonnes/ha would farmers’ seasonal margin have 
been similar to that theoretically achieved with the NTTA (see Table 12). 
Season 
Yield 
(t/ha/season) 
Farm gate price 
(GH₵/KG) 
Net returns 
(GH₵/ha/ season) 
Margin/season/ha  
(%) 
1 & 2 30 0.140 86 2 
3 & 4 50 0.125 2.136 34 
5 & 6 80 0.125 5.886 59 
Table 12: Development of yields, farm gate prices, farmers’ net returns and margins under 
Expom’s production model (own Table, 2014, calculations based on MOFA 2009: 6). 
As NTTA would not patronise local farmers throughout most of the year, Expom’s offer 
would have allowed for more assured and profitable specialisation in tomato markets on a 
regional level, unlike sticking with only the fresh market. Once fully in place, farmers could have 
made large, all-year profits. Expom’s economic future would have been secured, unlike that of the 
NSTC. When looking at processing costs in combination with farm gate prices paid once yields 
have reached 50 tonne/ha and more (0.125 GH₵/KG), and when assuming the common 8:1 
processing yield, Expom’s paste price would have been almost 12 percent below than that of 
imported Chinese paste (1.99 GH₵/kg from China, 1.77 GH₵/kg from Ghana). Farm gate prices 
in this processing scenario could have been higher, up to 0.15 GH₵/KG when taking the price for 
Chinese tomato paste with the same brix value (36-38 percent) as a benchmark in 2010. Vice 
versa, a further profit of 0.028 GH₵/KG could have been made for a processor like Expom (see 
Table 13 and compare to Table 14). 
Item Costs (GH₵/kg) Share of costs (%) 
Fresh tomato (8kg at 0.125GH¢/kg) 1.000 56.53 
Water 0.168 9.50 
Fuel  0.480 27.13 
Labour 0.050 2.83 
Electricity 0.008 0.45 
Maintenance of equipment 0.038 2.15 
Depreciation of equipment 0.025 1.41 
Total cost 1.769 100 
Table 13: Estimated cost of Expom’s processing of 1 kg of tomato paste in 2010 (own table, 2011, 
based on survey, 2010, ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 3). 
Item Costs (GH₵/kg) Share of costs (%) 
Cost of tomato concentrate 1.320 66 
Freight 0.450 23 
Customs duty and clearance (12.5%) 0.221 11 
Total cost 1.991 100 
Table 14: Landed cost of 1 kg of imported tomato concentrate (36-38 % Brix) from China in 2010 
(MOTI 2012: 10). 
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Expom would have added further value and profit by redistribution of the paste. These 
values cannot be estimated due to a lack of data: Expom was unwilling to share such data. 
Anyhow, Expom no longer seems to exist. Instead Mercury Tomato Industries (MTI) then offered 
to partner with NSTC (MOTI 2012). 
6.1.4. Governance Dynamics  
Northern Ghanaian farmers are faced with three alternatives, the NTTA, the NSTC and a 
privately run version of the former. The important difference lies beyond sheer inputs and outputs 
of value chains. It is defined by the dynamics of governance of these production networks. 
Advantages and disadvantages are provided to farmers and the future of the northern Ghanaian 
tomato value chain, by the NTTA, publicly and privately run processing facilities.  
6.1.4.1. Fresh Tomato Trade 
Value capture increasingly favours wholesalers over producers and retailers. Indeed, 
wholesalers and moreover their representatives, the tomato market queens who reign over their 
wholesalers and retailers, hold most of the governance power within the chain. Established in 
1985, around the time government withdrew support from agriculture and tomato production, the 
National Tomato Trader Association (NTTA) comprises women traders from all major towns and 
markets in Ghana. All regions of Ghana started to have associations that regulated and controlled 
activities of their traders, meaning they eventually altered prices to their favour, by limiting the 
quantities supplied to markets. The NTTA, nowadays a tightly organised association or cartel, 
factually has the exclusive right to sell to Ghanaian markets. Right to sell is often handed down to 
family members, via association membership.94 The association includes (male) truck drivers and 
local middlemen, who organise contacts with farmers in Burkina Faso and sometimes Ghana. The 
entire tomato value chain beyond the farm gate is controlled by NTTA, as a farmer from Biu 
explained: 
‘There was once a farmer here, who took all his tomato to the Accra market himself. He paid for 
the truck, loading and everything. Then, when he came to the market, the women were not even 
minding his tomato [ignored him]. In fact, they were chasing him [away] and all his tomato got 
spoiled. So you better not even try it!’95 
Traders of agricultural commodities report that it would be very hard, if not impossible for 
them to access domestic tomato markets, unlike with other produce, because of the NTTA. The 
association simply does not allow non-members to sell their produce on local markets, making 
                                                   
94 Interview with several market queens of the NTTA, 21.02.2010, Accra, Ghana. 
95 FGD participant, February 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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them wait for such a long time to sell that their tomatoes start to go bad.96 NTTA members hold 
identity cards and meet annually in the Upper East or the Northern Region, to discuss issues faced 
in business and to coordinate time schedules with drivers and middlemen. The NTTA cooperates 
closely with tollbooth officials at the border of the Upper East and with customs at the Burkinabe 
border, to assure that only the desired number of wholesalers will go to buy tomato. The 
government officials check that wholesalers have the required paperwork, i.e. allowances issued 
by NTTA executives. Quantities arriving at markets are thus tightly controlled, but where these 
stem from, Ghana or Burkina Faso, is up to the individual trader. Prices paid by wholesalers for 
allowances do not differentiate between the two countries and so there is little threshold for 
traders to travel further to Burkinabe competitors.97 Under the strict supervision of ‘tomato 
queens’, the NTTA sources its tomato via travelling merchants. Members are under intense 
pressure to follow the regulations of NTTA. If they do not, traders may be fined or suspended 
from work. Through its full control over the tomato value chain, the NTTA has attained greater 
influence on domestic politics (AMAKYE ET AL. 2008: 27, 64-66; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 58; 
ROBINSON & NGELEZA 2011). Thus, ‘hardboiled’ market women, working in hierarchically, 
highly organised groups actually ‘dominate agricultural market channels from the farm gate to the 
consumer’ (LAUBE 2007: 198).  
Farmers in Biu and Mirigu almost always describe fresh tomato value chain governance as 
being entirely buyer-driven and fully market-based. Transactions are mostly based on single sales 
and feature low complexity, if they occur at all. In terms of farmers’ levels of contractualisation, 
production for the NTTA shows features of a typical informal production model. Financial 
engagement of traders is minimal, short-lived and highly speculative and default risk is high for 
all parties involved. Little to no information is passed on from traders to farmers and production 
risks are entirely in the hands of farmers. Traders, however, have to face increasing risk in 
transport due to spoilage, which they primarily counter by buying in Burkina Faso instead of 
northern Ghana. Sometimes, tomato trade is also organised through middle men, mostly in 
Burkina Faso though, making it an informal intermediary production model, which breaks direct 
contact between farmers and wholesalers. Sponsors may lose the little direct control they had over 
production, prices, amounts and quality of the product, which can result in even lower incomes for 
the farmer as well as irregular production and low quality standards (SEE ALSO EATON & 
SHEPHERD 2001: 45, 52-56). Integration of farmers into the fresh value chain is thus 
increasingly difficult.  
                                                   
96 Interview with a rice trader coming from Accra, 05.01.2013, Navrongo, Ghana.  
97 Interview with a middleman from Paga, 09.01.2013, Paga, Ghana. 
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However, there is reason to believe that the fresh tomato value chain holds potential for a 
far more producer-driven form of governance. This is due to the high value of tomato, the 
relatively high sophistication required in production, the potential of northern Ghanaian farmers to 
compete on international markets and the nationwide seasonality of market supply – leading to 
shortages while tomato is in season in northern Ghana and Burkina Faso. A higher degree of 
contractualisation – at least modular or relational forms of governance – could provide higher 
incomes for farmers, possibly broader-based poverty alleviation in northern Ghana, while 
tomatoes are in season, three months a year. Interestingly, such forms of governance may have 
prevailed in the past. Literature indicates past ‘arrangements’ between farmers and traders which 
have broken down over time, and ‘soft loans’ that were once given to northern farmers by the 
NTTA (AMAKYE ET AL. 2008: 27, 64-66; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 58). It is thus worth 
examining changes in NTTA’s governance, as encountered in the study areas.  
Farmers and Tono Irrigation Cooperative Farmers’ Union (TICFU) representatives98 report 
that relationships to wholesalers were much better in the past. They generally date the change in 
this relationship to the first years of the 21st century – the time that traders started to go to Burkina 
Faso – accompanied by a decrease in profitability. The same wholesalers had previously visited 
the farmers each dry season; produce was picked up right at farm gate and traders occasionally 
used to sponsor farmers. Back in 2010 some of these arrangements were still in place, though 
probably fewer in number. By 2012 no farmers could be found to report of such arrangements. 
Thus, contract farming arrangements have largely broken down although they have managed to 
persist for some time, despite trade liberalisations efforts: 
‘If we would still have that help today, I would be relaxing and enjoying the fruits of my work. [...] 
We were making a lot of money! Now it is not like that anymore! Until about 8 or 9 years ago the 
traders would give us fertiliser, chemicals for spraying the tomatoes and we were sure that when 
a farmer farms, they [the traders] would come and buy. If the market women gave a farmer 
money and fertiliser, it was that same women who will come and buy.’99 
The former arrangements led to several advantages for those farmers included in them. The 
first was reliable market access. Farmers were able to rely on their wholesaler coming to buy their 
tomato at the time of harvest, leading to comparatively little losses at or after harvest, despite the 
informality of contracts. Farmers were in contact with traders long before the beginning of the 
growing season and arranged the amounts of tomato to be planted in accordance to their 
customers’ abilities and needs. Farmers occasionally received finance, seeds, fertilisers and 
chemicals, inputs they otherwise could not afford, as credits to be repaid in kind. Farmers were 
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99 Interview with farmer from Biu, November 2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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thereby able to start production early/in time and had a bigger chance of not being hit by early 
rains during fruiting or high temperatures that could further limit quality and quantity. Moreover, 
they were able to expand their farming activity, which speaks for the profitability of these 
arrangements.100 
Shortly before harvest, farmers arranged pickup times with their wholesalers. Prices paid 
followed prevailing prices, but left room for adjustment on both sides. All interviewed farmers 
reported that they had been willing to reduce the price paid to them, should tomato prices have 
been uncommonly high, and that on the other hand, traders were ready to increase their prices 
when farmers would otherwise have run at a loss. A few arrangements went so far as to serve, 
when sufficient trust between stakeholders was given, as an informal insurance against natural 
hazards. Some farmers reported that traders were once willing to cover up to one-quarter of all 
investments that had previously been forwarded in the form of agro-inputs. However, as indicated, 
arrangements between traders and farmers were reciprocal. Price fluctuations were balanced and 
both sides were assured of being able to conduct business, partly because both were able to do 
long-term planning. Moreover, tomato, while generally paid for in cash, was also sold on credit. 
Traders did not always have the means to pay at the farm gate and so farmers waited for them to 
pay after the produce was sold on markets in the south of Ghana. Reciprocity and closer 
interconnectedness further derived from the exchange of gifts. While farmers generally described 
this as a strategy for the upkeep of ‘friendship’, concrete monetary advantages derived from such 
exchanges. Tomato traders are reported to have brought zinc roofing from the south, while 
farmers presented traders with animals. As roofing is far more expensive in the north of Ghana as 
compared to the south, and durable housing is highly desired among locals as a result of 
increasing incidents of torrential rains through climatic changes, this was a beneficial arrangement 
for farmers. In 2010, it was reported that traders supported farmers far beyond buying their goods. 
It was supposedly not uncommon that merchants helped in times of needs should a farmer be 
unable to afford transport to a hospital or payment of school fees.101 Back then, the liaison of 
tomato traders and farmers seemed to be more than just a monetary relationship:  
‘We have become very good friends! Sometimes they bring me yam that they buy along the road 
side. They will also bring sweet bananas for my children. Before I am home my children will 
already run to me, smiling and tell me what nice things the women have brought for us. For my 
wife they will buy some clothes and they even brought bread for my farm boy. So everybody is 
happy whenever they come around!’102 
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Farmers claim that aside from trust, another major reason for their integration into such 
highly beneficial arrangements was the good quality of their tomato. Despite the fact that traders 
and farmers had arranged their terms of exchange through local leaders, when traders came to 
buy, some farmers insisted on higher payment. Vice versa, farmers were not able to act 
collectively, to stop selling, when prices were too low, as the poorest among them could not 
afford to wait, which undermined the effort. Partly as a result of such (poverty-driven) 
opportunism, trust among farmers, and between farmers and traders, was lost. Traders then 
coordinated more closely among one another to counter these trends. Similar behaviour by traders 
led to the farmers’ breach of informal contract farming arrangements. The traders united as an 
association, withdrew for some weeks to lower prices of the perishable produce, which severely 
frightened local farmers. From then on, traders arranged commerce in a way that came close to a 
spot market with prices changing by the hour, for example between the price agreed in the 
morning, the price following harvest and at the time of pick-up in the evening. Traders thereby 
forced farmers to reduce prices, because by then they had no alternative but to sell at any price, 
considering the perishability of tomato. This increased tensions between farmers and traders.103 
Traders emphasise that the primary threshold to pre-arranging with or even sponsoring farming 
(again) is trust, or rather assurance of terms and conditions agreed upon. Informality in 
arrangements means that trust or social capital is the substitute for legal certainty:  
‘Assuming you arrange with the farmer, agree and come to buy a crate [standard unit of weight] 
at the [agreed] price, the farmer can later on change his mind and raise the price! So that is why 
it is difficult for us to partner with the farmers and tell them what to produce for us. When they 
realise that you have brought the truck and that you cannot make the truck return empty, they try 
to do that and you will be compelled to buy at any price. They are cheats! So, how can they be 
asking us for help any longer?’104 
The farmers’ potential to misuse arrangements was only possible for as long as traders had 
no alternative, up until about the year 2000. Till then the producers were in possession of a 
seasonal monopoly at a nationwide level, enabled by protective duties in fresh tomato trade, 
safeguarding from Burkinabe/ECOWAS competition. That may have also been the reason why 
farmers, at first, enjoyed relatively favourable trade conditions with NTTA. Increasing 
organisation among tomato traders must be considered a reaction to an otherwise more producer-
driven chain. With great success in cooperation among traders, alternative producers in Burkina 
Faso and a lack of trustworthiness and coordination among northern Ghanaian farmers, aside the 
high perishability of (local) tomato, the NTTA managed to take over the entire governance of the 
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fresh tomato value chain. With the aim to increase their incomes, traders could now simply wait 
for local tomatoes to go bad, as their business could still be secured through Burkinabe produce.  
This, however, was a self-amplifying process. Perishability of tomato also gave basic 
reasons for traders to organise among one another as tightly as they do today, because their cartel-
like structure assures them immediate selling on local markets. Accordingly, in Burkina Faso, 
which provides high quality, durable tomato, value chain governance is said to be more 
favourable. There, former verbal farming arrangements have been formalised. The Burkinabe 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture and their local irrigation scheme managers are said to have 
meanwhile signed contracts with the NTTA on behalf of their farmers105, despite that traders were 
initially quite reluctant to venture outside of Ghana, as they didn’t know the language, didn’t 
know any farmers and were unfamiliar of the conditionalities under which commerce in Burkina 
Faso took place.106 But, quality issues with northern Ghanaian tomato, resulting from a loss of soil 
quality, became increasingly pressing and contributed to a loss of market access. Farmers have 
lost the affection of tomato traders to their counterparts in Burkina Faso, claims the local Ghana 
Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU), due to quality issues that relate to soil degradation, 
specifically a lack of organic material. MOFA officials and farmers in Biu confirm this, adding 
that a lack of organic material in soils further shortens harvesting seasons and the shelf life, which 
makes them increasingly unattractive: 
‘The difference is in the soil! In Burkina Faso they don't use these chemical fertilisers. They use a 
lot more of manure […]. So, their soil there is stronger than ours here. Here we put many 
chemical fertilisers and water on the soil and you see the tomato looking bad and being soft. […] 
Still we need to use chemical fertilisers, because if we don't, we don't have any results’107 
Lack of animals and manure means farmers cannot comply with quality needs, which 
further affects cooperation between farmers and traders. When traders started to select farms to 
buy from, instead of having farmers do that for them as had been done previously, selected 
farmers secretly mixed their fruits with the worse quality fruits of others (their neighbours and 
friends). Farmers were thus unwilling to take new quality standards seriously, which rendered 
growing shares of their harvest unsellable, while competitors from Burkina Faso complied and 
had better overall quality. In the eyes of traders, farmers were trying to betray them.  
Traders were no longer ready to buy tomatoes that could not withstand transport to southern 
Ghana. Traders claim that a trace of rotting tomato can spoil the share of produce still of sufficient 
quality. So, traders started to source tomato with the help of knowledgeable locals that check 
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quality requirements. Since these were more closely related to local farmers than to southern 
traders, they could not impose higher quality standards due to a lack of authority. Quality became 
harder to meet, through growing distance between players within the chain, which hindered 
further transfer of knowledge.108 Quality is now the number one determinant of market access. 
The level of product quality is to some degree equivalent to how the NTTA chooses to govern 
over its value chain and producers. Quality loss therefore resulted in a loss of demand for northern 
Ghanaian tomato and so prices fell. Vice versa, as prices fell, farmers reduced inputs and 
especially labour in production, which may have decreased the yields and quality of quite 
sophisticated tomato production.109 This initial downfall of local tomato farming was rather slow 
as compared to what happened a few years later.  
Government authorities reacted to traders’ demands for improved quality through a 2002 
initiative launched by the then District Chief Executive (DCE) of Kassena Nankana District 
(KND). He ordered the acquisition of Burkinabe seeds and their distribution among local farmers 
through the MOFA, to thereby allow locals to compete with cross-border trade. Later, the regional 
MOFA even took farmer representatives to Burkina Faso on a study tour to learn from their 
Burkina counterparts. However, the seed did not make any significant difference and, even worse, 
was not at all resistant to local pest and disease populations:110  
‘The sickness was too much! You will just get nothing! […] They said the quality would improve 
but really, everything died. The seed we had before was good. The tomato plant would grow very 
tall, only that the quality of the fruit became worse. […] But see what happened! All was dead and 
the Accra women [traders] never came again. […] Everybody here changed the seed, so now our 
own tomato, that did not become sick, is gone for good!’111 
Indeed, the decisive and long-term blow for tomato farmers in the study areas came from 
the Tomato Yellow Leaf Curl Virus (TYLCV), or Nematodes, in 2003/2004. Authorities speak of 
region-wide losses of up to 90 percent of total harvests.112 Locals refer to it as a ‘disaster’ that in 
the worse sense ’revolutionised’ trends, as from thereon traders patronised Burkinabe farmers 
instead. Contract farming arrangements broke down almost entirely, partly because of massive 
crop failure and the resulting, outstanding debts of farmers.113  
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As a result of financial distress, farmers reduced the areas used for tomato production in the 
seasons to follow, moreover, because they were rightfully ‘afraid’ to fail again. This scared those 
traders still visiting the area, as traders run into losses when there is not enough tomato grown to 
satisfy their quantitative needs. Farmers in the study areas, however, continued to cultivate 
tomato. The rationale behind a continuation of possibly unprofitable production under worsening 
conditions, derived from the hope of rising profits, because farmers were speculating on higher 
farm gate prices as a result of others dropping out. It was in the interest of large-scale farmers, 
most often FBO or union leaders that others fail in tomato production, so they themselves can 
receive higher farm gate prices. On the other hand, genuine smallholders have frequently 
indicated a great degree of path-dependency resulting from a lack of control over their lives 
imposed by their poverty. The tomato ‘lottery’, they hope, will help them overcome this. To 
farmers, tomato was the only cash crops they had:  
‘If you are under the scorching sun […] and there is no tree to hide under, is it not better you just 
stay under the hot sun, than to be roaming around in the heat, looking for a tree? […] Farming 
tomato is sometimes the only option. If we should need to leave it, it is ok, but where are we going 
and what will we eat from? That is why we continue. If we also run [quit], […] there will be no 
more tomato farmers, but maybe buyers will still come. So, that would be disastrous! I hope if just 
a few people are doing it, […] I will become the richest person.’114 
Moreover, farmers state that outcomes of tomato production are needed for reinvestments 
into further irrigated and rainfed production. Thus, they indirectly state that even minimal profits 
are sufficient, as long as they outweigh inflation and especially growth in fertiliser prices. 
Furthermore, females say that if tomato was not as male-dominated as it is, and women would 
possess more power to decide over venturing into production, women would have dropped out of 
tomato production faster, since men are supposedly more path dependent due to their risk affine 
habitus and have more assets at hand that they are willing to risk, occasionally against the will of 
female household members.115 So, for possibly irrational but also practical reasons, as much as 
cultural reasons, the plight of tomato continued. 
NGO activities highlighted in the media spurred on further developments. In 2006, a huge 
advocacy grant was given to local tomato farmer groups through the Business Sector Advocacy 
Challenge (BUSAC) Fund. Consequently, over 57,000 GH₵ were spent on a media campaign to 
put pressure on the government – in time for the 2008 elections – and to make it re-open the 
tomato processing factory in the Upper East. Furthermore, the farmers’ advocacy groups Ghana 
Trade and Livelihood Coalition and Send Foundation became involved in organising and 
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mobilising local farmers. Further contact was established with international NGOs, among them 
FIAN, OXFAM and others. Increased news coverage, speaking of annual suicides committed by 
local tomato farmers (of which there were actually only about two according to local farmers), led 
to further international NGO and research activities on the topic.116 By early 2007 anger among 
farmers rose, to the extent that farmers blocked the border to Burkina Faso. NGOs, via farmer 
representatives, organised locals for public protests, to hinder traders from crossing the border to 
Burkina Faso. Physical violence erupted at the border station in Paga, between farmers and those 
traders that insisted on travelling. Fights were stopped by force:  
‘The leaders around this area sat for a meeting with the NGOs and later we all went to the market 
women […]. We used different means of stopping them [the women traders] by crossing the road 
with stones and weeds. We came with our big men and were ready to fight them […]. When their 
vehicles came around, we would go and trouble them severely and deflate their tyres. We were 
violating them, beating them badly and making noises. The police chairman at Bolga 
[Bolgatanga] even came with his men to stop us with [tear-] gas.’117 
As a result, Ghana’s government closed the border to Burkina Faso for about two weeks, 
while it urged market women to buy domestic tomatoes instead of foreign ones. The women 
traders were, however, less than ever ready to buy comparatively expensive, yet bad quality 
tomato from farmers who had previously violated them. To meet ECOWAS protocols, however, 
cross-border trade had to continue.118 The production of tomato almost ceased in the region. Only 
farmers with higher quality tomatoes, often those doing SGI in places like Mirigu, managed to 
keep attracting customers, but only customers from nearby Tamale. Farmers in Mirigu still had 
the telephone numbers of these female traders, and were in contact with them over the year. But, 
these traders no longer forwarded inputs as before and instead ask to buy on credit, since the 
general market for tomato broke down. But, along with ongoing media coverage of happenings at 
the Burkinabe border came the promise by local politicians to restart production at the NSTC. 
Initially at least, this revived the production of tomato in northern Ghana. 
6.1.4.2. Public Tomato Processing 
Value capture with Northern Star Tomato Company’s (NSTC) part of the paste value chain 
primarily favoured its former partner Expom and, at least in comparison to the NSTC itself, 
farmers. The latter, however, only marginally, because the NSTC’s little production was 
completely economically unsustainable, while farm-gate prices paid were very low in comparison 
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118 Interviews with several local farmer union leaders, March 2013, UER, Ghana. 
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to the fresh market. This was due to the additional costs involved – the bad processing yields – 
stemming from the bad quality of local produce. With processing costs determining farm gate 
prices, selling quality tomato to a factory can only be a rational thing for farmers to do, if the 
alternative is a total loss of harvests, if yields improve drastically and if all year tomato production 
– implying at least a captive relation if not a hierarchic one throughout three fourth of a year – is 
actually desired. Farmers would need assurance in selling and support of their production beyond 
the current state. If farmers were not be part of an assured contract farming scheme that supplied 
them with inputs on credit to notably boost production and income all year round and possibly 
provide further benefits going beyond immediate economic interests, thus involves itself closely 
and positively in local society while using its attained closeness as a way of exercising social 
control over farmers, it is questionable if locals would want to and could in any way be made to 
comply with processing requirements. These are vast. If the NSTC were to run at a full capacity 
of 500 tonnes per day, for just 300 days per year, 119 that translates into about 150,000 tonnes per 
year, which would equal about 83 percent of Ghana’s annual, countrywide production in 2008, 
respectively a little less than 50 percent in 2012 (FAOSTAT 2014). However, NSTC’s efforts 
were actually close to non-existent and badly administrated.  
The NSTC management initially relied on radio broadcasts to motivate farmers to go into 
production, but failed to follow up.120 The majority of farmers did not receive support of any kind 
or formal contracts to go into production. Nevertheless, announcements on the radio had a big 
effect, as farmers all over the Upper East went into tomato production once more. At Biu’s 
irrigation scheme for example, the acreage used for tomato doubled from 2006 to 2007 (data 
obtained from ICOUR, 2010). Farmers were disappointed later, when they realised how small 
NSTC’s farm gate prices were. But the major problem was that the NSTC did not even have 
enough trucks and crates to allow for transport to the factory. The factory lacked money, because 
the management misused and misdirected the public finances provided.121 The chief of Kodima, 
also the secretary of the local union, tried to organise transport himself. His subordinates, 
however, were forced to sell their tomato to him at less than half the factory price. The outcomes 
for most farmers were losses due to mismanagement and elite capture. 
The managing director of the NSTC was exchanged by the dry season of 2007/2008.122 
Beforehand a few formal contracts were fixed between the factory and farmers. More than 800 
farmers spread throughout the region were supposed to be supplied with seeds. However, most 
                                                   
119 Interview with the NSTC farm operations manager, 15 03.2010, Pwalugu, Ghana. 
120 Interviews with the ICOUR director and NSTC farm operations manager, March 2010, UER, Ghana. 
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Pwalugu, Ghana. 
122 Interview with the MOTI, February, 2010, Accra, Ghana.  
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farmers did not take seeds from the factory for various reasons, notably because of the traumatic 
experience they had had with government/MOFA seeds only a few years back. The people that 
did receive seeds signed formal agreements with the NSTC. Farmers were thereby supposed to 
receive financial support for farm maintenance and were supposed to be assured of purchase. But, 
none of that happened. Support other than seed, which is by far the cheapest input, was not given. 
In fact, the amount of tomato that could have been produced with these seeds would have lasted 
the factory for only about 26 days. The seeds supplied were not suitable for production in the wet 
season, limiting production to about three months a year.  
Consequently, the effort to initialise contractual farming for processing had no success. 
After that, contracts were not signed again.123 In the years to come, the factory permanently failed 
to buy enough tomato to be regarded as a true alternative to the NTTA. Further trust was loss 
when in early 2010 (the dry season 2009/2010) no work was underway at the factory even though 
it had been announced on the radio, quoting Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) and factory 
management spokespersons. The factory continuously failed to live up to its promises. All farmers 
interviewed shared the opinion that the factory frequently came too late to buy tomato. In fact, the 
only positive thing farmers could report about the factory was that it was not at all selective over 
the kind of quality it would buy. The NSTC thereby successfully convinced farmers that their 
production could continue as in the past.  
Production under the NSTC was an unsustainable, ad-hock hybrid of different models. It 
merged several ways of organising contractual farming in an unfavourable way. It had traits of a 
multipartite model, as it involved multiple organisations with joint responsibilities, and included 
statutory bodies and corporations working with privately owned companies and local farmers. 
This choice of setup, due to the multiple actors in this form of arrangement, made internal 
management difficulties more likely unless there was excellent coordination between players. 
NSTC incorporated elements of a centralized model, as it bought from a large number of small 
farmers. Such arrangements are most common for vegetables for canning or freezing. Ideally, 
these are strongly vertically coordinated, thus under captive or hierarchical relations, with quota 
allocation and tight quality control. Sponsors’ involvement in production can vary from minimal 
input provision to the opposite extreme where the sponsor takes control of most production 
aspects, however, normally farmers are at least contracted and often are provided with 
management advice, materials and further inputs (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 44, 56, 150). 
None of this was done on a sufficient basis. NSTC could not live up to its own requirements, or 
those of tomato producers.  
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Most of the Northern Star Tomato Company’s business was transacted informally, 
sometimes including farmer leaders that had previously negotiated over farm gate prices. That 
these leaders bought tomato for themselves at cut-throat prices makes clear that they were not 
necessarily representing whom they were supposed to. Farmers often stated that these ‘leaders’ 
did not pass on information from the factory. Moreover, these large-scale farmers were preferred 
by the NSTC whenever the company actually managed to pick up tomato. Farmer leaders reported 
having had good and personal contact with the factory, while farmers did not even know how to 
contact it at the time of harvest. Consequently, trust towards the factory and leaders, indirectly 
representing the NSTC, was lost to the point that some farmers claim they will no longer react 
(i.e. pay attention) to these authorities. The local branch of the SEND Foundation, which was 
close involved in the process, explain how the people’s representatives are ‘in bed’ with a factory 
that betrayed the people at a time when they were in need of help. One major issue was the lack of 
a united farmer front. In meetings farmers pointed out that many of their leaders had been bribed 
by the company and were no longer working for their benefit. The tomato farmers association did 
not seem to have the confidence or support of its own farmers.124 Farmers and the NSTC 
management see the true reason for the rehabilitation of the factory based in political 
opportunism, not in a long-lasting attempt that seriously aims at sustainable running of the plant. 
Stopping traders to go to Burkina Faso was not possible due to ECOWAS agreements and so the 
revitalisation of the factory was simply the next best thing to do, shortly before upcoming 
elections.125 In fact, a GIZ paper states that the factory was permanently influenced by politics, 
had no functional management team, no clear governance structure and no functional strategic 
business plan whatsoever.126  
Market power remained in the hands of the National Tomato Trader Association (NTTA), 
which would hardly patronise the area anymore. The factory was limited to producing bulk 
tomato paste/puree, while it showed no attempts to enable product or market differentiation. It 
continuously depended on its one private customer Expom, which held a monopolistic position in 
the paste chain. Public investments in the paste value chain and specifically NSTC’s business 
were too small to enable proper running. Government underfunded the venture and so finance and 
credit were inadequate. Financing of and responsibility for production of the raw material for 
processing was entirely in the hands of farmers, as was risk and uncertainty. The factory had no 
incentives to successfully run. For example shutdowns did not seem to be a factor motivating the 
factory’s management or supervisors in Accra’s ministries. The government could have kept on 
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investing or even increased it efforts in the otherwise unprofitable venture, however, it did not 
have the ability or the willingness to keep on supporting the misuse of public funds. Further 
barriers to farmers wanting to enter the paste value chain derived from the factory’s substantial 
mismanagement, lack of reliable government finances and lack of essential equipment for 
transport. This favoured already successful farmers over those who were in need of help.  
That processing frequently started too late created additional barriers, excluding smaller and 
larger farmers alike because climatic conditions limit the timeframe within which tomatoes can be 
harvested. All in all, a potential future processor would therefore primarily have to rebuild trust in 
the factory, increase the production of farmers, and assure pre-financing for the thereby 
encountered costs, because hardly any farmer will be able or willing to do so by him or herself. 
Compared to what has happened in the past, so locals believe, the most realistic opportunity that 
could allow long-term success in local paste markets can only derive from a privately managed 
and thus governed processing factory.127 
6.1.4.3. Private Tomato Processing 
Expom’s initial attempt to source tomato for processing was based on a nucleus estate 
model, characterised by having a central estate or plantation for self-production and gathering 
produce from local farmers. Such a central estate is typically used to guarantee raw material 
supply and sometimes used only for research or breeding purposes (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 
44; MOFA 2009). Some few locals were to be employed to work on Expom’s plantation. First 
attempts had been made to acquire land along the White Volta River, close to Pwalugu.128 In order 
to secure further supply of raw material, farmers throughout the Upper East Region, Ghana even, 
were to sign contracts, guaranteeing that all production would go directly to Expom, most likely 
because such ‘large-scale investments, […] often require a monopoly in order to be viable’ 
(EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 17). Expom was not ready to invest into the factory, but to 
guarantee pre-financing of farmers’ production and to buy at harvest, which to the locals is the 
most important criteria to motivate them back to tomato.  
Contact through FBOs and a union was established129. Expom then wanted to introduce new 
hybrid seeds to farmers, but also further inputs on credit like fertilisers and agro-chemicals and 
further assistance in training farmers to adopt improved technologies. The company was aiming at 
a 90 percent recovery rate for its provided loans. To increase productivity further, Expom wanted 
to install a drip irrigation system, on a total of 2400 ha. Almost 60 percent of the equipment would 
have been made available on UER irrigation schemes (mainly at Tono and partly at Vea), about 
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20 percent to Bontanga, near Tamale in the Northern Region, and another 20 percent to 
Akomadan, in the south of Ghana, the Ashanti Region. Another 100 hectares were supposed to be 
cultivated with pumping machines by private farmers along the White Volta. Expom expected the 
set-up to take about three years.  
During that time, farmers were to be identified and selected for production by ICOUR, the 
Ghana Irrigation Authority and through FBOs. Thus, Expom’s model made use of multipartite 
models. Financial institutions for further financing of production for those not supported by 
Expom were to be found. A nursery was to be established for growing of seedlings by Expom. 
Seeds were to be imported, allowing cultivation of tomato from the third month onwards, 
coordinated in such a way that the factory could be constantly supplied with raw material. Expom 
offered to pay in cash at the farm gate and to bear the cost of transport, whereby farmers would 
have been allowed to sell 25 percent of total tomato production – thus three months a year, current 
dry season production – to the National Tomato Trader Association (memo examined at the 
MOTI, 2nd March, 2010, Accra, and MOFA 2009: 2-3).  
Allowing farmers to sell 25 percent of their production to the NTTA was a precondition set 
by the government. It assumed that the increases in farmers’ productivity and the resulting 
additional amounts of tomato produced could serve both fresh and paste markets and thereby lead 
to higher farmer incomes. Such a mixed scenario would have been most favourable to farmers 
with regards to monetary advantages. Furthermore, the government only partly agreed to Expom’s 
efforts to establish a monopoly in northern Ghana. So, to limit competition with the NTTA, it 
emphasised that that a quarter of production should be available to the fresh market, which would 
partly even out differences between the fresh and the processed market. The government did not 
allow Expom to set up captive relations in tomato processing. The company’s governance, as 
reflected in its strategy to source materials, was precarious. 
Expom wanted to make use of an informal model. The supply required to feed the factory 
was supposed to be gathered equally from Expom’s own fields, contracted farmers with full input 
support by Expom, and so called ‘freelancers’ with no support at all from whom tomatoes would 
have been spontaneously bought in case of shortages. Farmers would have been rewarded or 
sanctioned, according to their compliance to Expom, by being granted either status.130 It is 
questionable, therefore, how freelancers would have to enter into tomato production at all. Vast 
investments by freelance farmers would have been required to allow them to make use of 
economies of scale, to be able to sell profitably and with sufficient quality, to become a contracted 
farmer. Further issues were likely to arise among those contracted, when using FBOs and unions 
as mediators, to organise farmers and distribution of inputs and repayment, because these are 
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highly unreliable and are characterised by elite capture. The potential for local farmers was 
furthermore limited by the fact that, once yields are at 80 tonnes/ha, only 2,250 ha would have to 
be cultivated in order to supply the factory with produce. Thus, the more effective tomato 
production would have been, the fewer farmers would have been needed. That would have had an 
effect on the fresh market, if extremely efficient, contracted farmers could have then beat their 
competitors in Burkina Faso price- and quality-wise, but also their non-contracted, fellow farmers. 
Moreover, as Expom’s scope of processing activities was not limited to Ghana’s north, a running 
factory under Expom may have benefitted better-situated farmers from southern Ghana who 
would have been more able to live up to the costly production standard. At least 40 percent of raw 
material requirements would likely not have come from the Upper East.  
How hybrid seed would have done if farmers had taken it up is unknown. Currently soils 
seem degraded, and rains in the wet season could very well influence production negatively, so 
both factors would limit yields, thus decrease profitability. Producing for Expom would have 
resulted in permanent monocultures of tomato. The enormous amounts of inputs needed would 
have increasingly affected the environment, if not farmers’ health when using agro-chemicals 
incorrectly. But, processing of tomato seemingly cannot work profitably without the introduction 
of new seeds, new methods of cultivation and larger amounts of input use, resulting in huge 
increases in efficiency by means of industrial agriculture. This is what Expom was aiming at, but 
these hopes are hardly compatible with the agro-ecological realities of the study area. 
Environmental concerns should have been of concern to Expom, though they seemingly were not.  
Expom meanwhile closed as a result of massive tax frauds, uncovered by a presidential task 
force. The company, ‘which often kept their imports in bonded warehouses manned by the state or 
customs officials’, was ‘supposed to pay duties before clearing them. However, they succeeded in 
compromising customs officials and cleared the goods without paying the required amounts to the 
state’. Overall, more than 20,000,000 US$ thereby bypassed authorities (ARKU 2013). Such 
criminal behaviour is hard to understand, especially when considering that Expom already paid 
significantly fewer taxes as it was situated in a Special Economic Zone in Tema. Expom’s 
integrity turned out to be more than questionable when it sold Chinese tomato paste as a Ghanaian 
brand to be able to access ECOWAS markets, and when it sold services and goods to the NSTC 
for over 4 million US$, to then want to buy them back at one-quarter of the price. From this 
perspective, doubts about their potential conduct with farmers seem more than justifiable. 
However, their proposal may have been a better choice compared to the offer made by Mercury 
Tomato Industries (MTI) (MOTI 2012).  
The decisive difference in MTI’s current offer is that it is not really considering pre-
financing of farmers, though it claims to somehow want to ‘finance’ production. The extent of 
sponsoring is not explained at all. MTI does not reflect on the inputs required for suitable tomato 
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and paste production. According to their own survey data used in the proposal, farmers in the 
Upper East could produce a kilo of tomato for under 0.15 GH₵/KG – which is their proposed 
farm gate price. Like Expom however, MTI did not consider labour in its production cost 
estimates, even though this is one of the largest inputs in fresh tomato production. The data give 
the impression that MTI may be planning to leave farmers’ production the way it is, as its offer 
draws on contemporary estimates of farmers’ yields. MTI wants to venture into the processing of 
vegetables (possibly chili and pickles), whenever it is not tomato season, and wants to go into 
juice and shea-butter processing, ketchup and hot sauces, canned pickles and water bottling. Thus, 
the company would try to diversify production heavily, for which it proposes further investments 
in machinery.  
To source raw material for just its tomato section, MTI asks for areas to be put under drip 
irrigation, which it sees as the decisive factor for attaining quality produce. Yet the extent of 
irrigation, where it will take place or who will come up with the required money is not mentioned. 
MTI assumes that 500 farmers would be sufficient to feed the plant, while another 20 to 30 
workers and another five managers are to be employed to run the factory for six days a week at 
three shifts per day. MTI plans to rely on the government to ‘jointly’ manage the factory, despite 
the fact that the government failed to run it. The real task for the government in this would be to 
provide its factory estate and machinery for free and to assure exclusive market access for MTI. 
The government ought to allow them to become the only provider for their nationwide, public 
school feeding programme and for supplying further governmental programmes and institutions. 
MTI asks the government to buy at prevailing market prices, but offers a flexible discount. 
Possible overproduction is supposed to be exported to ECOWAS partner countries. However, the 
reason for why MTI remains rather vague in all of this derives from the fact that it needs to 
determine and secure the required funding, for which it hopes to win over the government. 
Attained start-up funds are to be used first and foremost to cover own operating costs, including 
payroll, taxes and utilities and to purchase further machinery. In total, about 60 percent of all 
funds are to be spent on operating the factory, not on sponsoring farmers or setting up irrigation, 
while the rest will be used for further assets until profitability is realised. Support for producers 
may come later (MOTI 2012: 3-6, 8-9).  
Under such conditions, the question of why farmers should sell to the factory arises. There 
is no reason for farmers, assuming they are able to produce sufficiently good tomato by 
themselves, to sell at extremely low prices to Mercury Tomato Industries (MTI). Quality tomatoes 
could again attract the National Tomato Trader Association (NTTA). If farmers cannot produce 
better quality by themselves, processing will most likely run at a loss, or farm gate prices would 
have to drop further, by about 50 percent, which then implies an even less profitable price for 
farmers. The likelihood of facing stiff competition from the NTTA is even bigger due to the fact 
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that tomato is not required all year around. Thereby the NTTA and the factory would require local 
tomato at the same time, whereby, the NTTA could not be beaten in terms of pricing. With no 
support granted to farmers for an indefinite timeframe, it is questionable how the company wants 
to assure farmers’ motivation to go into production, how sufficient quality can be produced and 
how profitable processing would be and who could actually participate.  
The same goes for other agricultural products that could be processed, e.g. chili. In the case 
of shea, it has been shown that buying nuts at common prices for further processing on the side of 
MTI would leave those engaged in picking with an attainable wage below all local averages. Their 
workforce, as much as anybody’s supplying the factory, is outsourced to independent 
pickers/farmers. Only if MTI was to buy and then refine locally made shea butter, which it is not 
aiming to do, could women possibly attain higher incomes. So, with these great uncertainties and 
the fact that achievable farmer (livelihood) outcomes seem rather low, government would be wise 
not to risk pumping further capital into a venture that, in initial financing and later market access, 
depends on subsidies and allows MTI to attain a monopoly through exclusive access to 
government programmes and institutions.  
If the government possessed higher skills to manage the factory, then it would be better for 
it to do so, rather than the MTI. Thereby, the best alternative currently remaining for northern 
Ghanaian farmers is production for the NTTA cartel, whereby farmers need government support 
to beat Burkina Faso’s farmers in terms of quality. This seems more feasible than wasting public 
monies on processing, which seems rather unsustainable in social and environmental terms, 
though profitable for farmers if done under the right conditions with sufficiently financed and 
trustworthy, private partners. It is also interesting to consider if the Ghanaian tomato market can 
be freed of the NTTA monopoly in fresh tomato trade. Without much investments required, that 
could lead to greater competition among wholesalers and thereby allow farmers to achieve greater 
prices, albeit only for three months in a year.  
6.1.5. Conclusion 
The overall dynamics of tomato market structures and their respective value chains, with 
relevance to local farmer livelihoods, are characterised by worsening market access with a 
negative impact on local producers’ livelihoods. That primarily has to do with dynamics in the 
fresh tomato market, as paste markets were never of significance. Tomato for fresh or paste 
markets are rightfully understood as separate commodities, also in livelihood contexts, with fresh 
tomato being far more lucrative than processed tomato (ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 4), 
assuming no sponsoring of local farmers’ production.  
Trends in the fresh market were triggered by regional trade liberalisation efforts. With 
borders to Burkina Faso open, seasonal patterns in nationwide production, which had prior 
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provided a seasonal producer monopoly for northern Ghana (ASUMING-BREMOONG & 
ASUMING BOAKYE 2008; MONNEY et al. 2009: 7), became a disadvantage for northern 
Ghana’s farmers access to markets. Burkinabe competition came at the time of year when prices 
could otherwise be most favourable. So trade liberalisation through ECOWAS agreements 
affected fresh markets and thereby northern farmers, thus regional trader regimes, and not 
necessarily SAPs or ERPs leading to global paste imports. Quality issues were identified as the 
primary factor of worsening of market access, because they determine the losses that wholesalers 
encounter (aside from processing yields). Quality differences between Ghana and Burkina Faso 
overshadow price competition when it comes to value chain participation. These findings stand in 
contrast to other studies on the issue (AWO 2010, 2007; LAUBE et al. 2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 
2011; PAASCH 2008; SEND FOUNDATION 2008; SONGSORE 2011: 263), while aligning 
with more specific publications and government analysis which point at quality and consequently 
post-harvest losses as being the most urgent issue in the fresh market (GHANAVEG 2014: 37; 
MOFA 2009: 1; VENUS et al. 2013: 33). Yet, competition with foreign paste has not made it easy 
to find alternative market avenues.  
The popular engagement of the government in its aim to provide alternative market avenues 
for foreign paste – as requested by studies that blamed SAPs and price competition – has not 
made things better. Rather it’s made conditions far worse, was short-lived and thereby precarious. 
Government has not set reward structures, roles that offer higher and more stable returns, as well 
as routes for arriving at these goals (GIBBON 2004: 26-30). The government itself caused the full 
collapse of most producers, by spreading seed not resistant to local pests. This cemented already 
prevailing, yet minor tendencies to source tomato elsewhere. Equally, trader-farmer relations 
completely broke down when crop disease put a halt to (prearranged, defined and timed) flows of 
tomato. The then publicly supplied alternative, the local processing facility, remained 
uncompetitive, mismanaged and generally underperformed. It was characterised by vast 
overspending in processing, whilst overall being underfunded and suffering from acute working 
capital shortage, thus it continued to fail locals that reinitiated tomato production for the factory. 
The public factory is unviable both with and without continuous government protection and 
support. Just like prior to SAP times (CHRISTIAN AID 2003; FAO 1970: 2; SCHÜRMANN 
1967: 4-11; VOSCON ASSOCIATES & MAGNA CONSULTING 1997: 6), the factory remained 
of little significance for locals and thereby had little to no positive effect on livelihoods. At the 
onset of northern Ghana’s post-adjustment era, the restoration of the paste factory by the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) government (WHITFIELD 2011b: 31, 32) was merely a campaign goody 
for elections. 
Outlooks for private processing in Ghana’s north are equally disappointing. Despite the fact 
that ROBINSON and KOLAVALLI (2010: 10) assume economical paste production to be 
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possible in principle, they neglect the issue of tomato quality, which makes local paste 
uncompetitive and unattractive to consumers. Even if locally sourced tomato paste could compete, 
would it really be desirable for locals to be integrated into processing? It would be accompanied 
by vast environmental impacts, create potentially severe economic disparity under even more 
exclusive and captive relations with private partners, and without greatly increased yields of 
farmers would pay far below all standards. From this view, it seems that offers made to the 
government were not as ‘laudable’ as proclaimed (MOFA 2009: 2; MOTI 2012). They would 
have required ‘a monopoly in order to be viable’ (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 17), which would 
have replaced the less tight and more decentralised monopoly in fresh tomato with an even stricter 
one in processing. So, the primary issue with the tomato value chain beyond farm gate, remains 
with the cartel-like structure of potentially lucrative fresh tomato markets, which suffers from 
severe and increasing value capture through wholesalers, as outlined by other studies (AMAKYE 
et al. 2008: 27, 64-66; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 58; LAUBE 2007: 198; ROBINSON & 
NGELEZA 2011).  
In purely theoretical terms, temporal dynamics in the coordination and governance of chains 
from a farmer’s point of view are characterised by worsening forms of chain coordination and less 
rewarding functional positions with less value added and deteriorating returns, thus economic 
downgrading rather than what is known as ‘upgrading’ (DIETSCHE 2011: 31, 33; GIBBON & 
PONTE 2005: 87-88; SCHAMP 2008: 8). A producer-driven, fresh tomato chain became a buyer-
driven cartel, accompanied by shifts in power. Chain governance was not formerly characterised 
by high technological competency and resulting supremacy of farmers, but stemmed from the fact 
that northern Ghanaian farmers enjoyed a quasi-monopoly during the dry season. Contemporary, 
buy-driven chain governance is now characterised by considerable flexibility in exchanging 
producers according to quality that determines prices for wholesalers through its impact on post-
harvest losses. A turnaround in chain governance was possible because of an influx in the 
numbers of possible tomato producers, which in turn accompanied trade liberalisation efforts in 
ECOWAS markets. Meanwhile a tight and highly professional cartel of lead firms was formed, 
the NTTA, which monopolised market access, thereby took control of the commodity chain, and 
started to dictate terms including prices. Consequently the present chain setup provides only 
marginal opportunities for value addition, capacity building and independent development to 
producers (as was theoretically layed out by BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 209-210). 
From a traders’ point of view, ‘territoriality’ of the chain needed to be expanded as policy 
and thereby ‘institutional structures’ changed towards regional trade liberalisation, which allowed 
traders to alter value addition to their benefit (in reference to theory laid out by GEREFFI 1995; 
1994). It can be concluded that market arrangements and governance of chains really depend on 
how production is done and the resulting quality in combination with further physical product 
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flow, especially the harsh climatic and road conditions that further increase post-harvest losses in 
fresh tomato trade. Furthermore, quantity and timing, as reflected in a breakdown of market 
access through crop disease, are rightly assumed as further major determinants in tomato chains 
(HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 2002: 1021), and can have a long-lasting aftermath. The same goes 
for the transaction costs therein reflected (TRIENEKENS 2012: 54). This abstract, linear, 
sequential, dichotomist perspective was contested in the local context (BRAUN & SCHULZ 
2012: 210-211; DIETSCHE 2011: 29).  
Further theoretical potential to illuminate the situation arises from a Global Value Chain 
(GVC) perspective (GEREFFI et al. 2005). This perspective highlights that the degree of 
codification in the chain is enlarged by real and perceived distance between actors, which further 
worsens the competency of partners in the chain to live up to requirements. So, lower vertical 
integration in chains really decreases the possibility of implementing more standards in value 
chains (BRAUN & DIETSCHE 2008: 13; BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 243-244). The transactions 
in terms of information and thereby product flow between farmers and traders has become 
increasingly hard. The perishability of a product like tomato should already raise transaction 
costs, which is why tomato traders should be naturally inclined towards contracting, higher 
coordination or by integrating farmers in their endeavours, to reduce costs. But, worsening quality 
and also opportunism on the side of local farmers increased transaction costs, making local 
producers unattractive and superfluous once alternatives were at hand. Relational value chains 
became modular to market based (see also BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 212-213; KULKE 2007: 
121-122; SCHAMP 2008: 6-8).  
Neglecting many economic realities, however, a wide set of non-commercial actors and 
institutions made further significant differences in governance and coordination, as revealed by 
the Global Production Networks (GPN) perspective. Among the wider horizontal entanglements 
of relevance were NGOs, governments and unions, actors who are not directly integrated in 
vertical relations but seemingly exercise vast power (as was indicated by ROSSI 2013: 224). 
Local dynamics could only be understood through relations and connectivity amongst entities 
(HENDERSON et al. 2002: 442) in combination with a bottom-up perspective that ‘addresses 
social, political and cultural contexts ‘on the ground’ within which production processes’ of the 
‘most powerless’ were embedded (DARBY 2013: 45). This is reflected in the demand for public 
processing, partly as a result of NGO and farmer initiated media campaigns, and the resulting, 
economically and socially unsustainable, transient actions taken by the government to win over 
voters. Processes of value creation, enhancement and capture derived from societal embeddedness 
and power (COE 2009: 557-558; HENDERSON et al. 2002: 448), and social and institutional 
contexts (COE 2009: 557-558). They did not work to the advantage of weakly organised, local 
farmers, who could not compete with the market power of fresh tomato traders. Furthermore 
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public (government), institutional power (KULKE 2013: 146) evoked in social and institutional 
contexts was extremely frail in enabling avenues for broad-based livelihood upgrading.  
Avenues for Upgrading 
Future interventions should perhaps focus on fresh tomato markets and forget about 
processing. Of primary importance to fresh markets are trader barriers. Traders should be able to 
enter the market without having to be part of the NTTA cartel, whose tight control blocks 
international competitors that could serve an alternative sale avenue for local farmers. NTTA as it 
functions decreases demand for local farmers’ produce (see also LAUBE 2007: 207-208). On the 
whole, governance structures and power differences, not necessarily the level of competency and 
knowledge (COE & HESS 2008: 268), seem of greatest importance for upgrading. With a break 
of cartel structures, consumer prices could, theoretically, drop while comparatively high farm gate 
prices could increase.  
It is hard to understand why a country like Ghana embarks on neoliberal, free-trade reforms 
with some success, but at the same time tolerates a monopoly that works mostly to the detriment 
of the poorest, those in northern Ghana. An answer may be found in the political power the NTTA 
holds. International trade has mostly benefitted traders of tomato but not northern producers. 
Allowing more competition and higher demand could alter trends. Farmers would be motivated to 
aim at improvements in processes and products, sophistication of production, and thereby provide 
more rewarding functions and higher value addition (FOLD & LARSEN 2011: 42-44; MILBERG 
& WINKLER 2010: 1). Yet, consumers’ and traders’ demands for higher quality are a 
prerequisite to domestic value chain entry and even more so for trade over longer distances. 
Process and product upgrading (NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1388; ROSSI 2013: 223), at least to a 
certain degree, has to take place beforehand, which points at locals farmers’ competency and 
knowledge levels (COE & HESS 2008: 268). 
Long-ongoing difficulties in meeting quality standards – formerly covered by exorbitant 
duties – have worsened as a result of environmental degradation, primarily caused by a lack of 
organic material such as manure. This has had a vast impact on market dynamics. The external 
side of environmental vulnerability – its transformation at local scale and a lack of coping with 
these dynamics, primarily a degradation of soils – is revealed when examining tomato production. 
Decreasing product quality eroded fresh produce trade, rendered processing increasingly 
uncompetitive, and allowed only marginal farm gate prices. While the fresh market became 
gradually selective as a result, codified quality standards were imposed that implied greater 
attention be given to environmental concerns. The factory, on the other side, encouraged farmers 
to continue production as it was. So reward structures, roles that offer higher and more stable 
returns, routes for arriving at these goals, and learning processes that are central to upgrading 
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(GIBBON 2004: 26-30) were all hindered by government and supported by the NTTA (ROSSI 
2013: 223).  
Soil quality, the very basis of farmer livelihoods, has to be improved against ongoing 
degradation to attract traders. An increasing number of locals are well aware of this, yet do not 
have the means to do so, namely livestock. That is not to say that farmers should be completely 
withheld from following a more intensified or even industrialised form of agriculture, such as 
required for processing, as these can be highly lucrative and thereby good for poverty alleviation. 
In fact, because the extent of production under shallow groundwater irrigation (SGI) is 
constrained by physical strength and thus youth, demographic trends namely an aging of 
population will make tomato value chains less accessible in the future, lowering outcomes 
because the dependency ratio will increase. Intensification, improved and more irrigation – 
through government schemes or pumping machines – and mechanisation are needed.  
The efficiency of fertilisers over manure also speaks for more intensive practices. Pests and 
disease may need treatment with agro-chemicals. But, the negatives effects of more industrialised 
farming must be clarified and dealt with adequately, so that farmers can achieve long-term 
advancements by themselves, for example by improved market access though higher quality. With 
Ghana being a highly developed country within the West African context, and thus equipped with 
a higher living and wage standard, prices cannot be the advantageous factor to locals. Farmers 
could pursue quality, sophistication, and organic forms of production that would appeal to 
southern Ghanaian consumers. ‘Environmental upgrading’, more ecological sustainability, is very 
much an economic consideration (BRAUN & DIETSCHE 2008: 13; DIETSCHE 2011: 37). Free 
animal vaccinations could, in this context, do much to support locals to apply their existent 
societal knowledge for sustainable land use. 
Social upgrading – in terms of wider external effects and societal issues of poverty 
alleviation, irrespective of purely economic concerns – are rightfully emphasised by scholars 
(such as PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1648) on top of environmental, economic improvements. In 
comparison to processing, access to fresh markets is easier, which is good for locals’ well-being 
as it allows easier participation and incorporates traditional traders, thus cultural heritage. If 
tomato was to be manured, further food-securing activities could benefit from improved soils on 
former tomato fields. On the other hand, processing tomato often comes with the need to produce 
tomato all year round. How are farmers supposed to keep on practicing traditional, wet season 
farming, when they already struggle with coordinating their labour activities throughout the year?  
Under the most profitable processing scenario, farmers could earn an annual income of less 
than 18,000 GH₵ per hectare and annum. Most locals don’t even cultivate that amount of land, 
but if they could, would it cover the expenses required to buy food for a family throughout the 
year? Risks will be high, when no form of assurance against climatic calamities or tomato disease 
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outbreaks is provided, and food security could suffer tremendously. It is also questionable if local 
farmers would be willing to go that way, because diversification is an elementary part of their 
survival systems and deeply embedded in local society, for good reason. The amount of external 
labourers at hand for tomato plots is also relevant. At certain times there are none available to 
handle a greatly enlarged production for processing. But it is questionable if workers would 
receive higher wages. Apart from the few sponsored by a processor, there is no room to increase 
wages for those in serving the processing market. Furthermore, it would take tremendous efforts 
to convince farmers to venture into processing at all. 
‘Sustainable’ or ‘livelihood upgrading’ – desirable economic, social and environmental 
effects – that enables the majority, or at least a large part of the poor, to cope and deal with 
stresses and shocks and enhance current and future capabilities and assets while preserving the 
natural resource base (see also CHAMBERS & CORNWAY 1991: 6), could be achieved by 
allowing locals to produce for fresh tomato markets with the right support. To provide adequate 
backing, the government’s institutional capacity must be enhanced both quality and quantity-wise. 
Attention must be given to the unfavourable way in which the tomato value chain and resulting 
interventions are embedded in livelihoods and in the collective power of farmer organisations.  
Support systems in terms of sale are dominated by elites at the local level that can and do 
alter dynamics according to their desires. The continued reliance on FBOs and unions would 
further cement the standing of elites, to the disadvantage of the majority of farmers and a threat 
for future attempts in processing. To allow for a united and thereby powerful farmers front that 
could withstand the market power of already united buyers, respectively a large-scale processor, 
FBOs and unions should be reformed or rather scrapped and set-up anew. The few studies that 
hint at former ‘arrangements’ and ‘soft loans’ once given to northern farmers producing for the 
fresh market, that indicate better relations between farmers and traders in the past (AMAKYE ET 
AL. 2008: 27, 64-66; AMANOR & PABI 2007: 58), should be taken seriously and capitalised 
upon.  
Farmers have to organise themselves to deliver sufficient amounts of quality tomato at the 
right time in order to be potential business partners for the NTTA. Genuine farmer representatives 
and possibly neutral entities are needed to negotiate between parties, since ‘collective power’ 
(BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 216-216; KULKE 2013: 146) is currently too weak. The prevailing 
informal intermediary production model – which breaks direct contact between farmers and 
wholesalers, makes sponsors lose control over production, prices, amounts and quality of the 
product, and results in lower income for the farmer (SEE ALSO EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 45, 
52-56) – could be transformed into a more mutually favourable form of contractual farming. 
Possibly a public entity like ICOUR would be able to negotiate, similar to in Burkina Faso where 
local irrigation management bodies have been able to arrange formal contract farming. 
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Overall there is potential to help locals succeed through and in tomato value chains, but the 
efforts required are vast. Government and other entities concerned with development will not need 
to alter tariff structures in Ghana, but are primarily required to start setting suitable support 
structures for sustainable production and cooperation amongst farmers. The advantages of 
northern farmers need to be exploited on domestic and international markets. International prices 
of fresh tomato are already favourable, however, under current conditions most locals have had to 
abandon tomato completely. Only some farmers could switch to the more rewarding, but also 
more expensive chili production. So only some were able to perform ‘chain upgrading’ (ROSSI 
2013: 223), especially in Mirigu where locals had no other choice, whilst the majority of people in 
Biu was able to turn to rice instead. 
6.2. The Chili Market 
As with tomato, a minority of locals produce the highly valued cash crop chili in Biu, while 
it is of greater importance in SGI communities such as Mirigu. In many ways, chili is the 
predecessor of tomato within both study villages. Not only is the crop quite similar to grow, it is 
often the same people that participate in its production. The structure and geography of the chain 
are similar to and overlap with that of tomato. It is therefore likely that chili value chains 
encounter similar developments to those of tomato. Unlike in tomato, however, government or 
NGO interventions have not yet taken place in the study areas. Thus this section presents an 
overview of the markets and possible leverage points for future interventions that could help to 
improve livelihood outcomes of the chain.  
6.2.1. General Overview 
Chili is at present cultivated on a slightly larger acreage than tomato in Ghana (GHANA 
STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 298). The history of chili in Ghana dates back to colonial days, 
although tomato was more popular initially. Production of chili increased since the 1960s, despite 
having encountered ups and downs in the fresh market. In 2012 Ghana became the world’s ninth 
largest producer of chili, after India and many Asian countries. Within the (West-) African 
context, Ghana is in fact leading by some distance. The largest competitor within ECOWAS 
markets, Benin, produces about 67 percent of what Ghana does. Northern Ghana’s traditional 
competitor in the tomato trade – Burkina Faso – is not even listed as a producer. Ghana is thereby 
responsible for almost half of West Africa’s total chili production (FAOSTAT 2014). Also 
evident is that there is hardly any globalisation tendency visible. Only some exports and even 
fewer imports seem to have occurred. These are on such an insignificant level that they would, 
together, mostly not even make up a percent of annual production, which is why they are not 
displayed in the figure below (see Figure 46). 
Markets 
 
247 
 
Figure 46: Production of chili in Ghana (own figure, 2015, based on FAOSTAT 2014) 
Other sources available on the basic set-up of the chili market talk of substantially different 
dimensions to that of tomato. The Millennium Development Authority (MIDA) indicates stagnant 
production figures for chili from 2001 to 2005 and less than 1 percent of growth from 2006 to 
2008. This however, sums up to about 280,000 tonnes per annum, which is substantially more 
than mentioned elsewhere. They figures indicate that, at best, just less than 1.5 percent of annual 
production is being exported, as was the case in 2007, while showing even fewer exports for 
2005, 2006 and 2008. Imports seem not noteworthy (MIDA 2012: 4). Equally, GHANAVEG 
indicates no imports, but instead a few exports to European markets, specifically the UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands. According to them, in 2013, roughly 1400 tonnes went to the UK, 
which is less than 1 percent of domestic production, as assumed by the FAO that year (FAOSTAT 
2014; GHANAVEG 2014: 14-15). According to UN data, exports of chili products have made up 
about 0.65 percent of domestic production from 1996 to 2013. Larger quantities were exported 
throughout the late 1990s, but have since dropped. The largest customer was said to be the 
European Union (COMTRADE 2015). Otherwise there is hardly any data available.  
Government publications talk about the vegetable as being a popular produce among 
farmers all over the country (e.g. MOFA 2011a), but cite no figures. Field research revealed that – 
at national, regional and district government level - no statistics exist to help shed light on the 
basic structures of the Ghanaian chili market. Insights derived thus remain tentative. Despite this 
overall lack of data, it seems correct to assume that the Ghanaian chili market is overall 
successful, has encountered turbulence, but holds further potential for exports. However, it is 
almost entirely characterised by domestic consumption. Domestic chili markets suffer less from 
global or intra-regional competition, specifically foreign imports, as is the case with tomato. On 
the contrary, Ghana seems to have the potential to dominate in West Africa and to compete 
globally. International markets, however, come with high standards.  
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Most Ghanaian exports derive from traditional chili varieties, red pepper varieties that are 
not as lucrative as others, such as the exceptionally hot varieties of ‘Bird Eye’ or ‘Scotch Bonnet’. 
The latter are produced in Ghana, but often fail to meet higher quality standards and are therefore 
not exported. Most farmers are not Global G.A.P.131 or otherwise certified. Also, productivity in 
Ghana is comparatively low due to the quality of seeds used, the lack of irrigation and poor 
agricultural practices. This makes chili highly expensive according to global standards, though 
cheaper to transport out of the country than compared to East Africa for example. Moreover, on a 
nationwide scale, the export market window of Ghanaian chili is unfavourable, since it coincides 
with harvests in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, which are closer to foreign consumers. 
In Ghana, harvest and thereby export times are bound to the major wet season, from March/April 
to September/October (CSIR SARI 2008: 3; GHANAVEG 2014: 15).  
Ghana is thus only partly equipped to further venture on international markets and is at risk 
of facing imports in the future, also reflected in a decrease in exports. Ghana was unable to 
contest with the largest suppliers to European markets, currently Israel (holding 33 percent), 
Morocco (32 percent) and Turkey (19 percent) (COMTRADE 2015). Yet, in terms of pricing, 
Ghana had no issues in competing with, for example, Israeli chili. In the past the unit value of air 
freight chilies from Ghana was about half the cost of Israeli ones, but quality issues made them 
unattractive on EU markets (JAEGER 2008: 29, 37). Northern Ghanaian farmers have probably 
not contributed to European imports or Ghanaian exports anyhow, but rather to domestic markets, 
because they are mainly harvested during off-seasons. The off-season falls at the opposite time of 
the year to the rest of Ghana, namely from March to May (own survey, 2013, n=177), which is 
outside of the regular export market window mentioned. Local specifics further alter opportunities 
for market access by northern farmers. 
6.2.2. Local Structure and Geography  
Farmers from the study areas, nowadays, mainly produce ‘Scotch Bonnet’ varieties of chili, 
which are explicitly produced for the domestic fresh market. The rate of spoilage of this fresh 
chili during transport is generally ‘high’ and so trade distances are limited. It is rather dried chilies 
that are exported and, in any case, these exports are said to stem entirely from the south of Ghana. 
It is equally these dryable versions of the crop that are commonly used for further processing into 
paste, powder, or chili sauce known as ‘shito’, though in total, just 5 percent of domestic 
production is said to be processed. New freshly bought varieties cannot be dried, because it gives 
them an unfavourable appearance in terms of shape and colour. Besides, fresh markets pay better 
for all involved. Even if overseas or processing markets were to pay better, assuming that quality 
                                                   
131 Minimum level of certification required to target EU supermarkets (GHANAVEG 2014: 17). 
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and quantity could be enhanced and producer prices lowered, seasonality of production gives 
locals an advantage in accessing domestic markets.132  
Domestic markets do not require certification, and there are currently no international or 
domestic competitors faced at harvest time in northern Ghana. Farmers thus have a seasonal 
monopoly. While chili gluts occur for the majority of Ghanaian farmers during wet season 
harvests, northerners able to produce the crop using irrigation can access markets at times of 
scarcity. Production over the country is divided into three phases. The first season is in the south, 
the Accra Plains, followed by Ghana's middle belt, followed by the north of the country. At the 
same time, demand in Ghana is high throughout the year. Chili is used in almost every Ghanaian 
dish and consumption is expected to rise due to increasing shares of the population residing in 
urban areas in the south of Ghana, where living standards have improved over recent decades. 
Domestically produced quantities are therefore generally insufficient and especially so during 
harvesting time in the UER. This explains why trends in local production patterns contradict those 
encountered at the national scale (see before, Figure 46).  
Unlike in the rest of Ghana, production of fresh chili has seemingly increased in the study 
areas. Buyers already compromise on quality in order to get sufficient produce from northern 
Ghana. While currently beneficial to farmers in the study areas, such insufficiencies in market 
supplies make future imports more likely. Shortage of fresh market supplies may help northern 
farmers to have the upper hand in price negotiations, which may alleviate issues with quality on 
the domestic market, but leave much potential for future competitors.133 So, with increasing 
international competition, competitiveness in local, regional and international markets needs 
improvement. Processing is less of an option in northern Ghana, because the market for processed 
chili is rather small and most of the local demand points entirely at fresh produce. Furthermore, as 
with tomato processing, potential outcomes for farmers are limited by the engagement of sponsors 
in terms of improving productivity. Until then, highest farm gate prices can only be achieved 
through the domestic fresh market.  
Within domestic markets for fresh chili, trade is mostly conducted through (local) 
intermediaries that buy for large wholesalers coming from the south of Ghana. There are also 
instances where wholesalers go to farmers directly, as is the case in more southern production 
areas, though not in the study areas. In very few cases, southern farmers sell to retailers directly 
(ADDAQUAY 2004; CSIR SARI 2008: 1, 3, 9, 10, 13). Thus, another significant difference in 
chili as compared to tomato markets is that, intermediaries dominate market access in northern 
Ghana, while merchants have not managed to form a cartel. From a farmer’s point of view, 
                                                   
132 Interview with Dr. Yeboah, University of Tamale and GIZ consultant, March 2013, Tamale, Ghana. 
133 Ibid. 
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market access through intermediaries is not optimal, but generally the chili market is more liberal 
than that of other vegetables. However, traders of chili may also be traders of tomato at different 
times of the year, and retail of chili products often takes place in the same or similar areas, in 
open-air markets in southern Ghana. Thus, to some extent, the NTTA cartel has influence on the 
chili value chain, though mostly through retailers which sell under its banners (see Figure 47). 
 
Figure 47: The (northern) Ghanaian chili value chain (own figure, 2015, own trader FDGs and 
expert interviews, 2012/'13, partly based on AMAKYE et al. 2008: 70; COMTRADE 2015; 
FAOSTAT 2014). 
Trends in chili could soon resemble those encountered in tomato. During the time of 
research, intermediaries and wholesalers indicated that they source growing amounts of fresh chili 
from Burkina Faso, because local supply is inadequate during the dry season in Ghana’s north, the 
time locals harvest, and because of growing quality issues.134 Growing international competition 
and the inability of locals to contribute to exports should be alarming to northern chili farmers. 
Chili traders seemingly face the same issues as in tomato, being post-harvest losses that derive 
from bad quality of local produce, which are possibly alleviated through the seasonal monopoly 
northern Ghanaian farmers still enjoy. From a trader’s point of view, there may be potential to 
imitate trends found in tomato chains, by increasing imports from Burkina Faso. Altering a rather 
producer-driven chain into a more buyer-driven one potentially puts northern Ghanaians at risk of 
more unfavourable forms of market integration. 
6.2.3. Access, Inputs and Outputs 
Chili and tomato markets, and access to the chain, are closely related from a farmer’s point 
of view. As previously indicated, due to problems in accessing tomato markets and a resulting 
decline in production, chilies were increasingly patronised by farmers in the study areas, as an 
                                                   
134 FGDs with chili intermediaries and wholesalers from Accra and Navrongo, March, 2013, Navrongo, Ghana, and interview 
with Dr. Yeboah, University of Tamale and GIZ consultant, March, 2013, Tamale, Ghana. 
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‘alternative crop’ (see also ICOUR 2013: 37). Trends in tomato are closely related to those in 
chili, as farmers in Biu and Mirigu emphasised frequently. To them the change of crops was 
primarily made possible by the fact that chili and tomato farming are somewhat alike and because 
production had often already been quite diversified. Chili offered a good alternative to tomato, 
because demand is currently very high, marginal returns are said to be greater, and because chili is 
a far more robust crop and less perishable. Tomatoes are said to be more difficult to handle, since 
fruits are more volatile.  
Yet, while farmers in Biu felt less forced to venture into chili, people in Mirigu point out 
that moving into chili production was somewhat without alternative and of greater importance for 
livelihood upkeep. Chili had been common in the community for a much longer time than in Biu, 
but it was only in recent years that the crop became a commodity helping to deal with the adverse 
effects of environmental change; by improving incomes, thereby food security, and by reducing 
outmigration through economic opportunities on SGI farms: 
‘The land is now infertile and a lot of conditions are not favourable for production. […] So, my 
face [eyes] fell on the new pepper. I could not sit down idle and I also didn't want to migrate. But, 
I was thinking that there is now an alternative of survival, which is pepper, so that I can get 
money to supplement my family’s food security.’135 
The traditional variety of chili, locally produced in former times, was a different one to that 
which prevails today. All farmers in Biu and Mirigu reported to have switched from finger-like, 
green chilies, which were dryable, to fresh ‘Scotch Bonnet’ varieties. Intermediaries claim to be 
responsible for the introduction of the new varieties. They state that southern chili wholesalers 
supplied them with seed, which they spread among farmers, in order to establish new production 
areas in northern Ghana and thereby to source larger amounts of chili throughout the year.136 
Locals in Mirigu still cultivate old varieties, but only during the wet season and for subsistence. 
Newer varieties of chili, introduced around 2004, are different from traditional ones. They are 
grown as cash crops, since they require greater and different inputs, most notably costly inorganic 
fertilisers and chemicals instead of only manure. New, fresh varieties are, however, the only ones 
that sell well, unlike the older, dryable ones that did not allow local farmers to progress much in 
life.137 Farmers from Mirigu and Biu therefore emphasise that their vulnerability has generally 
decreased by intensified production of exotic, fresh chili, although they also perceive higher 
investment requirements as a major risk factor imposed upon them, which could possibly 
withhold others from participation. Furthermore, the downside of this trend from tomato to more 
                                                   
135 FGD with chili farmers from Mirigu, January, 2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
136 FGDs with several chili wholesalers from Accra and Navrongo, March, 2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
137 FGD with chili farmers from Biu, February, 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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expensive chili is that it went along with increased socio-economic differentiation, because most 
people cannot afford the production of chili, which coincides with the time of year when farmers 
already suffer from a lack of money: 
‘When the tomato was gone, we didn't get money to eat. […] Now we must go for farming pepper, 
which is very difficult, because if you want to farm pepper and you don't have even more money at 
home now, forget it! […] So, not everybody can afford to do pepper. […] We can buy chemicals 
and fertiliser, but our neighbours cannot. […] They sit [are idle]!’ 138 
Those content with tomato give the same reasons for why they do not venture into chili. As 
a result of poverty the possibilities of local farmers are limited. Locals state they would be able to 
finance a crop like tomato, but not to produce new varieties of chili. Alternatively, they undergo 
vast risks, threatening livelihood upkeep and social capital, if friends and family have credited 
their last resources for an unsuccessful chili production.139 With no other form of support/credit 
available, it is richer farmers who were less affected by the change to chili. They could quickly 
substitute tomato, as they could afford higher inputs and had experience in vegetables through 
tomato, if they had not already grown chili. However, in Biu, just as the poor did, elites most 
often went from tomato into rice, because rice production is less risky and promises good returns 
with fewer investments, while also serving as food.  
The trend towards more rice in Biu rendered vegetable production increasingly difficult, 
because the irrigated uplands that were available for the production of vegetables were under the 
control of local elites, who did not produce rice. As a consequence, suitable land has become the 
crucial factor for chili production. Cultivation is thereby bound to take place in bush areas, often 
former virgin lands that need expensive/labour intensive clearing, also because soils are better in 
these areas. These lands also require irrigation. Moreover, as a result of large-scale farmers now 
using well-drained uplands for rice, overall water consumption of the irrigation scheme has 
drastically increased which in turn requires saving more water outside of rice seasons and further 
worsens accessibility to chili value chains.  
Thereby (chili) producers in Biu are directly constrained by the livelihoods of others. Only 
the few with access to the right land can venture into chili. What richer farmers on the uplands do 
determines the scope of action for others. This is so because chilies or vegetables cannot be 
irrigated and grown if the plot borders with a flooded rice field. Further, irrigation is sometimes 
turned off from December to January – the middle of the chili season – to save on water because 
the rice boom has increased water consumption so drastically.140  
                                                   
138 FGD with chili farmers from Mirigu, February 2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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Due to the overall exclusivity of chili and its additional lack of affiliation to tradition, 
production of the crop challenges social capital, which may be required to access credit to go into 
production. However, envy is most prominently expressed of those farmers content with its 
production, which must demoralise locals from participation. Chili farmers are criticised because 
their livelihood activity is perceived as purely money-oriented, due to the exclusivity of 
production and rising socio-economic differences in the community. This even leads to 
accusations of use of black magic to acquire riches, and thereby discrimination.141 
Access to the chili chain is also constrained by gender, because the chili is highly cash, 
labour and risk-affinity demanding.142 Of highest importance however, are natural capital and 
financial capital, both of which are highly scarce. If available, financial capital can grow 
tremendously and safely, which improves well-being and reduces vulnerability. Whether 
production of the crop will undermine the natural resource base in the long-run, as was evident in 
tomato production, is debated. 
‘With the way we have been misusing the soil, the lands have already lost their fertility and so you 
are only going to get money in the first year of chili. […] If you plant the second year it will never 
do well and you have the pepper looking bad, […]. You then migrate to a virgin land, to clear.’143 
Overall chili yields are comparatively low when compared to tomato. Tomato can be done 
by more farming households, on larger acreages, and thereby create more job opportunities for 
those not able to produce tomato themselves. In chili production, most labour cannot be simply 
handed down to everyday labourers, because they may easily spoil the expensive crop. This limits 
the extent to which farmers can expand their farm.144 Chili has a vast, if not the greatest, demand 
on livelihood assets, but fewer attainable outcomes for the majority of people (see Figure 48). 
 
Figure 48: Intensity of associations made between chili chain access and assets required (left) and 
chain outcomes for farmers’ assets and livelihood outcomes (right) (own figure, 2015, according 
to co-occurrence coefficients, own interviews and FGDs, 2012/’13 n=150 h). 
                                                   
141 FGD with chili farmers from Biu, February, 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
142 Interview with a female MOFA extension officer resposible for Biu, 03.02.2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
143 FGD with chili farmers from Biu, February, 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
144 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
Markets 
 
254 
For those able to produce chili, land access, soil properties and labour in combination with 
agro-inputs determine the primary outcomes of value chain access. As with tomato, resulting yield 
and quality is higher in Mirigu than Biu, as are farm gate prices. At the time of data collection, 
irrigation costs were drastically higher in Mirigu, but these are now seemingly similar in Biu, as 
access to irrigation is often not a given and because locals have to clear lands to irrigate by bucket 
or pumping machine. The numbers for production costs in Biu in Figure 49 are potentials. 
However, additional labour or money input pays well for an already high valued crop, as is 
seemingly the case in Mirigu. 
 
Figure 49: Illustration of chili costs, expected yields, prices (2012) and net returns per acre at 
minimum wage of 4.8 GH₵/man-day (own figure 2014, own survey, 2013, n=8 and *based on 
ICOUR and MOFA data, 2013). 
From a purely economic standpoint, there is room to further increase investments in chili. 
Local production is always sold during times of high prices, so local farmers could venture into 
more sophisticated forms of production (see ICOUR 2013: 101). For those able to produce chili, 
access to the chili chain is at present comparatively easy, because imports are not yet attractive to 
traders. Merchants express that they can obtain chili at a lower farm gate price in Burkina Faso, 
but that extra expenses for transport outweigh the benefits, at least while the crop is in season in 
the study area. Those growing chili in Burkina Faso mostly produce old varieties that are not 
attractive to the fresh market. Thereby locals in northern Ghana are able to achieve higher 
incomes than with other crops. Moreover, they attract the greatest share of profits accruing within 
the chili chain, which may express the market power farmers have due to their current monopoly 
on domestic markets (see Figure 50).  
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Figure 50: Estimated average composition of the kilogram retail price of chili from Northern 
Ghana, sold in Accra during the 1st quarter of 2012 (own figure, 2015, based on own calculations, 
own trader FGDs, 2013, ESOKO data, 2013). 
Farmers’ highly profitable value chain access is threatened by intermediaries and 
wholesalers who are becoming increasingly quality conscious. Farmers may have learned their 
lesson from trends in tomato however, such that they realise that they can improve chain relations 
by having an attractive product: 
‘It is now the same [as with tomato]! […] It is only the quality of pepper that can let you come 
closer to the women. All the buyers will rush to you. […] But, if your pepper is not quality, you 
may suffer. […] They have now prepared for getting quality […] such that they can also get the 
best out of that pepper. […] With them it’s now quality first, price second!’145 
Quality is determined by the ability to attain sufficient inputs, especially fertilisers and 
agro-chemicals, soil attributes and further influenced by watering practices. Especially the last 
two factors are believed to be decisive and more favourable in Mirigu and Burkina Faso than in 
Biu. Soil quality is higher, often improved by manuring, and water is fetched by hand, which is 
why fields are not as heavily flooded as in Biu and can thereby yield harder, more durable chili. 
Quality is such an issue, because it defines shelf-life and thus post-harvest losses encountered 
during transport by traders, which makes quality a major determinant of profitability for them. So, 
traders increasingly make quality a precondition for farmers’ market access and have therefore 
started to patronise (fertile) SGI farms in places like Mirigu, but also in Burkina Faso, since cost 
of sourcing is somewhat the same, while shelf-life is about twice as high – about a week – for the 
Burkinabe product, when compared to the Ghanaian version.146 Accordingly, some farmers, 
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146 FGDs with chili intermediaries from Navrongo, March, 2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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especially those in Biu, have reported that they have actively tried to improve product quality 
through soil attributes, specifically by adding organic material.  
Aside from lacking labour and agro-chemical inputs, the application of organic material to 
farmland constitutes a further basis for favourable value chain access. As farmers state, it pays to 
do composting and manuring in combination with inorganic fertilisation – somewhat integrated 
farming – because farmers are thereby able to produce a highly attractive produce in large 
quantities. Farmers acknowledge the influence of product quality on losses encountered on the 
side of traders. Chili must not be overripe, i.e. too soft, for it to travel to southern Ghana without 
spoilage, especially when trucks can break down due to the bad conditions faced on Ghanaian 
roads. Quality is a precondition for market access, because it assures fewer post-harvest losses.147  
Yet, while quality is becoming an issue, quantities remain less problematic. It currently 
even pays for intermediaries and sometimes wholesalers to send chili to southern market centres 
by taxis or by public buses.148 In fact, at the time of research, there were no traders to be found 
that came with trucks, though farmers mentioned that these exist. The minimum quantities 
required to satisfy the needs of each individual trader are often rather small, which makes chain 
access easier for local farmers, at least towards intermediaries. As farmers frequently state, 
demand is currently so high that they experience almost no issues in market access, the primary 
danger for any tomato farmer since the breakdown of favourable business relations. In chili, 
traders currently pick up most produce right at the farm gate. Chilies are easy to transport, because 
they are lightweight and have a higher price per kilo, which increases market accessibility for 
farmers greatly. Chilies remaining at the farm, when only parts of a harvest are transported to the 
market place due to a lack of finance, will not spoil in the meantime.149  
Quantity is thus a problem to solve by intermediaries. If large-scale wholesalers come with 
their own trucks, intermediaries must then source sufficient produce within the shortest time 
period possible. Chili is simply less perishable, making post-harvest losses and thereby risks 
significantly smaller for wholesalers and intermediaries. Thus less strict forms of governance are 
required within the chain, though stricter ones can be expected in future. As reflected in the 
composition of retailer prices, significant power within the chili value chain currently resides with 
producers. 
6.2.4. Governance Dynamics 
Demand for fresh chili is currently high, thus the product’s value chain is far more producer 
driven than that of any other locally produced commodity. Because of this and the way transport 
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is organised among traders, farmers can produce individually. The issues faced in production by 
one farmer do not become the problem of another, as is the case in tomato, where farmers had to 
team up to fill a whole tomato truck. Though this may increase individualisation tendencies, it 
also alleviates organisational, horizontal contractualisation, issues among farmers.150 Chili 
producers have thereby overcome the severe constraints imposed upon them by FBO and union 
leaders in the local governance of tomato chains. As much as this may benefit others along the 
chain in the future, at present farmers face an equally, rather decentralised form of governance 
among chili traders.  
Associations, thus attempts to form a cartel amid wholesalers, exist only at individual chili 
market levels, but not at regional or national ones. Traders are very much interested in mutual 
cooperation, knowing of the benefits that horizontal contractualisation at the wholesale level has 
brought to their colleagues in tomato chains.151 Because most business is conducted informally, 
there are already basic barriers to overcome in market access for merchants. Intermediaries 
express that they live off the fact that many wholesalers do not know producers, and so cannot 
reach farms to buy directly. Chili production for the fresh market started to take off only since 
2009/2010 in the study areas, so there may simply have been insufficient time to establish closer 
relations, aside from the fact that the intermediaries are not interested to hand over their business 
secrets (contacts to farmers) to others following them in the chain. Aside from finance and a 
trustworthy network required to conduct business, there have been hardly any reports on barriers 
to market entry.152 Yet for some years already, wholesalers try to ‘frustrate new entrants’ by 
inhibiting them from getting a space in the market, or by refusing to share information (CSIR 
SARI 2008: 13-14).  
Governance is thus becoming stricter with the aim of shifting powers within the chain 
towards wholesale. For example, to outweigh the extra expenses required to obtain chili via 
intermediaries, wholesalers have outsourced and spread responsibility and thereby risks to a net of 
intermediaries, through which they try to exploit their value shares within the chain. As the 
number of local intermediaries has increased over the last years, their individual profits have often 
shrunk. Whereas intermediaries claim to have been able to ‘dictate’ to wholesalers the price of 
chili, it is now said to be the other way around. Nowadays, wholesalers supposedly change prices 
within days, sometimes after harvesting has begun at an already agreed upon price. Intermediaries 
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may act as conduits of this exploitation by wholesalers, which can create tensions in commerce at 
the farm gate level.153  
Beyond this, farmers and union representatives frequently state that intermediaries try to 
lower farm gate prices to not only receive commission from wholesalers, but to also make extra 
profits by exploiting the fact that wholesalers have no direct contact to farmers. Moreover, 
farmers attest that intermediaries are the ones effectively establishing a more buyer driven form of 
governance at the local level, because from time to time they collectively stop buying local 
produce at lower prices. Farmers perceive the chili market to be ‘dictated’ by intermediaries and 
believe that they themselves could handle the market, if intermediaries were cut out. 154 So, chain 
governance is often characterised by an intermediate form of contractual farming, whereby 
intermediaries try to have the upper hand in negotiations with farmers, mainly because farmers are 
insufficiently organised.  
Direct relations between farmers and wholesalers in northern Ghana are rather rare, unlike 
in southern production areas where local farmers have even turned into genuine out-growers of 
wholesalers. In the south farmers are supplied with inputs on credit (ADDAQUAY 2004: 15; 
AWO 2010: 97), and relationships between farmers and wholesalers are based on ‘mutual trust 
that enables the actors to grant one another credit in times of need’ through ‘input credit schemes 
to be repaid in-kind’ (CSIR SARI 2008: 14). Consequently, there is reason to believe that farmers 
in the study areas could be capable of attaining better deals through wholesalers, if intermediaries 
could be excluded from chain participation. This is possible for those situated in a more buyer-
driven market, characterised by harvest gluts during nationwide wet seasons. 
Farmers report that relations with intermediaries have become closer in recent years. 
Similarly, intermediaries have reported that chili farmers are trustworthy, as they have learned 
their lessons from their opportunistic behaviour in tomato. The share of intermediaries coming to 
buy directly at the farm gate is also said to have increased, which saves farmers costs on transport, 
effectively increases farmers’ incomes, or is at least helpful at a time when farmers otherwise lack 
liquid funds. Intermediaries commonly try to motivate farmers to establish closer relations with 
them. For farmers, this is a strategy to reduce farm gate prices: 
‘They will start with the motivation first. […] Sometimes they'll give food. Sometimes, some of the 
women treat us like their husbands. They act to us as if we have no wives at home [they offer sex] 
to convince us to give our pepper to them. You will just wonder why they even treat you like that. 
                                                   
153 FGDs with several chilie intermediaries from Navrongo, March, 2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
154 FGD with chili farmers from Mirigu, January, 2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
Markets 
 
259 
[…] Then you will foolishly think that the woman is a good woman, not knowing that she wants to 
use that to take advantage of you. Afterwards she will slaughter you like a fowl […]!’155 
Farmers also state that for about three to four years now, since 2009, intermediaries have 
started to organise with farmers in terms of the quantities produced. Farmers are frequently 
contacted throughout the production period, to check they are able to stick with arrangements. 
This is a necessity for intermediaries, who must assure sufficient amounts for wholesalers. Greater 
assurance for local farmers is a positive side effect of this. Gratifications given to producers are 
limited by the size and range of intermediaries’ businesses and the fact that they monopolise 
access to farmers. Chili farmers, unlike tomato farmers, did not report merchants having 
supported them with cheap southern roofing materials or agro-inputs.156 
Yet chili intermediaries occasionally claim to have sponsored farmers when sufficiently 
good relations based on trust and product quality have been established. Such cases are, however, 
the exception or could simply be a white lie on the side of intermediaries, because they equally 
claim to have insufficient means to conduct business. One wholesaler was found who did sponsor 
farmers in the area, though not in Biu or Mirigu. Such merchants take substantial risks in doing 
so, but hope to thereby acquire sufficient produce, possibly at a pre-fixed price. Sponsors face 
similar problems in chili as they do in tomato: opportunistic behaviour by local farmers. The poor 
cherish sponsoring and are therefore more likely to stick to arrangements. Though wholesalers are 
likely to exploit their weaker position in an aim to establish captive relations by sponsoring, it 
could be that the pure economic interest of wholesalers has pro-poor effects:  
‘We go to the farmer and give them a little money […] But then, at harvesting time, some will 
rather sell the pepper to others and want to give us money back. That is not good, because we 
want their pepper. […] Some even tell us that all their pepper has spoiled, while really they have 
sold it to someone else. […] But, especially the gardeners [SGI farmers] […], the poor and small 
farmers will rather pay back [loans] than the big ones. […]So that next time you will help them 
again.’157 
Intermediaries not only limit the profits of farmers and wholesalers, they also block further, 
potentially advantageous contract farming arrangements. The intermediaries are actually 
safeguarding their access to farmers, though both sides desire direct sales. When farmers try to 
approach southern wholesalers directly, intermediaries threaten them by claiming to withdraw 
from all future sales.158 Intermediaries hope to thereby cement their standing within the chili value 
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chain. In fact, they have meanwhile managed to establish a formal, regional association that caters 
for its members in cases of emergencies. Intermediaries report that they are increasingly linking 
up with a wholesale association from southern Ghana. In the south, wholesale associations already 
try to control prices, by controlling quantities arriving at the market. Initial trials in limiting 
quantities in cooperation with their northern intermediaries have been successful. Yet, chili 
associations have yet to come as far as the NTTA. For example, they do not issue identity cards 
and are not united at the nationwide scale, but clearly try to establish similar, cartel-like structures 
as prevail in tomato markets. Farmers can only prepare for such cartel-like structures by a higher 
degree of coordination among one another, which they lack at present: 
‘With the way they [the intermediaries] are now uniting, we have to come together more in 
pepper also. We have to be better organised. To be well organised means to influence these 
buyers. […] If we are only organised halfway, like now, and somebody says this and another 
fellow stands elsewhere and says that, it means our organisation does not hold. And if our 
organisation does not hold, we can never influence any decision in the future.’159 
6.2.5. Conclusion 
Chili holds great potential and actually serves as an ‘alternative crop’ for northern Ghanaian 
tomato farmers (see also ICOUR 2013: 37). Thus it could be of major importance for poverty 
alleviation. However, a lack of data means that more research is needed on chili, its markets and 
producers, in the form of local studies and basic quantitative and qualitative assessments of 
market extents and structures, as well as the temporal dynamics shaping economic interactions. 
This study has provided first insights at the local level, by taking a look at the livelihood 
embeddedness of chili markets using a livelihood lens in combination with commodity and value 
chain analysis.  
It is clear that the dominant dynamics encountered in the chili market, with relevance for 
livelihoods, are characterised by a change in production among farmers, which was accompanied 
by various difficulties. Aside from the fact that most chili farmers are former tomato producers, a 
change from traditional, dryable chilies to freshly sold ones is evident and thereby changes of and 
in respective value chains. This worsens the attainable outcomes for the majority of locals and 
especially the accessibility of new chili chains, causing further socio-economic differentiation, 
which already stands at a high level. The changes have been facilitated by a vast increase in 
financial input. Only well situated farmers are able to venture into new chili varieties, to undergo 
‘chain upgrading’ (ROSSI 2013: 223) or ‘inter-sectoral upgrading’ (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 
2002: 1020, 1025; NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1395), and for them outcomes are impressive. 
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Coordination and governance of chili chains is currently characterised as favourable for 
farmers, rewarding functional positions with high value added and growing returns. Thus there is 
a general trend towards economic upgrading, and thereby chili stands as a possible example of 
economic prosperity following structural adjustments in the domestic economy and also for 
northern producers. As previously indicated, external social vulnerability in terms of markets can 
be positive. Present chain setup really provides great opportunities for value addition, capacity 
building and independent development to producers. Current domestic chili market access, even 
without considering the potential of export, can be very favourable, judging by the great demand 
that exists for the crop and the degree to which the value chain is thereby producer driven. 
However, one should not forget that this is only the contemporary state of the market set-up. 
Though chain governance through farmers is characterised by relatively high technological 
competency, trends in the value chain are much supported by the fact that farmers currently hold a 
seasonal producer monopoly, as used to be the case with tomato. Producers will venture into chili 
in northern Ghana and, together with growing competition from other ECOWAS markets 
specifically Burkina Faso, will make the chain increasingly buyer-driven. As with tomato, 
‘territoriality’ of the chain may have to be expanded from a trader’s point of view under 
prevailing policy and thereby ‘institutional structures’, trade liberalisation (in reference to theory 
laid out by GEREFFI 1995; 1994).  
The quality of locally produced chili has already going down and if it further decreases, 
post-harvest losses encountered by travelling merchants could soon prevail over transport costs, as 
is the case in tomato. This would make locals lose market access. Findings from studies declaring 
quality and not pricing as the major determinant of potential for export (JAEGER 2008: 29, 37) 
may also apply for domestic market access (as was also indicated with reference to tomato by 
GHANAVEG 2014: 37; MOFA 2009: 1; VENUS et al. 2013: 33). These findings as well as the 
generally positive dynamics encountered during field research contrast with the findings of other 
local studies concerned with local market development and livelihood sustainability/poverty 
(AWO 2010, 2007; LAUBE et al. 2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 2011; PAASCH 2008; SEND 
FOUNDATION 2008; SONGSORE 2011: 263). Quality is still the major factor, because it alters 
transaction costs, a major determinant of chain governance (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 2002: 
1021; TRIENEKENS 2012: 54). This is seemingly the case for most fragile vegetables, though of 
course chilies are more robust than tomato, and so changes in chain governance may be less 
pronounced.  
The relatively linear, sequential, dichotomist perspective provided by the Global 
Commodity Chain (GCC) perspective was, to a largely extent, already able to derive these 
findings (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 210-211; DIETSCHE 2011: 29). Yet the Global Value 
Chain (GVC) perspective (GEREFFI et al. 2005) added aspects of variations in governance and 
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power according to product quality and with significance for value chain integration. A 
perspective beyond that was not always required. As a result of a lack of a wider set of non-
commercial actors and institutions altering governance and coordination, an additional Global 
Production Network (GPN) perspective mostly contributed to analysis as far as it demanded a 
contextual look at livelihood systems. The influence of non-economic actors can thus, at times, be 
neglected, yet not a livelihood/bottom-up perspective that contexts ‘on the ground’ within which 
production processes’ of the ‘most powerless’ are embedded in (DARBY 2013: 45). The latter 
angle underlined the need to upgrade farmer in various ways, to help them keep pace in the onset 
of greater local and international competition. 
Avenues for Upgrading 
The livelihood analysis in combination with chain approaches revealed that farmers need 
support in terms of fertilisers and agro-chemicals to be able to go into chili production, more so 
than for the production of any other crop locally produced. Shifts to chili can be understood as 
‘inter-sectoral upgrading’, whereby farmers moved into a related product, chili, applying the 
knowledge and capabilities acquired in tomato production (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 2002: 
1020, 1025; NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1395), through unplanned (thus free) spill-over effects and 
imitation (SCHAMP 2008: 10). But, competency to upgrade (into new chili) chains (DIETSCHE 
2011: 31; ROSSI 2013: 223; SCHAMP 2008: 8) is limited by the financial endowment of locals, 
whereas local levels of knowledge and further capabilities, as well as governance structures and 
power allocation in the chain (COE & HESS 2008: 268), are favourable to producers. This limits 
the practical scope of broad-based development through chili, and puts a damper on possibilities 
of pro-poor, social and livelihood upgrading. 
For chili farmers, a fundamental condition for favourable chain relations in the future is the 
production of sufficiently good quality chili (NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1388; ROSSI 2013: 223). 
Aside from the question of input access, this points at the quality of the local natural resource 
base, which is evermore undermined by a trend toward chili, even more than was the case for 
tomato. Chili has more potential than any other crop to allow farmers to do more expensive and 
sophisticated production, because it pays best and thereby gives far more room for environmental 
concerns. Because of the experiences made with environmentally, thereby economically and 
socially unsustainable tomato production, it is likely that sophisticated farmers in the study areas 
now producing chili will recognise the value of paying for manuring or composting. To locals, it 
may be cheaper to setup a more sustainable form of land use, than for farmers to be on the search 
virgin lands to clear. Moreover, it may pay-off well within a few years and seems essential to 
uphold developments. For chili production, environmental upgrading is most compatible with 
economic advances. 
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The government must set appropriate avenues to allow for routes fostering such upgrading 
(GIBBON 2004: 26-30), to help locals in organisation, in accessing production – possibly also 
through private institutions – and to assure a form of chili farming that can be (ecologically) 
sustained. It is unlikely that locals will do so by themselves. The government did well, until now, 
in withholding from interference in the chili chain. Favourable chain integration was possible 
without government interference, though not for the majority of farmers in northern Ghana. Under 
the trade liberalisation efforts pursued, the government is required to maintain the competitiveness 
of local farmers, and to uphold competition among merchants. So intermediaries and wholesalers 
must be hindered from forming cartels. 
Suitable support must be given to producers and their associations, possibly through 
strengthened government entities. Against this background, farmers’ lack of horizontal 
contractualisation and organisation, or ‘collective power’ (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 216-216; 
KULKE 2013: 146), may become an issue again, because institutional power is low while chili 
wholesalers and intermediaries have seemingly managed to capitalise on the weaknesses of farmer 
organisations. The NTTA tomato cartel apparently serves as a role model for future development 
of the still-fragmented chili chain. Farmers, however, are rather badly organised. Intermediaries 
were in recent years able to attain more power in the chain, by forming a united front at the 
regional level, while wholesalers have allied at major southern markets that grant access to 
consumers. Each party, apart from the farmers, monopolises its share of the chain. When having 
in mind that value shares in the sister, tomato chain are allocated almost entirely to the advantage 
of wholesalers, it is questionable for how long these southern buyers will want to live with a setup 
in the chili chain that favours farmers and allows intermediaries to partake.  
It is likely that comparatively powerful wholesalers will try to cut intermediaries from the 
chain, so that they themselves, as a strong association, can face rather poorly organised farmers. 
Further power may be shifted within the chain towards wholesalers, but this could potentially 
benefit poor farmers who could enter higher levels of vertical contractualisation with wholesalers 
(as was indicated by ADDAQUAY 2004; CSIR SARI 2008: 1, 3, 9, 10, 13). Yet it would then be 
questionable if farmers could profit from rising farm gate prices. If wholesalers manage to form a 
cartel they are likely to exploit their resulting bottleneck position, previously held by 
intermediaries. Moreover, if they or anybody else would simply introduce the right varieties in 
neighbouring countries like in Burkina Faso, chili farmers in Ghana’s Upper East Region could 
soon face similar mal-developments, as were encountered in tomato. There is little to keep 
merchants from introducing new chili varieties in the neighbouring country, as it is in their 
interests to do so. If further advances are made in production abroad, allowing foreign farmers to 
decrease prices, then there will be no more reasons to patronise farmers in the study areas. This 
would alleviate all potential advances through greater horizontal or vertical contractualisation.  
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One hopes that farmers in northern Ghana have learned their lessons when it comes to 
attempting fraud on traders, thus misusing their monopolistic market position. Farmers 
increasingly see the benefits integrity brings. To keep a favourable market position, farmers 
would be wise to organise themselves, to form a working association whose administration could 
overtake the logistically important position currently held by intermediaries within the chain. 
Wholesalers need contact persons at the local level who are able and willing to take responsibility 
because of the great distance between the parties involved. Attempts to formalise relations could 
help, which farmers unions and FBOs could capitalise upon. This could be beneficial to the 
majority of locals and at the same time be an effective way to support farmers in production while 
withholding them from. Farmers could use this window of opportunity to establish good, trustful 
and reciprocal relations with traders, to not give them further reason to seek producers elsewhere. 
To counter a possibly unfavourable incorporation into markets in the future (CHOUDHARY et al. 
2014: 1059), ‘horizontal contractualisation’ amongst farmers must improve to increase revenues, 
reduce costs, reduce individual risks through cooperation, and allow for better vertical forms of 
contractualisation (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 13). 
6.3. The Rice Market 
Rice is a popular cash and staple crop in Ghana, on local irrigation projects and partly also 
outside of these too, but its markets are shaped by great global competition. In recent years 
markets have become more favourable for domestic production, due to government and 
development assistance in rice value chains. These initiatives, however, have suffered from trade-
offs at the local level. Pro-poor outcomes of the rice value chain and support by entities like 
MOFA, ICOUR and USAID have been below potential, as explained in this section.  
6.3.1. General Overview 
Rice is currently one of the most important cereals in Ghana, after maize and millet, 
produced on about 11.4 percent of the nation’s agricultural area in 2010 (FAOSTAT 2014; see 
also GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 212, 298). Its production is of similar importance 
to the north of Ghana, where rice has been popular for a long time.  
In the study area, rice was widely introduced with the onset of British agricultural services, 
initially pursued through the establishment of a nearby government demonstration farm that was 
party concerned with rice production (ADU 1963: 1). After independence, rice production was 
further expanded in the area, to make use of a shift in southern consumer preferences for the crop, 
which had taken place as a result of the government’s control and protection of agricultural 
markets due to import substitution policies. Over time, irrigation projects such as the ‘Vea’ or 
later the ‘Tono’ irrigation scheme, accompanied by the construction of rice mills and silos, 
supported large-scale production of the crop. A wider, though often exclusive, share of local 
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farmers were integrated into the southern dominated, domestic economy (ADU 1969: 17-18; 
ANTWI-ASARE 2009; FAO 1970: iii, 1; LAUBE 2007: 89, 92; LAUBE 2009: 2; OTENG 1997: 
38; SOIL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1977: 1; TONAH 2008: 113; YARO 2013: 6-11).  
Massive efforts made by subsidy provision under military rule in the 1970s further boosted 
rice production and integrated the north further into the demand structure of the south 
(SONGSORE 2011: 130; YARO 2013: 8). Alongside subsidies, the government made use of high 
tariff walls that protected farmers from international competition (AHWOI 2010: 9-10; LARYEA 
& AKUONI 2012: 10-12; SONGSORE 2011: 102). However, structural adjustments and 
economic reforms, the result of previous public overspending and control, exposed local rice 
producers to world markets through reduced tariffs and left them without further support. This 
caused an uproar by scientists concerned for the livelihoods of northern Ghanaian farmers 
(AHWOI 2010: 9-10; FAOSTAT 2011; ROBINSON & KOLAVALLI 2010: 2; SEND 
FOUNDATION 2008; SONGSORE 2011: 167; YARO 2013: 10-11).  
Since the mid-2000s the government became somewhat active again in the agricultural 
sector of the north, though with no significant effect. A major turn in politics followed, in an 
attempt to meet targets in poverty reduction. A fertiliser subsidy for the major farming season was 
introduced in 2008, and tariffs on rice were reinstated in 2010 and raised to 35 percent in 2011. 
Drawing on the fertiliser subsidy, rice is now supported in ‘Block Farming’ under the ‘Youth in 
Agriculture Programme’. Support also comes from donor interventions in the north of Ghana, 
mostly the USAID ADVANCE programme (BANFUL 2009: 1; OUMA et al. 2012: 227-228; 
PWC GHANA 2013: 5, 27; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 2009: 103; WHITFIELD 2011b: 34). 
These historical trends in agricultural development policies partly reflect in national trends 
of rice production, in its imports and exports. Production of rice was done on a rather insignificant 
scale throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but then grew constantly. Similar to a number of other 
crops, the amount of rice domestically produced tended to develop along government spending. 
This is, for example, reflected in a rise in rice production from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, a 
time of vast government investment, much of it in rice. This investment brought benefits to some 
farmers in northern Ghana, but when government support collapsed years later, production levels 
went back to those of previous decades (FAOSTAT 2014; see also GHANA STATISTICAL 
SERVICE 2013: 212, 298). Since the completion of the North’s major irrigation scheme (Tono), 
rice production rose again until about 2001, irrespective of the following government withdrawal. 
As indicated by Ghana’s rice imports, however, Ghana was never self-sufficient in rice production 
with the exception being a few years in the 1970s (see Figure 51). 
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Figure 51: Production and major imports and exports of milled rice in Ghana  (own figure, 2015, 
based on FAOSTAT 2014) 
Imports grew constantly since government reforms – SAPs and ERPs – as they also went 
along with efforts to liberalise trade in the form of lowered tariffs and reduced or abolished import 
quotas. Rice markets have since been shaped by global economic dynamics. From the late 1980s 
until about the middle of the 1990s, imports of rice overtook domestic production. Ghana had 
increasingly relied on cheap imports when world market prices had been rather low in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. But, when more West African countries started to privatise rice imports and 
withdraw from import control measures, by the middle of the 1990s, rice imports rose and so did 
global prices. Rice imports to countries like Bangladesh, China or Indonesia, which already 
accounted for over 30 percent of total world imports in 1995, keep increasing, which pushed 
prices higher. Therefore, international prices for rice were stable from about 1990 to 1994, but 
increased by 1996. Ghanaian rice imports dropped heavily, but soon recovered as world market 
prices went down again. By 2004, imports were three times as high as domestic production. 
Imported, milled, white, polished rice became ever more attractive and common to Ghanaian 
consumers. They started to prefer its taste, aroma and general quality to locally produced rice. 
Domestic production stagnated, even decreased. Yet further price peaks on world markets 
occurred between 2007 and 2008 – the global food and financial crisis – which led imports to go 
down again (ACKAH, ARYEETEY, BOTCHIE, et al. 2012: 228-229; FAOSTAT 2014; YAP 
1997). Countries like China, India, Vietnam and Egypt prohibited exports of rice through partial 
bans on new sales, by imposing minimum export prices or through taxes on rice exports 
(GULATI & DUTTA 2010: 289).  
Partly as a result of foreign policies that influenced world markets, imports of rice into 
Ghana shrunk drastically and domestic production was able to double within only four years. As 
previously indicated, this trend was supported by domestic efforts since 2008. A stiff rise in 
import tariffs increased prices for imported rice, and farmers were relieved of financial burdens 
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through fertiliser subsidies and additional government programmes. In combination, world market 
prices have generally been favourable for Ghanaian farmers, often 50 percent above that of local 
produce (AKRAMOV & MALEK 2012: 26). Thus, Ghanaian farmers now find themselves in a 
situation where they seem to be able to compete on domestic rice markets, at least in terms of 
price. Potential to make use of these trends is great, as domestic demand for rice is high and 
projected to grow by 11.8 percent per annum (MIDA 2010: 2). For both consumers and producers, 
rice thereby became ‘at the national level, the commodity that had the highest impact on poverty 
as a result of increases of its prices on the international market’. It began to favour northern, rural 
producers over urban consumers situated in southern Ghana (ACKAH & ARYEETEY 2012b: 8). 
Despite advances made in domestic production, these trends underline the need to further improve 
domestic production in terms of quantity and quality. Southern consumers, increasingly able and 
willing to pay for the right product, demand sufficient quality rice, which first suits their taste and 
then their pocket. 
Consumers buy different varieties and qualities of rice, each with a specific value chain. 
The rice market is actually heavily segmented by such attributes. All rice consumers want the 
produce to be free from stones and other debris in order for it to be attractive. Aside from their 
preference for imported over local rice, consumers prefer white, milled over brown, parboiled 
rice, and aromatic to non-aromatic rice. Consumer and trader willingness to pay varies 
accordingly. Domestic rice that meets consumer preferences could thus be a real alternative to rice 
imports and would also target the upper end of domestic markets, which offers higher prices and a 
less elastic demand (GAGE et al. 2012: 15-16, 18). The domestic and international 
competitiveness of Ghanaian rice production should thus be enhanced, as the country is otherwise 
likely to encounter further increases in imports (BREISINGER et al. 2011: 52).  
Competition in rice stems from counties where production is often subsidised, especially 
Thailand, China, the USA as well as Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso among others (FAOSTAT 
2014). The need to compete with these countries by improved rice production is largest in 
northern Ghana, because imports affect the mostly poor farmers living there, who are by far the 
largest suplliers of rice to domestic markets. While the Northern Region has contributed the 
largest share of domestic production, the Upper East Region is also among the largest producers 
aside from areas in the Volta Region and more minor ones thoughout the country. According to 
MOFA data, about 40 percent of all locally produced rice comes from the districts where Biu and 
Mirigu are located, though mostly from Biu’s irrigation scheme (see Map 11). Biu is thus located 
at the very heart of the Ghanaian rice sector and is examined more closely here, though enriched 
with encounters from Mirigu. 
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Map 11: Major regions of rice production in Ghana, according to their contribution to total 
domestic production in 2011 (own map, 2014, based on MOFA data, 2012). 
6.3.2. Local Structure and Geography 
There are many parallels between production trends at the national and local levels. 
However, in the more recent past, these have sometimes contradicted each other. After some 
initial success in increasing the local area under rice cultivation in the late 1980s, production 
dropped severely. The initial decrease, in 1989, may have been a result of subsidy withdrawal for 
land preparation and fertilisers (LAUBE 2007: 96), while the continuous shrinkage over the 1990s 
may have resulted from growing rice imports. At that time, as local farmers explain, they instead 
ventured into soya production and started to cultivate tomato. But, unlike at the national level, 
local production recovered through the 1990s and continued to grow, irrespective of all-time 
records in nationwide imports by 2004 and a resulting decline in production at the domestic level. 
In fact, by 2004 the local area under rice cultivation managed to climb back to levels encountered 
16 to 17 years before. Since 2004, production could have remained at a high level, as local 
monitoring officers assume, but the irrigation project started suffering from a breakdown of its 
infrastructure. Attempts were made to rehabilitate the irrigation canals in 1997 and again in the 
mid to late 2000s, most significantly in 2008 explaining why in that year only a little production 
took place. After refurbishment and with the return of subsidies and duties on rice, the area under 
cultivation reached its highest in at least 20 years (see Figure 52). 
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Figure 52: Hectares under rice cultivation at the Tono Irrigation Project from 1985 to 2011 
according to season and usage  (own figure, 2014, based on data attained from ICOUR, 2012). 
Production of rice seed began under the irrigation scheme in recent years. With a maximum 
of about 2000 ha available at the Tono Irrigation Scheme, rice was the most popular crop, often 
covering more than 50 percent of the command area, and particularly popular in the dry season. 
This latter fact may be the key to understanding why trends at the local level were able to counter 
those at the national level, because when locals produce during the dry season – through irrigation 
– they get an advantage in market access, as they are able to sell their rice during the off-season. 
Thus, trends in local rice production have the potential to develop independently and more 
favourably as compared to other areas in Ghana. Significant steps were made in recent years, but 
what facilitated these advancements?160 
The rice market is quite segmented, even in northern Ghana. In the Upper East Region most 
farmers produce rice for parboiling, which falls at the lower end of domestic markets, serves 
about one-fifth of domestic consumption, and lower price segments (GAGE et al. 2012: 17). 
Northerners are often content with growing a brown, traditional variety, while farmers from the 
south (like those from the Volta Region) produced milled, white, perfumed rice for the most 
favourable (southern) markets. In the past, northern Ghanaian rice farmers hardly served the 
demand of wealthy consumers in urban centres of the south, but mainly those living in or 
originating from northern parts of the country, where such traditional rice is popular. That limited 
the extent to which locals were exposed to international competition. At the same time it also 
narrowed potential incomes for northern rice producers. But since 2008, endeavours by the 
government as well as USAID interventions have aimed at the inclusion of northern farmers into 
southern, possibly global markets, or at least at import substitution, by introducing and supporting 
rice varieties like white, perfumed, Jasmine rice for milling. These activities have concentrated on 
major rice growing areas, such as the Tono irrigation project and valleys suitable for rice 
                                                   
160 Interview with and data obtained from ICOUR monitoring unit, July, 2012, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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production. Mirigu has hardly benefited from this support, as it fulfils neither condition. 
Government and USAID interventions in Mirigu have instead aimed at maize. As a result, new 
rice varieties are far less common in Mirigu.161 
Interventions in Jasmine rice chains started at the farm level. The Youth in Agriculture 
Programme – a.k.a. Block Farming (BF) – was conducted solely under the irrigation project and 
covered roughly a quarter of Biu’s inhabitants. The programme is partly handled by ICOUR and 
partly by the MOFA. Under ICOUR, Block Farming is content with producing Jasmine seed on 
irrigated uplands. These seeds are then used for rice grain production in other irrigated areas, 
especially lowlands, where BF is organised under MOFA. Farmers producing grain under BF 
receive subsidised fertilisers from MOFA and sometimes support for seed and land preparation, 
formally, on credit through these government entities. BF seed production additionally includes 
training for certification, but only for those farmers that have uplands under irrigation. BF 
subsidies overlap broadly with the general fertiliser subsidies, but BF also tried to improve market 
access through (more valuable) seed production as well as by forming a multipartite model of 
contractual farming. The latter was done, by organising seed sales to the government owned, 
National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO). The BF programme in seed guarantees sales for 
farmers, as that seed is used for grain production under MOFA. However, seed produced within 
the programme can also be, and is often, sold as grain. For the majority of rice producers, namely 
those producing grain, BF represents a way of helping locals attain fertiliser and seed on credit, 
with sales depending on the open market.  
Government support is limited to the wet season, though minor support is occasionally 
provided during the dry season. But initiatives often suffer from the fact that locals find it hard to 
actually attain the subsidies162, which is explained later. During the dry season, only those situated 
at irrigation schemes and included in USAID programmes can count on assistance. Support by 
USAID is concerned with training farmers and providing subsidised fertilisers (sometimes 
indirectly attained through MOFA), land preparation and seed, mostly to produce grain. These 
programmes are coordinated with ICOUR. Much more than BF, the USAID initiative further 
focuses on attracting large-scale, private wholesalers and processors, called ‘aggregators’. 40 
percent of female-headed and 50 percent of male-headed households from Biu are thereby 
currently able to sell their rice. Significantly fewer are also able to attain inputs in credits, 
machinery, other equipment or training.  
                                                   
161 Interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
162 Interviews with MOFA extension officers, February, 2013, Navrongo, Ghana; and Interviews with two technical 
associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana.  
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To provide support, organise repayment and possibly make contractual arrangements 
between farmers and large-scale buyers, BF (thereby ICOUR and MOFA) and USAID 
interventions rely and build upon existing farmer based organisations (FBOs), each with 
individual leaders, and the local farmers’ union. These groups are supposed to assure the effective 
allocation of help, at a ratio of 2500 farmers to one extension officer in MOFA programmes. 
Groups are also to provide collateral and assure the willingness to repay for credits given out in 
the form of inputs. The numerous FBOs consist of small groups of farmers, often headed by more 
commercially-orientated, large-scale farmers, and are used by BF in seed and grain production. 
The Tono Irrigation Cooperative Farmers’ Union (TICFU) is headed by local, large-scale farmers, 
the union’s president and the chief of Kodima from Biu, and is used by USAID to oversee its 
assistance. At the farmer level, the TICFU and through it the USAID programme again draws on 
FBOs. In USAID programmes the FBOs are termed ‘nucleus outgrowers’, emphasising the 
responsibility of those heading the FBOs. Organisations and forms of support thus overlap. Union 
members are also organised into FBOs, but not all FBO members are part of the union. Only those 
farmers that are in both may benefit from the two forms of external support, aside from fertiliser 
discounts. 
In USAID interventions, these administrative structures are used to organise production 
among farmers, via union representatives, nucleus farmers and their outgrowers. Union 
representatives act as buying agents, or intermediaries, since they are equipped with finances from 
wholesalers, negotiate prices with wholesalers and farmers, and assure timely conduct of business. 
As a result, in this chain set-up, the chief from Biu who is also the union’s secretary, sources rice 
on behalf of wholesalers from farmers within the union. In other villages under the irrigation 
scheme, this is done by local rice intermediary traders, long established in local business and now 
also included in USAID programmes. The union’s president, who is at the same time the owner of 
several trucks and also president of the local transport union, organises transport to southern 
Ghana. For the majority of farmers, however, Jasmine rice is produced without any support, often 
even without fertiliser subsidies. Merchants can occasionally take over parts of the harvesting, 
especially threshing labour for farmers. Business is normally conducted with numerous local 
intermediaries and sometimes larger, travelling wholesalers. Wholesalers then supply larger 
wholesalers, who mill the grain and distribute the produce to retailers in southern Ghana, parallel 
to importers (see Figure 53).163 
                                                   
163 Ibid. and interview with ICOUR staff, local farmers and USAID intermediaries, wholesalers and company representatives 
August to December 2012, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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Figure 53: The northern Jasmine rice value chain (own figure, 2015, own trader FDGs, expert 
interviews, 2013, and AMAKYE et al. 2008; GAGE et al. 2012). 
6.3.3. Access, Inputs and Outputs 
Farmers’ entrance to Jasmine rice value chains is primarily defined by the ability to acquire 
the right seed. The only local source of Jasmine seed is currently either ICOUR or MOFA, unless 
one is willing and able to travel to the regional capital, Bolgatanga, which is long costly 
undertaking for many of the poor. With the new Jasmine seed, farmers then venture into a new 
type of rice, which they characterise as less tasty, less nutritious, less tolerant to drought and 
flooding and more demanding in terms of inputs, such as fertilisers, agro-chemicals, aside labour 
and thereby sophistication.164 Farmers need to take a higher risk. But, much more than pointing at 
disadvantages, farmers praise the seed’s high yields and the high market demand. As USAID 
experts explained, older varieties, though far more drought resistant, able to grow with only 
manure, more nutritious and with higher shelf-life, are almost extinct because consumers do not 
want them and because they have a lower yield and do not pay well.165 Yet, it is important to note 
that the ordinary Jasmine rice farmer still faces comparatively low financial requirements at 
potentially good yields and little risks in general, when compared to chili or tomato farmers. Rice 
can serve as a staple for up to a year. So, motivation to enter the rice chain and to specialise in its 
production is high. Male and female farmers in Biu constantly talked of a genuine ‘rice boom’, 
which started in 2008: 
                                                   
164 Farmer rice FGDs, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
165 Interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
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‘The reason why everybody here – including me, my wife and my children – now farms that rice, 
is that it has now become an economical crop that can give us both money and a lot of food. That 
makes it the most cherished crop of all! That is what we demand and what we need today. 
Everybody has seen the importance of rice and so we don't joke with it! Everybody likes to take 
[eat] rice and that is why we keep on farming it!’166 
Access restraints based on gender are not evident in rice, though of course females own 
fewer lands and are generally worse equipped asset-wise. The basic input needed is suitable, 
irrigated land that allows the production of sufficiently good quality rice, however, this is 
especially scarce among women. Suitable land is furthermore a matter of geography. Generally 
SGI farmers cannot grow rice, because the labour costs for watering are too high. Production of 
Jasmine rice is thus limited to half a year, to the wet season at best, and can only take place in few 
valleys neither too close to flooded areas nor at too high an altitude where droughts are likely to 
occur. In places like Mirigu, there are too few suitable plots: 
‘The rice valleys are not enough, because that rice does not grow well on any other land apart 
from very swampy areas and some of those can flood. […] So, we grow [rice] mainly to eat, 
whereas you people [from Biu] grow mainly to sell. […] You farm on large scale and we farm on 
small scale. In Biu you have a lot of land lying down at the irrigation but we have mostly uplands. 
[…] We just do not have access to irrigation. […] The reason why we don't farm on commercial 
basis, is that the right land is not enough in Mirigu, here’.167 
Jasmine rice will do best only when irrigated, and where water supplies can be controlled. 
Water supplies are less controllable under rainfed production in low-land/valley areas and even 
worse on rainfed uplands. The water demands of Jasmine rice are much more pronounced than for 
the older varieties. The disadvantages of rainfed production include limited yields or possibly a 
total failure of crops. Furthermore quality of the product alters according to water provision, 
which determines the percentage of grain breakage after harvest, which in turn significantly 
influences post-harvest losses encountered by wholesalers and processors.  
Rice generally has to be harvested at a point in time when grains are neither too wet nor too 
dry (of 14-15 percent water content is optimal). Higher wetness will lead to rotting after harvests, 
while higher dryness will cause grains to crack or even pulverise in the course of milling. Both 
constrain sales, but especially dryness, which makes rice unattractive to traders especially from 
southern Ghana. Over-drying is a major issue, because it renders produce fit solely for parboiling, 
which can reduce the breakage of grains. All the same, it also limits the market range of northern 
                                                   
166 FGD Participant, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
167 FGD participant, March, 2013, Mirigu, Ghana. 
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rice, as parboiled rice is only sold at regional markets. In fact, non-quality rice and specifically 
heavily broken rice, which is often used for parboiling, achieves a farm gate price estimated to be 
at least 20 percent below that of good quality produce for milling. To avoid breakage, timely 
harvests are essential. But, over-drying is hard to come by, if Jasmine is cultivated in areas 
generally too dry or where water logging or flooding blocks timely harvests, where the produce 
can thus not be reaped in time. Often fields are too small to be harvested by machines. So, the risk 
of spoilage is highest when production takes place on small, rainfed uplands, followed by valleys 
and then irrigation projects. The rice most attractive to southern wholesalers comes from irrigation 
projects, which excludes the majority of farmers in northern Ghana from the market.168 
Moreover, a significant number of farmers having access to irrigation could be excluded, 
because delays in production are frequent. These arise from a lack of financial credit/capital and 
work overload specifically at the start and end of wet season activities – when it would be best to 
start working on the next season’s rice – even though the poorest farmer will do his/her best to 
give priority to its production. Because it is mostly small-scale farmers that produce on irrigated 
lowlands liable to flooding, the poor generally face higher risks in production and in quality 
standards imposed by new rice markets. At the irrigation project, unequal allocation of land and 
spatial marginalisation are further consolidated by the trend towards more Jasmine rice. Many 
farmers have tried to enlarge their production, as markets were so attractive over recent years.  
Access to the Jasmine rice value chain is thereby defined by access to external support and 
natural capital in combination with irrigation. Social allocation mechanisms play a crucial role 
and work to the disadvantage of the lower strata of society. But, farmers believe that dynamics 
encountered in rice value chains could help to overcome socio-economic polarisation in the 
community. Rice is an inclusive crop and it may improve well-being, if suitable land is accessible: 
‘Rice is bridging the gap. […] Somebody who was very poor some years back […] is now better 
off, because he will […] rather be working on his rice. But […], those that were already rich 
profited more from the trends of events, because they already had the money, […] had more 
farmlands […]. Some of the poor used to give up [irrigated] lands to the rich, for money, and so 
they can’t work on them now and keep on begging’169 
If irrigated land can be accessed, the financial threshold is comparatively low when 
compared to other cash crops. Jasmine rice thereby holds potential for livelihood development of 
the poor. Jasmine rice is popular among most farmers and especially among the poor that cannot 
go for more expensive and riskier cash crops. Farmers growing Jasmine constantly emphasise that 
                                                   
168 Interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
169 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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financial constraints would not allow them to buy all the required fertilisers and chemicals. In 
order to produce rice that is free of stones, locals require tarpaulins, which hardly anybody can 
afford. This further limits access to the value chain and is the reason why they stress that financial 
capital at hand is the primary asset required for chain access.170 But rice is otherwise not too 
demanding. With regards to social capital, generally a crucial asset among the poor, rice has partly 
been incorporated into local belief systems, as it can formally serve as a staple:  
‘Everybody is looking for rice now, more than for any other type of food. We also make sacrifices 
to the gods, not to allow the rice to spoil, although it is not a traditional crop. […]. We are 
leading the whole of the Upper East in terms of rice production, and everybody knows that it is 
because the gods are behind us. They [the gods] cannot refuse our foodstuffs and that is why they 
allow rice […]. The gods accept the rice and the people also like it.’171 
Yet rice production takes time, which in turn can cause conflicts with traditionalists in 
households that insist on the production of crops like millet to suit local belief systems. Incomes 
generated by successful participation in the rice value chain increase social capital, as income is 
invested in schooling of children (human capital) and allows the erection of permanent housing 
structures (physical capital). Such abilities are regarded as highly prestigious, but understood as 
impossible with traditional staple crops only: 
‘When I was still a boy, everybody lived in a mud house and we farmed millet, but today I am old. 
All the big, strong houses you are seeing here are rice-homes. Millet can never build such a 
house! If we were to farm only millet, then we can’t put up any block [concrete] house. So, why 
should we want to waste time? That’s why the people have migrated to rice.’172 
Emphasis on the livelihood outcome generating abilities of Jasmine rice through income 
earned is so strong, because the real poor currently have no alternative form of cash cropping, 
with the exception of maize. As was frequently expressed in FGDs and individual interviews, 
success in rice markets has enabled farmers to acquire higher well-being and to reduce overall 
vulnerability. Vulnerability is also reduced by rice production because food security throughout 
the year is assured (without prior sales). Yields are often higher than before, and even if the 
produce does not suit quality requirements, it can be stored for a long time (about one year) and 
feed entire households. Another advantage of rice in terms of livelihood outcomes is that 
production is relatively environmentally sustainable. Farmers do not report of environmental 
degradation that would undermine production (see also Figure 54).  
                                                   
170 Farmer rice FGDs, October, 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
171 Interview with the chief of Kodima, 24.02.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
172 Interview with an elderly farmer, 26.03.2012, Biu, Ghana. 
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Figure 54: Intensity of associations made between rice chain access and assets required (left) and 
chain outcomes for farmers’ assets and livelihood outcomes (right)  (own figure, 2015, according 
to co-occurrence coefficients, own FGDs and Interviews, 2012/’13, n=150 h). 
Rice farmers can easily pay themselves or their workers the minimum wage and often make 
significant profit, if they are able to access the chain. Government estimates, however, seem 
slightly over-optimistic. USAID estimates state the opposite and assume higher inputs. Data 
collected during field research suggest that the average farmer in Biu is able to achieve a profit 
margin of about 44 percent on an acre of Jasmine rice, thus less than what government entities 
estimate but more than what USAID suggests. This is due to variance in yield and farm gate price. 
The average calculated below is thus a rough figure (see Figure 55). 
 
Figure 55: Estimates of paddy Jasmine rice production costs, expected yields, average prices 
(June – July 2012) and net returns per acre at minimum wage of 4.8 GH₵/man-day (own figure, 
2014, own survey, 2013, n=6 and *based on ICOUR, MOFA and USAID data, 2013). 
Regarding market access, farm gate prices were favourable. Farmers at the Tono irrigation 
project were able to undercut the average world market price of 1.125 GH₵/kg in June/July 2012 
for imported, Thai/Jasmine rice (5 percent broken) by about 34 percent.173 But, that is only a 
temporal and incomplete sketch. From early 2009 onwards, world market prices have been below 
                                                   
173 Exchange rates from www.oanda.com and world market prices from WORLD BANK 2014. 
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those of local farm gate prices. Moreover, it is important to add that local farm gate prices 
collected by the government actually refer to un-milled rice, known as paddy. Its milled 
equivalent/‘processing yield’ is just 60 to 70 percent of farm gate weight (data obtained from 
USAID and ICOUR 2013: 98).  
Additional costs and nominal losses arise for wholesalers and processors of local produce, 
while world market prices refer to already milled rice. The difference between world market 
prices and wholesale prices for (milled) imported rice, indicate that importers are able to make 
vast profits, at least when compared to profits in domestic trade. Differences between retail and 
wholesale prices for imported rice are larger than for local produce. More value is seemingly 
generated in import value chains. These are more beneficial to importers and retailers within the 
chain, but less so to wholesalers and retailers active on domestic markets. In comparison, 
domestic merchants compromise on profits, because farm gate prices are higher than world 
market prices. Additionally, losses during processing are greatly limited. Wholesalers have to 
convince retailers of selling their product, as retailers’ margins are then rather smaller. Though 
retailer margins were often higher when dealing in local rice throughout 2009, they fluctuated 
more than margins of imported rice. Since 2010 imported rice has allowed them larger incomes.  
On the side of consumers, however, locally produced milled Jasmine rice, still has great 
potential, because market prices could be lower if local produce would show similar qualities as 
imported rice. The latter is of special significance. This is so, because retailer prices on major 
Ghanaian markets have eventually been lower for local than for imported rice. Prices have started 
to align in recent times. To convince retailers of selling local produce, consumers’ will to pay 
needs to be increased by higher quality (see Figure 56). 
Within the domestic rice value chain, retailers are somewhat underprivileged. The lion’s 
share of the final retailer price consists only of wholesale profit. Additional costs for 
intermediaries are negligible, as they make up less than 0.5 percent of retailer prices. 
Proportionally to the profits generated by wholesalers, the investments required for aggregation – 
being sacks, loading and handling, tax, transportation – aside from farm gate prices, are 
insignificant. Costs encountered for processing, milling and further handling, are even smaller. 
While farmers are comparatively privileged in profit allocation, the profits and costs encountered 
by retailers are marginal (see Figure 57). Seemingly, profit and therefore power is concentrated 
mostly at the wholesale level. 
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Figure 56: Prices of rice at district, southern Ghanaian and world level from 2009 to 2012 (own 
figure, 2014, based on data obtained from ESOKO, 2013, *based on data obtained from MOFA, 
2013, and **based on exchange rates from www.oanda.com, prices from WORLD BANK 2014). 
 
Figure 57: Estimated average composition of the kilogram retail price of milled Jasmine rice grain 
from irrigation projects in Northern Ghana, sold in Accra in June – July 2012 (own figure, 2015, 
based on own calculations, trader FGDs, 2013, USAID and ESOKO data, 2013). 
For wholesalers, the profits accruing at farmer level are thus crucial. Wholesalers will likely 
attempt to lower these. The rice chain currently compromises between extremes, but has the 
potential to become increasingly buyer- or wholesaler-driven.174 When more farmers enter into 
Jasmine production, competition for their rice is likely to decrease. The calculated shares in the 
chain refer to dry-season production, a time of rice scarcity on markets. Most likely, the chain will 
                                                   
174 Interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
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already be more buyer-driven during the other half of the year, when harvests coincide with the 
rest of the country. At present demand is so high that farmers report ‘violent competition’ for their 
produce, which explains why farmers were able to access large shares of profit.175 Yet, from a 
farmer’s point of view, there are limitations to these numbers, going far beyond seasonality.  
Farmers’ margins and shares in the chain depend on the extent to which they comply to 
good agricultural practices, as these affect variable costs and determine yields. Rice is most often 
produced under sub-optimal conditions, partly because it is so popular among poor farmers. 
During FGDs, farmers constantly emphasised that if they lack inputs like sufficient fertilisers, 
production of rice will not be economically sound but only good to attain food security. 
According to farm budgets collected in Biu, a lack of fertilisers can lower yields, product quality 
and thereby farm gate prices to the extent that it is simply not worth selling. Farmers’ shares in the 
chain then drop severely. Only those locally understood as being ‘commercial’, thus big-time 
farmers (local elite), have the possibility to sell their rice as seed because they are highly 
sophisticated, certified farmers on uplands. Alternatively they can simply wait for better prices, or 
receive much better farm gate prices by being able to access trade with wholesalers attracted by 
USAID. Especially the latter can be of major advantage, because farm gate prices may increase up 
to 19 percent above what others encountered as ‘average’. ‘Poor’ farmers, on the other hand, 
rather produce grain, have worse quality, low yields, sell fast during low price (harvest) periods, 
and may run at a loss. Diverse factors are at play. Finances for inputs, especially fertilisers, and 
support through USAID or BF are important for market-orientation (see Figure 58).176  
It can be deducted that access to external support programmes – government seed 
production in BF, fertiliser subsidies and USAID enabled sponsoring and selling – and the ability 
to produce high quality rice plays a key role in livelihood development of local smallholder 
producers. When able to combine all forms of support currently available for production – for 
land preparation, fertilisers and seed – subsidy relief of up to 30 percent of total production costs 
can be received. Assuming that rice produced under ‘commercial’ conditions generates higher 
farm gate prices (possibly even those of seed or under USAID support), margins and farmers’ 
incomes, food security and socio-economic development will differ even more. Most often 
‘commercial farmers’ seemed able to attain these subsides and access better paying wholesalers 
attracted by USAID. In contrast the ‘poor’ did not enjoy most of these advantages.177 
                                                   
175 Female FGD participant, October 2013, Biu, Ghana.  
176 Farmer rice FGDs, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
177 Farmer rice FGDs, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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Figure 58: Illustrations of paddy Jasmine rice production costs, yields, average prices (June – July 
2012) and net returns per acre at minimum wage of 4.8 GH₵/man-day, according to socio-
economic stand (own figure 2014, own survey, 2013, n=6 and *based on two FGDs). 
As ‘commercial farmers’ already produce at a sophisticated level, their incremental gains 
attained through subsidies are marginal, as dictated by the principle of diminishing returns. ‘Poor’ 
farmers taking great leaps forward are able to use rice as a valuable cash crop. This holds true 
even without any further advancements, no seed certification, and no higher farm gate price. 
Simply lowering the cost of contemporary production would allow the poor to generate incomes. 
Lowering costs and heightening farm gate prices via external support is not a necessity for 
commercial farmers, unlike for the poor (see Figure 59). 
 
Figure 59: Illustration of margins per acre according to socio-economic stand of producer (own 
calculation and figure, 2014, own survey, 2013, n=6 and based on FGDs). 
Subsidies and external support and the decision over which value chain to enter (seed or 
grain) show the potential to turn subsistence farmers into more commercially-orientated ones and, 
moreover, to drastically increase all outcomes generated by the Jasmine rice value chain. Well-
being as well as food and income security may benefit, though subsidies are often a prerequisite. 
The majority of local farmers are likely to be dependent on external support to make production 
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economically sound. According to household survey data, the average farmer in Biu produces 
about 1.35 tonnes of rice on one acre per season. Such farmers sell about three-quarters of their 
produce, most likely at equally precarious margins (survey, 2013, n=177). Only poor farmers 
desperate for incomes will try to use rice as a cash crop when they are not externally supported. 
Such farmers remain excluded from the current market boom and the most favourable forms of 
value chain access. As farmers explicitly asked during FGDs, it is essential to examine the wider 
production network of rice, which alters the basic accessibility, outcome and governance of the 
rice market through the local chain.  
6.3.4. Governance Dynamics 
The governance of rice production can be separated into three major parts, the dynamics of 
which are explored in this sub-section. Firstly there is general trade, without much external 
interference and provided immediately by merchants. Secondly are public programmes, such as 
the fertiliser subsidy and the Block Farming initiative provided by entities like MOFA and 
ICOUR. Thirdly, these efforts are accompanied by the USAID ADVANCE programme. 
6.3.4.1. Governance Dynamics in General Rice Trade 
Access to Jasmine rice markets by acquiring seed is exclusive, because MOFA and ICOUR 
hold a monopoly on the seed.178 Farmers mobilise social relationships to compensate for a lack of 
knowledge on improved seed varieties and to deal with their lack of connections to these public 
entities. Insufficient vertical embeddedness seemingly derives from discrepancies in the level of 
pro-poor engagement of government entities and a lack of grass-roots’ monitoring. Indeed most 
farmers have probably acquired seed informally, using “weapons of the weak” to steel seed from 
commercial farmers: 
‘You see, they [MOFA/ICOUR] bring it [the seed] only to the commercial farmers, […] but we 
work for them […] When you observe that this fellow’s rice does well, you will be interested to go 
and help with harvest and get the variety for yourself. […] They [commercial farmers] will not 
even like you to be informed about these things and we can’t get it directly.’179 
Once in production, farmers describe the governance of rice value chains by merchants – 
mostly intermediaries and seldom wholesalers – as fully informal and spontaneous, as a spot 
market on which a large number of individual producers and buyers meet with little to no 
exchange beyond monetary terms. To farmers, this is partly a result of a lack of vertical 
contractualisation or cooperation among them.180 Farmers are organised in a union as well as in 
                                                   
178 Interview with a KNE MOFA officer, October 2012, Navrongo Ghana. 
179 FGD participant, 22.01.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
180 Farmer rice FGDs, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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FBOs, but these do not act as unified entities. Farmers regret that they are divided over selling as a 
result of poverty, which reduces their bargaining power. Whenever farmers try to agree upon a 
certain price amongst them, to thereby have a bigger say in relations to rice traders, the poor that 
cannot wait for better prices break away from arrangements and soon everybody sells at lower 
prices than agreed upon. Farmers believe that they require a united front to improve their 
situation, but attest that poverty makes it harder for them to unite.181  
Intermediaries and wholesalers, on the other hand, act comparatively independently as they 
are not organised into any local, regional or national associations that control qualities supplied to 
markets and thereby prices. The basic governance of domestic rice chains is thus quite 
unrestricted, with few barriers to entry.182 In fact, some farmers from Biu have sent rice to 
southern Ghana and sold to wholesalers directly, though that is an exception because it requires 
investment in transport. But, direct sales are principally possible.183 Nevertheless, traders possess 
vast purchasing power, specifically wholesalers that drive the chain, as was shown in the 
composition of retailer prices. Until recently, dominance of wholesalers allowed them to act as 
purebred brokers. It was common that farmers would have to pay to transport their rice to Biu, if 
not Navrongo, where they credited it to intermediaries. The intermediaries passed it on to 
wholesalers, against commission, but again on credit. Wholesalers would give rice to retailers on 
credit and later collect repayments after everything was sold. This is how wholesalers reduced 
their risks encountered in price fluctuations.184 However, it took months before payments reached 
farmers, whereas payment is now higher and instant.185 The high demand for locally produced 
Jasmine rice has helped farmers to have a greater share of profit and better terms of exchange. 
Farmers thus profit from recent policy trends, especially during the dry season, when food and 
income security become critical.  
Intermediaries and retailers have remained in fully captive relations with wholesalers. These 
upstream and downstream partners in the chain continue to depend entirely on wholesalers’ 
market access and especially on their finances to conduct business. Wholesalers’ money 
channelled through bank accounts is used by intermediaries to buy and accumulate rice. Rice is 
then transported by wholesalers to southern Ghana, where it is given to retailers, on credit. Direct 
contact between farmers or intermediaries and retailers is not common. Thus, major barriers to the 
rice market exist. Wholesalers have continued to control most of the value chain, though they are 
                                                   
181 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
182 Interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
183 Farmer rice FGDs, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
184 Interview with a local, big-time intermediary, March 2013, Navrongo, Ghana. 
185 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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not organised and still compete among each other. As a result, intermediaries try to capitalise on 
the monopoly they have in terms of contact to farmers.186  
Intermediaries make use of the fact that there is no trust between farmers and wholesalers, 
which, first of all, allows them to charge commission. Trade with intermediaries are not 
transparent in terms of quantities and qualities. Therefore, the positive impressions of trends 
gained by farmers must be treated with some caution. While one can assume that rice 
market/value chain trends are positive for farmers, estimates of the quantitative effects they attest 
are often vague, mainly because units of sale vary heavily. Traders often insist on measurement 
done by sense of proportion not weight, leaving much room to manoeuvre in terms of kilogram 
pricing, and therefore mistrust between the parties involved. Exercises performed during FGDs, 
whereby farmers were asked to estimate the weight of Jasmine paddy rice by filling sacks with 
equal loads as demanded by traders, revealed deviations in the weight of units of sale by about 10 
to 20 percent. Furthermore a broad variety of units is used for measurement, mostly differently 
sized rice sacks or basins that are then also filled at varying levels. There is thus some 
standardisation in measurement, yet so opaque that even locals will not master it. It causes 
confusion and argumentation between the parties involved. Also, when measurement is based on 
volume and not weight, farmers are less interested in threshing their rice too well, as chaff 
increases volume. This decreases quality and raises economic concerns by traders. Especially in 
the wet season, merchants permanently make use of weak standards by increasing the size of units 
of sale at fixed prices, up to a point where farmers’ profits can fall too low for meaningful 
production. Such conduct of business can easily make a difference of another 10 percent in weight 
and thereby farm gate price.187 Farmers were well aware of these deviations, and complain of a 
lack of transparency in the rice sales, but are not in a position to argue for higher prices, because 
(they believe) it would otherwise be cheaper for traders to buy in southern parts of Ghana.188 
Further room to alter prices arises from the fact that intermediaries subjectively measure 
moisture content, considered an indicator of quality. Farmers frequently state that intermediaries 
unwarrantedly use moisture content and other quality concerns to argue for lower prices. As a 
response, farmers team up to mix non-quality, over-dry or rotting rice with that of others able to 
fulfil requirements. Locals feel obliged to risk rice market access and incomes for solidarity.189 Of 
further concern to farmers, is that local intermediaries take advantage of seasonal poverty in the 
                                                   
186 Interview with a local, big-time intermediary, March 2013, Navrongo, Ghana; and two technical associates at 
ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
187 Household survey and FGDs, 2013, and interviews with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE 
programme), July to August and December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
188 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
189 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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area, during dry season harvests, when value chain integration and thereby prices could be most 
favourable. Knowing of the hardship locals face at that time of year, intermediaries regularly offer 
to buy rice that is still standing on farmers’ fields, meaning that intermediaries (and sometimes 
wholesalers) themselves will take over harvesting and especially threshing labour, but in turn 
attempt to buy at cut-throat prices, in order to increase their profits. Especially poor rice farmers, 
the majority of locals, are greatly tempted by quick money, as they suffer from a lack of income 
and food at the time prior to dry season harvests, have no means of storage, and need money for 
investment into the next season, though they could be sure to sell the rice at a later time for a 
better price. So, seasonal poverty is used by intermediaries to counter farmers’ market advantages:  
‘Those traders, I call predators. […] A predator will try and kill you when you are unaware […]. 
They don't have any consideration for the farmer […]. Because the farmer may not have certainty 
as to when he is going to sell or who is going to buy from him, they feel that if there is money 
available right now, they are better off taking that little money, than selling tomorrow. […] 
Sometimes the farmer has not even harvested to know the quantity but they just want to buy 
everything and the farmer – depending on his economic or financial status – might say ok.’190 
Farmers in northern Ghana supply markets during periods of low price, at the end of the wet 
season, when the chain becomes increasingly buyer-driven. Intermediaries may try to actively 
dominate their part of the chain, which decreases profitability for farmers far beyond the 
commission intermediary’s charge. It is thus questionable to what extent farmers are still 
favourably incorporated into the chain, especially the poor, if their shares of profits in retailer 
prices are occasionally far lower than previously estimated when intermediaries try to lower farm 
gate prices to increase their own margins.191 Yet, farmers are generally thrilled by the fact that 
markets have moved closer to them, since about 2008. They say that solely intermediaries from 
the village itself bought their rice in the past, whereas nowadays many intermediaries come from 
the district centre, Navrongo, to conduct business. A few wholesalers from southern Ghana have 
also started to source rice directly from farmers: 
‘Before, we were left in the house of the local market women [mostly intermediaries], who would 
just treat us so badly. […] But it was then, when the Twi-speaking people [speaking a language of 
southern Ghana] came for the Jasmine rice. It was this particular seed […] that then attracted the 
                                                   
190 Interview with a technical associate at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and December 
2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
191 Interview with a local, big-time intermediary, March 2013, Navrongo, Ghana, and two technical associates at 
ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
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Ashanti traders [traders from southern Ghana], that normally aggregated only from the south. 
[…] So now, we are making money! […] It [rice] should be cultivated everywhere!’192 
For farmers, the increased competition among buyers led traders to begin visiting them on 
their fields, and wholesalers to be referred to as ‘friends’. Relationships, though still based on 
pricing, are becoming deeper and most importantly, farmers emphasise that increases in farm gate 
prices outstrip those of the (unsubsidised) inputs needed for production. As a result, farmers 
emphasise great willingness to increase their investments in rice production, specifically in terms 
of producing sufficient quality, for example by threshing on costly tarpaulins to avoid 
contamination of rice with stones. Yet, such improvements are hard to come by, if finances are 
not enough even though food security may have improved. What aggravates the situation is that 
financially weak intermediaries cannot sponsor farmers in production, while wholesalers are not 
ready to do so through intermediaries, as they fear a loss of investment. Farmers now hope for 
explicit sponsoring, enabled through direct contact with southern-based wholesalers. Farmers 
have heard that this is in principle possible, and practiced south of the UER, such as in the 
Northern Region. However, they underline that intermediaries actively block direct contact 
between them and potential sponsors.193 Sponsoring of farmers by traders, especially wholesalers, 
or any sort of contractual farming has, therefore, not yet taken place. Between farmers and 
wholesalers, no modular, relational or captive forms of governance exist. Relations in the value 
chain are purely market based, especially for traders who have little knowledge and understanding 
of the issues encountered in farmers’ production.194 Still, farmers are satisfied with contemporary 
trends and are willing to invest further in production because of the potential rewards: 
‘Before the revolution in rice began [the market boom], or before the aggregators start coming 
in, we used to send our rice just to the local market […]. Now we have some aggregators that 
come from Accra, but they are few. Then we have the other traders [mostly intermediaries] that 
now come all the way to our farms and transport for us. So, now we are all farming with the hope 
that these aggregators will soon also be coming […]. With these in our mind, we use all our 
energy to farm very properly.’ 195 
Credit for inputs to farm rice is provided to farmers by roughly 15 percent of locals (2013, 
n=177). Contractualisation thus primarily occurs on a comparatively local, more vertical level, 
                                                   
192 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
193 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
194 Interview with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
195 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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informally and partly through social control/capital within the community.196 There is potential for 
contractual farming, but as in other chains, a lack of direct contact, thereby mistrust, resulting 
default risk, legal uncertainty and ineffectiveness still withhold wholesalers from entering into 
more sophisticated forms of cooperation with farmers. Moreover, formal, written contracts are 
simply not a part of local norms and values, which is why farmers do not see the need to use them. 
In case of disputes local chiefs, who side with farmers, are referred to for resolution.  197 A more 
neutral entity will thus be needed to organise numerous smallholder farmers for trade with large-
scale wholesalers or companies, and to assure compliance to previously made agreements. 
Functioning FBOs and farmer unions are needed to give farmers greater market access, power in 
price negotiations, and to be able to deal without intermediaries that block more favourable forms 
of value chain integration. The baseline for all such favourable forms of chain access is external 
support granted in the production and selling of rice, as strived for in public/government 
programmes and USAID interventions. 
6.3.4.2. Governance Dynamics in Public Programmes 
Major publicly funded government programmes, with relevance for rice cultivation in the 
study area, started out with a subsidy on fertiliser. This was later side-lined by an initially more 
comprehensive initiative, named Block Farming (BF) or the Youth in Agriculture Programme. 
Though BF intended to provide improved market access, in practical terms, it turned into a source 
of subsidised inputs like fertilisers and seed, at least for the majority producing rice grain at the 
Tono irrigation project. Initiatives thus mainly centre around providing the same subsidised, 
inorganic fertilisers, against cash in the prior and on credit in the latter. Both run through similar 
actors, public institutions like MOFA, in BF also ICOUR and NAFCO, plus private agro-input 
business. Government performance of each attempt as well as the interaction of both in terms 
governance will now be explored. 
The General Fertiliser Subsidy 
General fertiliser subsidies came about partly as a reaction to price developments in the 
market for N.P.K., the most widely used fertiliser in Ghana. As prices increased by about 30 
percent between June 2007 and March 2008, the country’s largest N.P.K. fertiliser importer, ‘Yara 
Ghana Ltd.’, suggested a subsidy scheme to the government. The proposal was swiftly taken up 
by the government in 2008, giving a 50 percent discount to beneficiaries (BANFUL 2009: 1-2, 6). 
Farmers were to receive the subsidy in the form of vouchers distributed by MOFA extension 
agents. The vouchers would allow farmers to buy discounted fertilisers, mostly N.P.K. and 
                                                   
196 own observation and three seasons of own contract farming with 32 locals, 2012-2013, Biu, Ghana. 
197 Interview with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
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sulphate of ammonia, from private dealers. In the Upper East the fertilisers were solely provided 
by Yara through its major distributor ‘Iddisal Company Ltd.’ under the supervision of MOFA. 
After farmers had bought fertilisers, their dealers were supposed to hand the receipts back to the 
MOFA district directors, who registered and approved the sales, before passing the vouchers on to 
the regional and national administrative level, where they were checked again to assure the 
repayment of fertiliser vendors.198 
Substantial problems were encountered with the subsidy. Enquiries by the SEND 
Foundation suggest199 that not many farmers were even aware of this form of support. Information 
dissemination is often quite poor and hardly reaches the grass-roots level. The illiterate and 
uneducated, in particular, were practically cut off from receiving the subsidy as they simply did 
not know about it. They were dependent on others that were able to attain the subsidy. As reported 
by farmers in Biu and Mirigu, access to vouchers was even not granted to people aware of the 
scheme. Farmers participating in interviews and FGDs strongly emphasised that subsidised 
fertilisers arrived too late to be used meaningfully in wet season production (mostly in June, July, 
August), and that they were not able to access these anyhow, because they would not be able to 
‘pay’, thus bribe, MOFA extension officers to acquire vouchers. As the head of the regional 
agricultural workers union stated: 
‘The problem was simply corruption. If you knew an extension officer well or you would pay him 
a bribe, instead of giving you the official number of coupons [vouchers] he will give you much 
more [...]. I would say not even half of the people that were supposed to benefit from the subsidy 
also received it. Those that did not have money became greatly disadvantaged.’200 
Vague rumours of ‘the rich stealing the poor man’s help’ constantly characterised many 
farmer FGDs, specifically in the context of rice. Most participants stated that it was hard for them 
to acquire the subsidy. Farmers frequently said that even if they were able to acquire vouchers, 
most of times, stocks of subsidised fertilisers had already been given out to the ‘rich’.201 As their 
story went, elites in Navrongo, where the fertilisers initially arrive, divert such vast loads of these 
at night time that the whole region as much as interviewees themselves suffered from a lack 
throughout months.202 Further inquiries made on the matter reveal that the government was aware 
                                                   
198 Interview with the KNE MOFA director, 05.02.2013, Paga, Ghana and MOFA data. 
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200 Interview with the regional GAWU director, 19.02.2010, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
201 FGD and interviews with farmers, 2010 and 2012, Biu, Ghana. 
202 Participant of farmer rice FGD, October 2013, Biu, Ghana. 
Markets 
 
288 
of this, as ministry-internal email correspondence states.203 According to this, fertiliser was not 
distributed freely and publicly through the proclaimed voucher system, but most often 
disseminated at night, upon arrival. Therefore fertiliser shortages occurred with the onset of 
fertiliser subsidies. As scientific publications also state, the whole of northern Ghana suffered 
from a lack of fertiliser even though vast amounts of subsidised fertilisers had been made 
available (BANFUL 2009: 24). Lack of fertiliser was most severe in the Upper East Region, and 
wherever fertiliser was still available, it was sold at unsubsidised prices.  
A closer look at what actually happened with the subsidies was taken during field research. 
In the course of detailed MOFA investigations, it was detected that smuggling of fertilisers to 
Burkina Faso and Togo was a major contributing factor in this scam.204 Local MOFA 
management confirmed these accusations and spoke of thousands of bags given out each night, 
over a maximum of two to three days, not to farmers but rather to people that would then smuggle 
the goods to neighbouring Burkina Faso, where it could be sold at vast profits. The MOFA 
management added that this was large-scale fraud, made possible by close cooperation and 
organisation among fertiliser traders and extension officers. Local politicians such as District 
Chief Executives (DCEs) were also said to divert substantial amounts for political patronage, sale, 
and smuggling: 
‘It was the [fertiliser] dealers that went to the [MOFA] extension officers and made them fill out 
forms with fictitious names and then shared the money after the fertiliser was sold in Burkina 
Faso. […] The other people that got some [subsidised fertiliser] […] were well linked to political 
actors […] Because of the political power they have you must give them [subsidies]. It was the 
DCE that brought about 100 […]. They would then smuggle it to Burkina, or they would go and 
sell it to people who were actually farmers. […] That is why the system had to be stopped!’205 
Due to these problems with the subsidy and to allow for better transparency and thereby 
accessibility, government efforts ceased, were reformed and reintroduced by 2010.206 A “way bill” 
system was introduced, with a passbook system added in 2012, to further improve control over 
subsidy allocation and especially to curb smuggling. With their voter or national health insurance 
card, farmers were to register freely with their community MOFA extension officers for a 
passbook that enabled them to buy fertiliser at the subsidised price, again through private dealers. 
                                                   
203 Email from Cletus Achaab, UER MOFA director, to Kwesi Ahwoi, Minister for Food and Agriculture, with copies sent to 
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A total of 56,000 passbooks were officially prepared for the whole Upper East Region (MOFA 
UER RADU 2013: 2-3). MOFA-internal data at the regional level, however, speaks of only 
42,500, out of which only 30,992, thus 72 percent were allocated.207 A maximum of 16,000 
passbooks had thus vanished on their way through government departments.  
The new passbooks did not bring an end to the encountered problems, especially the 
smuggling of fertiliser. In fact, the practice increased over 2010 to 2011 and peaked in 2012208, 
when fertiliser smuggling ‘boomed’ in the Upper East, leading to ‘mountains of [illegally 
exported] fertilisers’ in neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso. According to the regional 
minister, Mr. Woyongo, local farmers and their donkeys smuggled the fertiliser to the border: 
donkeys were ‘trained […] to manoeuvre their way to the border’ without their owners 
(JALULAH 2012). A total of 315,720 bags or 15,786 tonnes of subsidised fertilizers, worth over 
10 million GH¢, had been allocated for regional wet season production. But, the eventual 
allocation of subsidies had little in common with what had officially been planned. Districts in the 
eastern parts of the region, which were already greatly favoured in the planned allocation, 
eventually received substantially more, while others including those of the study areas got about 
50 to 90 percent less than intended (see Table 15).  
 District Planned (bags) Received (bags) Difference (%) 
Bolga 45,060 23,223 - 48.4 % 
Bongo 10,740 1,247 -88.3 % 
Talensi Nabdam 6,540 270 -95.8 % 
Garu Tempane 78,000 114,940 +47.3 % 
Bawku Municipal 93,580 121,631 +29.9 % 
Bawku West 23,360 32,102 +37.4 % 
Kassena Nankana East 33,630 14,775 -56.0 % 
Kassena Nankana West 13,100 1,860 -85.8 % 
Builsa 11,720 2,490 -78.7 % 
TOTAL 315,730 312,538 -1.01 % 
Table 15: Planned and actual allocation of subsidised fertiliser bags (50 kg) among districts of the 
Upper East Region in 2012 (own Table, based on MOFA UER RADU 2013: 2-3). 
The three districts that had already managed to heighten their quota (see Table 15, namely 
Garu Tempane, Bawku Municipal and Bawku West) then further exceeded their allocation by 
another 40,548 bags. In total, about 353,086 bags of fertilisers should thus have arrived in the 
Upper East, however, region-wide billing at the end of the 2012 period could only account for 
299,231 bags of fertilisers given out on farmers’ passbooks. Thus, almost 16 percent of all 
government subsidies on fertilisers are unaccounted for. Just like passbooks they were ‘lost’ along 
the chain.209 However, unlike their minister, MOFA employees in charge of subsidy allocation in 
the KNW attribute this massive intra-regional deviation and the encountered losses to criminal 
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behaviour, smuggling, even though the initial displacement of fertilisers was officially branded a 
mistake by Yara, the main company supplying the Upper East: 
The fertiliser was collected from YARA, in Tamale. […] The subsidised fertiliser can be sold very 
profitably in Burkina Faso, so it was then taken there. So that meant that we did not have enough 
fertiliser here at our place. […]The sulphate of ammonia was gone completely [about a third of 
total, as planned]. […] I pray hard that they will get those people [arrest them].’210 
A meeting of the Municipal Assembly, held on 17th July, 2012, confirmed that the practice 
of smuggling continued to be a reality in all districts of the region, most notably in the Bawku 
Municipality, but also in the study areas where the above quote came from.211 Email 
correspondence at the national, administrative level confirms that the well trained donkeys 
government officials were referring to when accusing farmers of smuggling were actually 
fertiliser dealers, in cooperation MOFA extension officers and security agencies from Burkina 
Faso and Togo. Extension officers and fertiliser dealers were using farmers’ passbooks to either 
fake or to exaggerate quantities of fertilisers purchased by farmers, after giving these farmers a 
few bags freely. They then smuggled fertilisers to neighbouring countries where they could be 
sold at a vast profit. Those primarily in charge of stopping this, police and customs forces, were 
not able to do much about it. Smugglers generally travelled with armed guards and so Ghanaian 
authorities were afraid to arrest them. When they did they received ‘calls and threats’ from ‘very 
important people in Accra’.212 MOFA-internal documentation gives no more details on these 
important people, because if corruption is uncovered at too high a government level, those 
revealing misuse may have to fear for their lives.213 One can safely conclude that government 
executives at a regional and national level benefit from smuggling, while trying to blame farmers:  
‘If you look at the whole fertiliser chain, you will see that people are in it, which are also part of 
government. […]. There are also other people in the chain that are just very close to the corridors 
of power, but I am now mainly talking of the NDC and NPP party executives […]. They […] go 
into this business [of smuggling] […] so that they can also finance their party activities, to stay in 
power […]. You will have people who are engaged in very serious smuggling of fertiliser, but they 
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Ghana. 
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are linked to the minister or somebody somewhere in Accra […]. People […] have even been 
arrested, but they […] are covered by those in power.’214 
As well as the national and local level big-shots making vast profits from subsidy deviation, 
Ghanaian security agencies bent the law rather than enforce it. During a meeting of MOFA 
officials with the local police commander in the course of trying to curb smuggling, it turned out 
that the fertilisers of those that had been arrested for illegal trafficking had been sold afterwards 
by police and customs to the general public, respectively the highest bidder, without the use of 
pass books and without MOFA supervision. The forces were unwilling to reveal what happened to 
the money they had made.215 Attempts by the municipal director of agriculture to gather 
information on the seizure and sale of fertiliser proved futile.216  
The fertiliser subsidies left for farmers were thus limited by corruption and misuse on the 
side of government entities from the national to local level. This favoured better-situated farmers, 
those that could pay and/or bribe, over poorer ones. Furthermore, government figures show that 
what was left to distribute among farmers showed significant gender bias when it came to 
allocation. On a regional level, only 38 percent of recipients were female and within districts of 
the study areas it was only about 20 percent in the KNE and 25 percent in the KNW.217 General 
fertiliser subsidies thus hardly reach those most in need of them. This makes space for male, elite 
farmers, local politicians or fertiliser dealers to credit inputs to the poor at exorbitant prices. 
Though farmers acknowledge that these sponsors are taking further advantage of their poor 
production and livelihood options, these arrangements are highly popular because the poor often 
have no other way of attaining external support. The benefits enabled through access to such 
sponsoring, in the form of fertilisers, can outweigh the interest charged.218  
While it may still be lucrative for locals to partake in indirect sponsoring made possible by 
government subsidies, it is alarming that the local elite has taken over the land of the poor, 
through informal contract farming/outgrower arrangements to produce rice. Overall socio-
economic inequality is thus larger than formal land allocation already suggests, and will keep on 
growing, because the produced rice is comparatively cheap to attain for its sponsors. It allows 
them to dump externally produced rice on local markets together with their own subsidised 
production, to thereby attract wholesalers via enlarged quantities at a lower cost.219 In the long 
run, such horizontal forms of contractual farming do not necessarily put the poor at much of an 
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advantage. Another way to attain subsidies by interest free credit and including buyers, which 
allows the possibility to repay in kind, has been established over recent years: Block Farming 
within the Youth in Agriculture Programme. 
The Block Farming/Youth in Agriculture Program 
Aside from the general fertiliser subsidy, public endeavours in Block Farming within the 
Youth in Agriculture Programme aimed at ‘mobilizing the youth to take up farming and its other 
related activities as [commercial] life time vocation’ (MOFA 2013b). To do so locally, initial 
yield trials were performed with Jasmine rice in 2009, and the first subsidies on a broader scale 
came in 2010,220 but it took until 2012 for the programme to provide more substantial support. 
Prior to the introduction of Block Farming (BF), ICOUR had occasionally been tasked with 
distributing so called ‘rice packages’, agro-inputs on credit for grain production with guaranteed 
sales, however, this task had gone into the hands of the MOFA. Yet ICOUR remained responsible 
for BF seed production on its premises. Efforts made in the context of BF were great, at least 
compared to previous programmes.221  
In 2012, another 38,705 bags of subsidised fertiliser were made available by the 
government, most of which went to those areas that were also able to acquire the largest shares of 
the general subsidy, Bawku and the KNE and KNW. Not only were patterns of regional allocation 
similar, the issues faced in BF were also identical. BF drew from the same sources of fertilisers 
and suffered from smuggling and misallocation. Farmers and government documents state, BF 
was thereby equally characterised by a lack of access for farmers.222 In informal interviews, 
extension officers in two visited districts actually admitted that they as well as the most other 
MOFA employees would frequently top-up their salaries and substitute a lack of money for their 
services by siphoning off government funds: 
It [the deviation of inputs] may come from extension officers, the one responsible for block 
farming, the director or even me! Just understand that if you want to do work genuinely here, you 
will have a problem. The whole of this year we did not get any money for fuel, to go out into the 
field. The whole year! Do they think I should be running my car with my own, scanty salary? No! 
[…] If somebody supposes I should do genuine work, how can I do that with the little money they 
give me? […] So you can imagine what we will do with the fertiliser.’223 
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It seems likely that smuggling, through exporters and dealers, is a problem at the district 
level. At this level subsidies were diminished, as shown by statistics for one of the districts 
visited, whereas this accusation remains based on interviews in the other. For both districts, 
however, MOFA records gathered during field research show that vast amounts of support was 
used directly by local elites, among them most notably the DCEs of the KNE and KNW districts, 
the NDC chairman, the coordinating director of the KNW, chiefs and their relatives, hospital 
owners, the president of the Tono irrigation farmers’ union, pharmacists, lawyers, even a 
Pentecostal pastor, and a few large-scale farmers. Several custom house agents and fertiliser 
dealers, proven to have never engaged in agriculture, were also found among the beneficiaries.224 
Political patronage was again used to attain BF support, initially by NPP, later by NDC officials 
and partisans.225 To put the extent of these activities into perspective: in one of the districts visited 
about one-fifth of all support went directly to what was locally referred to as ‘big men and 
smugglers’. Misuse also took place within the Regional Agriculture Development Unit (RADU) 
of MOFA itself, where government employees used 6 percent of all BF inputs! Almost one-
quarter went solely to the village from which both the RADU director and his deputy came from, 
whereas other villages each received only 3 to 8 percent each. In total 40 to 50 percent of all 
subsidies available at the district level were primarily allocated based on nepotism instead of 
need, while about 25 percent are characterised as dubious, in the sense that they primarily support 
local elites and possibly smugglers. The remaining 6 percent kept by MOFA employees were it 
seems, illegal (see Figure 60).  
 
Figure 60: Allocation of all Block Farming subsides in 2012 at anonymised district level (own 
figure, 2014, based on data obtained from the MOFA, 2013). 
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225 Interview with a UER MOFA officer in charge of block farming, March 2013, Bolgatanga, Ghana. 
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About 1,500 bags of fertilisers in one research district and about 4,500 in the other226, 
assuming 50 percent deviation, may have gone into the wrong hands. At a relatively high input 
level, eight bags of fertiliser per hectare as recommended by ICOUR, those misused subsidies 
could have translated into fertiliser for a maximum of 562 ha of rice cultivation. That is equal to 
one-quarter of the whole irrigation project area or a little less than half of its seasonal production. 
Respectively, that equals more than a thousand farmers in Biu, almost a third of all inhabitants, 
when assuming they each use only an acre (estimations based on ICOUR 2013: 3). 
Putting an end to such practices is difficult. MOFA officers expressed they were afraid to 
lose their jobs, if they were to speak out against the practices, and that it would not bring change 
anyhow.227 A district director added that supervisors themselves would factually often not be in 
charge of their subordinates content with BF input distribution. Thus political power overrides 
formal hierarchies in the ministry:  
‘You have to be careful in dealing with such staff. Where their voice can go, even you the director 
cannot go there [they are better connected to those in power]. For the sake of your own work, you 
don't want problems with them. So, when I ask for information [about who really participated in 
BF] and he doesn't give, I cannot force him. […] I always ask for that information, but […] he 
won't give it to me. The whole office is aware.’228 
The shares of subsidies in BF reaching communities on a fully legal basis are likely to be 
diverted to elites within these villages. This is a result of the fact that subsidies are given on credit. 
In turn, extension officers handling allocation are under pressure to attain sufficient return rates, 
currently said to be at only 40 to 50 percent. If return rates are not met, then communities will no 
longer receive support or be served last, aside from the problem that extension officers will be 
made responsible and face consequences from their superiors. Naturally therefore, officers will 
choose farmers with collateral, or FBOs whose members will already have made sure that they 
will not have to pay for others in case of default. Thereby access of the poor to BF is hardly given: 
‘About 90 percent of those that are in Block Farming are already rich, because government is so 
focused on recoveries […]. So if you don't have […] a group that can pay back in any case and 
within a specific period, or you not are a very big farmer yourself, then you are out! If you are 
poor, you cannot even join any group. The other farmers will not allow the poor to partake, 
because they are afraid they will later have to pay for them. So, it is systematic! […] We, the 
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extension officers, must also focus on recovery. If you are not able to recover, they [our 
superiors] say that you are not performing well.’229  
Recoveries and extra income are instantaneously assured when fertilisers used by MOFA 
employees themselves are sold locally or smuggled to Burkina Faso with the help of fertiliser 
dealers and those into export services. The latter even pay cash upfront for government subsidised 
fertilisers. On the other hand, MOFA employees above the rank of field extension officers state 
that they would occasionally embezzle returns, to thereby profit from subsidies, without having to 
face consequences. The system allows manipulation. 
Further misallocation of government support results from the fact that MOFA turned a blind 
eye to the real members of the groups they supported. Locally formed FBOs, at a closer look, 
often turn out to consist only of the founder himself. These groups are even given names that give 
the impression they consist of several females! Farmers do so with the aim to access BF and 
general fertiliser subsidies, government efforts that are now ought to be ‘gender-sensitive’.230 
When government records thus speak of shares of female beneficiaries reached by their 
programmes, reality is likely to differ greatly. Moreover, government figures for the 2012 season 
are alarming, since only about 15 percent of all those under BF in the KNW were female, 
respectively 23 percent in the KNW, even though in the latter BF is organised under a female 
extension officer. Even more alarming is the fact that BF is supposed to support the youth, while 
in KNE and KNW the average farmer registered for the programme is said to be over 45 years 
old.231 It seems to be primarily those already heading households, older males, which are the 
primary beneficiaries of BF government help at the village level. 
BF placed an initial emphasis on improving sales of rice, to be enabled through government 
agencies. Since 2010 the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) has supposedly bought 
paddy (un-milled rice) in the area. When supplies outstripped demand, the government company 
was ‘to provide a market window’ through independent purchasers to supply the government 
school feeding programme, Prison Service and NADMO (GAGE et al. 2012: 22). NAFCO 
cooperated with MOFA BF, by enabling farmers to pay their credit back in kind. However, 
business conducted by farmers was supposedly so poor that it became a major factor for bad 
return rates. Farmers’ payments in kind often consisted of straw, stones and chaff, but not rice, 
according to MOFA employees. Interestingly, MOFA FGD participants also attested that payback 
moral was generally higher among poorer farmers, because they cherish support more than those 
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already well-situated. Bad returns mainly come from overfed elites aside from illegal practices 
within the MOFA.232 
NAFCO bought rice grain in just one season in 2011, and supposedly did not even source 
large quantities. NAFCO had severe problems in handling its own business activities. A good 
illustration of this is the fact that more than 350 tonnes of already purchased rice were left to rot, 
as it was kept standing in the regional MOFA headquarters for over a year because the 
government company never managed to pick it up. Prices paid for grain were far below market 
value, too low to make it an attractive alternative for locals and, worse of all, it took ‘far too long’ 
to pay farmers for their produce, which is why many farmers felt betrayed by NAFCO.233  
The agency also gathered minor quantities of rice seed, outsourcing the organisational work 
to ICOUR and sales to a private company called M-Trade, itself headed by an executive of 
NAFCO.234 Payment by M-Trade was again delayed and so rice harvests were locked up in 
ICOUR’s silos for months. Inadequate weighing, inaccurate record keeping and fraudulent 
conversion of payments were reported (GHANAWEB.COM 2011). Due to the numerous 
problems through payment in kind via NAFCO, MOFA reduced credits given, concentrated on 
fertilisers and seed, and changed to repayment in cash.235 The government’s attempts to assure 
better production of rice and market access through such a public form of contractual farming had 
been of little success. Lack of marketing was often a problem for locals, circumvented only 
recently as markets have started to show greater interest local produce.236 
Dynamics in marketing were decisively different for the upper end of local rice production, 
where farmers produce seed instead of grain within the BF programme. Farmers in BF under 
ICOUR actually received double the amount of fertiliser as officially granted to those doing grain 
under MOFA. Equally important is that sales at fixed prices, far above those of grain, were 
guaranteed. Though NAFCO and its private dummy firm (M-Trade) were largely unsuccessful in 
becoming reliable buyers, the seed was used by less wealthy farmers growing rice as grain. Seed 
is produced only on irrigated uplands, which is in the hands of very few, but large-scale farmers, 
an elite. Their shift to more rice production on these lands led to higher water consumption of the 
run-down Tono irrigation system, causing droughts in lowland areas of the poor if those lowlands 
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are not flooded. These elites are further fostered because they face the best possible conditions in 
rice production: 
‘ICOUR buys just the seed at a better price and so it makes those […] with ICOUR become more 
successful, compared to those that farm with MOFA [grain producers]. The agricultural people 
[MOFA] […] don’t negotiate prices and they can’t buy […]. We only hear of big aggregators 
[from USAID] coming to buy, but […] they come into the hands of only a few people. […] You 
only hear that people are scaling [selling via ICOUR], but then, how many people can scale their 
rice like that? […] If you are not fortunate to have your farm within those [up-] lands [where seed 
is done] you are not covered […]! The rich have already gone to occupy those lands’237 
Aside from the fact that ICOUR initiatives in BF are subject to elite capture and little is 
done to prevent this, there were never any complaints raised by farmers about ICOUR staff or 
their conduct of business.238 In combination with the significantly better standing among, and 
power possessed over local farmers, return rates and thereby the issue of subsidy misuse is said to 
be much better in ICOUR than in MOFA BF endeavours. Contractual seed farming with ICOUR 
is arranged in such a way that taskforces constantly monitor and question farmers, aside from the 
fact that produce is taken to silos right after harvests, which greatly helps in recovery.239 More 
successful contractual farming enabling improved rice cultivation and better conditions for market 
access, including sponsoring of inputs, is possible in principle. Yet at present only elite farmers 
benefit, due to the MOFA’s corrupt and badly equipped system. 
6.3.4.3. Governance Dynamics in the USAID ADVANCE Programme 
As a result of the global food crisis in 2007-2008 and with the aim to further support the 
Feed the Future Initiative, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
endeavoured to assist in the development of Ghanaian agriculture. Poverty and chronic food 
shortages were to be addressed through its Agricultural Development and Value Chain 
Enhancement Project (ADVANCE) (ACDI/VOCA 2015), with the aim of supporting rice value 
chains in northern Ghana. ADVANCE has, since 2011, moved its resources and most offices to 
the Northern Region (Tamale), the Upper East Region and West Region. Since then, the 
programme has implemented ‘an aggressive first-year technical program’ in rice value chains, 
through which it tried to increase access to certified seed, linkages between producers and 
markets, input suppliers and financial institutions, ‘to improve productivity and raise incomes of 
producers, especially smallholder farmers’. To do so, ADVANCE relied on nucleus farmers to 
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serve as channels to larger buyers and processors, to supply agricultural inputs and credit and to 
organise smallholder outgrowers (68 percent of farmers).  
ADVANCE used smallholders affiliated to already existing FBOs (32 percent), to thereby 
guarantee ‘a long-term sustainable approach […] ensuring that the improved practices remain in 
the market system after the end of the project’ (USAID GHANA 2012: 1). Via these channels, 
farmers were supported with Jasmine seed, fertilisers, agro-chemicals and training, to increase 
yield and volumes. Of further, major significance in the ADVANCE programme were ‘buyer-
missions’, which meant that southern wholesalers and companies (a.k.a. ‘Aggregators’) were 
brought into contact with northern farmers, especially farmer representatives of the local Tono 
Irrigation Cooperative Farmers’ Union (TICFU), to improve contracting mechanisms in supply 
chains. The primary outcome of these missions was the sale of rice to several wholesalers, 
mediated by ADVANCE staff.  
Some cash credits were sponsored by these wholesalers, covering the cost of land 
preparation and seed, in exchange for the right of first (and possibly further) sales from farmers. 
To do so locally, 330 farmers from across the irrigation scheme were organised under just five 
nucleus farmers, one of them being the chief of Kodima/the union’s secretary in Biu. Premium 
Foods Limited (PFL), a southern-based company, was introduced to union executives and 
ICOUR, to see how far equipment for land preparation could be supplied in future contract 
farming arrangements for rice. So far, an MOU was signed indicating the future delivery of new 
tractors, later to be managed by the union itself (Ibid.: 17-22). USAID furthermore offered 
discounted machinery, tillers for land preparation, donkey carts and tarpaulins, and installed 
warehouses in the area, one of them in Biu, Kodima. In these warehouses rice is temporarily 
stored, weight and tested according to moisture content before sale.240 
The ADVANCE programme (in cooperation with ICOUR) was highly regarded among 
local farmers, mostly because of the assured input credits, negotiated sometimes higher prices for 
organised sales, scaling and further services.241 Those farmers partaking in the USAID rice chain, 
which is currently still a forerunner of a multipartite model for contractual farming, thereby pay 
less for production and receive higher, more assured and transparent farm gate prices than normal. 
Farmers were happy to have their credited inputs directly delivered to the village and have 
reported no fraudulent behaviour on the side of USAID and ICOUR. On the contrary, both were 
mostly characterised as greatly beneficial to those working with them, fair and of high moral 
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standards.242 There was, however, also quite some perceived and factual distance between farmers 
and the involved institutions, especially USAID, which came about as a result of huge socio-
economic differences, making these unapproachable for most of Biu’s villagers.243 
At the village level local authorities, namely the chief of Kodima/the TICFU secretary and 
his chairman, were to mediate within this steep hierarchy. The chief did so by acting as the 
nucleus farmer for all others included in the programme in Biu, his outgrowers, organised under 
the same FBOs as used in MOFA programmes. He controlled the quantities and qualities of sales 
via the USAID warehouse with its scales and moisture meters, as these stood in his section of the 
village. This was of quite some importance, as it was the first time that at least some more 
objective measure and thereby higher transparency was given, in terms of quality and quantity in 
the sale of a crop. Moreover, within his role as the union secretary, he negotiated prices and 
quantities with traders and, more importantly in the local context, organised sourcing from the 
village. The chief’s chairman Paul was content with the ground implementation of these sales.244  
The chairman Paul is a long-time companion and protégé of the Kodima chief who had 
practically proven his allegiance in the violent conflicts that broke out over paramount chieftaincy 
in Biu. In the 1990s his superior, the Kodima chief, contested against the chief of Seenza, in 
turned backed by his own brother, the landlord of the whole of Biu (LAUBE 2007: 137-139). This 
background of violent conflict in the community, though supposedly unknown to USAID, had 
quite some significance in the implementation of their programme, as it limited potential 
outcomes. The complaints laid out by farmers during FGDs, pointed out that the chief withheld 
large shares of locals from participation in the programme. To USAID, the Kodima chief was 
understood as being the sole chief of Biu, as he would introduce himself this way, despite the fact 
that he was only one out of many in the community.245 He thereby became the only one at the 
village level to have full power over project implementation. As a result, only people from his 
section – one of three – benefited directly from ADVANCE initiated support and sales.  
The chief of Kodima sourced ADVANCE funds to initiate development in his part of the 
village to thereby convince larger parts of the population that he was the best possible paramount 
chief for development of the community. Consequently, people that lived in other sections had 
worse chances to improve their livelihood because they could not get subsidies, received worse 
prices, and could not be as sure to sell all they produced. USAID thus invested the chief with vast 
executive powers in village development through rice markets, by allowing him to manage access 
                                                   
242 Farmer FGDs, July to December 2012, Biu, Ghana. 
243 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 24.04. 2010, Biu, Ghana. 
244 Farmer FGDs, July to December 2012, Biu, Ghana 
245 Interview with two technical associates at ACDI/VOCA (USAID – ADVANCE programme), July to August and 
December 2012, Bolgatanga/Biu, Ghana. 
Markets 
 
300 
to the provided subsidies and services, on top of the judicial role he already played.246 The 
irrigation project manager, in this regard, stated that it would not only be selected people from one 
part of the village that would get support via ADVANCE. But he added that it was indeed mostly 
farmers from Kodima that make up the membership of TIFCU as a result of the earlier conflict 
between chiefs.247 Of all the support that went to Kodima – thus fertilisers, agro-chemicals and 
seed – large amounts were said to be diverted to the chief himself, his family members and 
companions, before they reached other shares of the section’s population.248 It was similar with 
the machinery and donkey carts provided.249  
Gender balance was another problematic issue in the USAID sponsoring of inputs via the 
chief and his FBO’s. USAID employees estimated the total share of females participating in their 
programme in Biu to be below 25 percent, as based on the Kodima chief or his representatives’ 
records.250 Yet many of the farm implements provided to those few partaking women didn’t 
actually reach them. As male and female FGD participants in Biu explained, the primary reason 
for this was the fact that eventual control within households remained with men. Males even 
opposed interventions due to their female target groups.251 So, though many external interventions 
such as that of USAID may formally have been able to prove that they work for the advancement 
of women, it was very much questionable to what degree females actually profited.  
In Kodima, women were oftentimes used as dummies for other men to acquire help. 
Donkey carts or tilling machinery supposedly given out to ‘only women’ could be found in front 
of others’ houses, even a day after distribution. When USAID machinery remained within the 
woman’s household, no members ever associated it as belonging to the women in whose name it 
had formally been received. Most household assets were understood to be the property of men, 
and women were included in the concept of assets.252 Yet, internal USAID gender reports on the 
allocation of farm implements praise the positive gender impact of their intervention and 
especially that of the Kodima chief, claiming that though it was formerly taboo, women now 
owned cattle, donkeys and donkey carts253. In truth, for women to be allowed to partake in the 
ADVANCE programme, they were forced to provide compulsory labour and cash payment to the 
Kodima chief. Subsidies allowed the chief to exercise pressure, forcing the exploited women to 
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leave aside their produce and could also not pursue their primary addition to own small-scale 
agriculture, casual work on others’ lands. Outcomes of rice chain integration were thereby limited 
through adverse inclusion at the village level: 
‘It is really too much that he asks for! […] If you are in his group [ADVANCE] you are subjected 
to his will. […] So that is why some of us just ignore him and his group. […] You work for him 
like a donkey before he even takes your name down. Then you still have to make sure you bribe 
him before he will include it and […], you still have to make sure you attend his farm duties.’254 
Sales under ADVANCE, handled by the Kodima chief, faced similar issues.255 Large-scale 
buyers of rice newly attracted in recent years, partly due to USAID involvement, were generally 
more accessible to large shares of the public, namely for about 48 percent of Biu’s households. 
However, village elites profited most as they occasionally supplied half of what was ordered per 
aggregator.256 They were able to do so because they were well connected to the local chief, and 
mostly large land owners who had attained government subsidies. They told others too late of 
sales or pretended that demand would be insufficient to allow everybody to partake, after they had 
gone rid of their own rice, or used officially listed women groups as dummies for sales.257 
Another common practice was that of allocating the most favourable sales to only a selected few. 
These generally received cash payments, while letting other ADVANCE members serve those 
aggregators with whom the union had previously agreed on credited sales, payment up to five 
months later. As indicated, such sales on credits can be a great burden on local farmers, because 
they require money to reinvest in the next season. This not only deprived others of short and long-
term opportunity, it lowered the attractiveness of the whole initiative and threatened the 
establishment of deeper relations with aggregators.258 
Further problems arose in the rice chain, when produce bought through ADVANCE went 
into the hands of the union’s president himself previously equipped with money by aggregators. 
The president gathered rice primarily for himself, sourcing it from intermediaries all over the 
irrigation scheme – locally established rice traders – and from the chief of Kodima. As mentioned, 
the president then organised transport of rice to the south of Ghana, through his own transport 
company, but according to intermediaries partaking in the programme, he charged up to four 
times as much as was regularly paid. Negotiations between farmer representatives and aggregators 
were thereby disturbed and had to be repeated several times to reach an agreement. That 
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256 Records attained from the local chairman, March 2013, Biu, Ghana.  
257 Farmer FGDs, July to December 2012, Biu, Ghana 
258 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
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agreement, however, did not entail lower profits for the president. Instead, on top of an already 
charged ‘union fee’ and further commission going to ADVANCE intermediaries, prices received 
by farmers were lowered further to offset the president’s charges for transport. Moreover, the 
president had seemingly kept intermediary charges for himself.  
Apart from the Kodima chief, most intermediaries did not receive payment for their 
services, which is why some of them started to leave the project, or were planning to do so. There 
was little reason for them to stay in ADVANCE anyhow. In sales conducted without ADVANCE, 
they receive instant and threefold commission and weight without scales, which increases 
profitability.259 Misconduct of a few powerful individuals, the local elite, could thus threaten the 
entire setup of the USAID value chain programme and lowered outcomes for farmers. These 
practices were hard to stop. According to a knowledgeable teacher from Biu, who also 
participated in ADVANCE and is related to the chief of Kodima, the union’s president himself 
was so influential that when a USAID employee complained about rent seeking behaviour, he was 
soon fired.260 
Negotiations headed by the farmers’ union representative resulted in prices below all local 
standards. Contract farming schemes under ADVANCE provided credit for seed and land 
preparation to farmers via aggregators in exchange for the right of first sale, but this boiled down 
to an immensely low farm gate price of 0.44 GH₵/kg (calculations based on USAID GHANA 
2012: 24-25). Only after credits had been fully repaid in kind at that price, could farmers sell more 
of their produce at regular, sometimes even higher prices. The profits made on the side of 
sponsors were higher than those made from any informal contract farming arrangements. Those 
providing credit charged an interest rate of over 100 percent per annum. At a regular interest rate 
of 23 percent p.a., as was charged by local banks in 2012 (ICOUR 2013: 10), this must be 
considered as usury. As mentioned in interviews conducted with a Premium Food Limited (PFL) 
representative, PFL’s plans are principally similar.261 In addition, an MOA signed between PFL, 
ICOUR, TICFU and ADVANCE indicates that TICFU is to take more responsibility for future 
growing seasons with regard to the machinery and sales provided.262 Future developments in 
market arrangements are therefore not only unfavourable; they are again likely to suffer from elite 
capture and misuse. The crucial aspect in this is supervision:  
                                                   
259 Interviews with a local ADVANCE rice intermediary and a teacher from Biu, Farmer FGDs, July to December 2012, 
Biu/Navrongo, Ghana. 
260 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
261 Interview with a local PFL representative, Novermber 2012, Navrongo, Ghana. 
262 Memorandum of Understanding, 08.05.2012, Navrongo, Ghana. 
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‘It is all because the NGO [here USAID] leaves the money in the hands of those people, our 
leaders. […] They don't follow the implementation and that is where leakages come in […]. The 
leaders can just sit and say the people were happy […], not knowing that the people are crying at 
the other side of the village. […] Even if they check, […] the leaders go to the poor, force them to 
produce information that is good […]. They know the thoughts of the people, they know the 
problems of the people, so they can take even more control of them and tell them what to say.’263 
During field research, USAID was then confronted by the researcher with the accusations 
made by farmers, however, it denied them all aggressively and then declined to answer further 
questions264. News spread fast within Biu. The next day, the chief of Kodima was unwilling to 
answer any questions. Equally, those partaking in the ADVANCE programme in Kodima were 
mostly no longer allowed to partake in interviews and FGDs. Those still willing to answer 
questions did so in somewhat secret interviews. They expressed that they saw little alternative to 
the chief, but emphasised that they may be better off without him in the future. They were 
concerned that the subsidies he attained through programmes such as ADVANCE allow him and 
other large-scale farmers to take over growing amounts of land at the crowded irrigation 
system.265 The chief, who is already a large-scale land-owner, managed to further enlarge his 
holdings and production through the inputs credits he received through ADVANCE. In 2012/2013 
he alone was able to utilise more than 15 hectares of irrigated lands, almost five times as much as 
the average farmer (household survey, 2013, n=177, and data obtained from ICOUR, 2013).  
Farmers were often afraid to speak out against the chief and the president, as they feared 
exclusion from the programme or revenge through the judicial powers of the chief. At the time of 
research, issues like the misallocation of support and compulsory labour were only beginning to 
be addressed because of the rivalry between the two major chiefs of Biu (Kodima and Seenza). To 
some degree this rivalry has led to a system of mutual checks and balances because either chief 
makes sure misconduct by the other is reported to their superiors in Kandiga and Navrongo. 
Impeachment proceedings on the Kodima chief followed, due to his gross misconduct, but had no 
success.266 Along with the blind eye that USAID willingly turned to happenings at the grass-roots 
level, the ADVANCE programme in Biu remained firmly in the hands of the Kodima chief and 
his local elite. 
                                                   
263 Interview with a teacher from Biu, 04.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
264 Attempted interview with USAID UER executives, April 2013, Bolgatanga, Ghana.  
265 Interview with a farmer from Biu, 07.05.2013, Biu, Ghana. 
266 Interview with the son of the Kandiga chief, April 2013, Kandiga, Ghana. 
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6.3.5. Conclusion 
The staple crop rice has a long history in the study area. Import substituting policies, until 
the era of SAPs and ERPs, contributed to a spread of rice as a more commercial produce (ADU 
1969: 17-18; ANTWI-ASARE 2009; FAO 1970: iii, 1; LAUBE 2007: 89, 92; LAUBE 2009: 2; 
OTENG 1997: 38; SOIL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1977: 1; SONGSORE 2011: 130; TONAH 
2008: 113; YARO 2013: 6-11). Vice versa, following government withdrawal, trade liberalisation 
and massive imports, it has not been easy for local producers to maintain an economically 
favourable production and market access, though rice markets are generally characterised as 
having a small economic threshold and less monopolisation tendencies, in contrast to vegetables.  
Conclusions drawn on the effects of policies on rice markets are vague and provide only a 
little indication as to whether protectionism is by any means useful in contemporary times. The 
rice market is heavily segmented at the national level (GAGE et al. 2012), as it is at the local scale 
too. This means that general conclusions drawn on the whole market (e.g. ACKAH & 
ARYEETEY 2012b: 8; ANTWI-ASARE 2009; SEND FOUNDATION 2008) leave room for 
doubt when they do not differentiate between the highly varying value chains attached to each 
market segment. This conceptual gap includes the oversight that some chains are subject to more 
international competition than others. That global economic competition and a lack of support are 
a threat and limitation to northern Ghanaian livelihoods cannot be attested in general, as is done 
so by other scholars (LAUBE et al. 2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 2011; SCHRAVEN 2010; 
SONGSORE 2011; YARO 2013). In contrast, on nationwide and local scale rice production 
levels have at times developed positively despite continuous government withdrawal and trade 
liberalisation with growing imports.  
Ghanaian consumers in the (wealthier) south of the country have started preferring the 
qualities, not necessarily prices of imported over domestic rice. The market with the highest 
economic potential which suits the consumers’ taste and whose seed was introduced to northern 
Ghana only in recent times, that of Jasmine rice (GAGE et al. 2012), holds great potential for 
producer livelihoods while being most dependent on world market dynamics. Large foreign 
corporations and the countries backing them dominate the market and influence it according to 
their needs, possibly to the detriment of northern Ghanaians. Yet overall, global dynamics have 
favoured local producers over imports in recent years (AKRAMOV & MALEK 2012: 26). Price 
competition initiated by globalisation is not always a disadvantage for local farmers. Domestic 
policies in the form of a rise in tariffs, and input subsidies provided alongside donor support have 
been key support measures at the local level. Arguments can be made for government intervention 
to provide favourable market conditions by protective duties and by supporting farmers’ 
production via import substitution. 
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Support was successful where it targeted input subsidies that helped locals to perform 
product and possibly chain/intersectoral upgrading (HUMPHREY & SCHMITZ 2002: 1020, 
1025; NAVAS-ALEMÁN 2011: 1395; ROSSI 2013: 223), while also considering demand, 
specifically taste and thereby the quality concerns of consumers (ACKAH, ARYEETEY, 
BOTCHIE, et al. 2012: 228-229; GAGE et al. 2012: 15-16, 18). Only through specific support 
tailored to market demand have northern Ghanaian producers often attained a level of 
competitiveness to counter future imports (as was asked for by BREISINGER et al. 2011: 52) and 
to improve livelihoods (income and food security) within an ever more wholesale-driven (not 
cartel-like) market. Overall publicly initiated market dynamics, side-lined by input subsidies 
partly also through donors, thereby went along by an economic upgrading (DIETSCHE 2011: 31, 
33; GIBBON & PONTE 2005: 87-88; SCHAMP 2008: 8), with a positive impact on farmer 
livelihoods, a pro-poor market boom with opportunities for value addition, capacity building and 
independent development (BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 209-210). 
Input subsidies are the key to partake in recently favourable market dynamics. The 
government intervention which introduced Jasmine seed set the way for further improvements of 
farmer livelihoods, though coming with higher investments and threats from the natural 
environment, and occasionally hard to attain for smallholder farmer. Still, a change to Jasmine 
rice meant specialisation in a cash crop, and production of a higher yielding crop that can make 
farmers at least food secure, should markets fail. There is little reason to believe markets would 
fail. For example, local farmers are increasingly patronised by southern wholesalers instead of 
northern intermediaries, which allows farm gate prices to be increased and could lead to higher 
levels of contractualisation within chains. As rice is comparatively more common than other cash 
crops, at least in Biu, external intervention in the sector can have a comparatively larger pro-poor 
effect than interventions in other sectors. The concept of subsidising inputs also entails a more 
bottom up perspective, as engagement in rice is primarily aimed at removing production 
constraints, whilst prior interventions (such as in tomato) tried to create artificial, public markets. 
The latter was tried in recent rice initiatives and proved to be poorly managed and unsustainable.  
As favourable as conditions are, a pressing issue that arises mostly in rice value chain 
enhancements is the internal side of local social vulnerability, i.e. societal coping mechanisms that 
influence input support accessibility to perform chain or inter-sectoral upgrading. That is basically 
so, because most external support goes to large-scale producers at irrigation schemes like in Biu, 
which are generally rare throughout in the region and highly exclusive amongst users. 
Misallocation among the remaining potential recipients deprives the poor amongst them of access 
to the rice value chain, and they remain subsistence farmers because they cannot acquire sufficient 
inputs, especially fertilisers. As became clear when observing production networks, actors 
normally not directly integrated in vertical chain relations again exercise vast power (as was 
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indicated by BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 210, 214-216; ROSSI 2013: 224) and in combination 
with relations and connectivity amongst entities (HENDERSON et al. 2002: 442), alter processes 
of value creation, enhancement and capture (COE 2009: 557-558; HENDERSON et al. 2002: 
448) to the disadvantage of smallholders. Collective power is too weak to shift institutional rule in 
favourable directions, which goes for both public and donor support. 
If the poor and vulnerable are able to access government subsidies for rice production by 
cash or on credit, they pay quite a price for doing so. This limits their scope of improvements, 
sometimes even renders their rice growing useless in terms of generating income. Most locals are 
actually marginalised and abused within a public system mainly helpful in enriching and 
empowering politicians in charge, government employees, private fertiliser dealers and local ‘Big 
Men’, all of whom also benefit from subsidy smuggling. Region-wide fertiliser shortages 
(BANFUL 2009: 24) come about as a result of elite capture, which is a criminal misuse of 
government help. Furthermore, interventions focus on recoveries, which forces extension officers 
to concentrate on large-scale farmers with enough collateral. Fertiliser shortages resulting from 
illegal activities further stress the need for recoveries and thereby the need to systematically 
favour the upper strata of local society.  
Block Farming is a system that partly exploits the poor, since the most lucrative form of 
production in the programme – that of seed – is done only by large-scale farmers on flood and 
drought free plots, who then supply poorer farmers growing grain in marginalised areas. The 
implementation of BF contrasts greatly with its conceptual background. It originally aimed at 
‘mobilizing the youth’ (MOFA 2013b), but did quite the opposite and benefitted mostly elderly, 
elite males, thus showing gender and seniority bias. With the majority of locals and especially the 
poor dependent on the elites that dominate support systems, they hardly benefit from government 
initiatives. The poor instead draw on help indirectly, through other large-scale farmers, via illegal 
activities such as by ministries and security agencies or powerful individuals, possibly non-
agriculturalists, having become fertiliser deals (see Figure 61). 
Thus, the most decisive move to post-SAP policies, as embodied by a shift in policies 
towards import substitution in rice, could have really constituted a step towards meeting goals in 
poverty alleviation (see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 2009: 103), specifically addressed the north of Ghana since it is a major rice 
growing area (as was asked for by GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 302) and could have 
further safeguarded locals from global competition by lowering their production costs, but does 
not reach the majority of locals in the area and greatly increases local prosperity gaps due to 
misappropriation by government itself using local, elite structures. However, public institutions 
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are characterised by inefficiency and mal-governance. Institutional advancements within the 
MOFA are unable to hold pace with economic, environmental and social realities.267 
 
Figure 61: Flowchart of all traceable, legal and illegal government subsidy usages (own figure, 
2014, own expert interviews, 2012/'13, MOFA-internal correspondence and data, 2012/'13, 
graphics partly based on internet sources and AMAKYE et al. 2008). 
For local farmers hope arose from the USAID ADVANCE programme, considered a neutral 
entity content with giving inputs, training and machinery to local farmers. USAID is also heavily 
engaged in organising farmers for sales with southern wholesalers and has already had some 
successes in initiating sponsoring of farmers in formal, far more transparent contract farming 
arrangements, which could boost local production or at least allow for higher farm gate prices. On 
top of already favourable market conditions set by the government, economic and livelihood 
upgrading could have resulted from provision of better deals and an improved balance between 
rewards and risk (PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1637). In fact ADVANCE offered much better 
conditions than what was offered in public programmes, making the program highly desirable to 
locals (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 17).  
Yet ADVANCE suffered from elite capture too. Even more so than in government 
activities, USAID’s value chain intervention drew on farmer based organisations and unions, 
identified as precarious in terms of allowing broad-based development. Still, local authorities 
were put in positions where they could misuse their power in rice value chains at the producer 
level. Long-standing conflicts within the village (LAUBE 2007: 137-139) and local, post-
feudalistic social structures were not sufficiently accounted for by USAID. The conflict still 
simmers today, though fought out by subsidy allocations instead of physical violence. As in the 
past (SONGSORE 2011: 88-90), the chief continues to commercialise his power through 
                                                   
267 Informal interview with the head of cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, September 2012, Accra, 
Ghana. 
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compulsory labour, now through donor interventions, which continues to foster disconnect to 
villagers, especially women in the village. Thus USAID’s intervention was not only gender biased 
but exercised influence in assuring further suppression of women as well as the continued political 
disenfranchisement of the poor, especially the marginalised residing in two-thirds of the village 
where help did not reach.  
USAID planned for horizontal, social integration of value chain enhancements, to guarantee 
‘a long-term sustainable approach’ (USAID GHANA 2012: 1), and set avenues for future 
development in terms of MOUs and greater responsibility for heads of the local union (Ibid: 17-
22); however, quite the opposite was achieved. It may have been sustainable in terms of the 
commercial powers invested in the local chief and the union’s president – who both dominated 
governance of the ADVANCE programme in some respects – but otherwise it frustrated other 
participants, farmers as much as intermediaries. Thereby, USAID’s primary goal, sustaining 
introduced practices after the end of the project, not only became less likely but was in many ways 
undesirable. ADVANCE-enabled support and sales primarily served the local elite.  
One cannot speak of equal chances in access, but rather a severe bias based on wealth, 
power and gender. The structures used in aid allocation deprived the poor and vulnerable of 
higher food security and incomes, while further fostering general inequality. The contract farming 
arrangements made were mostly only lucrative for large-scale producers with low kilogram 
prices, specifically those elites who, through the efficiency of their production, were able to attract 
independent wholesalers by dumping. Other farmers only accepted the conditions because they 
were otherwise unable to access credit; there was no alternative. ADVANCE facilitated their 
further exploitation by local authorities. The positive, long-term effect of the US government’s 
Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancements (ADVANCE) programme on 
vulnerability, poverty and food shortages through rice chains (ACDI/VOCA 2015) remains 
limited. 
All public and donor driven interventions in rice value chains were found to suffer from 
elite capture, thus it can be concluded that they resemble past government/public sector 
experiences prior to SAPs (SONGSORE 2011: 130, 134, 178, 199). Basic constraints to 
improving livelihoods in northern Ghana have remained the same throughout. Development 
projects thereby made and still make intraregional disparities grow, since they provide high 
incomes mostly to the upper strata of the local population, while the vast majority of peasants 
remain at subsistence level. As in the past (WHITFIELD 2011b), mal-developments were made 
primarily possible by clientelism pursued by political actors, limiting potentials of economic 
change and poverty reduction, despite overall growing market chances. Such opportunism has 
been previously identified as a general pattern in local livelihood upkeep. Support for rice chains 
– be it from the USAID or Ghanaian government – is below potential and creates larger problems, 
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such as that of growing inequality in land allocation. To advance vulnerable farmers, it seems, 
these interventions themselves need further improvement such that they no longer serve as 
instantaneous conduits of ‘exploitation and control’ (YARO 2013: 12) at the local level, though 
not necessarily at the domestic or global level. 
Avenues for upgrading 
Rice markets are already favourable and when assuming that these are further upheld by 
sticking to import duties, the only threat currently facing local producers in the open rice market is 
that the chain is likely to become more driven by wholesale firms. Farmers must prepare for the 
fact that wholesalers may misuse their growing power and could then act as rice brokers again, 
thus making local farmers provide their rice interest-free on credit for further processing and 
allocation amongst somewhat integrated retailers. Thus farmers need strong levels of cooperation, 
or higher levels of horizontal contractualisation (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 13), to counter and 
forestall these tendencies. Another threat for vulnerable, northern rice producers arises from a lack 
of access to external support, which could help them to lower production costs, raise output and 
thereby participate in markets. Avenues for sustainable or ‘livelihood upgrading’ – currently 
desirable economic, social and environmental change for the majority of the poor – can thus be 
found in the setup of interventions, in the way the allocation of support takes place at regional and 
local levels. 
To enable better livelihood upgrading in the case of government engagement, trust in the 
MOFA must be rebuilt by overcoming mal-administration and crime within the ministry, to 
enable better compliance of farmers. At the local Tono irrigation scheme, ICOUR could be a 
genuine alternative in implementation. Though not free from elitist abuse, ICOUR suffers least 
from the most severe forms of corruption, has a better standing in local communities, and can 
exercise quite some power over farmers. It is thus regrettable that ICOUR, in the course of the 
introduction of BF, was partly disempowered by the MOFA. But, in any case, locals must be 
made aware of their rights and be practically enabled to assure they can make use of these, when 
dealing with public entities. 
Further bodies backing a pro-poor approach can be found in the democratically elected 
representatives at local scale, assembly-men, who are invested with a significant amount of trust, 
though not power amongst locals. Generally, external brokers indirectly sharing economic 
interests in the rice chain are required to avoid opportunistic behaviour from all parties involved. 
Unless such an entity then provides excellent coordination amongst players, for which it will 
require substantial powers, internal management difficulties are again likely to occur, as typical 
for a multi-partite model of contractual farming with sponsoring by external entities such as 
government (EATON & SHEPHERD 2001: 150). The government is therefore asked to enforce 
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legislation, to allow for legal certainty in the market, sponsoring arrangements and most of all, to 
fight crime in MOFA, police and customs units while not using farmers as scapegoats. Yet, it is 
unlikely the authorities will be willing to do this, for those in control are themselves either 
engaged in breaking the law or feel unable to challenge those breaking it. Civil rights and anti-
corruption organisations working together with media outlets such as radio stations, newspapers 
and TV should be supported to help reveal these cases to the broader public. 
At a smaller scale, similar issues limit donor-imposed development initiatives, e.g. the 
USAID ADVANCE programme. The primary problem is that neither ADVANCE nor aggregators 
could take over the sourcing of produce or allocation of subsidies, as they did not know local 
farmers sufficiently well and thereby didn’t have the means to organise them. Using local elites 
limited access and possible outcomes of the value chain on the side of farmers. If USAID really 
wanted to cut out intermediaries in the rice trade to increase farmers’ incomes and improve levels 
of contractualisation, it should not have created new middle-men that then misuse the additional 
powers invested in them. Faults in USAID’s endeavours thus come about as a result of how the 
project was implemented right from the start, and its later poor supervision. Yet, USAID’s close 
interaction with and between parties, to setup marketing arrangements, could have allowed them 
to take a critical look at the setup of these organisations to enable them to identify institutional 
weaknesses, especially those of their major target group, farmers. However, USAID failed to do 
this, thereby failing to attempt to alter local institutions according to democratic needs, and to 
develop the most crucial part in the set-up of their structures. It is not enough to work with local 
unions, to thereby be able to claim to have farmers’ voices heard in development interventions. 
Partners must be carefully and critically selected. The project failed to serve as platform for 
establishing genuine farmer representatives: democratically elected, non-elitist, giving locals 
equal livelihood opportunity, needed more than ever.  
Sustainable livelihood development and (economic) upgrading of locals in rice chains 
thereby remains mostly a question of democratic, social change and good governance. The 
poorest of the poor need empowerment so that they themselves can take better advantage of 
advances in economy and trade and enable greater economic and social sustainability. Does this 
facilitate environmental sustainability? Newly introduced rice is more input-demanding, which is 
why locals need greater external support to profit from the crop and require initiatives to maintain 
the natural resource base, especially since lands are being taken over by large farmers who will 
further intensify usage. Investments in irrigation projects, aiming to help a greater share of locals 
to be able to venture into rice safely, facilitate the production of newer varieties that are less 
tolerant to environmental, especially climatic calamities. Environmental upgrading is thus of far 
smaller significance in rice as it is in other chains, and does not necessarily go along with 
economic advances.  
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Social progress is of greatest importance when it comes to rice value chains. Horizontal 
contractualisation (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 13), collective and institutional powers, social dialogue 
(ILO 2008: 1-2) and further improvements in farmers’ rights and entitlements, thus social 
upgrading (ROSSI 2013: 224) is most essential. This points at civil rights and specifically 
peasants' rights advocacy groups, who must help farmers in their struggles. Such support, 
including publications on the matter, should abstain from generating too broad insights (as is the 
case in some studies of rice and tomato markets REFERENCES), and must critically examine the 
actions they then propose. They should primarily focus on entitlements and the access farmers 
have to basic assets and external interventions at the local level.  
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7. Sustainable Livelihoods and Value Chains 
This study investigated Northern Ghanaian smallholder livelihoods facing (globalised) 
agricultural markets. It focussed on the value chains of tomato, chili and rice – and government 
and donor interventions in parts of them. It thereby provides an example of how sustainable 
development could be measured, understood and fostered for the most vulnerable and poor in an 
economy emerging after structural adjustments. This concluding chapter delivers a number of 
valuable insights, in reference to the research questions, with implications for conceptual, 
theoretical approaches and avenues to sustainable development.  
7.1. Theoretical insights 
Theoretically this study focused on (mainly gendered) smallholder livelihood systems and 
how these are exposed to a vulnerability context within a social and physical locality. At the local 
scale these elements alter the way people are embedded into market value chains. Dynamics, 
captured by value chain and livelihood analysis, were shown to determine (pro-poor) outcomes 
and at the same time allowed a look beyond the local scale, a studying of ‘local-global 
interactions’ (DE HAAN 2012: 351-352), with a focus on the local and regional dynamics. 
Further useful enrichments came from a Global Production Networks (GPN) perspective, able to 
account for non-economic constraints imposed by livelihood systems, or networks, within which 
economic transactions take place. This theoretical combination allowed outcomes of value chains 
and public or donor interventions – parts of which draw on local, social networks – and livelihood 
strategies, to be benchmarked by indicators based on normative, yet locally defined principles, 
those of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. 
With regards to the very basis of the livelihood analysis here performed, SEN’s early work 
(SEN 1985, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c) rightly emphasises entitlements generated by trade, people’s 
own production and labour, inheritance and transfers (Ibid.: 1981c: 1-2), aspects of practical 
agency entitlement as major determinants of local development, food in his context (see also 
BOHLE & GLADE 2008: 101; DE HAAN 2005: 5). Development is grounded in the political 
economy, as well as in society in general (DE WAAL 1987; WATTS 1983; WATTS & BOHLE 
1993). To define ‘development’, elements of post-development and alternative development 
approaches, such as the bottom-up perspective used in livelihood analysis, were found to be useful 
to unmask concepts grounded in structurally defined and reproduced ideas, to deconstruct the 
ideological concept of (non-) modernity that dominated theoretical, practical and also local 
discourses (CHAMBERS 1995; DE HAAN 2012: 346; DFID 2001: Section 1.1; HAUCK 2004: 
14; KAAG et al. 2004: 52; MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 5, 7; ZIAI 2011). Thereby, values 
and norms of development, very much shaped by structural adjustment initiatives and thus 
market-orientated and neo-liberal ideologies that argue for government withdrawal (ARCE 2003: 
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199, 201-203), could be successfully questioned to limit an ideological bias. The danger of 
drawing on and overcome developmental discourses (MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 9-10) 
was limited by asking for local definitions and needs.  
Livelihood analysis was used to generate an up-to-date and tailor-made approach to local 
development. The livelihood approach, as a representative of ‘middle-range theories’, was proven 
to be suitable, in contrast to structural analysis (MÜLLER-MAHN & VERNE 2010: 9) as often 
pursued by other studies concerned with Northern Ghanaian development (e.g. LAUBE et al. 
2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 2011). The approach thereby managed to focus on practical aspects of 
vulnerability, thus, structural constraints, but those with relevance to agency-centred, local 
development (RAUCH 2008: 210-211). Livelihood analysis continues to be popular and broadly 
acknowledged due to its overall comprehensiveness and specifically its incorporation of social 
inequality, socio-spatial disparity and power-allocation within society. It remains a valuable tool 
for researchers (BÜRKNER 2010: 36; JAKIMOV 2013: 494; KAISER & ROTHFUß 2013: 2; 
RAUCH 2006: 52). 
Yet on its own livelihood analysis is insufficient. The holistic and synthetic concept of 
livelihoods (TANG et al. 2013: 17-18) not only allowed but also demanded an incorporation of 
further theoretical approaches. Since (global) agricultural markets largely determine agrarian 
potentials (PENDER et al. 1999: 36-38) at the local scale, market-based value chain approaches 
are the major tool for enhancing local agricultural development in the onset of growing 
government and donor involvement (GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 2010; OUMA et al. 2012: 
227; YARO 2013: 12). Since livelihood analysis lacks the profound investigation of such market 
based initiatives (respectively the analysis of markets and value chain as indicated by KANJI et al. 
2005: 8; SCOONES 2009: 187), additional theoretical perspectives were needed. The perspectives 
of Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and Global Value Chain (GVC), and of their successor, 
Global Production Networks (GPN), were thus incorporated.  
GCC and GVC perspectives provided general insights on the basic setup of chains, their 
coordination, governance and allocation of value amongst participants, including problems that 
arise from the composition of required investment and gained value for farmers, intermediaries, 
wholesalers and retailers. Basic structures identified were often sufficient to recognise general 
constraints and potentials imposed upon livelihoods. However, value capture, general trends in the 
chain, governance dynamics and livelihood impacts, in the case of rice and tomato value chains, 
could not have been understood without a production network (GPN) perspective, which entails a 
further look at actors not immediately integrated into commodity/value chains. The GPN concept 
heuristically applied to the local level was relevant though complex to apply. The shortcomings of 
many studies (and development approaches) with regards to the notion of social ‘embeddedness’ 
of value generation (see MARKUSEN 1999; OINAS 1997; PIKE et al. 2000), could be 
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conceptually improved by a GPN perspective. This would also allow the exploration of structural 
preconditions and interfering power relations that shape economic interactions (HENDERSON et 
al. 2002: 442-443). Similar findings were also derived through the livelihood perspective.  
In this sense, a GPN view is essential if a pro-poor market analysis does not encompass a 
look at livelihood systems. However, GPN may still be inferior to livelihood analysis. Livelihood 
analysis provides a more bottom-up perspective than a GPN view, which ‘addresses social, 
political and cultural contexts ‘on the ground’ within which production processes’ of the ‘most 
powerless’ are embedded in (DARBY 2013: 45), but more from an economic viewpoint, not a 
human-centred one as in livelihood analysis, and with little further conceptual outlines on how to 
do so. The GPN approach, to some extent, neglects livelihood realities, gender relations, (labour) 
market participation decisions, class mobility, exclusion processes and ‘the cultural context of 
social reproduction’. Therefore ‘the GPN framework is less effective at addressing: 
environmental/landscape change, households/livelihoods, and socio-spatial uneven development’ 
(KELLY 2013: 83). Producer agency must be increasingly understood as grounded in local social 
relations and livelihood strategies that constitute a reproductive sphere for local development. 
This, however, is often hidden in GPN analysis (COE & HESS 2013: 6-7). So, future analysis 
must also ‘incorporate aspects of rural livelihood approaches’ (CHALLIES 2008: 375), to be able 
to play out its potential for developmental politics and ‘practice in the empirical realm’ 
(NEILSON et al. 2014: 7). Whether or not market processes improve rural livelihoods is site 
specific, and depends on the embeddedness and exchanges between actors within general social 
structures at local level (NEILSON & PRITCHARD 2009: 2) in combination with rules and 
standards set by the private sector that ‘dictate’ farmers’ livelihoods, their interaction with the 
environment and production systems and trade networks (NEILSON & PRITCHARD 2009: 5-6). 
The Global Production Networks (GPN) perspective allows an incorporation of livelihood 
analysis, partly by understanding livelihood systems as the human- and actor-centred network 
within which creation of value takes place. Very much like a holistic livelihood analysis, GPN 
perspectives operate ‘at the interface of structure and agency’, help to overcome dichotomies of 
‘flows and territories, as well as culture and economy’, and are thus a truly ‘integrative 
perspective‘ (COE et al. 2008: 289). The approaches are complex, especially when combined. 
This was overcome by drawing initially on the livelihood perspective, which then helped to 
reduce complexity in the subsequent GCC/GVC and GPN analysis. By starting with the livelihood 
analysis, locals were themselves allowed to define the relevant elements and knots of networks, 
perform their own analysis, and suggest priorities for further research. Livelihood analysis was 
thereby also useful to serve as a reference framework, a mostly locally defined ethical/normative 
benchmark by which to measure dynamics with a special focus on ‘losers’ and the ‘mid-field’ of 
society (as asked for by RAUCH 2006: 52).  
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The theoretical synthesis of this study contributes to the theoretical discourse about the role 
of GPN concepts in answering questions that arise in the context of economic globalisation (as 
asked for by BRAUN & SCHULZ 2012: 216) and development. General pro-poor market and 
livelihood analysis cannot only complement each other (BATTERBURY et al. 2011: 4), but 
rather the concepts need merging, especially those of GPN and livelihood analysis at the local 
level, if they are to have potential. This can be done by using the Sustainable Livelihood 
Framework as the basis for analysis, to see how far the elements included prove to be of relevance 
for further GPN analysis, which can then be concretised further via GVCs and GCCs. Dynamics 
encountered in these more market-based approaches, can in turn be referred back to livelihood 
characterisations and especially to locally desirable outcomes. Such proceedings could lead to 
checks and balances between economic necessities and very concrete aspects of human-centred 
development, including tangible and immaterial valorisations, and thereby be an efficient tool to 
increase the efficiency of external aid (CHAMBERS 1995; DE HAAN 2012: 346; DFID 2001: 
Section 1.1). 
Future theorisations can draw on the conceptualisations of YEUNG and COE who try to 
refocus GPN perspectives on ‘structural competitive dynamics and actor-specific strategies’ 
(2015: 32). If they were to add livelihood approaches to their concept, meaning that their notion of 
‘actor-specific strategies’ should be viewed as a strive for desirable livelihood outcomes, they 
could make use of a well-established and holistic framework that also get to grips with what they 
call the ‘ultimate dependent variable’, uneven development (Ibid.: 33). Currently prevailing ideas 
about economic, environmental and social upgrading need not be viewed separately if a livelihood 
perspective is taken. The different avenues of upgrading complement each other well. That 
economic upgrading will bring social advances was shown to be less tight than often assumed 
(MILBERG & WINKLER 2010: 3), indeed it was even occasionally contradicted. Environmental 
upgrading accompanies economic advances in the case of tomato markets, and social upgrading in 
the context of rice. Inherited land-uses were shown to sustain the environment. A holistic and 
integrative perspective in the context of understanding the pro-poor effects of markets (COE et al. 
2008: 289) and interventions within them, need not conceptually separate avenues for upgrading.  
The analysis suggests that pro-poor development – essential in the search for upgrading 
avenues – can only be sustainable at ‘local, regional, national, and global levels’ if it meets ‘the 
requirements of all three dimensions of sustainability’, namely social, economic and ecological 
aspects (HURNI & WIESMANN 2011: 17). An equal treatment of these dimensions in analysis, 
by employing the livelihood framework, can help to ‘break away from normative views of 
upgrading as moving up the value chain’ (PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1648) in purely economic 
terms, and instead define ‘positive or desirable change in chain participation that enhances 
rewards and/or reduces the exposure to risks’ (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 17), ‘a better deal, including 
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a balance between rewards and risk’ (PONTE & EWERT 2009: 1637) in the eyes of those whose 
ought to be developed. How these theoretical insights were filled with life and how avenues for 
sustainable development could look like is discussed in the next sub-section. 
7.2. Central Aspects of Livelihoods and Avenues to Sustainability 
Local livelihood systems are characterised by their dependency on land that is degraded and 
insufficiently valued. The potential to make agricultural use of the local natural resource base is 
thus small and shrinking. Primarily this has to do with the high – though decreasing – population 
growth rate in an area already having a high population density, in which people make use of a 
generally infertile, fragile ecosystem that is undergoing severe environmental and social changes. 
Traditional usage of environmental resources – mostly through the production of traditional 
staples – was once ecologically sustainable, but this came at the cost of a very low level of basic 
livelihood outcomes like food security and income. Practices could not be upheld due to growing 
population pressure, a loss of animals and growing need for finances, in a context of a lack of 
support from the government.  
Thus agricultural intensification, perchance through the production of higher yielding cash 
crops instead of only traditional staple crops, could be a major avenue to higher livelihood 
sustainability. This is also the case when considering climatic changes that are already taking 
place. In this context, an operational and further expanded irrigation system is of high priority, as 
those having access to irrigation are by far less dependent on rainfall – wet seasons that are 
regarded as a dying source of livelihood – and have higher outcomes overall, especially financial 
outcomes. Financial capital is highly relevant to farmers. Financial input is required to produce 
fast growing crops within rainy seasons shortened by climatic change, which come with a higher 
economic value and provide more food. Not everybody is able to produce such crops due to a lack 
of financial capital.  
Higher incomes through markets could support local development, but also be the decisive 
factor for further social differentiation. The substitution of traditional, food-orientated and heavily 
diversified subsistence agriculture with specialised market orientated production is difficult for 
the majority of farmers due to high poverty levels and traditional values and norms. Quite some 
level of social differentiation is deeply interwoven in local society. Not only are hierarchies 
extremely steep within the villages (Biu and Mirigu), allocation of land, especially fertile and 
hazard-free land is highly unequal. Due to this, future outcomes will remain imbalanced among 
farmers. Accordingly, the level of financial capital at hand for investment is greatly polarised. So, 
while market orientated production may in theory be pursued by the majority of farmers and be a 
precondition for higher livelihood outcomes, in reality most farmers produce at levels that allow 
only marginal returns, because they cannot afford fertilisers and have no animals to provide 
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manure for their poor and run-down soils. Furthermore, though agricultural markets are nowadays 
often favourable for local producers, this apparent economic boom has developed only in recent 
years and, moreover, concerns non-traditional crops, which not everybody (has the financial 
ability to) produces.  
People need subsidies to venture into lucrative forms of agriculture. Global and often 
regional competition makes it harder for locals to compete on domestic markets, mainly due to 
quality. Greater, more sophisticated production, able to compete at regional and global levels, was 
the aim of contemporary interventions in value chains of non-traditional crops by entities such as 
MOFA, ICOUR or USAID (see especially Section 6.3 on rice). Yet these interventions became 
another important mechanism for local socio-economic differentiation. They altered the 
conditions under which market access takes place, nowadays primarily at production level in rice. 
Earlier interventions, such as those in tomato markets, were content with building artificial market 
outlets that have continued to deceive locals. Current attempts to do just this, by the government, 
have again failed the northern Ghanaian farmer.  
Locals are rightfully disappointed with the role the government has played in providing 
market alternatives. But, recent attempts, also supported by USAID, seem more promising as they 
set favourable market conditions, such as the government’s increase of rice import duties, to 
attract wholesalers. This may have been more successful in fostering broad-based poverty 
reduction. Protective duties and other measures should, however, not be used to cover up drastic 
insufficiencies in quality – that make commerce unattractive in the long term – as was the case 
with tomato before SAPs and ERPs. Attention should be given to helping farmers produce not 
only more but at a higher quality, to meet consumer demand. Quality issues can also not be solved 
by ad hoc measures, as was tried by the government when it introduced new tomato seed and 
devastated the local sector. Instead, long-term commitment is required, for example by improving 
soils upon which sensitive crops like tomato or chili grow. 
Though external interventions nowadays support agricultural products that are good for 
food and income security, and for women, these interventions have many shortcomings. The 
access people have to this support is greatly limited, as observations made in the wider production 
network revealed. This internal side of vulnerability was neglected in previous local studies 
(LAUBE et al. 2008; LAUBE et al. 2013, 2011). All external interventions have severe gender 
biases which further increase the differences in terms of access to land, self-determination, 
workload, responsibilities within the family and community. Interventions also discriminate 
against the lower end of society, because they favour those with greater economic and 
social/political backing over the poor and vulnerable. That is in turn a result of elite capture, 
corruption and criminal behaviour from the national to local level, predominantly played out in 
government programmes. USAID interventions become victim of elite capture at local level, by 
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identical structures and similar actors to those of government programmes. Whereas both 
government entities and USAID could solve such problems through greater supervision, 
evaluation and participation at the grass-roots level, public endeavours may well require 
substantial funding for appropriate staffing and implementation of programmes, in addition to 
anti-corruption measures that also include security agencies and do not shy away from targeting 
high-ranking officials. 
Technologies provided through public and donor arrangements, in multipartite attempts to 
establish contractual farming, have ‘primarily benefited the better resourced groups in society […] 
rather than the most vulnerable ones’ (IAASTD 2009a: 23). Further to this, arrangements made 
amongst farmers themselves as much as between farmers and traders, often have an exploitative 
character. In the case of cooperation amongst farmers, local sponsors (large scale farmers), yet not 
large multi-nationals, used smallholders as cheap suppliers of land (as assumed by CLAPP 1994: 
79 and 81; OYA 2004: 10). Land-grabbing was mostly made possible by export promotion, as 
was the case in Biu. Furthermore, the gender mainstreaming effect of arrangements was equally 
questionable. At the local level, the traditionally lower bargaining power of women really was 
exploited (SINGH 2003: 2). Finally, a widening of socio-economic gaps can be attested (as 
indicated by WARNING & SOO HOO 2000: 21). 
Contemporary development approaches do not account sufficiently for societal aspects. 
They neglect inequality in ‘sensitivity’ to externalities and thereby the responses possible to 
external stress factors, amongst them also environmental concerns. The vulnerable cannot alter 
their livelihood strategies as a result of the performance of structures and processes (BOHLE 
2011: 48). Despite the great importance of structures and processes (DIDERO 2012: 17; OBRIST 
et al. 2011: 279; WIESMANN et al. 2011: 234-235), which could also be attested at local level, 
interventions serve as a conduits of ‘exploitation and control’, yet not just as a result of a lack of 
‘regulatory mechanisms which are non-existent in a regime of neoliberal globalization’ (YARO 
2013: 12), but also as a result of elite capture, which is thus the most relevant socially 
differentiating, internal dynamic. In previous eras of local agricultural development approaches 
(SONGSORE 2011: 199), elites dominated the allocation of support, while the majority of the 
local population were mostly neglected. Horizontal entanglements, the great dependence of 
interventions and thereby market access ‘on broader networks of social relations’ (OUMA et al. 
2012: 228) aside ‘linkages between the external and internal dimensions of vulnerability’ and 
‘responses at the individual, aggregate and collective level’ (BRONS et al. 2007: 91) do not 
provide for a better ‘ability to cope without irreversible loss of assets’ under ‘risks, shocks and 
stress’ to which vulnerable individuals or households are exposed to (Ibid.: 3). Social relations, 
institutions, interests and power alter entitlements within market contexts greatly (BOHLE 2011: 
49). So, ‘variations in real markets’ become ‘practical problems of development’, yet not as 
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‘exogenous’ factors (WHITE 1993: 2). Local social networks and general structures exclude 
people and households from securing benefits as regulated by societal norms and sanctions 
(AßHEUER et al. 2013: 23). Social structures show quite some level of bonding and mutual 
contractualisation among villagers and so non-material assets rightfully receive prominence in 
livelihood studies (JACOBS & MAKAUDZE 2012: 577).  
Horizontal relationships are often the last resort to turn to (BOHLE 2005: 71; ELLIS 2000: 
36-37). People rely on neighbours, family, extended kin and networks (WOOLCOCK & 
SWEETSER 2002: 26) to deal with vulnerability, especially in times of severe crisis (AßHEUER 
et al. 2013: 21; ELLIS 2000: 36-37). Horizontal relations are also often characterised by 
exploitation, especially when it comes to bridging ties and can at best be characterised by a high 
level of functionality. Partly as a result of this functionality, access to the most lucrative forms of 
monetary livelihood upkeep as much as the most valuable lands and external support systems, are 
fairly exclusive, which fosters social inequality at an already high level. Only those with higher 
resource endowments or access to external support can shift ‘to more rewarding functional 
positions […] that can provide better returns’ (GIBBON & PONTE 2005: 87-88). Thereby 
growing market potentials are undermined for the poor, which further challenges the social 
sustainability of projects and economic outlooks.  
Institutional capabilities and local collective powers need to advance to be able to provide 
access to subsidies to the most vulnerable, while maintaining otherwise favourable setups of 
markets. Improved organisation among farmers, further horizontal and thereby vertical 
contractualisation (BOLWIG et al. 2008: 13), is important to improve dealings with external, 
vertical business partners. Trustworthy intermediaries, speaking and acting in favour of the 
majority of farmers, could be helpful to attract large-scale wholesalers from southern Ghana. They 
could facilitate contractualisation between farmers and wholesalers, because it needs 
knowledgeable locals to overcome the segmentation of value chains, to establish closer contact 
between farmers and traders. An effective, transparent and reliable farmer based organisation that 
can implement quality standards and give farmers a greater say in any value chain’s governance is 
desperately needed. External interventions cannot reform all long-established structures of 
community organisation, but they must also not take over and thereby further cement 
unfavourable setups. It may not necessarily be of use to simply restructure organisations, because 
rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviour is common at present at all levels of society. The upper 
to lower strata of the local population strategise according to the ‘peasant principle of 
diversification’, meaning to exploit every opportunity possible. Opportunism (see KÜHLMANN 
2009) accompanied by legal uncertainty defines transactions within value chains and thereby their 
basic coordination (VAN DIJK & TRIENEKENS 2012: 54), often to the detriment of northern 
farmers, but somewhat due to their own fault.  
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Subsistence logics, most deeply engraved in local hearts and minds by severe famines still 
recalled by some, have to be overcome by better assuring basic necessities of life such as food, 
health, education, housing and finances, at least credit, to live a self-dependent life. Ideally the 
poor and vulnerable will be less dependent on local elite and thereby empowered politically to the 
degree where they themselves are able to overcome exploitative structures. But, on the whole, 
sustainable development in northern Ghana remains an issue of transparency and good 
governance, so that a greater share of the public can participate in developing markets and 
overcome subsistence logics and feudalistic social structures. That goes particularly with regard to 
ongoing climatic and environmental change and the drastic inequality in the allocation of most 
livelihood assets. Another central aspect in this context is the refurbishment of existing and the 
construction of new irrigation schemes, that also ought to be safeguarded from elite capture. If 
such support does not reach the majority of locals, as is presently happening, it may be that 
government support decreases the overall purchasing power and food security of the most 
vulnerable. In the past, this has led to famines, despite vast government spending (YARO 2013: 
9), though it seems unrealistic that the situation in northern Ghana could again become that bad. 
To better assure sustainable development in the future, traditional crops and thereby those 
engaged in this sector need to be targeted. Fast growing crops, that demand labour yet not finance 
as the primary input, that are suited to local environments and possibly compatible to food habits, 
are promising. Rice, as a non-traditional crop, could be the exception since it’s more commonly 
grown by women and thus socially as well as comparatively environmentally friendly. 
Specifically females and also environmental protection would be targeted if the shea sector were 
supported. Agencies concerned with development would be wise to help locals shift to more 
environmentally sustainable production, instead of imposing western ideas of (industrial) 
agricultural development that devastate livelihoods in the long run, especially when it comes to 
the best paid crops like tomato and chili. Locals need support not only to be able to produce such 
crops, but to maintain their production and be attractive to markets.  
While government entities demand specific, pro-poor support for northern farmers and 
underline the potential contribution of recent attempts (GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE 2013: 
231, 302) – the recent ‘roll out’ strategies now at the heart of economic and development policies 
– these neglect primarily local ‘structural environment and power relations’ (OUMA et al. 2012: 
228). A ‘radical readjustment’ in (Ghanaian) agricultural policies appears to be needed to fight 
poverty primarily in a socially, but also environmentally sustainable approach that extends beyond 
pure economic advances (quoting HERREN 2009: 62; in reference to IAASTD 2009a; 2009b, 
2008). Positive change continues to be undermined in Ghana’s north, due to imbalances in social 
and economic prosperity. If left this way, things could become ‘catastrophic to the northern rural 
dweller’ (YARO 2013: 12).  
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